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While flows of policy information and the quest to acquire this information are 
generally accepted as important to the policymaking process (Krehbiel 1991; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005), 
the means by which this policy information is actually cquired by decision-makers has 
been relatively understudied in policy literature, to date. Within Congress, the hearing 
process provides an optimal opportunity for relevant policy information to be gathered 
and put on display. Yet, very little is known about the factors that drive policymakers to 
choose particular witnesses to testify at congressional hearings, and, in general, the 
purposes for which the congressional hearing process is utilized.  
Utilizing my theory of information collection and display decisions, I attempt to 
answer the following general research question: what factors affect how congressional 
committees decide to utilize the congressional hearing process to collect and display 
information presented by witnesses? More specifically, I seek to understand the 
conditions that drive how subsystem contexts affect congressional policy makers’ use of 
information collection and display strategies in each of the stages of the congressional 
hearing process including the selection of witnesses to testify at hearings, the 
presentation of information by the chosen witnesses, and the questioning of witnesses 
during the hearings.  
Using original data collected from content analyses of committee member 
opening statements and witness testimony given during hearings in the policy areas of 
tobacco, biotechnology, and climate change, I study he institutional and political 
factors that determine the tone of testimony presented in congressional hearings. I find 
xvi 
 
that the degree to which certain factors affect the ton  of congressional testimony is 
affected by the issue area that the hearing is examining and in issues with multiple 
dimensions, the dimension of the issue being examined. When holding hearings on 
distributive issues that are likely to unite committee members, members of committees 
that are predisposed toward consensual politics will utilize the hearing process to collect 
and display information that bolsters the overall bias of the committee venue holding 
the hearing. When holding hearings on partisan issues that are likely to divide members 
of different parties within a committee venue, committee chairs utilize the hearing 
process to collect and display information that bolsters their own positions on the issue 
at hand. Finally, when holding hearings on new and technical issues that are likely to 
heighten uncertainty amongst members concerning the proper action to take on the 
issue, committees utilize the hearing process to collect expert and relatively neutral 
testimony that will help to reduce uncertainty amongst members on the proper policy 
actions to take. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: The Importance of Studying Information 
Collection and Display Decisions in Congressional Hearings 
 
Introduction  
Past scholarly attempts to explain policymaking within Congress have placed 
great importance on the quest for policy information and the methods by which this 
information is processed and utilized by relevant actors in explaining many facets of the 
policymaking process within Congress (Krehbiel 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). First of all, 
institutional informational theorists argue that in order to achieve the goal of good 
public policy (Fenno 1974), Congress is organized in order to allow for policy experts 
to inform the floor about the potential effects of p licies so that good public policy can 
be created (Krehbiel 1991; Jones 1994, 151). Furthermore, scholars of public policy 
change attribute changes in public policies to changes in how a particular policy issue is 
framed in information presented at congressional herings (Baumgartner and Jones 
1991, 1993; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 
1993) and how policy actors process this information using internal cues (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993).  
Yet, while flows of policy information and the quest to acquire this information 
are generally accepted as important to the policymaking process, the means by which 
this policy information is actually acquired by decision makers has been relatively 
understudied in policy literature, to date. Within Congress, the congressional hearing 
process likely provides one of the best opportunities for relevant policy information to 
be gathered and put on display. More specifically, congressional hearings provide a 
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forum by which relevant stakeholders and experts wihin a policy issue area can present 
relevant information on a policy issue and by which congressmen, in turn, can directly 
question these witnesses to determine the quality and v lidity of the information they 
present.  
Unfortunately, different groups with a stake in thepolicy issue have an incentive 
to produce a wide variety of informational signals to policymakers, and thus, 
policymakers must choose from a nearly infinite body f information when choosing 
what information will be gathered and put on display in congressional hearings (Simon 
1983). Furthermore, due to the fact that congressmen have many lawmaking (Hall 
1987) and constituent-oriented responsibilities (Fenno 1978), congressional committee 
members can only devote a limited amount of time to conducting congressional 
hearings, and thus, must make difficult decisions as to what information to consider in 
these hearings and which information to ignore. In such an information-rich 
environment, where policy actors are subject to certain “time and computational 
constraints”, it becomes necessary to utilize certain strategies to effectively make 
decisions on which information to gather and put on display in congressional hearings 
(Simon 1983; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Baumgrtner and Jones 1993; Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005; Krutz 2005).  
Policy actors act within issue-specific subsystems whose qualities constrain the 
type of strategies they can realistically pursue whn making policy decisions within 
these subsystems. In policy literature today, a wide variety of subsystem types have 
been offered that could potentially affect how information is dealt with within 
subsystems. These subsystem types include unified subsystems, where policymaking is 
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characterized by agreement amongst policy actors within the subsystem on how policy 
should be formed within the issue area, competitive subsystems, where policymaking is 
characterized by a competition for influence amongst members of the subsystem 
belonging to issue-specific coalitions, and specialized subsystems, where policymaking 
is characterized by a quest amongst members of the subsystem to become experts on a 
policy issue and make the most informed policy decisions possible. It is my contention 
that the type of subsystem that a congressional committee operates within is conditional 
on the issue that a subsystem is seeking to address and the political characteristics of 
actors within the subsystem.   
In light of the lack of systematic consideration of the forces driving information 
collection and display in congressional hearings, the following research question is 
worthy of examination: what factors affect how congressional committees decide to 
utilize the congressional hearing process to collect and display information presented 
by witnesses? More specifically, how and under what conditions do subsystem contexts 
affect congressional policy makers’ use of information collection and display strategies 
in each of the stages of the congressional hearing process including the selection of 
witnesses to testify at hearings, the presentation of i formation by the chosen witnesses, 
and the questioning of witnesses during the hearings? In this chapter, I will describe the 
need for research designed to explain the process by which congressional committee 
members collect and display information during congressional hearings and how this 
process is impacted by the subsystem arrangements that characterize policymaking 




The Importance of Information and Congressional Hearings    
 As stated earlier, the importance of information t many different facets of the 
congressional policymaking process is fairly well established (Krehbiel 1991; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005). First, the quest for quality information has been argued to lead to the 
development of legislative rules and procedures that provide incentives for legislators to 
cultivate policy expertise in particular policy ares and to share this expertise with 
fellow legislators (Krehbiel 1991, 5). Furthermore, the tone of policy information has 
been argued to determine what types of policy will be produced concerning a particular 
issue area with policy changes occurring when the preponderance of the information 
presented about an issue shifts in valence in the opposite direction from the direction of 
information presented in the past (i.e. from negative o positive) (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991, 1993; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, and 
Talbert 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009). 
Finally, although the belief systems of policy actors will usually cause them to discard 
information that conflicts with their beliefs, researchers have also argued that under 
certain circumstances, the revelation of new information can bring about a process of 
learning that can lead policy actors to advocate for different policies than in the past 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier and Weible 2007).  
Yet, while information is generally regarded as important to the congressional 
policymaking process, the means by which information is actually collected by policy 
actors has been relatively understudied by researchrs, to date. Among the methods by 
which information can be collected by congressional policymakers, the congressional 
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hearing process likely provides one of the most important opportunities for relevant 
policy information to be gathered and put on display for other actors involved in the 
policy process.  Congressional hearings afford congressional policymakers with the 
opportunity to call almost anyone they choose to testify before them and extract 
information out of these witnesses that is relevant to the policymaking process. Those 
invited to testify at hearings will typically view the invitation to testify with excitement 
and voluntarily choose to appear at these hearings, as the hearing presents an 
opportunity to express their views and expertise on an issue to policymakers and the 
public (Palmer 2007). However, even when individuals are reluctant to testify at 
hearings, congressional committees and subcommittees can require individuals to 
appear before them by issuing subpoenas to those who refuse to testify (Palmer 2007).  
Additionally, there are no formal rules on who can be invited to testify at these 
hearings. Congressional committees and subcommittees can call the main experts in the 
policy area, those representing all of the reasonable viewpoints in the area, or can even 
stack the hearing in a way where only those representing a particular point of view in 
the debate on the issue will be invited to testify (Palmer 2007). When the witnesses 
arrive to testify before these congressional committees and subcommittees, through the 
question and answer period of the hearing process, ongressional committee and 
subcommittee members can seek clarification on arguments or information presented by 
witnesses during the hearing, assist in bolstering the arguments made by those called to 
testify, or call into question the validity of arguments made by witnesses (Palmer 
2007).Thus, through the congressional hearing process, congressional committees are 
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afforded the institutional power to collect information from virtually any individual 
actor they so choose. 
Furthermore, congressional hearings also afford congressional committees and 
subcommittees the opportunity to display information they have gathered to a wide 
variety of individuals. Although congressional committees and subcommittees can close 
their hearings off to the public, most congressional he rings are open affairs that can be 
viewed by the public, as well as other important actors in the policy process (Palmer 
2007).Some of the hearings are televised, as they take place, on the C-SPAN cable 
outlets (Hallowell 2008). However, after a hearing takes place, congressional 
committees and subcommittees will normally print written transcripts of the content of 
the hearings, unless extenuating circumstances makeit necessary for them not to do so 
(Palmer 2007). Clearly, other members of Congress do pay attention to these hearings, 
as simply holding a hearing on an issue has been found to demonstrate to the floor that a 
committee believes that an issue is important (Burstein and Hirsch 2007, 179; Oleszek 
1989; Diermeier and Feddersen, 2000; Edwards and Wood 1999; Edwards, Barrett, and 
Peake 1997) or that there are enough significant problems with a piece of legislation 
that it should not be passed (Brasher 2006). Furthermore, members outside the 
committee do appear to believe in the ability of congressional hearings to display 
information to a wider audience, as they themselves testify at these hearings (Kingdon 
1984; Gormley 1998; Mattei 1998; Burstein and Hirsch 2007).  A communications 
study found that, other than coverage of congressional campaigns, media coverage of 
congressional hearings make up 85% of all media coverage of Congress (Gandy 1982).  
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Finally, Congress as an institution places a great d l of importance on 
collection and display of information in congressional hearings, as the institution spends 
a great deal of time on the activity. Between 1989-2004, Congress conducted, on 
average, 11 congressional hearings per day on a wide variety of topics1. In fact, the 
organization of Congress, as a whole, conducts so many congressional hearings that  
typical congressman often cannot even feasibly attend all hearings hosted by each of the 
committees and subcommittees he or she is a member of, because many of these 
hearings must be run at the same time (Hall 1987). Of course, the process of holding 
hearings is very costly in time and money. For insta ce, congressional hearings require 
the organization of Congress to hire and pay congressional staff members to conduct 
extensive research on the topics being discussed at the hearing, including interviewing 
those testifying at hearings prior to the hearing taking place (Oleszek 1989, 98). 
Furthermore, the process of conducting congressional hearings takes time away from 
congressional policy makers that could be used to produce more legislation on issues 
important to citizens or to provide services to constituents that may be of utmost 
importance in whether these constituents decide to r elect said congressman. Thus, 
clearly Congress, as an institution, places a great d l of importance on the act of 
gathering information in congressional hearings, as they conduct a large amount of 
hearings and devote a great deal of time and resources that could be utilized on other 
                                                
1
 Information on the number of hearings per Congress was collected from Baumgartner and Jones’s 
Policy Agenda Project website, which can be found here: http://www.policyagendas.org .  
Information on the number of days Congress was in session that was used to calculate the average 
number of hearings per day that Congress was in session can be found at the Library of Congress 
website here: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ds/ . 
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important activities in order to conduct said hearings. Yet, while it is clear that 
congressional hearings could potentially be a powerful tool through which 
congressional committees and subcommittees can collect and display information, 
existing research on the topic of congressional hearings has strayed from analyzing how 
congressional policymakers choose the tone and types of information to collect and 
display in these hearings.  
 
Controversy over the Purpose of Hearings 
While congressional hearings clearly have the potential to be used as important 
tools in the policymaking process, past studies on their use have largely arrived at 
divergent conclusions on how the process is actually ti ized by congressional 
committee members to collect and display information. Ideally, most Americans would 
like to think that congressional committee members utilize the hearing process to call 
witnesses that will genuinely assist members in making the policy decisions that will 
provide the greatest benefit for society. Informational theorists have long argued that 
Congress is organized into different congressional committees in order to allow for 
policy experts to inform the floor about the potential effects of policies so that good 
public policy can be created (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991). 
More specifically, informational theorists argue that the outcomes of particular policies 
are uncertain. This uncertainty poses a difficulty for legislators who prefer to choose 
policies where the outcome is certain. Certainty of outcomes allows legislators to plan 
to take credit for policies that they know will succeed and avoid embarrassment in 
voting for policies with harmful outcomes for their constituencies (Krehbiel 1991, 62).  
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Thus, individual legislators value expertise on the outcomes of policies because it 
increases the certainty of the outcomes of policies in that experts in a policy area are 
more knowledgeable about the effects of a policy than the Congress as a whole 
(Krehbiel 1991, 62).  
Informational theorists further argue that legislative rules and procedures will be 
developed that provide incentives for legislators t cultivate policy expertise and 
specialization in particular policy areas and to share this expertise with fellow 
legislators (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991). In order to test this 
proposition, most past informational theorists have us d tests of whether a committee is 
representative of the floor in terms of ideological voting scores to determine the validity 
of the informational perspective (Krehbiel 1990, 199 ).  However, testing whether or 
not committees are predominantly representative of the loor and not homogeneous 
seekers of benefits does not directly test whether congressional institutions are actually 
utilized to gather expert information that can be disseminated to the floor.  More work 
must be done, including determining whether committees actually conscientiously use 
institutions with the committee structure (most notably committee hearings) to gather 
expert information about certain issue areas.   
While informational theorists remain relatively agnostic on the subject, as 
Diermeier and Feddersen (2000) argue, the congressional hearing process likely 
provides the best opportunity for relevant policy information to be gathered in order for 
congressmen to gain a better understanding of a policy issue and pass this policy 
information to members of the floor. Nonetheless, sy tematic evidence on whether 
congressional hearings are actually utilized to infrm the policy making process is quite 
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sparse. Furthermore, the evidence that does exist on the subject has been decidedly 
mixed. On the one hand, some theorists have found that hearings can have a powerful 
effect in gathering information on a particular issue.  For instance, the content of certain 
bills has been affected by conflicts amongst those te tifying in congressional hearings 
about framing of an issue (Burstein and Hirsch 2007, 179; Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Johnson 1995; Weeks et al. 1986).  Furthermore, interest group testimony, about 
whether a particular bill was favorable or not, had an effect on whether the bill was 
actually adopted (Burstein and Hirsh 2007).   
 Finally, as Burstein and Hirsch (2007, 179) furthe note, anecdotal evidence also 
suggests that information presented at hearings powerfully affects congressional action 
in certain issue areas.  For example, congressional hearing testimony about the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963 presented evidence that assisted advoc tes of gender equality in 
gaining backing for prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Burstein and Hirsch 2007, 179; Burstein 1998).  Also, 
testimony presented at congressional hearings concerni g hate crimes had a powerful 
influence on the content of hate crime legislation, as well as the likelihood that it would 
be enacted (Burstein and Hirsch 2007, 179; Jenness, 1999).  
If congressional committee and subcommittee members utilize the hearing 
process to genuinely collect policy-relevant information, we naturally would expect that 
this information-seeking mindset would have a substantial effect on the types and tone 
of the testimony of witnesses selected to testify in front of particular committees and 
subcommittees. First of all, one would logically exp ct that committees would call the 
types of witnesses that are most likely to give the highest quality policy information: 
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non-partisan, non-ideological policy experts (i.e. academic researchers, think-tank 
researchers, etc.). Secondly, as Leyden (1995, 433) describes, one would also expect 
that committee and subcommittee chairs would instruct their staffs to seek out witnesses 
that are representative of the diverse set of viewpoints on an issue in order to provide as 
many different informational perspectives about a policy problem as possible.  
 In terms of the first expectation, as I will discus later, congressional hearing 
researchers have given only sparse attention to the role that policy experts play in the 
congressional hearing process. As such, we really do not know whether congressional 
committees and subcommittees call large numbers of experts to testify at hearings. 
However, with respect to the second expectation, some researchers have uncovered 
evidence which suggests that congressional committees and subcommittees, under 
certain circumstances, call witnesses representing the wide spectrum of viewpoints on a 
particular issue. For instance, in a study of the rol s/strategies of committee and 
subcommittee chairs in witness selection, DeGregorio (1992) finds that 74.4% of 
committee staff members interviewed made an effort to ensure that a wide range of 
beliefs were represented when selecting witnesses to tes ify at congressional hearings. 
According to DeGregorio (1992, 979-980), staff membrs seek to call witnesses from a 
balance of different perspectives for the following reasons: “(1) their chairman demands 
it; (2) the adversarial atmosphere requires the availability of political cover; (3) a sound 
decision process necessitates all the facts.”  Congressional committees and 
subcommittees also may seek to call witnesses with a wide cross-section of perspectives 
on an issue in order to avoid challenges to their dcisions from floor members on the 
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grounds that the consequences of a policy have not been fully explored (Wright 1996, 
42; McQuide 2007, 62).  
Furthermore, in a study of the factors influencing the selection of lobbyists to 
testify at congressional hearings, Holyoke (2008) discovers that committees, like the 
agricultural committee, whose members are outliers in terms of their preferences on 
issues are likely to call interest groups lobbyists that disagree with the position of the 
committee on issues that are relatively less important to the committee and interest 
groups operating in that issue domain. Holyoke (2008), however, also finds that outlier 
committees are also more likely to call interest group lobbyists that agree with their 
position during hearings dealing with issues that are important to the committee and 
interest groups. Thus, outlier committees likely call witnesses that disagree with them to 
testify during hearings dealing with less important issues to build a credible reputation 
so their information can be trusted by the floor on more important issues (Holyoke 
2008, 30-31). Nonetheless, it is still clear that, under certain circumstances, committees 
are concerned with calling witnesses that espouse a variety of different viewpoints to 
testify in congressional hearings. 
With this said, many researchers argue that committee members do not select 
witnesses with a mind toward collecting the best possible information on a particular 
policy issue. At the extreme end of the spectrum, some theorists argue that 
congressional hearings serve no greater purpose than a “window-dressing” event or 
“propaganda channel” through which congressional committees and subcommittees can 
display carefully selected information to actors outside the committee (i.e. members on 
the floor, interest groups, the general public, etc.) in order to drum up support for 
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positions espoused by committee members and/or “claim credit” for providing policy 
benefits to constituents (Truman 1951; Berry 1984; Davidson and Oleszek 1985). 
According to this perspective, committee staff membrs choose witnesses with a mind 
toward selecting individuals that are likely to support committee leaders’ positions on 
policy issues (Berry 1984). As Huitt (1954, 354) notes in a study of member behavior in 
the House Committee on Banking and Currency, “[e]ach group seemed to come into the 
hearings with a ready-made frame of reference. Facts which were compatible were 
fitted into it; facts which were not compatible even when elaborately documented, were 
discounted, not perceived, or ignored.”  
Furthermore, according to critics of the informational theory, committee 
members enter hearings with prepared questions and are typically confident of the 
content of the testimony to be received from key witnesses, because committee staff 
members have heavily vetted these witnesses in interv ews held before the hearing takes 
place (Oleszek 1989). Finally, skeptics of the informational value of congressional 
hearings note that hearings are frequently only sparsely attended by committee 
members, which demonstrates that members themselves do not find much informational 
value in the testimony presented in from of congressional committees (Oleszek 2004). 
As such, according to these theorists, committee members generally do not gain any 
informational value from congressional hearings anddo not tend to be persuaded by the 
information presented at such hearings.  
While there is a degree of validity to evidence supporting the argument that 
congressional hearings are no more than “dog-and-poy shows”, this argument suffers 
from a series of flaws. First of all, although it is true that many hearings are only 
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sparsely attended, this may not be an indication that committee members do not care 
about the information being presented in these hearings. Since hearings are often 
scheduled at the same time as other important congressional policymaking events (i.e. 
markup hearings, floor votes, hearings in other committees/subcommittees, etc.), 
committee members must often make decisions between att ding a particular hearing 
and attending some other important event (Hall 1987). Thus, committee members may 
choose to not attend a hearing not because they do not appreciate the value of the 
information presented at the rather, but rather because they have a more important 
engagement that they must attend.  
Furthermore, as Diermeier and Feddersen (2000, 52) argue, holding 
congressional hearings can be very costly activities. For instance, congressional 
hearings require congressional committees to hire and p y congressional staff members 
to conduct extensive research on the topics being discussed at the hearing, including 
interviewing those testifying at hearings prior to the hearing taking place (Oleszek 
1989, 98). Congressional committees must also often pay for any expenses (i.e. travel, 
lodging, etc.) involved with ensuring that witnesses can appear at a committee hearing 
(LaForge 2010). Furthermore, the process of conducting ongressional hearings takes 
time away from congressional policy makers that could be used on other policymaking 
activities (i.e. writing legislation, forging compromises on bills, providing services to 
constituents, attending other committee meetings, etc.) that may be of utmost 
importance in determining whether constituents willreelect committee members in 
subsequent elections (Diermeier and Feddersen 2000, 52).  
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Yet, despite these significant monetary and opportunity costs, congressional 
committees and subcommittees still spend significant portions of time conducting 
congressional hearings. According to the Policy Agenda Project, between 1989-2004, 
Congress conducted an average of 11 congressional hearings per day on a wide variety 
of policy topics2. Thus, clearly congressional committees and subcommittees place a 
great deal of importance on the act of gathering and displaying information in 
congressional hearings, as they conduct a large amount of hearings and devote a great 
deal of time and resources that could be utilized on other important activities in order to 
conduct these hearings.  
Finally, as I will discuss later, a significant amount of evidence suggests that 
congressional committees and subcommittees sometimes stack witness lists with 
individuals who espouse a particular point of view n a policy debate. However, such 
evidence does not mean that the whole hearing process is only a “window dressing” 
event that has no higher meaning or purpose outside of a means to disseminate 
propaganda to support a particular viewpoint. For instance, congressional committees 
and subcommittees may stack hearing testimony and still be utilizing the process to 
establish expertise in a particular issue area to gain or retain jurisdictional control over 
legislation in the policy area (Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; Talbert, 
Baumgartner, and Jones 1995; King 1997; Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000).  
                                                
2
 Information on the number of hearings per Congress was collected from Baumgartner and Jones’s 
Policy Agenda Project website, which can be found here: http://www.policyagendas.org .  
Information on the number of days Congress was in session that was used to calculate the average 
number of hearings per day that Congress was in session can be found at the Library of Congress 
website here: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ds/ . 
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Furthermore, even if a committee stacks hearing testimony to over-represent a 
particular viewpoint, it does necessarily mean thatcommittee members do not gain any 
informational value out of the testimony presented. For example, although committees 
and subcommittees routinely call representatives of interest groups to testify with a 
mind toward selecting witnesses that will support the chair’s position in a debate, 
committee staff also search for witnesses representing interest groups that have the 
organizational resources to provide costly political and policy information to 
congressional policymakers (Leyden 1995; McQuide 2007). Additionally, 
congressional committee members may stack hearing testimony, because they 
genuinely believe the witnesses they have selected will provide the most “accurate” 
information or will espouse the “correct” argument in a debate.  
In light of the information above, it is not accurate to represent the hearing 
process as a “window dressing event” or a “dog and pony show” that has little to no 
meaning just because committees occasionally stack testimony at these hearings. Even 
within the community of scholars that have found evid nce for stacking of witness 
testimony, most still acknowledge the utility of congressional hearings to the 
congressional policymaking process. For example, although punctuated equilibrium 
theorists find evidence of committees stacking testimony to fit particular viewpoints, 
they also find that changes in the tone of policy information presented in congressional 
hearings can produce policy changes when the prepondera ce of the information 
presented about an issue shifts in valence in the opposite direction from the direction of 
information presented in the past (i.e. from negative o positive) (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991, 1993; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, and 
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Talbert 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009). 
Furthermore, although the belief systems of policy a tors will usually cause committees 
members to discard witness testimony that conflicts wi h their beliefs, Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF) scholars have also found that the revelation of new 
information can bring about a process of learning that leads policy actors to change their 
positions on policy issues (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier and Weible 
2007).  
Nonetheless, different scholars have found significant evidence suggesting that 
congressional committees do stack hearing lists to be consistent with particular points of 
view in a policy debate. However, a substantial degre  of disagreement exists amongst 
hearing scholars on the factors that determine how t e tone of witness testimony is 
stacked by committees and subcommittees in congressional hearings. On the one hand, 
punctuated equilibrium theorists argue that differences in the tone of information 
presented at congressional hearings will be determined by the perceived institutional 
bias of the committee holding the hearing. According to this perspective, before a 
policy issue makes its way to the floor, competing coalitions seek to influence the tone 
of the information presented about an issue in order to boil the issue down to a 
dimension that is most favorable to their viewpoint o  the issue once the issue reaches 
the floor for debate (Jones 1994; Jones 2001; Talbert and Potoski 2002; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). Congressional committees play their part in the process by 
prioritizing information that is sympathetic to their respective favored sides in policy 
debates during congressional hearings (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Talbert, Jones, 
and Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993).  
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 Committees that currently have control over a policy area and have an interest in 
maintaining the status quo conception of an issue will call witnesses to testify that will 
present testimony that is consistent with the statu quo conception of the issue so that 
they can maintain control over policymaking in that issue area (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993). Committees that are sympathetic venues to coalitions who disagree with the 
dominant image of a policy issue use the hearing process to reach out of their respective 
formal jurisdictions and compete for influence with committees who have traditionally 
held control over the image of an issue (Jones, Baumg rtner and Talbert 1993; Talbert, 
Baumgartner and Jones 1995; King 1997; Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000). 
These competitions for influence between committees allow for new perspectives to be 
heard on an issue, which eventually leads to the breakdown of dominant policy images 
and increases the likelihood that substantive policy change will occur (Hardin 1998; 
Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod 2000; Sheingate 2006). However, this change is not 
immediate and takes significant changes in the tone of information about an issue over 
significant periods of time before a punctuation in the state of policy occurs (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005).  
In this conception of witness selection in congressional hearings, differences in 
the tone of testimony and the types of witnesses selected to testify at hearings will be 
apparent when comparing the witnesses selected at different committees. Each 
committee will select witnesses that fit their members’ respective favored conceptions 
of the issue in order to influence how policy will be formed in that issue area. Past 
empirical evidence on the issue areas of pesticides, nuclear power, and tobacco policy 
have confirmed these expectations in demonstrating that particular congressional 
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committees tend to be biased in terms of the topics of ongressional hearings and the 
types of witnesses called to testify at particular hearings (Talbert, Jones, and 
Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; Worsham 2006).  
For instance, in the case of tobacco policy, witnesses were selected to testify that 
fit the policy goals and biases of the committees holding the hearing. Since agricultural 
committees sought to protect the economic interests of tobacco farmers, members of the 
tobacco industry (i.e. tobacco farmers, tobacco manufactures, tobacco sellers, etc.) 
made up the vast majority of witnesses that were invited to testify in front of these 
committees while health experts and advocates that were likely to bring up the 
detrimental effects of tobacco use made up a very small percentage of the witnesses 
testifying (Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 
1993; Worsham 2006). By contrast, the health committees in Congress, who members 
sought to expose the health effects of tobacco use, call d large percentages of health 
experts and advocates to testify while calling significantly fewer representatives of the 
tobacco industry who would be most likely to bring up the economic benefits of tobacco 
products in their testimony (Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, 
and Talbert 1993; Worsham 2006). 
 While differences between committees in the types of witnesses called to testify 
in congressional hearings are the focus of punctuated equilibrium studies, the effects of 
differences in the characteristics of the leaders of committees on witness selection in 
congressional hearings are largely downplayed in such tudies. In particular, according 
to punctuated equilibrium theorists, the beliefs and partisanship of those with control 
over a committee do not play a large role in determining the types of witnesses that 
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testify in hearings or policy changes in a particular policy area. For instance, policy 
changes and changes in the tone of information present d in front of congressional 
committees were found to be related with partisan changes in only one of the seven 
issues studied by Baumgartner and Jones (1993): urban policy. Sharp punctuations in 
other issue areas like nuclear energy, pesticides, and child abuse were related to factors 
unrelated to changes in the parties and belief systems of those controlling particular 
committees. Furthermore, Jones and Baumgartner (2005) found that about ½ of all 
major public laws between 1946-1997 were enacted aft r the first session of Congress, 
which is a long time period away from elections that could potentially change 
partisanship.  
On the other hand, many researchers of witness selection strategies in 
congressional hearings emphasize the importance of the characteristics of leaders of 
committees to the process of determining the types of witnesses testifying in hearings. 
Proponents of this line of thinking subscribe to a vision of congressional committees 
where competing coalitions with vastly different beliefs concerning an issue fight for 
control over the policy issue within a particular committee (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993; Sabatier and Weible 2007). Due to time and computation constraints and the fact 
that there are nearly limitless sources of information in a particular issue, members of 
these coalitions must use their respective belief systems to determine what types of 
information to collect and how to process the acceptability of different types of 
information (Simon 1983; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; Sabatier and Weible 
2007). According to Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) theorists, the main 
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proponents of this viewpoint on information processing and collection, policy actors 
hold the following types of beliefs (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 194-196): 
• Deep core beliefs – very general normative assumptions about human nature 
and the role of government in providing for the public good that span across all 
policy issues  
• Policy core beliefs – more specific normative assumptions concerning an entire 
policy issue 
•  Secondary beliefs – very specific assumptions about single policy issue that 
are not considered to encapsulate an entire policy issue 
ACF theorists argue that deep core and policy core beli fs are very difficult to change 
even through technical and scientific information from respected sources (Sabatier and 
Weible 2007, 198). Thus, when information comes in co flict with deep core or policy 
core beliefs, policy actors tend to discount the information and label those that deliver 
the information as belonging to the opposing coalition in the issue (Sabatier and Weible 
2007, 194).  
 Significant evidence demonstrates that deep core beli fs have a significant 
impact on whether or not individuals accept information from scientific experts as being 
true (Liftin 2000; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Rothman and Lichter 1987). For 
instance, in the policy subsystem of nuclear energy p oduction, there is a general 
consensus amongst scientific experts that the potential risk involved in expanding 
nuclear power capabilities in the United States is relatively small (Rothman and Lichter 
1987). Yet, despite being exposed to this clear consensus amongst scientific experts, 
reporters and non-scientific expert elites tend to respond to their ideologies in assessing 
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the safety of nuclear technologies with more liberal individuals considering nuclear 
technology to be unsafe (Rothman and Lichter 1987). Furthermore, despite being 
exposed to the same information concerning the issue of environmental policy at Lake 
Tahoe, environmental groups who were predisposed to support information arguing that 
water quality was a problem in the region and incorporate it into their decision making 
processes while business and property rights groups were more reluctant to support the 
same information (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  
 With respect to the specific case of information cllection and display strategies 
when selecting witnesses to testify at congressional he rings, many researchers have 
found a degree of evidence that congressional committee chairs are affected by their 
belief systems and personal biases when selecting wit esses. These researchers have 
generally found that staff members will seek out witnesses to testify who fit the 
predisposed viewpoints of the chair of the committee and stack the witness list with 
witnesses who will present testimony that fits the pr disposed viewpoints of the chair of 
the committee (Hinckley 1971; Leyden 1995; DeGregorio 1992, 1998)  For instance, 
through interviews with committee staff members, Leyden (1995, 434) finds that staff 
members will sometimes be instructed by the chair to search for witnesses that can 
assist in “selling” a chair’s point of view to the g neral public and other legislators. 
Furthermore, although finding that committee staffs generally try to balance 
perspectives in selecting witness testimony, DeGregorio (1992, 979) also finds that a 
sizable portion of committee staff members interviewed do not make a deliberate 
attempt to hear from a range of views in testimony a d actually see the hearing process 
as a “time to sell” the committee’s chairs beliefs to other congressional policymakers. 
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Finally, as stated earlier, Holyoke (2008) discovers that committees, like the agricultural 
committee, whose members are outliers in terms of their preferences on issues are likely 
to call interest group lobbyists that agree with their position during hearings dealing 
with issues that are important to the committee and interest groups. 
As the proceeding section clearly demonstrates, resea chers studying witness 
selection in congressional hearings have arrived at very different conclusions 
concerning the factors that drive information collection strategies. Each of the different 
sides in the debate has arrived at their respective onclusions through systematic 
analysis of congressional hearings. Yet, the conclusions reached by these different types 
of researchers as to how congressional committee members determine which witnesses 
to select at congressional hearings have been wildly different. How can several different 
researchers conducting systematic studies arrive at such different conclusions 
concerning the factors influencing witness selection in congressional hearings?  
In all likelihood, each of the different theoretical perspectives for understanding 
witness selection strategies in congressional hearings contains a degree of validity. The 
key to truly understanding the witness selection process in Congress is to uncover the 
factors and conditions that determine when one set of factors will take precedence over 
other sets of factors in driving witness selection decisions. Unfortunately, most 
researchers have not tried to apply a conditional theory to explaining congressional 
committees’ witness selection and information collection and display strategies. 
Researchers have used conditional theories in attemp ing to explain congressional 
committee organization (Hall and Grofman 1990; Maltzman 1998) and the factors that 
influence policymaking in the policy subsystems within which congressional 
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committees operate (McCool 1998; Worsham 1998; Weible 2008). For instance, in the 
case of congressional committee organization, Maltzman (1998) argues that the way 
congressional committees operate and the factors that will motivate their decisions are 
dependent on the salience of the issues being addressed by a committee, the strength of 
loyalty toward political parties within the committee, and institutional factors like the 
capacity of members outside the committee to monitor the action of committee 
members.  
In terms of the factors influencing how policies are formed within policy 
subsystems, scholars have argued that policy subsystem politics are influenced by 
factors like the characteristics (i.e. conflictual or consensual nature) of the issue being 
addressed by the subsystem, the diversity of beliefs amongst actors within the 
subsystem, and the availability of benefits to be distributed amongst interested parties 
within the subsystem (McCool 1998; Worsham 1998; Weible 2008). The types of 
interactions that occur amongst policy actors within different types of subsystems has 
been argued to affect many different policymaking activities including the ability of 
policy actors to control what legislative items make it on the governmental agenda 
(Worsham 1998) and the ways in which policy actors use information in policymaking 
activities (Weible 2008). For example, Weible (2008) argues that policy actors are most 
likely to use information for the purpose of making a political point in subsystems 
where there is a high degree of conflict between different groups of actors within the 
subsystem.  
Unfortunately, scholars have not attempted to test or apply conditional theories 
of subsystem politics and congressional organization to congressional hearing witness 
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selection politics. In particular, both sets of literature suffer from a series of flaws with 
respect to their application to congressional hearing politics. In the case of 
congressional organization literature, conditional theories of committee organization 
focus exclusively on the conditions that lead to different types of congressional 
organization without realizing the intimate relationship that committee organization has 
with the subsystem context within which it operates. Furthermore, current committee 
organization literature also does not consider the implications that different committee 
organization/subsystem contexts have on different stages of policy creation, including 
information collection. In the case of public policy literature, conditional theories of 
subsystem types do not consider the importance that mediating institutions, like political 
parties, play in subsystem politics. Additionally, as of yet, these conditional theories of 
subsystem effects on information production and utiliza on remain untested in 
empirical reality. This project intends to fill the gaps in congressional hearing and 
policy information literatures by demonstrating theconditional nature of information 
collection and display strategies through empirical tests of the factors that influence the 
tone and types of testimony and how these factors change in different issue areas. As I 
will argue and demonstrate empirically in subsequent chapters, the 
subsystem/committee context and its effect on information collection and display in 
congressional hearings will ultimately be determined by two sets of conditions: the 
issue context and the characteristics of actors within the policy subsystem. 
 
Current Research’s Focus on Interest Group Witnesses 
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 As stated earlier, congressional hearings are relativ y understudied institutions 
in current political research. Of the research done  congressional hearings, a large 
portion focuses on the role congressional hearings play as a forum for interest groups to 
express their viewpoints and provide policy information directly to congressional 
policymakers. Testifying at congressional hearings ha  generally been found to be an 
important activity for interest groups seeking to lobby the government (McQuide 2007).  
For instance, in a survey of interest group activities, nearly all interest groups (99%) 
surveyed noted that one of their representatives had testified in a congressional hearing 
(Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Interest group lobbyists also rated testifying at 
congressional hearings as the second most important lobbying activity behind only 
meeting personally with congressional policymakers (Nownes 2001).  
 Due to the importance interest groups place on testifying in congressional 
hearings, it is not surprising that many researchers ave attempted to understand the 
factors that influence the likelihood that interest group lobbyists will be invited to 
testify at hearings. In this strain of research, interest group representatives’ participation 
in hearings is used as a measure for how successful interest groups are in gaining access 
to congressional policymakers (Leyden 1995). Early research focused on how different 
characteristics of interest groups helped their lobbyists/representatives gain access to 
congressional policymakers by testifying at congressional hearings. For instance, 
interest groups with greater organizational resources (i.e. number of lobbyists 
representing the group’s interests in Washington, whether the group has a political 
action Committee, and number of staff member) are more likely to be called to testify at 
congressional hearings than groups without these resou ces (Leyden 1995). In exchange 
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for the benefits that groups with organizational resources can provide to committee 
members, committees agree to invite witnesses to tes ify in front of the committee 
(Leyden 1995).  
 In addition to the aforementioned resources valued by committee members, 
committees also value the different types of information that interest groups can provide 
about the political and policy ramifications of certain policy proposals. As Wright 
(1996, 42) describes, congressional hearings provide an opportunity for congressional 
committees to display to the public information that they have heard in private 
conservations between committee staff members and members of interest groups. Due 
to the fact that congressional hearings are taped and sometimes televised and the 
transcripts for the hearings are released to the public, committee members can be 
confident that interest groups will not change their positions on a particular policy issue 
at a later date out of fear that past statements will be used against them if they change 
their positions (Wright 1996, 42). Even when committee members hear the same 
arguments/information from interest group lobbyists that they have heard in private 
conversations, the lack of new information/arguments can still have informative value 
because it gives committee members more confidence in the lines of debate on a 
particular issue (Wright 1996, 42).  
 Interest groups can provide several different types of information to 
congressional committees through the hearing process. As McQuide (2007) describes, 
political researchers have described two general types of information that interest 
groups can provide to congressional policymakers: political information and policy 
information (Webber 1979; Sabatier and Whiteman 1985; Hansen 1991; Leyden 1993; 
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Heitshusen 2000; Lowery and Brasher 2004). In general, political information refers to 
information on how particular policy decisions will impact the favorability of the views 
of committee members’ constituents toward a member, and thus, the electoral prospects 
of a member (Hansen 1991; Whiteman 1995; Lowery and Brasher 2004; McQuide 
2007). On the other hand, policy information refers to information about the nature of a 
policy problem, the likely economic and social consequences of different proposed 
solutions to solve the problem, and recommendations on which policy proposals will 
serve as the best solution for a problem (Whiteman 1995; Lowery and Brasher 2004; 
McQuide 2007).  
 Researchers have found that congressional committees consider the types of 
information that will be provided by interest groups when deciding who will be called 
to testify at congressional hearings on particular topics. In turn, interest group 
representatives seek to provide the type of information that will be most valued by 
committee members in order to be selected to testify at particular hearings. For instance, 
Esterling (2004, 2007) finds that technical policy information is valued by 
congressional policymakers and interest group lobbyists more than one would 
necessarily expect. Interest groups with increased technical expertise and the ability to 
make instrumental fact-based arguments were more likely to be called to testify at 
congressional hearings than interest groups who could not provide such information 
(Esterling 2004). In turn, in the context of debates during congressional hearings on 
Medicare, interest groups were more likely to provide campaign contributions to 
members who demonstrated the ability to make fact-bsed analytical arguments during 
29 
 
hearings rather than emotional appeals that do not demonstrate an understanding of the 
issue at hand (Esterling 2007).  
 Many researchers have uncovered that the type of information valued by 
particular congressional policymakers may depend on the context in which the hearing 
takes place. For instance, Heitshusen (2000) finds that the types of information valued 
by congressional committees in certain issue areas shifted subsequent to the reforms 
that decentralized the U.S. House during the 1970’s. According to this line of thought, 
committees with more ideologically moderate members are less likely to be firm in their 
beliefs on a particular issue, and thus, are more likely to value policy information that 
may be crucial in helping them decide what the prope  solution is to a particular policy 
problem (Heitshusen 2000). By contrast, committees with more ideologically extreme 
members are more likely to have already made up their minds on particular issues, and 
thus, are more likely to value information that states how particular policy decisions 
will be perceived politically by interest groups and members’ constituencies 
(Heitshusen 2000). In the case of environmental policy, after committee 
decentralization reforms, environmental groups specializing in political information 
were more likely to be called to testify during thepost-reform period, because of the 
increased likelihood of testifying in front of the more ideologically pro-environmental 
Energy and Commerce Committee (Heitshusen 2000). By contrast, in the case of labor 
policy, committees specializing in technical policy nformation were more likely to 
testify after the reforms due to the increased likelihood of testifying in front of 
committees that were more moderate in their preferences on labor policy like the 
Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means committees (Heit husen 2000).  
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 McQuide (2007) further finds that the type of information valued by committees 
when selecting witnesses to testify at hearings is largely based on the issue context 
being addressed by a hearing. For instance, in older, less-technical issue areas, like 
agricultural policy, political information is more likely to be valued by congressional 
committees due to the fact that committee member have already established firmly-held 
beliefs on an issue and do not need technical policy information to convince them of the 
acceptability of a particular policy proposal (McQuide 2007). By contrast, in newer, 
technical issues, like biotechnology policy, policy nformation is more likely to be 
valued due to the fact that congressional committees ar  uncertain about the impacts 
that particular policy decisions will have on society and need technical policy 
information to inform them of the proper actions to take (McQuide 2007).  
 Finally, interest groups may also be selected based on the likely content of their 
testimony. For instance, committees, particularly composed of members that are 
ideologically outliers, frequently pressure representatives of interest groups to express 
the committee’s official position when testifying in a congressional hearing (Holyoke 
2008). Many times, if interest groups do not agree to support the committee’s official 
position on an issue, their representatives will not be invited to testify at a congressional 
hearing (Holyoke 2008). As such, interest groups will sometimes compromise and 
support a position with which they do not wholeheart dly agree in order to be afforded 
the opportunity to testify in front of congressional hearing (Holyoke 2008). With this 
said, interest group lobbyists were less likely to compromise their positions in order to 
gain access to the congressional hearing forum when the issue being addressed was very 
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important to the interest group and the level of disagreement/conflict amongst the 
different groups in the issue area was greater (Holyoke 2008). 
 From the preceding discussion, it is relatively clear that a large purpose of 
congressional hearings is the exchange of benefits between interest groups and 
congressional policymakers. In this exchange, congressional policymakers receive 
benefits that only interest groups can provide (information and organizational resources) 
in exchange for allowing interest groups to have a forum to express their positions 
directly to congressional policymakers and the public at large. Due to the fact that the 
largest stream of congressional hearing research focuses on interest group participation 
in the process, many might understandably feel that the aforementioned exchange of 
benefits is the most important role that hearings play in congressional policymaking. 
 However, while interest group participation in congressional hearings is clearly 
an important facet of the hearing process, the current focus on interest group witnesses 
by hearing scholars obscures the role that other types of witnesses may play in the 
hearing process. As Quadrel and Rich (1989) note, members of private interest groups 
make up only one portion of the types of witnesses that testify in front of congressional 
committees. Other types of witnesses include congressional representatives, 
representatives of federal executive agencies and departments, individuals representing 
state and local governments, and experts from non-ideological private research firms 
and universities (Quadrel and Rich 1989).  
 Unfortunately, research coverage of the role that other types of witnesses play in 
the hearing process is far less extensive than research xploring the role that interest 
groups play in the hearing process. In particular, the role that non-partisan research 
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experts play in hearing politics has only received attention relatively recently (see Rich 
2001 and Esterling 2011). Yet, as I will discuss in ubsequent chapters, these types of 
witnesses make up significant percentages of witnesses testifying in technical policy 
areas like climate change and biotechnology. As such, the role that these types of 
witnesses play in hearing politics should not be ignored in favor of a sole focus on 
interest group witnesses. As such, this dissertation pr ject seeks to explore the role that 
all types of witnesses play in the hearing process and how different types of witnesses 
may be relied on more by certain types of committees, at certain points of time, and 
when examining certain issue areas.  
 
Lack of Examination of Tone of Testimony 
 When examining congressional hearings, most research rs have focused on the 
topics of congressional hearings and the group affiliation of those testifying to 
determine whether or not committees use the hearing p ocess to select witnesses likely 
to espouse particular points of view concerning a particular policy issue (Quadrel and 
Rich 1989; Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; 
Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Leyden 1995; Heitshusen 2000; Worsham 
2006). The decision to use group affiliations to measure the overall level bias or balance 
in the witnesses selected to testify in front of particular congressional committees is 
understandable considering the relative ease in coding such data by comparison to other 
methods of measuring tone of witness testimony. Furthermore, until recently, 
congressional hearing documents had not been universally available in electronic 
format, which made tracking down and analyzing the content of actual witness 
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testimony quite difficult. Finally, since witness participation in hearings has most 
frequently been utilized to study interest group lobbying effectiveness, the actual 
content of hearing testimony has normally not been very useful to analyze in most past 
studies.  
As Esterling (2004, 251) indicates, many researchers ave raised questions 
about the reliability and validity of data collected from congressional hearing 
documents due to the fact that few studies have utilized congressional hearings as a 
source of data for systematic research (McQuide 2007, 62). Fortunately, with recent 
advances in the online availability of congressional hearing transcripts on sites like 
ProQuest Congressional (https://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp) and GPO Access 
(http://www.gpoaccess.gov/chearings/index.html), ore researchers have been able to 
make use of the vast amount of information contained  congressional hearings for the 
purpose of conducting systematic research (for recent examples, see Esterling 2004, 
2007, 2010; McQuide 2007; Holyoke 2008). As congressional hearings are utilized 
more frequently as a data source, researchers will gain more confidence in their validity 
and reliability.  
With this said, many still question whether the time and effort necessary to 
analyze the content of hearing testimony is worth the benefits that may be derived from 
conducting such research. In the case of this reseach project, the benefits of directly 
studying the content of hearing testimony are quite clear. The overarching goal of this 
project is to understand what types of factors influence what witnesses are selected to 
testify at congressional hearings. As stated earlier, one of the factors that have been 
hypothesized to affect the selection of witnesses i the degree to which the viewpoints 
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of the witnesses match the viewpoints of committee chairs. Thus, it is important to 
understand the tone of witness testimony in order to determine whether the degree to 
which the testimony matches committee chair’s belief systems is an important 
determinant of witness selection strategies.  
Some may argue that the tone of witness testimony ca  be inferred from the 
group affiliations of the witnesses testifying at hearings. However, in many cases, the 
tone of a particular witness’s testimony will not be evident simply by analyzing the 
group affiliation of the witness testifying. Consider the case of academic experts who 
have been called to testify in front of a particular committee. The vast majority of the 
time, these experts will represent an institution that is respected for its perceived 
neutrality. As such, it is next to impossible to determine the tone of most expert 
witnesses’ testimony simply by studying the group affili tion of the witness. Since 
congressional committees have relied to a large extnt on expert witnesses in the 
technical issue areas I will be examining, simply studying the group affiliations of 
witnesses will not be sufficient in order to determine the tone of the content they are 
presenting in their respective testimony. 
In addition to the problems with identifying the tone of testimony presented by 
witnesses representing organizations with a reputation for neutrality, even witnesses 
representing organizations with a fairly clear perceived bias on an issue may not always 
present testimony that is consistent with that bias. For instance, past research has 
uncovered that individuals have presented information about particular issues that 
diverges from what one may expect given their organizational affiliation (Jenkins-Smith 
and Silva 1998). Furthermore, committee staff generally interview prospective 
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witnesses prior to allowing them to testify at the hearing, and thus, have some 
knowledge of the content of their testimony prior t the hearing taking place (Palmer 
2007; Davis 2007). In the course of these interviews, staff members sometimes will ask 
prospective witnesses to refrain from expressing certain viewpoints at a hearing in 
exchange for the opportunity to express their viewpoints on the issue being addressed at 
the hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). As such, the organizational affiliations of witnesses 
cannot always be utilized to determine the content of hearing testimony even in cases 
where the organizational bias of the witness may seem clear. 
  In order to more directly examine how the overall tone of witness testimony is 
determined, this dissertation analyzes hearing documents to determine the tone of 
witness testimony. As stated earlier, few studies have utilized hearing documents as a 
source of data. This study will demonstrate the clear advantages of utilizing hearing 
documents to gather information about the hearing process that could otherwise not be 
obtained.  
Conclusion 
 As this chapter demonstrates, existing congressional hearing research has 
suffered from three main flaws. First of all, existing research has mainly focused on 
interest group participation in congressional hearings to the detriment of understanding 
why other types of witnesses (i.e. experts and executive branch officials) are called to 
testify in congressional hearings. This dissertation seeks to fill this hole by taking a 
closer look at the role all types of witnesses play in the hearing process. Second of all, 
existing congressional hearing research has not made great use of the wealth of the 
information that can be obtained by analyzing the content of congressional hearing 
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documents. Finally and most importantly, existing hearing research has not attempted to 
understand why congressional hearings operate very differently under different 
circumstances. For instance, why do congressional committees stack hearing testimony 
at certain times while balancing testimony at other imes? In the next chapter, I will lay 
out a theory that attempts to understand why congressional hearings may operate very 
differently depending on the subsystem, issue, and political contexts within which a 




Chapter 2. Understanding the Dynamics of Information Collection 
and Display Decisions in Congressional Hearings 
 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I discussed why witness selection and the dynamics of 
hearing politics are important and relatively understudied topics in political science 
literature. In this chapter, I will first use information collected from interviews with 
committee staff members to help gain a better understanding for how the preparation for 
congressional hearings is conducted. Then, using ths information as a backdrop, I will 
lay out a theory of congressional information collection and display strategies that will 
inform the analyses conducted in later chapters of this project. 
 
Process and Procedures of Congressional Hearing Preparation 
 While congressional hearings are public affairs that, on many occasions, garner 
a great deal of media attention, the preparation for these hearings is conducted in private 
mostly by staff members of congressional committees (Palmer 2007; Davis 2007; Staff 
Interviews 2010). As such, the process that makes up the preparation for congressional 
hearings is fairly poorly understood by the public. For the purposes of truly 
understanding how congressional committee members make information collection and 
display decisions in congressional hearings, it is important to first take a step back from 
the public proceedings that make up the end product of congressional hearings and take 
a look at the process and procedures that guide the production of the final congressional 
hearing product. In this section, I will draw from Congressional Research Service 
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reports and other second-hand accounts of the congressional hearing process, House and 
Senate committee rules, and interviews with congressional staff members3 with an 
intimate knowledge of the congressional hearing process, to present a comprehensive 
picture of the process and procedures that guide preparation for congressional hearings.  
 
Deciding to Hold a Hearing. The first stage of the congressional hearing process is the 
decision on whether or not to hold a hearing on a particular topic. Committee and 
subcommittee chairmen have the discretion to call hearings on topics they deem 
important to collect testimony from interested and expert parties (LaForge 2010). 
However, the amount of discretion that committee and subcommittee chairs have in 
deciding to hold a hearing depends in large part on the type of hearing that is being 
held. Congressional committee chairs may hold a wide variety of different types of 
congressional hearings. These types of hearing include the following: 
• Considering the merits of potential or pending legislat on  
• Reviewing the performance of bureaucratic officials n the implementation of a 
program 
• Investigating the potential wrongdoing of public officials or private citizens 
• Reviewing the acceptability of presidential nominations and terms of 
international treaties 
                                                
3
 Interviews were conducted with 10 congressional majority and minority staff members in both the 
House and Senate in the summer of 2010. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes to an hour and 
consisted of open-ended questions concerning staff members’ personal duties in preparing for 
congressional hearings. Interviews were taped if respondents provided permission and notes were 
taken during all interviews. To ensure confidentiality, I have omitted any information that could be 
connected back to individual respondents.  
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• Reviewing budget requests made by the president/determining how to 
appropriate the authorization of federal funds 
• Investigating policy topics in absence of any pending legislative actions 
On the one hand, committee chairs have a relatively low level of discretion in 
determining whether to hold hearings for the purpose f reviewing budget and 
appropriations requests. According to Section 242 (c) of the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1970 and Clause 4 (a)(1) of Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, 
within thirty days after the president’s budgetary requests are transmitted to Congress, 
the House Committee on Appropriations is required to hold hearings where 
administration officials are given the opportunity to defend the president’s budgetary 
requests (Heitshusen 2007). Typically, the task of scrutinizing the more specific 
components of the president’s appropriations requests is delegated by the 
Appropriations Committee to its different constituent subcommittees (LeLoup 1984; 
LaForge 2010). While the Senate rules do not requir the Senate Appropriations 
Committee to hold hearings on appropriations requests, the process that takes place in 
the House is typically followed by the Senate Appropriations Committee as well 
(LeLoup 1984; LaForge 2010). Nonetheless, particularly in the House, the 
Appropriations Committee does not have much discretion in determining whether or not 
to hold a hearing on presidential budget requests. Unlike hearings held for other 
reasons, it is expected that appropriations hearings will be held whether the chair wants 
to hold these hearings or not. However, even in the cas  of appropriations hearings, 
committee and subcommittee chairs still have some degree of discretion in determining 
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the amount of hearing days to devote to particular appropriations requests (LaForge 
2010).  
Congressional committee and subcommittee chairs have a greater degree of 
discretion in deciding whether to hold hearings to consider the merits of passing 
legislation that does not involve the appropriation of federal funds and in determining 
whether to hold hearings to review the acceptability of presidential nominations. Unlike 
hearings concerning presidential budgetary requests, there are no rules in either 
chamber mandating that congressional committees must hold hearings on all legislation 
and nominations that come before the committee (Heitshusen 2007; Rybicki 2009). In 
fact, at times, nominations and legislation may progress through the legislative process 
without ever receiving a formal congressional hearing. For instance, according to the 
Congressional Research Service, about half of the nominees requiring congressional 
approval to assume their positions are confirmed without a hearing scrutinizing the 
credentials of the candidate ever taking place (Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998; Rybicki 
2009).  
In the case of legislative hearings, congressional committees and subcommittees 
do not have the time and resources to conduct a hearing on every single initiative that is 
referred to them (Krutz 2005). Thus, congressional committee and subcommittee chairs 
must use discretion in determining whether or not to hold hearings on certain initiatives. 
Congressional scholars disagree to some extent on the circumstances under which 
congressional committees will decide to hold hearings on particular initiatives. On the 
one hand, some scholars argue that committee chairs decide to hold hearings on 
particular initiatives to signal to the floor that a particular initiative has been given the 
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proper scrutiny and is worthy of passage. For instance, Walter Oleszek notes the 
following about the place of legislative hearings in the legislative process: 
The decision to hold a hearing is often a critical point in the life of a bill. 
Measures brought to the floor without first undergoin  the scrutiny of 
hearings will likely receive sharp criticism…The importance of the 
committee stage is based on the assumption that the experts – the 
committee members – carefully scrutinize a proposal, and hearings 
provide a demonstrable record of that scrutiny (Oleszek 2004, 93). 
On the other hand, other scholars argue that committee chairs decide to hold hearings to 
demonstrate to the floor that there are enough significa t problems with a piece of 
legislation that it should not be passed (Brasher 2006). Whatever the reason that 
committee and subcommittee chairs decide to hold hearings on particular pieces of 
legislation and on certain presidential nominees while not holding hearings on others, it 
is clear that chairs have a great deal of discretion in making these decisions.  
 Nonetheless, while subcommittee and committee chairs ve the discretion in 
deciding which legislation and nominations is deserving of the attention provided by a 
congressional hearing, chairs do not have the discret on to hold hearings on nominations 
and legislation that have not been referred to them or are not in their respective 
jurisdictions. For instance, committees in the House cannot hold hearings to question 
potential presidential nominations because the House does not have jurisdiction over 
these matters. However, if hearings are held for reasons not related to any legislative 
action (i.e. the production of legislation or the confirmation of presidential nominees 
and treaties), committee chairs are afforded nearly unlimited discretion in determining 
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what topics to focus on in congressional hearings. In non-legislative hearings and 
hearings that do not involve powers delegated to the Senate, congressional committees 
and subcommittees are allowed to hold hearings on almost any topic area the chair of 
these entities choose, even if the topic area is outside the formal statutory jurisdiction of 
the committee or subcommittee conducting the hearing (Talbert, Jones, and 
Baumgartner 1995; King 1997). As such, in many insta ces, committee and 
subcommittee chairs have fairly wide discretion in deciding whether a particular topic is 
worthy of a formal congressional hearing or not. 
 Due to the wide degree of discretion that committee and subcommittee chairs 
have in deciding whether or not to hold hearings on certain topics, these chairpersons 
are faced with many requests from other actors (i.e. the public, interest groups, fellow 
majority committee members, minority committee membrs) to hold hearings on topics 
that are important to them. Often, committee staff will listen to requests for hearings or 
even suggest possible topics for exploration themselve , and will prepare a 
memorandum for the chair to suggest a possible topic f r exploration that will include 
why the hearing is necessary, who should be invited to the hearing, the number of 
hearing days needed to hold the hearing, the minority party’s views on the hearing, and 
possible political ramifications that will result from the hearing being held (Palmer 
2007, 2009a). With respect to non-legislative hearings, committee chairs often 
ultimately schedule a hearing for a variety of reasons including, but not limited to, 
drawing media attention to a particular topic, demonstrating activity on a topic that is 
already gaining media attention or attention from the public/interest groups, 
demonstrating expertise in a particular topic area in order to stake a claim to jurisdiction 
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in that area, and gathering information on an issue that is of interest to the chair himself 
or other committee members (Talbert, Jones, and Baumg rtner 1995; King 1997; Davis 
2007). 
 
Announcing and Scheduling a Hearing. After a committee or subcommittee chair has 
deemed a topic worthy of exploration via a formal congressional hearing, committees 
and subcommittees must begin the process of announcing and scheduling the hearing. 
Once again, committee chairs have relatively autonomous power in determining when a 
hearing takes place. In general, subcommittee chairs’ also have the power to schedule 
hearings on any topics they would like at any time they choose. However, in some 
committees, committee rules explicitly state that subcommittee chairmen must obtain 
the approval of the committee chairman before formally scheduling a hearing in order 
to ensure that committee rooms are available and to avoid subcommittees 
simultaneously scheduling hearings.4 Some committee rules also require that 
subcommittee chairs coordinate with each other when scheduling hearings (Davis 
2011e).  
Most of the time, the process of scheduling and annou cing a hearing date is 
relatively apolitical. Committee staff will often schedule a hearing with a mind toward 
ensuring that enough members will be present to establi h the quorum necessary to hold 
the hearing (usually one or two members), committee leaders (both majority and 
minority) will be present at the hearing, members with a vested interest in the issue will 
                                                
4
 See the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s rules 
(http://energycommerce.house.gov/media/file/PDFs/112th_rules.pdf) as an example. 
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be allowed to attend, committee rooms are available, and, where possible, hearings are 
not scheduled at the same time as other commitments of committee members to ensure 
as much participation as possible (Palmer 2007, 2009a; Davis 2011a, 2011e).  
Nonetheless, the scheduling of a congressional hearing can involve some 
political considerations. Due to the chair’s control over the scheduling process, majority 
staff members have the ability to schedule a hearing date with a mind toward ensuring 
that potential witnesses, whose testimony the committee or subcommittee chair feels 
will be crucial to the goals set forth in the hearing, will be able to testify at the hearing. 
As such, majority staff members very rarely run into scheduling conflicts when 
attempting to get their preferred witnesses to testify a  a congressional hearing. On the 
other hand, since minority members have no formal powers in scheduling hearings, 
minority party members are more likely than the majority to run into scheduling 
conflicts that prevent them from calling their most preferred witnesses to testify (Staff 
Interviews 2010). More specifically, since minority members have no power in 
scheduling hearings and must cater to the whims of the majority, minority members’ 
preferred witnesses may not always be able to testify on the date set by the majority 
staff (Staff Interviews 2010). Although this happens relatively rarely, some minority 
staff members noted that they have had to settle for witnesses that were not their first 
choices due to scheduling conflicts involving their original witness selections (Staff 
Interviews 2010). Thus, the scheduling of a hearing can be strategically planned for 
political purposes and can have political ramifications for the types of witnesses called 
in a particular hearing.  
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After a hearing date has been scheduled, the committee or subcommittee chairs 
must formally and publicly announce the hearing date to other committee members and 
the public. House Rule XI, clause 2(g)(3) and Senat Rule XXVI, paragraph 4(a) both 
stipulate that committees and subcommittees are required to publicly announce the date, 
place, and subject of any hearing it conducts at least one week in advance of the 
scheduled date of the hearing (Palmer 2007; Davis 2011a, 2011e).5 This rule allows 
other committee members to properly prepare for the hearing and for the minority 
ranking member to have enough time to select the witness or witnesses that will 
represent the minority’s point of view in the hearing. Nonetheless, in both chambers, 
this rule can be circumvented if the committee determines that there is “good cause” to 
not give a week’s notice prior to a hearing (Palmer 2007; Davis 2011a, 2011e).  
The procedures for determining whether there is “good cause” to provide a 
shorter period of notice for a hearing differ depending on the chamber conducting the 
hearing. In the House, the standing rules indicate that the hearings may be held with less 
than a week’s notice if the chair and the ranking minority member agree that there is a 
need to do so or a majority of committee or subcommittee members vote to waive the 
requirement in the presence of a quorum for conducting official committee business 
(Davis 2011a, 2011e). Senate standing committee ruls provide flexibility to individual 
committees in determining the procedures to waive the requirement of one week’s 
public notice before a hearing. The Congressional Research Service notes the following 
                                                
5
 This rule applies to all committees except the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the Senate 
Committee on the Budget.  
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variations between committees on the requirements for waiving one week hearing 
notice requirements in the Senate: 
[T]he rules of the Committee on Environment and Public Works state 
that hearings held with less than a week’s notice require the concurrence 
of the ranking minority member, and in any case, notice must be made at 
least 24 hours in advance of the hearing. The Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry permits hearings with less than a week’s public 
notice if the committee or subcommittee chair determines that the 
hearing is noncontroversial or that “special circumstances” require swift 
action, and a majority of the committee or subcommittee concurs6 
(Palmer 2007).  
Although providing public notification before a hearing is most of the time a 
relatively apolitical activity, the process can have political ramifications and the 
decision on when to give public notification for a hearing can be made by committee 
and subcommittee chairs in a strategic fashion. Minority members and their staff would 
prefer to be informed about a hearing as soon as pos ible in order to properly prepare 
lines of questioning for potential witnesses and to be able to ensure that their most 
preferred witnesses are given enough notice so that they are able to testify at the 
hearing. However, as noted above, in all House committees and some Senate 
committees, the chair has the option of waiving the on  week notice requirement 
without approval from any minority members. According to one minority committee 
                                                
6
 Both of these rules are still in effect as of August 16, 2011 according to their committee websites.  
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staff member, this option has been utilized by the majority in some instances, and has 
caused stress for minority staff members in trying to prepare lines of questioning for 
potential witnesses and in trying to determine what witness or witnesses the minority 
will call at the hearing (Staff Interviews 2010).  
 
Selecting Witnesses. Likely the most crucial part of hearing preparation is determining 
the witnesses that will testify at the hearing. In general, committee and subcommittee 
chairs have fairly wide-reaching power over the witness selection process. Committee 
and subcommittee chairs are responsible for overseeing the process of selecting 
witnesses and sending the formal invitation to those selected to testify at a particular 
hearing (Sachs 2003; Palmer 2007; LaForge 2010). With little to no input from other 
members if they so choose, committee and subcommittee chairs can call almost anyone 
they choose ranging from experts to administration officials to members of interest 
groups and private citizens to testify before them at a hearing (LaForge 2010).  
Although those invited to testify at hearings will typically view the invitation to 
testify with excitement and voluntarily choose to appear at these hearings, even when 
individuals are reluctant to testify at hearings, all congressional committees and 
subcommittees in both chambers have the formal power to r quire individuals to appear 
before them by issuing subpoenas to those who refuse to testify (Palmer 2007, 2009a, 
2009b, 2009c; Davis 2011a, 2011d, 2011f). While some committees give chairs sole 
power over subpoenas, in most committees, the chairdoes not have sole discretion in 
authorizing a subpoena (Palmer 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Davis 2011a, 2011d, 2011f). 
Nonetheless, most committees simply require that a majority of committee or 
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subcommittee members vote to authorize a subpoena in the presence of a quorum for 
conducting official committee business (Palmer 2009a, 2009b. 2009c; Davis 2011a, 
2011d, 2011f). The chair is required to gain approval from the minority ranking 
member to authorize a subpoena in only a few committees (Palmer 2009a, 2009b, 
2009c; Davis 2011a, 2011d, 2011f). Thus, in most committees in both chambers, the 
chair has the ability to authorize the use of a subpoena without approval from any 
minority members. 
 As the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, majority part  committee and 
subcommittee chairs in particular have immense powers over the witness selection 
process. However, due to formal statutory rules in both chambers of Congress and 
informal norms that operate in every committee on the hill, the minority party in general 
and the minority ranking member in particular play a key role in witness selection. 
According to House Rule XI, clause 2(j)(1) and Senat  Rule XXVI, paragraph 4(d), all 
congressional committees and subcommittees (except th  Senate Appropriations 
Committee) are required to allow the minority party to call witnesses on at least one day 
of the hearing if a majority of minority committee or subcommittee members vote to 
invoke this rule (Davis 2011b, 2011c). If a request by he minority to call witnesses has 
been made after the hearing has already begun, the hearing must be extended by one 
day to allow the minority to call witnesses (Davis 2011b, 2011c). In reality, the formal 
rules of the House and the Senate are seldom invoked by the minority to force the 
majority to invite witnesses the minority chooses to testify at a hearing (Davis 2011b, 
2011c). The rule simply serves as a procedural safegu rd to protect the minority from a 
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chair that wishes to totally exclude their witnesses from a hearing (Davis 2011b, 
2011c). 
 For many years, norms have existed in both chambers giving the minority party 
the right to call at least one witness and sometimes ore to testify at a particular 
hearing. As the Congressional Research Service notes, th  committee report7 
accompanying the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act that formally codified the so-
called “minority witness rules” in both chambers acknowledges that “[b]y custom, 
committees ordinarily honor requests from their minority party members to call certain 
witnesses” (Davis 2011b, 1). According to interviews ith congressional staff 
members, minority witness selection norms are still strong even in the modern day 
polarized environment that operates on Capitol Hill (Staff Interviews 2010). In all 
committees, the minority party is allowed to call, t the bare minimum, one witness to 
testify (Staff Interviews 2010).  
However, both majority and minority staff members noted that in many 
committees the minority may be given more than one witness depending on the total 
number of witnesses being invited to the hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). For instance, 
two different minority committee staff members (one i  the House and one in the 
Senate) indicated that they are typically allowed to call one witness for every three 
witnesses that the majority calls to testify and that t ey typically are allowed to call 
whatever witnesses they choose even if the majority does not agree with their selections 
                                                
7
 The committee report referred to can be found at the following source: U.S. Congress, House 





 sess., H.Rept. 91-1215 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p.6. 
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(Staff Interviews 2010). Several majority staff members remarked that while the 
majority gets to select the majority of witnesses at a hearing, they try to converse with 
the minority in witness selection and try to allow the minority to have as much input in 
witness selection as is reasonably possible (Staff Interviews 2010). Nonetheless, staff 
members on other committees noted that the minority is t pically only allowed to call 
one witness to testify and only rarely gets the opportunity to call more than one witness 
at a hearing (Staff Interviews 2010).   
In the end, there are no hard and fast rules on how many witnesses the minority 
is allowed to call at a hearing. The number of witnesses that the minority is allowed to 
call at a hearing is largely dependent on the chair of the committee and his/her 
relationship with the minority member on the committee, as well as the strength of the 
norms on witness selection that operate within the committee (Staff Interviews 2010). 
Nonetheless, on every committee, strong institutional norms are present that permit the 
minority party to call at least one witness it chooses to testify at the hearing. As I 
discuss later, these norms affect the witness selection process and the overall tone of 
testimony at a hearing more than past researchers have acknowledged.  
Both committee staff members, who are accountable to the chair of the 
committee, and minority committee staff members, who are accountable to the minority 
ranking member of the committee, have certain respon ibilities related to the selection 
of witnesses at a congressional hearing. Majority and minority committee staff 
generally begin the process of selecting witnesses by first identifying individuals that 
seem to be good candidates to testify at a congressional hearing on a particular topic 
(Staff Interviews 2010). Committee staff will use many different methods to search for 
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witnesses to testify at congressional hearings. If a hearing involves a policy area under 
the jurisdiction of a particular executive agency or is for oversight purposes, the 
committee will almost always ask representatives of federal agencies to come to testify 
in order to directly question them on their past performance/actions or to get their 
expertise on the situation (LaForge 2010; Staff Interviews 2010). In the case of 
oversight hearings, if the focus of the hearing is an actor outside of government (i.e. a 
business) engaging in an activity that is harmful to others, that actor will normally either 
be subpoenaed or asked to testify at the hearing to defend his or her actions (Staff 
Interviews 2010). 
Often, if an issue is important enough to them or their constituencies, members 
of Congress outside the committee will want to be allowed to testify at a hearing to give 
their point of view on the issue (Kingdon 1984; Gormley 1998; Mattei 1998; Burstein 
and Hirsch 2007). Knowing this, committee staff memb rs will often contact members 
that are likely to want to testify at a particular hearing or allow members to testify that 
have contacted them prior to a hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). Furthermore, committee 
members typically like to call witnesses from their own districts in order to build 
goodwill with their constituents (Staff Interviews 2010). As such, staff members will 
typically contact members of the committee (particularly the chair and the minority 
member respectively) to determine whether any of the members have someone from 
their district who would be a good candidate to testify at a hearing (Staff Interviews 
2010). 
While the strategies above will produce enough witnesses to testify for some 
hearings, many times staff members must actively search for good candidates to testify 
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at particular congressional hearings. Typically, if at all possible, staff members try to 
call witnesses who have testified for them in the past in hearings with similar topics 
(Staff Interviews 2010). Sometimes, witnesses will be called to testify and end up 
interacting poorly with committee members or expressing views that they were not 
expected to express (Staff Interviews 2010). Staff members are more confident of 
individuals who have already made it through giving testimony successfully in front of 
a congressional committee and have demonstrated how they interact with committee 
members and what their views are on the issue at hand (Staff Interviews 2010).  
Nonetheless, many times either witnesses that have previously testified at a 
hearing will not be available to testify at a hearing or the hearing is on a topic where the 
expertise/interest of previous witnesses is not applicable. In situations where all of the 
above methods of selecting potential witnesses havebeen exhausted, committee staff 
will conduct extensive searches for potential individuals who can testify at a hearing 
(Staff Interviews 2010). When in doubt over who cantestify, committee staff often look 
to interest groups, who are likely to be friendly to their position or are seen as having 
enough resources/expertise to provide committee members with the information 
necessary to make good policy, to see if they can provide good candidates to testify at a 
particular hearing (Hansen 1991; Leyden 1995; Wright 1996; Esterling 2007; McQuide 
2007; Staff Interviews 2010). Committee staff also may conduct internet searches to 
identify individuals who either are considered experts in the topic being addressed at a 
hearing or are likely to have interesting information to present at a particular hearing 
(Staff Interviews 2010).  
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After committee staff members have identified good candidates to testify at a 
hearing, they typically interview these prospective witnesses prior to allowing them to 
testify at the hearing, especially if a witness has never testified at a hearing in the past 
(Palmer 2007; Davis 2007; LaForge 2010; Staff Interviews 2010). Congressional 
committee members typically do not want to be caught off guard by the content of 
witness testimony and how witnesses behave at the hearing, as being caught off guard 
increases the likelihood that congressional committee members will appear ill-prepared 
or uninformed about the issue being examined at a hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). 
Furthermore, if the content of a witness’s testimony differs from the testimony that he 
or she was expected to give, the message or perspective that a chair or minority ranking 
member wants to have portrayed at a hearing may not get presented at the hearing at all 
(Staff Interviews 2010). Thus, staff members consider t their responsibility to 
understand what witnesses will say at a hearing and how they will behave at the hearing 
before a hearing takes place (Staff Interviews 2010).  
As such, committee staff interview prospective witnesses to determine what the 
witnesses will say at a hearing and how they will respond to questioning from 
committee and subcommittee members (Staff Interviews 2010). In these interviews, 
staff members may also coach witnesses on how to answer particular questions and how 
to deal with members who are likely to be antagonistic to the arguments they are going 
to make in a hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). Staff members may also decide after an 
interview that a witness that seemed promising should not be called to testify (Staff 
Interviews 2010). One staff member noted that in these interviews committee staff 
members have asked witnesses to refrain from expressing a certain view at a hearing as 
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a condition for being invited to testify at the hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). Of course, 
even as much as staff members try to control the content of witness testimony, since 
witnesses have total control over what they end up saying at a hearing, staff members 
have in the past been caught off guard by the content of the testimony of particular 
witnesses (Staff Interviews 2010). Nonetheless, most staff members use preliminary 
interviews to avoid being surprised by anything that a witness will say or do at a 
particular hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). 
Once staff members have acquired enough information b ut prospective 
witnesses, they will then make final decisions on who should be invited to testify at a 
hearing. Staff members consider a wide variety of different criteria when making a final 
decision on who will testify at a particular hearing. These criteria include the 
following8: 
• Expertise – The perceived expertise of a witness, usually as a re ult of academic 
qualifications, lends credibility to the comments of that witness that other less 
expert witnesses do not have. Regardless of the purpose of a hearing, expert 
witness testimony is usually valued at a hearing. If the purpose of the hearing is 
to genuinely gather information about a little-known or technical policy topic, 
expert testimony will be valued because experts are the most likely to know 
what the best policy options are in such issue areas. If the purpose of a hearing is 
to support the point of view of the chair, expert tstimony provides credibility to 
that particular point of view.  
                                                
8
 These criteria were all gathered from interviews with congressional staff members.  
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• Ability to engage committee members and the general public – Staff 
members typically look for witnesses who are personable, able to give testimony 
that is interesting and informational, and able to in eract well with committee 
members during question and answer periods. Staff members do not like to call 
witnesses that only give yes or no answers and do not engage the audience and 
committee members in a meaningful discussion of the issues at hand. Staff 
members may look for personable witnesses for a variety of reasons. On the one 
hand, the goal of many staff members when they set up a hearing or call a 
witness to testify is to gain attention from the prss for their particular issue. 
Witnesses that are interesting and personable are thought to grab more attention 
from the media and the public than less personable witnesses would do. On the 
other hand, if a hearing is designed to genuinely btter understand an issue, a 
witness that is personable and gives testimony that is informational and 
interesting can help members to gain a better understanding of an issue than a 
witness that simply gives yes or no answers and does n t engage the audience 
and committee members. 
• Location in home district of committee member – As stated earlier, 
committee chairs/minority members typically, if at all possible, like to bring in 
witnesses from their own district/state to testify at a hearing. This establishes 
good rapport with constituents within the district, as it gives a chance for an 
interest group/expert/citizen/governmental actor within the district a chance to 
espouse their viewpoints on an issue to a wider audience. 
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• Balance in occupations/walks of life – Committee chairs typically seek to 
ensure that individuals with a wide spectrum of diferent backgrounds come to 
testify at a particular hearing. This can be done for a variety of reasons. If a 
hearing is designed to genuinely better understand an issue, committee members 
can gain a better understanding of how to deal witha particular policy problem 
by listening to as many different perspectives on the issue as possible. On the 
other hand, if a hearing is designed to bolster the policy positions of the chair, 
bringing in witnesses from a wide cross-section of different backgrounds can 
demonstrate that individuals from all walks of life support the position the chair 
espouses. 
• Concurrence with views of chair/minority ranking member – Most staff 
members noted that on many occasions they seek out individuals to testify that 
they are confident will help make a point with which the chair or minority 
ranking member agrees. Nonetheless, most staff members also noted that in 
some hearings, the degree to which the views of a witness are in line with the 
views of the chair or the minority ranking member is not an important 
consideration when deciding on which witnesses to invite. Later in this chapter, 
I will discuss the reasons why this criteria is an important consideration for 
witness selection in some hearings while not being a  important consideration in 
other hearings.  
 
Preparing Member Statements and Lines of Questioning. Individual rank-and-file 
legislators are not typically intimately involved with the selection of witnesses in 
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congressional hearings since control over that process is usually reserved for committee 
and subcommittee chairs (Sachs 2003, 11; Carr 2006, 10-11; LaForge 2010). 
Nonetheless, these members still are typically given th  chance at the start of a hearing 
to present an oral statement and are given an additional five minutes during the course 
of a hearing to use as they please. Committee members will often use this time to 
influence the hearing process through questioning the validity of arguments made by 
witnesses (Palmer 2007) and through orally presenting statements for the record that 
serve as either dissent or affirmation of the general tone of information selected by 
committee and subcommittee chairs. When not present, committee members are also 
given the privilege of submitting statements for the record, which also serve to establish 
a record of dissent or affirmation for the overall tone of the hearing (Staff Interviews 
2010). 
 Unlike the other stages of the hearing preparation pr cess, the personal staffs of 
individual members tend to have a greater role in the crafting of opening statements and 
lines of questioning for individual members of the committee (Staff Interviews 2010). 
Minority and majority committee and subcommittee staff  do write opening statements 
and lines of questioning for their respective chairs nd minority ranking members and 
will sometimes try to persuade particular rank and file committee members to highlight 
certain points in their opening statements or ask particular questions over the course of 
the hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). However, the final decisions on what particular 
committee members will say and ask over the course of a hearing are ultimately up to 
the individual committee members who will be participating in the hearing (Staff 
Interviews 2010). Even when their own personal staff  write out questions and opening 
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statements for a member ahead of time, committee members will frequently “go off 
script” and ask questions that are interesting to them or that they feel will help them 
accomplish the goals they want to accomplish at a hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). As 
such, more than any other aspect of the hearing process, individual rank-and-file 
members have a large degree of control over their own individual participation in 
congressional hearings (Hall 1987).  
 Congressional committee and subcommittee members can use their opening 
statements and lines of questioning for a variety of reasons. Members can seek 
clarification on arguments or information presented by witnesses during the hearing, 
assist in bolstering the arguments made by those called to testify, call into question the 
validity of arguments made by witnesses, or make clear what they seek to accomplish in 
a particular hearing (Palmer 2007; Staff Interviews 2010). Personal and committee staff 
members write possible questions and opening statements for members with a mind 
toward accomplishing whatever goal the member wants to accomplish at a hearing 
(Staff Interviews 2010). For instance, staff members may write “tough” or “hostile” 
questions of witnesses called by the opposite party in order to attempt to discredit the 
testimony of the witness in much the same fashion that an attorney will discredit the 
testimony of a witness called by the opposing side at a trial (Staff Interviews 2010). In 
fact, one staff member noted that committee and subcommittee members will often 
strategically decide not to ask questions of an opposing party’s witnesses in order to 
restrict the face time of witnesses whose testimony the  know that they cannot discredit 
(Staff Interviews 2010).  
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Congressional committee members will often use opening statements to make it 
clear exactly what they are trying to accomplish in the hearing and why they are 
participating in a hearing, even if only to send in a written statement. Committee 
members will often use the time given to them for an opening statement or statements 
throughout a hearing to present statements for the record that serve as either dissent or 
affirmation of the general tone of information selected by committee and subcommittee 
chairs. These statements are often carefully crafted by the personal staff members of 
individual members prior to a hearing (Staff Intervi ws 2010). These opening 
statements and lines of questioning are important, because they give members that were 
not involved in the witness selection process (which most are not) the opportunity to 
participate in the hearing process themselves. As such, although a committee may be an 
hospitable venue in terms of collecting and displaying information supportive of a 
particular side in a debate, committee members that dis gree with the prevailing tone of 
information presented in the hearing may prove inhospitable to certain witnesses by 
using their own time to deconstruct the information being presented by witnesses 
(Palmer 2007; LaForge 2010). With the components of hearing preparation laid out, I 
now turn to a discussion of how the political subsystem and issue contexts of particular 
hearings are expected to affect the decisions made when putting together the end 
hearing product.  
 
Information Prioritization Strategies and Policy Subsystems 
As the proceeding sections demonstrate, congressional c mmittees are guided 
by a number of institutional norms and rules when preparing for congressional hearings. 
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However, how do committees ultimately make decision  how to collect and display 
information in congressional hearings? As the next s c ions demonstrate, congressional 
committees are guided by a number of contexts when making decisions on how to 
utilize the congressional hearing process.  
When conducting congressional hearings, congressional c mmittee members 
must confront the decision on what types of individuals to call to testify, what types of 
information to collect, what types of questions to ask, and how to utilize this 
information, once it is collected and displayed during the hearing process. 
Unfortunately, policymakers are bombarded by large amounts of information from 
individuals seeking to influence the policy process, which offers contradictory signals 
on the type of policy to be pursued, that they must find some way to properly sift 
through in order to determine which information should be collected and put on display 
during congressional hearings (Simon 1983; Jones and B umgartner 2005). Although 
the congressional committee system affords Congress th  ability to gather information 
on multiple issues and even multiple dimensions of the same issue at the same time 
(Jones 1994), even large institutions like Congress are subject to informational attention 
limits and cannot possibly collect and display all of the relevant policy information 
available on a policy issue (Jones 2001).   
Therefore, policymakers on congressional committees and subcommittees must 
develop strategies for prioritizing certain types of information and discarding other 
types of information (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). In such an environment, 
policymakers can use a wide variety of strategies in making decisions on which 
information to prioritize in congressional hearings. These strategies include, but are not 
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limited to, stacking the hearing to present one point f view on the issue, selecting 
testimony that represents a wide variety of viewpoints on the issue, choosing testimony 
that is perceived to be of the highest quality avail ble, or even selecting testimony that 
disagrees with their positions on the issue in order to discredit the information.  
When making decisions on the types of strategies that will be utilized in 
collecting and displaying information in congressional hearings, congressional 
committee members operate within a larger policy subsystem made up of a variety of 
actors, including, but not limited to, members of cngressional committees that have 
jurisdictional control over the issue, members of bureaucratic agencies, scientific 
experts, interest groups, and other interested individuals (Redford 1969; Baumgartner 
and Jones 1991, 1993). These subsystems are normally organized around a particular 
substantive, yet manageable, policy issue (i.e. climate change) so that individuals can 
hope to have an impact over policymaking in the issue (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993; Sabatier and Weible 2007).  
Congressional committees and their members form a key component of policy 
subsystems, and, as such, actions they take within the policy process are likely to be 
affected by the dynamics of the subsystem they operate within. First of all, since 
congressional committees are designed to specialize on a specific set of policy issues 
(Mayhew 1974), interested non-governmental actors (i.e. interest groups, citizens, etc.) 
are likely to focus their efforts to affect policymaking on an issue of interest to them on 
members of committees with a logical claim to jurisdiction over the issue (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993; King 1997; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones, and 
Jochim 2009). Furthermore, due to the fact that congressional committees are sub-units 
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of a representative body and the fact that other subsystem actors have a vested interest 
in affecting the actions of congressional committee members, debates amongst 
congressional committee members are likely to be representative of the debates on the 
issue within the subsystem as a whole.  
Therefore, since congressional hearings form a key portion of the duties that 
congressional committees perform during the policymaking process and since 
congressional committees operate within wider policy subsystems whose actors are 
likely to have an effect on all policy making decisions congressional committees 
undertake, it is likely that the immediate subsystem context that a congressional 
committee operates within will have a sizable effect on the types of information 
presented and displayed in congressional hearings. I  the next section, I will explain 
several different ideal representations of policy subsystems as detailed in different 
theories of policy change and congressional organization and provide explanations for 
how each ideal subsystem context will affect information collection and display in 
congressional hearings.  
 
Subsystem Contextual Effects on Information Collection and Display 
Unified Subsystems. In unified subsystem contexts, subsystem politics are 
characterized by agreement amongst subsystem actors on the understandings of policy 
problems. The idea of a unified subsystem originated in conceptions of policy 
subsystems as iron triangles, in which policymaking was decided upon by relevant 
interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, and congressional committees, all of whom 
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generally were in agreement as to what types of policies should be pursued (i.e. Griffith 
1939; Maass 1951; Cater 1964; Freeman 1965). While subsequent literature has 
debunked the idea that only a triad of actors are involved in policy subsystems (Heclo 
1978), according to punctuated equilibrium theorists, policy subsystems are, at times, 
tightly configured around particular issues, with a dominant subsystem having 
policymaking control over a particular issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). This tight 
configuration of control over an issue can break down ver time as different actors (i.e. 
congressional committees who have not traditionally had control over the issue) fight 
for control over policymaking within the subsystem (Schattschneider 1960; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Nonetheless, at times, 
politics within certain subsystems can be characterized by general agreement amongst 
policy actors within the subsystem. 
 Agreement amongst actors within policy subsystems can be caused by a number 
of factors. First of all, due to the fact that members of the subsystem work together to 
form policy within the issue, they begin to develop shared understandings of the policy 
problem and tend to compromise with each other on policy decisions (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009). As such, members of a 
subsystem will often use their past decisions in determining the correctness of 
information and will continue to ignore information that is contrary to the decisions 
they made in the past (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  
Within the specific context of congressional committees, agreement amongst 
policymakers can also be the result of policymaking actors’ quest to gain particularized 
benefits for their respective constituencies. According to this line of reasoning, 
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congressional policymakers can be seen as “single-minded seekers of re-election” 
(Mayhew 1974). As such, any action taken by congressional policymakers is done with 
a mind toward satisfying constituents enough so that they can be re-elected by these 
constituents (Mayhew 1974). Congressional committees provide ideal institutions for 
congressional policymakers to utilize in order to increase their chances of re-election. 
Most importantly, congressional committees provide a forum by which congressional 
policymakers can gain particularized benefits for their respective constituencies and 
credibly claim that they were directly responsible for affecting policy in areas that 
directly affect their constituents (Fenno 1974; Mayhew 1974).  
According to this perspective of legislative policymaking, in order to take 
advantage of the clear benefits and inherent powers that committees confer to their 
members, individual legislators organize themselves into committees that will best 
allow them to use committees for the benefit of their respective constituencies 
(Weingast and Marshall 1988; Adler and Lapinski 1997). For instance, members who 
represent large farming communities will seek placement on the Agricultural 
Committee in order to have direct control over policies that are going to affect large 
portions of their respective constituencies (Adler and Lapinski 1997). Once in these 
committees, congressional policymakers seek to cooperate with each other and support 
each other’s demands for constituency benefits in order to ensure legislative support for 
their own constituency’s demands in the future (Mayhew 1974; Weingast 1979; Shepsle 
and Weingast 1981; Tullock 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Past research has 
found that politics within committees whose members are more constituency-oriented 
tend to be more consensual and less divisive, as congressional policymakers support 
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each other’s demands for constituency benefits to ensur  legislative support for their 
own constituency’s demands in the future (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Weingast 1979; 
Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Tullock 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Smith and 
Deering 1990; Deering and Smith 1997; Maltzman 1997). Thus, according to this 
theoretical perspective, policymaking within congressional committees that are more 
constituency oriented will be characterized by a large degree of consensus and 
compromise as members seek to gain benefits for their respective constituencies.  
With this said, congressional committees are also often faced with the threat that 
other committees will encroach on their jurisdictional turf and take partial control over 
the policy issue. Members of the dominant subsystem/co mittee working on the issue 
have a vested interest in keeping control over a policy issue in order to prevent their 
policies being undone by those outside the subsystem who wish to change policy in the 
issue area (Schattschneider 1960; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005). As such, members of the congressional committees and subcommittees with 
formal jurisdictional control over an issue tend to prioritize information that is 
sympathetic to their particular subsystem’s point of view on the issue (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993). By contrast, those who do not subscribe to the dominant subsystem’s 
viewpoint on the issue seek to find a venue that will collect information that is 
consistent with the outside actors’ viewpoints on an issue or at the very least will allow 
outside actors’ viewpoints to be heard alongside the viewpoints of the dominant 
coalition in the debate (Baumgartner 1989; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; Wison 2000; Pralle 2003; Wood 2006). Congressional 
committees associated with subsystems sympathetic to alternative viewpoints on the 
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issue use congressional hearings, especially non-legislative hearings, in an attempt to 
reach out of their own formal jurisdiction and compete for influence on a policy issue 
with committees who have traditionally held control over the issue (Jones, Baumgartner 
and Talbert 1993; Talbert, Baumgartner and Jones 1995; King 1997).  
Congressional committees, as members of unified subsystems, will collect and 
display information that is consistent with the policy positions of those within the 
respective subsystems operating within the issue, so that their positions on the policy 
issue and their qualifications to have control over th  issue can be backed up by the 
information put on display in congressional hearings (Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 
1993; Talbert, Baumgartner and Jones 1995). Furthermore, since disagreements in 
unified subsystems are likely to be muted between mmbers of the committee in general 
and the leadership of the two parties in the committee in particular, the testimony 
collected in committees organized around unified subsystems is likely to be more 
stacked to represent one particular perspective than any other subsystem type. In unified 
subsystems, since mostly everyone within the committee agrees on the conception of 
the policy issue, minority members are not likely to use their privilege to call witnesses 
at a hearing because the witnesses called by the majority lready called the witnesses 
they would have called to testify. Past empirical evid nce on the issue areas of 
pesticides, nuclear power, and tobacco policy have confirmed such expectations in 
finding that particular congressional committees likely to be associated with a unified 
subsystem tend to be biased in terms of the topics of ongressional hearings and the 
types of witnesses called to testify at particular hearings (Talbert, Jones, and 
Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; Worsham 2006).  
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The agricultural committees in both chambers of Congress clearly fit the 
qualities of the unified subsystem type. According to interviews with congressional 
committee staff, agricultural committee members are typically in full agreement on 
witness selection (Staff Interviews 2010). Minority committee members typically will 
not use their privilege to invite witnesses to testify at a congressional hearing because 
the majority has selected the individuals they would have asked to have testify (Staff 
Interviews 2010). Majority committee staff members al o typically prepare questions 
and opening statements for members of the minority, a practice unheard of in other 
committees in Congress (Staff Interviews 2010). Thus, if the preceding analysis is 
correct, we should expect the following hypothesis to hold true: 
 
Unified Subsystems Hypothesis: In unified subsystems, information collection decisions 
will fit the collective biases of the entire membership of the committee.  
 
Competitive Subsystems. In competitive subsystem contexts, subsystem politics are 
characterized by a competition for control amongst different coalitions made up of 
individuals motivated by their personal beliefs on an issue (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993; Weible 2008). The idea of competitive subsystem contexts grows out of the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of policy change and partisan theories of 
congressional organization. ACF theorists argue that opposing coalitions of interested 
individuals will struggle for control over policymaking within the subsystem (Sabatier 
and Weible 2007) while partisan theories of congressional organization argue that 
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different political parties will use congressional committees to ensure that their 
preferred policy proposals pass and that the minority party’s policy proposals are not 
even considered (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1997, 2005).  
Under the ACF, actors within opposing coalitions are motivated by their 
normative beliefs on how the world should run when processing and collecting 
information about a particular policy issue (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 
and Weible 2007). Beliefs concerning a policy issue are very difficult to change even 
through technical and scientific information from respected sources (Sabatier and 
Weible 2007, 198). Thus, when information comes in co flict with these beliefs, policy 
actors tend to discount the information and label those that deliver the information as 
belonging to the opposing coalition in the issue (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 194).  As 
such, the coalition whose members have control overthe main committees and 
subcommittees within a subsystem will likely collect and display information with the 
intention of providing credibility to the common beliefs they share on the issue and/or 
discrediting the positions of the members of the minority coalition in the subsystem. 
 Within Congress, of the many different types of coalitions that can form on 
different policy issues, political parties make up likely the most important and dominant 
coalitions. Partisan theorists argue that the rules, procedures, and organizational makeup 
of Congress are designed by the majority party to exclude the minority party from the 
legislative process.  This exclusion allows the majority party to put pressure on partisan 
members to conform to the party opinion on issues in order to effectively achieve the 
majority party’s collective goals (Binder 1997; Cox and McCubbins 1993 and 2005).  
Partially subscribing to the electoral connection school of legislative behavior, partisan 
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scholars argue that the leadership of the party seeks l ctoral success and part of this 
success rests on a party caucus’s record in Congress (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; 
Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).  
 Thus, seeking to enhance their collective party reputation through policy 
outcomes (Forgette 1997), party caucuses and party le dership put pressure on 
individual legislators to force them to act as unified agents of the party that will pass the 
policies that the party wants passed (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 2005).  Due to the fact that individual members of Congress also 
recognize the importance of a party caucus’s record to its own success (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005), individual party members will be 
responsive to these pressures and will act as the party wants them to in their decisions 
on policy. 
 Very few policy theorists have considered the potential linkages between 
partisan legislative organization and policy change. Yet, those that have considered this 
possibility have given researchers strong reason to believe that political parties can have 
strong effects over many different stages of the policymaking process. For instance, 
intense partisanship and the distance between the ex reme legislators in both political 
parties prevented moderate health care reform proposals from being enacted in 1994 
(Talbert 1995). Furthermore, majority party members, particularly majority party 
leaders in the House, are more likely than minority party members to see their proposals 
pass through the winnowing process by which bill proposals receive attention by 
congressional committees (Krutz 2005). In terms of the implementation stage of the 
public policy process, political parties have been theorized to be important in providing 
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broad representation for citizens in operating the U.S. bureaucratic state (Redford 
1969). Finally, although remaining agnostic on the subject, Talbert and Potoski (2002) 
theorized that there was good reason to expect that either congressional committees or 
political parties could be responsible for boiling multidimensional issues down to the 
unidimensional form they take once they are considered on the floor.   
Significant evidence demonstrates that beliefs of different coalitions in policy 
debates have a significant impact on whether or not individuals accept information from 
scientific experts as being true (Liftin 2000; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Rothman 
and Lichter 1987). For instance, despite being exposed to the clear consensus amongst 
scientific experts that the risk involved with expansion of nuclear energy is relatively 
small, reporters and non-scientific expert elites in the U.S. tend to respond to their 
ideologies in assessing the safety of nuclear technologies with more liberal individuals 
considering nuclear technology to be unsafe (Rothman and Lichter 1987). Furthermore, 
as stated in the previous chapter, despite being exposed to the same information 
concerning the issue of environmental policy at Lake Tahoe, environmental groups 
were more likely to incorporate information arguing water quality was a problem into 
their decision making processes than business and property rights groups (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993).   
Unlike unified subsystems, competitive subsystems are made up of at least two 
coalitions who disagree vehemently over the conception of policy issues. These two 
different coalitions are also likely to disagree over the types and tone of information that 
should be presented about a particular policy topic. As stated earlier, formal rules and 
informal norms that operate in both Senate and House committees and subcommittees 
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permit minority party leaders to call at least one, and likely even more than one, witness 
to testify at a particular hearing (Staff Interviews 2010; Davis 2011b, 2011c). Minority 
party leaders will be far more likely to use this witness selection privilege when they 
disagree vehemently with the witnesses selected by the majority party. Therefore, 
unlike in committees organized around unified subsystems, the tone of testimony of 
witnesses selected to testify in committees organized around competitive subsystems 
are likely to be more diverse than testimony presented in front of committees organized 
around unified subsystems. Nonetheless, since the committee chair is the main actor 
with control over witness selection decisions, the ov rall tone of testimony in a hearing 
will still by and large fit the belief systems of the committee chair. As such, in 
competitive subsystems, we should expect the following hypothesis to be confirmed: 
 
Competitive Subsystems Hypothesis: In competitive subsy tems, committee chairs will 
use the congressional hearing process to collect and display information that is 
consistent with their beliefs on an issue.  
 
Specialized Subsystems. In specialized subsystems, members of a policy subsy tem 
genuinely attempt to gather high quality information with the goal of using this 
information to inform policy decisions. The idea of specialized subsystem contexts 
grows out of informational theories of congressional organization. According to 
informational theorists, in order to achieve the goal of crafting good public policy 
(Fenno 1974), Congress is organized to allow for policy experts to inform the floor 
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about the potential effects of policies (Krehbiel 199 ; Jones 1994). Informational 
theorists argue that the outcomes of particular policies are uncertain, which poses a 
difficulty for legislators who prefer to choose policies where the outcome is certain, so 
that they can take credit for policies that they know will succeed and avoid 
embarrassment in voting for policies with harmful otcomes for their constituencies 
(Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 199 ).  Thus, individual legislators 
value expertise on the outcomes of policies because it increases the certainty of the 
outcomes of policies, as policy experts are more knowledgeable about the effects of a 
policy than Congress as a whole (Gilligan and Krehbi l 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 
1991). For that reason, informational theorists argue that legislative rules and 
procedures will be developed that provide incentives for legislators to cultivate policy 
expertise and specialization in particular policy areas and to share this expertise with 
fellow legislators (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991). 
 Therefore, if the informational perspective is correct, congressional committee 
members should actively seek to become policy experts on an issue in order to cut down 
on the information gathering costs for the rest of the institution. As a result, legislative 
hearings should be constructed so that expert information on a topic is gathered and the 
testimony of technical and policy experts on a particular issue should be valued, as 
these individuals are the most likely candidates to provide the information necessary for 
congressional committee members to become experts on a p licy issue. Furthermore, 
those individuals who provide testimony that is consistent with the views of technical 
policy experts will also be disproportionately called to testify at congressional hearings.  
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 Past empirical evidence has uncovered evidence that congressional hearings are 
valued as a genuine information gathering activity.  For instance, interest group 
testimony, about whether a particular bill was favor ble or not, had an effect on whether 
a bill was actually adopted (Burstein and Hirsh 2007).  Furthermore, congressional 
committees do tend to value technical expertise when c oosing which interest group 
lobbyists to testify at congressional hearings, as increased technical expertise amongst 
lobbyists was significantly related to increased likelihood that a lobbyist would be 
allowed to testify at congressional hearings (Esterling 2004). If the preceding analysis is 
correct, we should expect the following hypothesis to be confirmed: 
 
Specialized Subsystems Hypothesis: In specialized subsy tems, congressional policy 
makers will use the congressional hearing process to ga her and display information 




Effects of Issue Contexts on Information Collection and Display Decisions 
Distributive Issue Contexts. As stated earlier, unified positions amongst policy a tors 
within a subsystem characterize policymaking within unified subsystems. In distributive 
policy contexts, members of policy subsystems work t  make decisions on how to 
distribute particularized benefits for specific groups and geographic areas in society 
(Lowi 1964, 1972; Weingast 1979). In such policy contexts, benefits can be accrued to 
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one group or area within society without taking anybenefits away from or incurring 
disproportionate costs for other sectors of society (Weingast 1979; Shepsle and 
Weingast 1981). Realizing that their pet projects may not be approved without 
compromise within the subsystem, actors will generally support the approval of benefits 
for others within the subsystem (Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981). As such, 
distributive policy contexts are generally characterized by consensual relations amongst 
actors within the subsystem (Lowi 1964, 1972). Nonethel ss, those within the 
subsystem may still need to collect and display information in congressional hearings to 
demonstrate to those outside of the subsystem that the policies and benefits they are 
proposing are based on solid reasoning (Sabatier 1978; Feldman and March 1981; 
Weiss 1988; Galster 1996; Shulock 1999). Furthermore, they also must use the 
congressional hearing process to demonstrate their expertise on the issue in order to 
thwart efforts by those outside of the subsystem to encroach on their control over the 
issue (King 1997). Thus, if the preceding explanation is correct, we should expect the 
following hypotheses to hold true: 
 
Distributive Policy Context Hypothesis: In distributive policy contexts, information 
collection and display decisions should operate as hypothesized under unified 
subsystems.  
 
Partisan/Contentious Policy Contexts. As issues become more contentious between 
the two political parties, it becomes more likely that each committee venue will be split 
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into competitive coalitions by virtue of the control party leaders have over the 
committee appointment process and the fact that moscommittees’ memberships break 
down along partisan lines (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005). Therefore, as parties 
become more polarized on an issue, the likelihood that any naturally sympathetic 
venues to one side or another will be present decreases, as there will likely be two 
political parties at odds with each other on the issue within each committee venue. In 
these cases, we should expect that the personal views of those running the hearing 
should have more of an impact on the information colle tion and display process than 
the type of committee venue in which the hearing takes place.  
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in general, the congressional hearing process 
acts in a very partisan manner when issues are morecontroversial and operate along 
partisan lines (Staff Interviews 2010). Committee staff members tend to select witnesses 
to testify with an eye toward supporting whatever vi wpoint their chair is seeking to get 
across in a particular hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). While minority staff members are 
given the chance to select at least one witness to tes ify at a hearing, the vast majority of 
witnesses are selected by the staff members of the majority party (Staff Interviews 
2010). Furthermore, although this rarely occurs, minority staff members have 
complained that majority staff members have scheduled hearings on days when they 
knew a minority witness would not be available likely to avoid having that witness 
testify at a hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). Thus, a  certain issues become more 
controversial and more partisan, we should observe some of the same types of partisan 
dynamics described above also occurring in other partisan issues. 
76 
 
 However, it should be noted that in partisan issue contests, party identifications 
of key actors will not necessarily trump belief systems in determining information 
collection and display decisions in congressional he rings. The polarization of parties 
into separate camps in the climate change debate may or may not be due to political 
parties exerting influence over their members to ac in a certain way on the issues at 
hand, even when these actions may conflict with their own belief systems. Nonetheless, 
even if political parties are not influencing their members to separate into different 
camps on an issue, the fact that they are divergent on the issue at hand creates a 
situation where two coalitions diametrically opposed to one another on the issue will be 
present in committee after committee due to the partisan nature of committee member 
selection. Thus, no venues will be homogenous in their viewpoints on the issue, and the 
characteristics of the individual leaders in a committee will play a very important role in 
information collection and display decisions. As such, I expect the following hypothesis 
to be confirmed: 
 
Partisan Policy Context Hypothesis: In partisan policy contexts, information collection 
and display decisions should operate as hypothesized under competitive subsystems. 
 
New and Technical Policy Contexts. One of the main reasons that specialized policy 
subsystems may form is to reduce uncertainty, so that subsystem members can be 
assured that the policies they will propose will have their intended effects (Gilligan and 
Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991). However, uncertainty on particular issues 
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will vary dramatically from issue to issue. On older and less technical issues, 
policymakers have worked for long periods of time on the issue and have developed an 
understanding of how the issue works (McQuide 2007). Thus, they are more certain that 
the policies they pass will produce intended results. Of course, it is entirely reasonable 
that different individuals will come to different conclusions about the effects of similar 
policies. However, due to the long periods of time that have been spent working on the 
issue, congressional policymakers are, rightly or wrongly, relatively confident that their 
conclusions are correct and will likely collect and display information with the intention 
of providing credibility to policy decisions that they have already made (Sabatier 1978; 
Feldman and March 1981). Thus, as McQuide (2007) notes, it is no great surprise that 
congressional hearings are used to display information consistent with the beliefs of 
committee members presiding over the hearing on older less-technical policy areas 
where policymakers have had the time and certainty to develop their own positions on 
the issues (Schick 1976; Jones 1976; Kingdon 1981; Whiteman 1985). 
 However, on newer and more technical policy issues, policymakers do not have 
the expertise to be confident their conclusions on an issue are correct, if they have 
developed any beliefs at all. Thus, policymakers typically must genuinely collect 
quality information so that they can develop expertis  on the issue, which will inform 
their conclusions as to what effects particular policies will have (Ainsworth 2002; 
McQuide 2007). It is my contention that when policymakers are uncertain, the only cue 
they have to determine the validity of information s the perceived expertise of the 
individual giving the information. Additionally, due to the fact that beliefs cannot be 
relied upon to determine which information to collect and display, the tone of 
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information should show more variation, as committee members develop positions on 
the issue. Furthermore, when policymakers are uncertain, they become genuinely 
curious as to what information perceived experts in a policy area have to say about the 
policy issue and will use the question and answer phase of the hearing process to extract 
even more information from those testifying before th  hearing. Thus, if the preceding 
analysis is correct, we should expect the following hypotheses to hold true: 
 
New and Technical Policy Context Hypotheses: In newer and more technical policy 
contexts, information collection and display decision  should operate as hypothesized 
under specialized subsystems. 
 
Multi-Dimensional Issue Contexts. Obviously, not all policies fit the neat issue 
contexts described above. There are multiple dimensions to many policy issues and not 
all of these dimensions will cause a divide amongst different political parties 
(Wolbrecht 2000; Talbert and Potoski 2002) or amongst individuals with different 
belief systems. In Congress, different dimensions of a policy issue can all be considered 
simultaneously by different policy venues like committees and subcommittees (Simon 
1983; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 2001). As such, the different dynamics on 
these dimensions may cause subsystems to act very diff rently depending on the 
dimension being considered. In such issue contexts, certain dimensions of the issue may 
exhibit qualities consistent with distributive issue contexts while other dimensions of 
the issue may exhibit qualities consistent with more partisan issue contexts.  
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On policy issues that are more complex and multidimensional, multiple existing 
policy subsystems working on other related issues have a vested interest in 
policymaking on the issue (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998; Fenger and Klok 2001; Weible 
2008; Jones and Jenkins-Smith 2009; Weible, Sabatier, nd McQueen 2009). Each 
subsystem working on the issue may exhibit completely different characteristics 
depending on what dimension of the issue is being examined. On dimensions of the 
issue with a distributive component, committees within subsystems whose members 
have a vested interest in extracting benefits on the issue may exhibit qualities consistent 
with unified subsystems when collecting and displaying information in hearings. On the 
other hand, on dimensions of the issue with a partisan component, committees within 
subsystems may exhibit qualities consistent with competitive subsystems when 
collecting and displaying information in hearings. A  such, if the preceding logic is 
correct, we should expect the following hypothesis to be confirmed in the context of 
multidimensional issue contexts: 
 
Multi-Dimensional Policy Context Hypothesis: In dimensions of multi-dimensional 
issues that are more distributive, information collection and display decisions should fit 
the perceived subsystem bias of that committee. On the other hand, in dimensions of 
multi-dimensional issues that are more partisan, committee chairs will use the 
congressional hearing process to collect and display information that is consistent with 





 As this chapter has demonstrated, many different factors are considered by 
committee members when making decisions on how to collect and display information 
in congressional hearings. Furthermore, the rules and norms that guide the process of 
preparing for congressional hearings, particularly those involving witness selection, are 
set up to clearly advantage the majority party in hearing decisions while still allowing 
for participation by the minority party in the process. In general, I expect that the key 
factors affecting information collection and display decision in congressional hearings 
will differ depending on the issue and subsystem contexts within which a hearing is 
conducted. In the next chapter, I will lay out the research model that I will use to test the 




Chapter 3. The Systematic Study of Congressional Hearing Politics 
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I argued that the factors that drive congressional hearing 
information collection and display decisions will differ based on the context in which a 
particular hearing takes place. To test this argument, I will conduct a series of analyses 
studying different facets of the congressional hearing process in three distinct issue 
contexts and compare how the factors influencing congressional hearing decisions 
change based on the issue being studied. In this chapter, I will describe in fuller detail 
the research design that I will use in subsequent chapters to test propositions made in 
the previous chapter. 
 
Selection of Issue Contexts 
 The issue context that subsystems operate within is hypothesized to be a 
powerful condition for which variables will be significant indicators of information 
collection and display decisions. In issue areas with a sizable distributive component, 
committees with members whose constituents have a vested interest in the issue are 
likely to display information supportive of these interests regardless of the belief 
systems of those controlling the committee. On the ot r hand, in issue areas with a 
sizable partisan component in which the likelihood that two groups antagonistic toward 
each other will be represented on committee after committee becomes more likely, the 
belief systems of those controlling the committee vnue will be a significant 
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determinant of the tone of testimony on the issue. In issue areas with high degrees of 
perceived uncertainty involved, congressional hearings will be used to genuinely collect 
information from witnesses. Finally, in multi-dimensional issue areas, the main factors 
driving information collection and display decisions will depend on what dimension of 
the issue is being examined. In order to study the expectations derived from my theory 
of congressional hearing politics, I plan on performing a series of separate analyses on 
the following issue areas: tobacco, climate change, and biotechnology. In this section, I 
will describe the reasoning behind choosing each of t ese topic areas.   
 
Similarities in Issue Areas. Before discussing the different qualities of each individual 
issue area that caused each to be selected, it is important to first discuss the similar 
qualities of the issue areas that also led to theirselection. First of all, each of the issue 
areas chosen has components that have generated conroversy between different 
segments of society. Obviously, many topic areas addressed in congressional hearings 
are relatively non-controversial. In such topic areas, information produced by policy 
actors is likely to be fairly homogenous in tone since most policy actors already agree 
on the definitions and solutions to policy problems in these issue areas. While these 
issue areas still form a large portion of the issue addressed in congressional hearings, 
the politics of information collection and display in such issue areas are likely to be 
uninteresting due to the lack of variation of the one of information. As such, I was 
mindful of choosing more controversial issues where variation in information collection 
and display strategies is likely to be present.  
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 Second, each of the issue areas chosen has sizable technical components that 
increase the difficulty of understanding the issue for policymakers and the general 
public. Furthermore, policy options in each issue area entail various risks that would 
cause policymakers to want to be more certain in making the best policy decision 
possible for their constituents.  Once again, many issue areas addressed by 
congressional hearings (i.e. tax policy, civil rights policy) are relatively well developed 
and easier for policymakers and the general public to understand. Although information 
collection and display strategies in non-technical issues areas are very interesting and 
important to understand, I choose to focus on technical policy issues because they 
provide an interesting test of my theory. As noted in the last chapter, my theory argues 
that in most cases committee members will be driven by certain biases when selecting 
information to collect and put on display in congressional hearings. Only rarely, when 
significant uncertainties exist in an issue and policymakers’ existing biases cannot be 
easily utilized to help form opinions on the issue, will congressional policymakers 
utilize the congressional hearing process to genuinely collect information and come to a 
better understanding of what policies to craft in the issue area. However, if 
congressional policymakers would be motivated to consistently use the congressional 
hearing process to genuinely collect information to make the best decisions possible, it 
would be in technical issue areas where advice fromperceived experts on these issue 
areas is likely to be valued by congressional policymakers.  As such, I intentionally 
select technical issue areas to see whether policymakers use the congressional hearing 
process to collect and display information consistent with their own biases even in 
technical issue areas.  
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Distributive Issue Context – Tobacco. Tobacco policy is chosen as an issue area, 
because it is representative of issues where committees have acted as unified 
subsystems even as other committees encroach on its jurisdictional turf. Much ink has 
been spilled attempting to understand the dynamics of tobacco policy. As these studies 
have uncovered, the agricultural committees in both chambers of the U.S. Congress 
serve as the “institutional anchors” for the tobacco promotion subsystem (Worsham 
2006, 439). During the early stages of the issue, agricultural committees enjoyed nearly 
full jurisdictional control over tobacco policy, and thus, the informational content of 
congressional hearings on the issue (Baumgartner and Jo es 1993; Talbert, Jones, and 
Baumgartner 1995; Worsham 2006). Agricultural committees used this jurisdictional 
authority to hold hearings that were stacked with testimony that emphasized the 
importance of the tobacco industry to the U.S. economy and largely filtered out 
testimony attempting to emphasize the health risks of tobacco use.  
Although there has been some debate on the degree to which the tobacco 
subsystem’s influence over tobacco policy has waned ov r time (see Worsham 2006; 
Givel 2006), researchers generally concur that the obacco subsystem remained unified 
and vigorously supportive of the tobacco industry even as other subsystems entered the 
fray (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Talbert, Jones, ad B umgartner 1995; Worsham 
2006). Even while other committees came on the scene to compete for jurisdictional turf 
with the agricultural committee, the agricultural committee served as a rather 
dependable venue for tobacco proponents (particularly tobacco farmers) to state its case 
to members of Congress and the general public. Thus, t e agricultural committee within 
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the tobacco policy area serves as an interesting example of how unified subsystems may 
act in information collection and display decisions.  
 
Partisan Issue Context – Climate Change. Climate change is chosen as an issue area 
because it represents a relatively young issue area, in which parties have aligned 
themselves into separate camps across time. Wildly divergent opinions have developed 
amongst actors involved with the climate change issue. On the one hand, there are 
members of the environmental coalition who argue that climate change is a significant 
problem and that current economic practices will only lead to future environmental 
problems that could threaten the world’s survival (Liftin 2000, 249). On the other hand, 
there are members of the economic coalition who argue that climate change is not a 
significant problem, evidence is not clear enough to warrant policy action on the issue, 
and attempting to solve the problem will only harm the economy (Liftin 2000, 249).  
 With the economic costs of solving the problem on the one hand and the 
increased visibility of the problem as the result of the advocacy of such public figures as 
Al Gore on the other hand, climate change is a visible and controversial enough issue 
that could potentially provide an issue around which two political parties can align 
themselves. Indeed, significant evidence has been fou d that political parties have 
aligned themselves into distinct camps on environmental issues in general. More 
specifically, based on League of Conservation Voters voting scores, Republicans and 
Democrats have become increasingly divided over the issue of environmental policy 
since the 1970’s (Shipan and Lowry 2001; 245). Therefore, if political parties have 
diverged from each other on all environmental policy issues, there is good reason to 
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expect that parties have aligned themselves around the issue of climate change in 
particular. 
 
Multi-Dimensional Issue Context – Biotechnology. Biotechnology refers to the use of 
living matter to modify other materials (Smith 2004; McQuide 2007). As such, the 
policy area involves a wide variety of issue dimensio , ranging from the genetic 
manipulation of crops to encourage agricultural productivity to the use of human stem 
cells to assist in curing diseases. Depending on the dimension of the issue being 
examined by a particular hearing and the context in which a particular hearing took 
place, information collection and display decisions in hearings concerning 
biotechnology may be driven by a number of different factors. For instance, during the 
early stages of the biotechnology issue, members of Congress initially knew relatively 
little about the issue. As such, before belief systems developed on the issue, individual 
members of Congress lacked confidence in the proper action to take when forming 
policy on the issue. Thus, congressional hearings o the biotechnology issue area may 
have been used for genuine information collection in order to cut down on uncertainty 
in the early stages of the issue.  
 However, as the issue has progressed and committee embers have become 
more and more confident in their positions on the issue, it is likely that information 
collection and display decisions have begun to be driven by the institutional biases of 
particular committees and the belief systems of committee members. The degree to 
which either the institutional biases of committees or the belief systems of committee 
members will affect information collection and display decisions will likely be 
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dependent on what part of the biotechnology issue area is being examined. On the one 
hand, parts of the issue have distributive components that are likely to encourage 
members of unified subsystems to act in concert with one another. For instance, the 
genetic manipulation of crops provides farmers with a new tool to increase agricultural 
productivity and ward off pests without the use of pesticides. Thus, members of both 
political parties within the agricultural subsystem are likely to be supportive of 
biotechnology, due to its importance for farmers in their respective districts, and will 
likely use congressional hearings on the topic to encourage development of this tool for 
future use. 
 On the other hand, biotechnology also can be used to create and clone human 
embryos and human embryonic stem cells for health purposes. Due to conservative 
beliefs that the human embryo is where life begins a d should be respected, these uses 
of biotechnology have been a source of very contentious debates between the two 
political parties on the issue. As such, we should fin  that the tone of information in 
hearings concerning the use of biotechnology to create and clone human embryos and 
human embryonic stem cells for health purposes should be dictated by the belief 
systems of committee chairmen presiding over the hearing.  
 
Congressional Hearing Documents as a Data Source 
The main focus of this project is to understand how c ngressional policymakers 
determine how to collect and display information in congressional hearings across 
unified, competitive, and specialized subsystem types. Past research studying the 
change in the tone of information in congressional hearings has relied on the topics of 
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congressional hearings and the group affiliation of th se testifying (rather than the 
individual testimony given) to determine the valenc of congressional testimony 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Jones, 
Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; Worsham 2006). While, as I will discuss later, it is 
important to study the factors that account for variation in the group affiliations of 
individuals asked to testify at congressional hearings, it is not sufficient to gaining a 
true understanding of how congressional policymakers actually decide what information 
to collect and display in congressional hearings.  
Assuming that the group affiliations of the individuals that are asked to testify 
will be indicative of the actual information present d in hearings can be problematic in 
light of the fact that past research has uncovered that individuals have presented 
information about particular issues that diverges from what one may expect given their 
organizational affiliation (Jenkins-Smith and Silva 1998). Furthermore, in light of the 
finding that the public has been persuaded by information that is contrary to what one 
would expect given the organizational affiliation of those relaying the information 
(Jenkins-Smith and Silva 1998), it would not be surprising to find that congressional 
policymakers seeking to add credibility to their own arguments may purposefully seek 
out individuals to testify at hearings who agree with the policy positions they seek to 
advance even though their organizational affiliation suggests that they should not. 
Finally, in light of the fact that committee staff generally interview prospective 
witnesses prior to allowing them to testify at the hearing, and thus, have some 
knowledge of the content of their testimony prior t the hearing taking place (Palmer 
2007; Davis 2007), it seems necessary to actually study the content of the testimony to 
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discover the main factors that determine what positions the testimony favors if it favors 
a particular positions at all.  
Congressional hearing documents contain a wealth of inf rmation that can give 
powerful insight into the information collection and display decisions made by 
congressional committee members. In particular, by analyzing congressional hearing 
documents, the tone of information presented in congressional hearings can be directly 
measured and analyzed in order to discover whether committees with particular 
predispositions purposefully select witnesses that will estify in support of these 
predispositions. Furthermore, congressional hearing documents also contain the 
statements of members participating in a hearing, which can be analyzed to uncover the 
reasons why individual committee members participate in particular hearings. 
Unfortunately, despite the significant insights that c n be gained from analyzing 
congressional hearing documents, only recently have res archers begun to tap into 
congressional hearings as a data source for systematic research. As McQuide (2007) 
notes, many researchers are skeptical of the validity and reliability of congressional 
hearings as a data source (62). However, as Esterling (2004) indicates, questions about 
the reliability and validity of congressional hearings arise from the fact that few studies 
have utilized congressional hearings as a source of data for systematic research (251). 
Fortunately, with recent advances in the online avail bility of congressional hearing 
transcripts on sites like ProQuest Congressional (https://web.lexis-
nexis.com/congcomp) and GPO Access 
(http://www.gpoaccess.gov/chearings/index.html), ore researchers have been able to 
make use of the vast amount of information contained  congressional hearings for the 
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purpose of conducting systematic research (for recent examples, see Esterling 2004, 
2007, 2010; McQuide 2007; Holyoke 2008). As congressional hearings are utilized 
more frequently as a data source, researchers will gain more confidence in their validity 
and reliability.  
Nonetheless, although technological improvements have increased the 
availability of congressional hearings and potentially the validity and reliability of 
hearings as a source of data, some researchers still doubt that any valuable insights can 
be garnered from analyzing congressional hearing documents. At the extreme end of the 
spectrum, some theorists have argued that congressional hearings serve no greater 
purpose than a “window-dressing” event or “propaganda channel” through which 
congressional committees and subcommittees can display carefully selected information 
to actors outside the committee (i.e. members on the floor, interest groups, the general 
public, etc.) in order to drum up support for positi ns espoused by committee members 
and/or “claim credit” for providing policy benefits o constituents (Truman 1951; Berry 
1984; Davidson and Oleszek 1985). Yet, for every scholar arguing that congressional 
hearings are events designed to promote a particular position on an issue, there are just 
as many scholars that argue that witnesses are selected with a mind toward hearing from 
a balanced set of perspectives on a particular issue (Leyden 1995; Wright 1996) and that 
hearings can be informationally useful for members of Congress (Weeks et al. 1986; 
Johnson 1995; Diermeier and Feddersen, 2000; Esterling 2004; Burstein and Hirsch 
2007). By analyzing congressional hearing documents a d the tone of information 
presented by witnesses and committee members, the question of whether information is 
stacked to fit the predisposed positions of committee members can be more concretely 
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answered than it has in the past. Nonetheless, the mer suspicion that hearings are “dog 
and pony shows” should not deter researchers from analyzing hearing documents to 
more directly determine whether  this suspicion is i  fact validated by the information 
contained in these documents.  
 
Selection of Congressional Hearing Cases 
As noted in the previous section, congressional hearing documents contain a 
wealth of information about the congressional hearing process that can be extracted to 
better understand the decisions made by congressional p licymakers when preparing for 
and conducting hearings. As such, in order to properly understand the hearing process 
in the climate change, tobacco, and biotechnology policy areas, I had to identify all of 
the congressional hearings conducted on these issue areas and obtain copies of the 
transcripts of these hearings. To ensure as comprehensive a list of congressional 
hearings as possible, the following two pronged approach for selecting congressional 
hearing cases was utilized.  
First, hearings were selected by searching through hearings from the 
“Congressional Hearings Data Set” of the Policy Agendas project 
(http://www.policyagendas.org). In the Policy Agendas project, information concerning 
the topic of hearings has been collected to allow hearings about particular topics to be 
easily accessed.  Hearings were selected in the following topic areas related to the 
tobacco, climate change, and biotechnology issue areas:  
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• Tobacco – Agriculture (Agricultural Marketing, Research, and Promotion; 
Agricultural Trade; Animal and Crop Disease and Pest Control; Food Inspection 
and Safety; General Agriculture; Government Subsidie  to Farmers and 
Ranchers, Agricultural Disaster Insurance); Health (Tobacco Abuse, Treatment, 
and Education) 
• Climate Change – Environment (Air pollution, Global Warming, and Noise 
Pollution; Research and Development; General Enviromental Issues); 
International (General International Affairs and Foreign Aid Issues; 
International Resources Exploitation and Resources Agreement); Space, 
Science, Technology, and Communications (Weather Forecasting and Related 
Issues, NOAA, Oceanography; Research and Development) 
• Biotechnology - Agriculture (Research and Development); Environme t 
(Research and Development); Health (Research and Development); Space, 
Science, Technology, and Communications (Research and Development) 
In order to ensure all cases were selected, I then conducted searches using 
ProQuest Congressional Universe (https://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp) for hearings 
using the search terms related to the different topic areas being examined. These terms 
were selected because they are either synonymous with the issue area being studies or 
make up subsections of the larger issue area being examined.  
• Tobacco - tobacco, cigarette, cigar, and smoking  
• Climate Change - climate change, global warming, and greenhouse ga  
• Biotechnology - biotechnology, genetically enhanced, genetically ltered, 
genetically engineered, genetically modified, genetic ngineering, genetic test, 
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cloning, embryonic transfer, genome, gene therapy, recombinant, somatic cell, 
stem cell, transgenic, biodegradation, bioremediation, and growth hormone  
From these searches, I selected those hearings whose descriptions noted that the 
whole hearing or a substantial part of the hearing (i.e. at least one panel of the hearing) 
dealt with these policy areas. If only a part of the hearing dealt with the policy area 
being studied, only statements made by witnesses and committee members dealing with 
the issue area were coded. PDF copies of the hearings identified via the methods 
described above were then downloaded from the ProQuest Congressional Universe 
website (https://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp). In the next section, I will turn to an 
explanation of how data to measure key dependent variables was collected from 
congressional hearing transcripts.  
 
Testing the Conditional Theory of Information Collection 
As the last chapter described, I theorize that information collection and display 
decisions at all stages of the hearing process will be affected by the specific subsystem 
context that the hearing is operating within. To test he theory described in the previous 
chapter, I plan to conduct a series of analyses on each phase of the congressional 
hearing process. There are essentially three phases of the congressional hearing process 
that will be examined. First of all, committee members choose which individuals or 
groups will testify at hearings. Secondly, the indivi ual presents information before 
Congress. Third, congressmen have the opportunity to ask questions of those testifying 
before the committee. In the next sections, I will discuss why each of the dependent 
variables being studied is important to study and how the data will be collected. I then 
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discuss how each of the independent variables is specifically hypothesized to affect 
each of the separate independent variables to be analyzed and how each of the 
independent variables will be operationalized.  
 
Dependent Variables 
Tone of Committee Member Statements. Individual rank-and-file legislators are not 
typically intimately involved with the selection ofwitnesses in congressional hearings 
since control over that process is usually reserved for committee and subcommittee 
chairs (Sachs 2003, 11; LaForge 2010). Nonetheless, the e members still are typically 
given the chance at the start of a hearing to present an oral statement and are given an 
additional five minutes during the course of a hearing to use as they please. Committee 
members will often use this time to influence the hearing process through questioning 
the validity of arguments made by witnesses (Palmer 2007) and through orally 
presenting statements for the record that serve as either dissent or affirmation of the 
general tone of information selected by committee and subcommittee chairs. When not 
present, committee members are also given the privilege of submitting statements for 
the record, which also serve to establish a record of dissent or affirmation for the overall 
tone of the hearing. As such, although a committee may be an hospitable venue in terms 
of collecting and displaying information supportive of a particular side in a debate, 
committee members that disagree with the prevailing to e of information presented in 
the hearing may prove inhospitable to certain witnesses by using their own time to 
deconstruct the information being presented by witnesses (Palmer 2007; LaForge 2010).  
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This part of the process is very important to understand, because it allows us to 
determine the intent of congressional policymakers when they call a hearing and why 
they make decisions on who they call to testify. This is a part of the process that cannot 
be wholly captured by simply studying witness testimony alone since congressional 
policymakers will sometimes call witnesses whose tetimony they disagree with in 
order to directly question and discredit certain individuals with which they disagree. For 
instance, through the congressional hearing process, ongressional committee and 
subcommittee members have the opportunity to call executive officials from the 
opposing party to testify before them and directly a tempt to discredit the information 
they provide. Analysis of opening statements allows us to understand what the actual 
goal of a hearing is even when they purposely call witnesses that disagree with them on 
certain issues. Furthermore, analysis of opening statements also allows us to understand 
the main part of the process where rank-and-file members get to participate in the 
hearing process, since they are normally left out of the witness selection stage of the 
process. 
In order to capture the influence that rank and file members have over the 
hearing process, I will study the tone of statements given by congressional committee 
members in a hearing. Congressional committee members will often use these 
statements to make it clear exactly what they are trying to accomplish in the hearing and 
why they are participating in a hearing, even if only to send in a written statement. 
Statements were selected as follows. In most cases, committee members either orally 
recited an opening statement or submitted a written s atement. In these cases, the 
statements were analyzed to determine their tone. However, not all committee members 
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participating in a hearing recited or submitted opening statements. Nonetheless, most 
times, in these cases, committee members used portions of the five minutes assigned to 
them for questioning witnesses to make fairly lengthy statements discussing their intent 
in asking questions and/or their reasons for participating in a hearing. In these cases, 
these statements were analyzed to determine their tone.  
 The tone of committee member statements was determin d as follows. Particular 
arguments made over the course of a statement were coded as either supportive toward 
a particular point of view, moderate, or opposed to a particular point of view. More 
specific information on how each statement was assigned can be found in Appendices 
C, D, and E.  
Using PDF XChange Viewer’s free PDF editing software9, notations were made 
to denote the positive, moderate, and negative suppositions made over the course of a 
statement. Each sentence of the statement was codedas either positive, moderate, or 
negative toward the issue. The whole statement was also highlighted to determine how 
much of the statement was made up by arguments in each of the different categories 
discussed above. After highlighting the statement, the statement could be better 
analyzed to determine how much of each type of statement was made up by different 
categories of statements. In most cases, the calls on statements were quite easy as the 
vast majority of the statement was made up of statements that fit one type of category of 
statement. However, in cases where statements were mad up of mixes of statements, 
                                                
9
 PDF XChange Viewer allows users to highlight and mark up PDF documents obtained by other sources. 
This software can prove invaluable to individuals seeking to content analyze documents on a limited 




highlighting the document helped to visualize how much of the document was made up 
of different categories of statements.   
Based on the content analysis above, each individual statement was assigned on 
overall score on a five point scale from -2 (very po-economic on climate change/very 
negative toward tobacco/very negative toward biotechnology) to 2 (very pro-
environmental toward climate change/very positive toward tobacco/very positive 
toward biotechnology) to denote the denote the toneof the statement toward the issue 
area in question. The following generic scale describes how I made decisions on how to 
code each overall statement: 
• Very negative (-2): Statements where most or all (over ¾) of the statement was 
made up of negative arguments toward the issue and very little (less than a ¼ of 
the statement) to no positive or neutral arguments 
• Negative (-1): Statements where negative arguments are made in over ½ of the 
statement and positive arguments are made in between ¼ to ½ of the statement. 
Statements where negative and neutral arguments were made in an equal 
proportion of the statement were also coded as negativ .  
• Neutral (0): Statements where neutral arguments were made in over ¾ of the 
statement. Statements where around ½ of the statemen  is devoted to both 
negative and positive statements are also coded as neutral 
• Positive (1): Statements where positive arguments are made in over ½ of the 
statement and positive arguments are made in between ¼ to ½ of the statement. 
Statements where positive and neutral arguments were made in an equal 
proportion of the statement were also coded as positive. 
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• Very positive (2): Statements where most or all (over ¾) of the statement was 
made up of positive arguments toward the issue and very little (less than a ¼ of 
the statement) to no negative or neutral arguments  
 
Tone of Testimony. The main goal of this project is to determine how specific 
characteristics of committees influence the overall tone of testimony presented in 
congressional hearings. As stated earlier, while it s important to study the factors that 
account for variation in the individuals and groups asked to testify at, understanding the 
dynamics that lead to certain groups and individuals being asked to testify is not 
sufficient to gaining a true understanding of how congressional policymakers actually 
decide what information to collect and display in congressional hearings. In light of the 
fact that committee staff generally interview prospective witnesses prior to allowing 
them to testify at the hearing, and thus, have some knowledge of the content of their 
testimony prior to the hearing taking place (Palmer 2007; Davis 2007), it seems 
necessary to actually study the content of the testimony to discover the main factors that 
determine what positions the testimony favors if it favors a particular positions at all.  
I analyze the tone of information presented in congressional hearings on the 
topic of tobacco, climate change, and biotechnology by analyzing the actual content of 
hearing testimony itself. The tone of hearing testimony was determined as follows. 
Particular arguments are made over the course of a statement. Each statement was 
coded differently depending on the issue being examined.  More specific information on 
how each statement was assigned can be found in Appendices C, D, and E. For climate 
change, statements were coded as either supportive f th economic coalition in the 
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climate change debate, moderate, or supportive of the environmental coalition in the 
climate change debate. For tobacco policy, statements were coded as either supportive 
toward the tobacco industry, moderate, or opposed to the tobacco industry. For 
biotechnology policy, statement were coded as either supportive toward the 
biotechnology, moderate, or opposed to the biotechnology.  
Using PDF XChange Viewer’s free PDF editing software, notations were made 
to denote the positive, moderate, and negative suppositions made over the course of a 
statement. I use the same coding criteria for coding individual pieces of testimony as I 
did for coding opening statements of congressmen. I then take the average of the scores 
for each piece of testimony given before a particular committee in a particular Congress 
to measure the overall tone of testimony in that committee for that Congress.  
 
Dependent Variable – Group Affiliation. A wide variety of individuals get called to 
testify before congressional hearings including, but not limited to, policy analysts, 
scientists, bureaucrats, interest groups, politicians, nd citizens. For my theory, it is 
important to test the determinants of who gets called to testify at these hearings for a 
variety of reasons. First of all, studying the groups that testify at hearings give 
researchers a method of understanding what types of sources are favored by particular 
congressional committees and how the types of groups favored change across time and 
across different subsystems. Second, the expertise of ndividual witnesses can only be 
determined by virtue of examining their professional credentials as represented by their 
working title and the organization that they work for. 
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 In each individual issue area, there will be specific groups that are interesting to 
study for a variety of reasons. These different groups and the reasons for studying them 
will be presented in the subsequent empirical chapters. Nonetheless, every chapter will 
also consist of analysis of broad categories of groups that tend to testify at all hearings 
regardless of the issue being discussed. In the analysis, I will discuss how each of these 
groups have ebbed and flowed in terms of their selection by congressional committees 
and subcommittees over time and what this evolution says about how witnesses are 
selected in these issue areas over time. In general, there are five types of groups that 
testify at congressional hearings. These groups include the following: 
• Experts – Individuals representing non-ideological think tanks, universities, 
governmental research institutions (i.e. NASA and DOE’s nonpartisan research 
institutions), or any type of organization respected for the quality of the 
information they are providing 
• Representatives of Private Interests – Individuals clearly trying to represent 
the viewpoints of an organization or group in society. These can include interest 
groups, businesses, and private individuals (i.e. farmers). 
• Federal Bureaucratic Officials – Individuals speaking on behalf of a particular 
federal executive governmental agency or department (i. . Department of 
Energy, Environmental Protection Agency) 
• State and Local Politicians – Any representative of a state or local 
governmental entity (bureaucratic, legislative, executive, or otherwise) 
• Federal Politicians – Current and former members of Congress (unless a 
former member of Congress is representing one of the groups above) 
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I will analyze the affiliations of the groups giving the testimony, which is given 
in the Lexis-Nexis Congressional database descriptions of the testimony. I then break 
down hearing testimony on the issue areas studied into typology of the groups giving 
the testimony above as well as any additional typologies necessary for each individual 
issue area. I will then take the percentage of testimony given by each of these groups in 
a particular committee or subcommittee during a particular congressional session.  
 
Independent Variables 
Personal Beliefs. Individuals involved in the policy process are motiva ed by their 
normative beliefs on how the world should run when processing and collecting 
information about a particular policy issue (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 
and Weible 2007). Thus, one of the most prevalent cues that policy actors may use to 
process and collect information is whether the information fits their normative views on 
an issue. Policy actors, including those that sit on c ngressional committees and 
subcommittees, tend to hold the following types of beliefs on policy issues (Sabatier 
and Weible 2007, 194-196): 
• Deep core beliefs – very general normative assumptions about human nature 
and the role of government in providing for the public good that span across all 
policy issues  
• Policy core beliefs – more specific normative assumptions concerning an entire 
policy issue 
•  Secondary beliefs – very specific assumptions about single policy issue that 
are not considered to encapsulate an entire policy issue 
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If these belief systems guide how committees and subcommittees process information, 
it seems logical to expect that these belief system will also have a powerful influence 
on what types of information these institutional entities collect during the congressional 
hearing process.  
In the case of climate change policy, deep core beli fs should affect information 
collection and display decisions as follows. More conservative individuals would likely 
be more supportive of economic interests in the climate change debate, as the increased 
regulation of particular industries that would be required to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions is antithetical to conservative belief systems. By contrast, more liberal 
individuals tend to believe in a more active role for the government in protecting 
individuals from environmental harm. In the case of tobacco policy, more conservative 
individuals would likely be more supportive of tobacco interests as the tobacco industry 
represents a significant portion of the economy and regulation of particular industries is 
antithetical to conservative belief systems. By contrast, more liberal individuals are 
more supportive of policies that regulate industrie in order to protect the public, and 
thus, may be less supportive of tobacco interests. Finally, in the issue area of 
biotechnology, on dimensions of the issue concerning the use of human embryos and 
stem cells for health purposes, more conservative individuals should be less likely to be 
supportive of biotechnology while more liberal indivi uals will be more supportive of 
this technology. In order to measure the ideological preferences of committee and 
subcommittee members that characterize deep core beliefs, I use Poole and Rosenthal’s 
first-dimension DW-Nominate scores, which are based off of roll call votes taken by the 
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committee members (http://voteview.org). This variable is measured on a continuous 
scale from -1 to 1 with higher scores indicating a more conservative member ideology.  
In the specific case of climate change policy, policy core beliefs comprise more 
specific beliefs about the role of government specifically in protecting the environment. 
These beliefs may slightly differ from the ideological beliefs that characterize deep core 
belief systems. For instance, although some individuals may have conservative beliefs 
about the role of government in general, these same individuals may believe that 
protection of the environment is a special instance, in which aggressive governmental 
policies are necessary. In order to measure the morspecific policy core beliefs that 
span environmental policies in general, I use the League of Conservation Voters voting 
scores (http://www.lcv.org/scorecard/), which are based off of roll call votes taken by 
the committee members on bills with an environmental dimension. This variable is 
measured on a continuous scale from 0 to 100 with hig er scored indicating a more pro-
environmental belief system.10  
 
Ideological Polarization. In the context of the overall tone of climate change 
testimony, it is very likely that ideological polarization between political parties may 
have another effect aside from making venues more cmpetitive. According to 
committee rules, committee chairmen are required to allow the minority ranking 
member to call at least one witness to testify at a he ring (Sachs 2003, 11; Carr 2006, 
10-11; Staff Interviews 2010). Minority ranking members will likely be relatively more 
                                                
10
 Measures of policy core beliefs are not as readily available in issue areas related to tobacco policy and 
biotechnology policy, and thus, cannot be used.  
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likely to exercise this privilege when the ranking member’s views are far apart from the 
chairman’s and the ranking member does not believe his or her views will be 
represented at the hearing otherwise.  In particular, c imate change was a relatively non-
contentious issue at its start with both parties in agreement about the potential 
seriousness of the problem. Thus, minority ranking members (mostly Republicans) 
likely did not exercise their privilege at the issue’s start as they agreed with the 
decisions made by committee chairmen.  
However, as time has worn on and the two parties have become more and more 
divided on the issue of climate change, the impetus for the minority ranking member to 
exert the privilege to call at least one witness to testify on behalf of their position on the 
issue has become much stronger. Due to the fact that the two parties started from a pro-
environmental position toward the climate change issue and the fact that Democrats 
have stayed relatively pro-environmental over time while Republicans have become 
significantly more pro-economic in their views, it is likely that this polarization has had 
the effect of causing testimony to become more pro-economic rather than more pro-
environmental over time. Democrats were relatively equally motivated throughout time 
to ensure the pro-environmental position would be presented at these hearings, while 
Republicans have become more motivated to ensure that the pro-economic position is 
represented as they have strayed away from the pro-nvironmental position on the issue. 
In order to measure this effect, I create two variables taking the absolute values of the 
differences between both the DW-Nominate scores and the League of Conservation 




Policy Subsystem Bias. As stated earlier, some theorists argue that differences in the 
collection of policy information will be influenced by the biases involved with the 
subsystem that a particular committee or subcommittee operates within (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1991, 1993; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, and 
Talbert 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009). 
According to this perspective, biases in the ways different institutional venues 
characterize particular policy issues through congressional hearing testimony must be 
apparent. If congressional committees and subcommittees do not show bias in the way 
they frame particular policy issues, each committee would be just as likely as another to 
present information that was favorable to the statu quo conception of the issue. Thus, 
different congressional committees attempting to extend their jurisdiction over a policy 
issue would make no impact over how the issue is def ned and whether policy change 
occurs on a policy issue or not.   
 In the cases of tobacco and biotechnology policy, due to the consensual nature 
of politics within the agricultural subsystem and the historical role of the committee in 
promoting all agricultural commodities, it is expected that hearings held by agricultural 
committees in Congress will be significantly more positive toward the tobacco industry 
and the use of biotechnology than a typical run of the mill committee. In the case of 
climate change, if there are subsystem biases in the collection of information, 
congressional committees that are expected to be sympathetic to interests that downplay 
the significance of the climate change problem (i.e. energy and foreign policy 
committees) will preside over hearings that produce more pro-economic testimony 
toward the issue of climate change. Congressional committees that are expected to 
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highlight the importance of tackling the climate change issue (i.e. environmental and 
science committees) will preside over hearings that produce more pro-environmental 
testimony toward the issue of climate change. 
 
Controversial Issue Dimension. As stated earlier, in the biotechnology issue area, it is 
expected that dimensions of the issue dealing with the creation and cloning of human 
embryos and human embryonic stem cells for health purposes will encourage more 
conflict between the political parties than other issue dimensions of the issue (Sheingate 
2006). When committees and subcommittees deal with this issue dimension, it should 
have two distinct effects on the tone of information. First of all, in this dimension of the 
issue we should expect that differences in the belief systems of committee chairs will be 
an important determinant of the tone of hearing testimony while on other dimensions of 
the issue the belief systems of committee chairs will be relatively unimportant. 
Secondly, since committee chairmen are required to allow the minority ranking member 
to call at least one witness to testify at a hearing (Sachs 2003, 11; Carr 2006, 10-11; 
Staff Interviews 2010), even when the committee chairs are liberal, hearings on these 
issue dimensions will be relatively more negative toward biotechnology than a typical 
biotechnology hearing because the conservative will be more likely to exercise their 
privilege to call witnesses that are critical of the use of biotechnology to create and 
clone human embryos and embryonic stem cells. In order to consider these effects, I 
create a variable that equals 1 if the committee or subcommittee held at least one 
hearing dealing with the topic of the creation or cl ning of human embryos and stem 
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cells for health purposes. This variable was then interacted with the ideology of the 
committee chairs.  
 
Control Variables 
Constituency Characteristics. In the specific case of tobacco policy, past findings that 
agricultural committees tended to produce information sympathetic to the tobacco 
industry in congressional hearings could be attribued to the fact that the main leaders in 
the agricultural committees and subcommittees holding hearings on tobacco policy were 
made up of individuals from the leading tobacco-producing states. Thus, chairs from 
tobacco-producing states may have stacked hearing testimony to produce information 
consistent with their own constituents’ interests in the issue and encountered little 
resistance due to the fact that the minority leader rep esented similar constituent 
interests, and thus, tended to agree with the selections made by the chair. In any event, 
if committee members come to hearings with the intention of representing their own 
interests, we should expect that those individuals representing tobacco interests will 
participate with the purpose of bolstering information supportive of tobacco interests 
and debunking information in opposition to tobacco interests. As such, this 
consideration must be controlled for in my analysis.  
In order to capture the effect of constituency interests on the subject of tobacco 
policy, I use Worsham’s (2006) criteria for coding tobacco states. According to 
Worsham (2006), tobacco states include the following: North Carolina, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Georgia, and South Carolina. As Worsham (2006) states, 
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according to the Economic Research Service of the USDA these states comprise the 
leading producers of tobacco. Five of the six also comprise the largest manufacturers of 
tobacco products. Thus, I create a dummy variable that is coded 1 if committee 
members hail from these tobacco states and 0 if they do not.  
 
Time. It is expected that some elements of information colle tion and display in 
tobacco policy simply cannot be accounted for by elements of changes in different key 
characteristics between different committees across different time periods. To control 
for the effects of time on informational collection, I include dummy variables for each 
decade that congressional hearings took place: (1971- 80; 1981-1990; 1991-2000; 
2001-2006).11 The 1970’s (1971-1980) serve as the reference decade for variables the 
biotechnology and tobacco models while the 1980’s serve as the reference decade for 
variables in the climate change model. 
 
                                                
11
 Although including dummy variables for each of the Congresses can be argued to be more 
appropriate, doing so uses up a large number of degrees of freedom. With the small number of cases in 
the committee level models, the loss of degrees of freedom made it impossible for the statistical 
package to estimate the F statistic, which is necessary to show the significance of the overall model. 
Furthermore, it is likely that certain characteristics of the chairmen will be nearly perfectly collinear with 
the particular Congress being controlled for. For instance, since the House and Senate are typically 
controlled by the same party, it is likely that there are relatively few instances where differences in party 
control will be observed within Congresses. Additionally, ideological differences within Congresses and 
between chairs are also likely to be muted due to the high correlation between ideological preferences 
and party identifications. As Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) note, one of the drawbacks of their suggested 
method of using time dummies for each time period studied is that it cannot account for the effects of 
variables where there is little to no variation within the time period. As such I use the decade variable 
approach, as it allows time effects to be captured without using up too many degrees of freedom and 
allows certain important variables to vary so their effects can be more helpfully studied.  
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Chamber. Of the two chambers of Congress, the House represents maller 
constituencies, and thus, may operate in a more parochial manner than the Senate. As 
such, due to their broader constituency bases, the Senate may show more of a concern 
toward broader policy issues like environmental protection. On the other hand, the 
House may be a more receptive venue to more parochil interests like tobacco interests 
than the Senate. In order to control for this effect, I reated a dummy variable for each 
of the models, which equal 0 if the hearing takes place in the Senate and 1 if the hearing 
takes place in the House.  
 
Statistical Model 
Pooled OLS. In order to test the expectations laid out above, I conducted a series of 
pooled OLS regression analyses that grouped data based on the committee or sub-
committee a particular hearing was held in for the committee level models and grouped 
data based on the member presenting statements in the statement model. A pooled OLS 
regression assumes that any two unit years can be compared whether across committees 
or across times and its estimator is a weighted average of collapsing groups down to a 
single, mean time point and differencing each observation within each group from its 
group mean.  
 
Conclusion 
In the next three chapters, I will use the basic research design laid out above to 
test the theory of information collection and display decisions discussed in Chapter 2.  
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In Chapter 4, I will demonstrate how issue areas with a distributive component can 
cause members of unified subsystems to unite together w en making information 
collection and display decisions using data collected from hearings dealing with the 
issue area of tobacco policy. In Chapter 5, I will discuss how partisan issues can lead to 
divisions amongst members of subsystem members and how these divisions can 
heighten the degree to which the beliefs of committee chairs affect witness selection 
decisions using data collected from hearings dealing with the issue area of climate 
change policy. Finally, in Chapter 6, I will discuss how the dynamics of information 
collection and display decisions can differ when studying different dimensions of the 
same issue using data collected from hearings dealing with the issue area of 
biotechnology policy. I now turn to the next chapter to discuss how the dynamics of 




Chapter 4. Tobacco Policy – Distributive Issue Contexts, Unified 
Subsystems, and Information Collection and Display Decisions 
 
Introduction 
In 1983, nearly twenty years after the Surgeon General r leased its seminal 
report linking tobacco use to increased incidence of cancer, the House Committee on 
Agriculture’s Subcommittee on Tobacco and Peanuts held a set of hearings to review 
the tobacco price support program in light of concer s that forces opposed to tobacco 
products may attempt to end the program. Despite repres nting a district with no 
tobacco growers and despite the growing consensus of the negative health consequences 
of tobacco use, then-Representative Pat Roberts from Kansas’s first district made the 
following statement explaining his support for tobacco growers: 
“[T]he economic adversity that we face in agriculture today is so 
severe that I perceive at least that the time for consensus is long 
overdue…I had a newspaper reporter ask me last nighfor about 
30 minute how on Earth I explain to my [wheat] producers why I 
am serving on the Tobacco Subcommittee, and I said ‘Look, we 
are all in this together (Hearing Doc 83-H161-25).’” 
 In 2000, as arguments to end the price support program reached a fever pitch, 
the House Committee on Agriculture’s Subcommittee on Risk Management, Research, 
and Specialty Crops held a hearing in Lexington, KY chaired by Representative 
Thomas Ewing from Illinois. Once again, despite not directly representing any tobacco 
interests in the state, Ewing made the following statement expressing general support 
for tobacco growers: 
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“The subcommittee has worked hard over the last few y ars to 
successfully defeat repeated attempts…to add amendments to 
appropriations bills which would limit or end the Fderal 
Tobacco Program. As most of you know, there are many in 
Washington, DC and around the country that have no tolerance 
for tobacco products and would do most anything to put tobacco 
companies out of business…As a corn and soybean producer, I 
know that you probably just want a fair price…Let me assure you 
that we will be working hard to include tobacco growers in any 
disaster and supplemental assistance this year (Heaing Doc. 
2000-H161-9).” 
 As these statements suggest, politics within the agricultural committees in 
Congress are characterized by consensus rather than struggle between competing 
coalitions. As this chapter will demonstrate, agricultural committees represent peculiar 
types of venues in congressional information collection and display politics. Due to 
their consensual nature and the steadfast support of their members for agricultural 
commodities, agricultural committees tended to produce information that is supportive 
of tobacco interests regardless of the characteristics of the individuals controlling the 
committee. Furthermore, agricultural committee membrs participating in tobacco 
hearings tended to participate in support of tobacco interests, even when controlling for 
constituency characteristics and personal ideological preferences of those participating 
in the hearing. These results lend support to the idea promoted by punctuated 
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equilibrium theorists that certain venues are biased in terms of the tone of information 
produced in congressional hearings.  
 
Tobacco Policy Issue Context 
Much ink has been spilled attempting to understand he dynamics of tobacco 
policy. As these studies have generally demonstrated, tobacco policy has evolved from 
a policy area dominated by a subsystem seeking to promote the expansion of the 
tobacco industry to an issue characterized by competition for influence between this 
subsystem and rival subsystems with a greater propensity for emphasizing the health 
and safety risks involved with tobacco use (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Talbert, 
Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Worsham 2006). Although there has been some debate 
on the degree to which the tobacco subsystem’s influe ce over tobacco policy has 
waned over time (see Worsham 2006; Givel 2006), researchers generally concur that 
the tobacco subsystem remained unified and vigorously s pportive of the tobacco 
industry even as other subsystems entered the fray (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Worsham 2006). 
As these studies further uncovered, the agricultural committees in both 
chambers of the U.S. Congress serve as the “institutional anchors” for the tobacco 
promotion subsystem (Worsham 2006, 439). During the early stages of the issue, 
agricultural committees enjoyed nearly full jurisdictional control over tobacco policy, 
and thus, the informational content of congressional he rings on the issue (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; Worsham 2006). Agricultural 
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committees used this jurisdictional authority to hold hearings that were stacked with 
testimony that emphasized the importance of the tobacco industry to the U.S. economy 
and largely filtered out testimony attempting to emphasize the health risks of tobacco 
use. Even while other committees came on the scene to compete for jurisdictional turf 
with the agricultural committee, the agricultural committee served as a rather 
dependable venue for tobacco proponents (particularly tobacco farmers) to state its case 
to members of Congress and the general public.  
However, while the agricultural committee has clearly been a friendly venue to 
the tobacco industry throughout most of the issue’s history, it is unclear why the 
agricultural committee has been such a hospitable venue. It is unlikely that personal 
belief systems or party identification of committee chairman have much to do with this 
phenomenon. As I will demonstrate later on, the two political parties have not been 
divided on the issue of tobacco policy until relatively recently, and this divide can 
probably be explained by the influx of members from t bacco states into the Republican 
Party. As my theory notes, political parties are not likely to get particularly involved in 
distributive issues, as these institutions have limited time, attention, and resources and 
can concentrate their resources on influencing certain very salient policy issues like 
health care and environmental policy (Redford 1969; Bader 1997). Furthermore, chairs 
from both the Democratic and Republican parties, with both conservative and liberal 
preferences have held control over agricultural committees across time, and yet, the 




However, in the context of the distributive nature of tobacco politics, two 
interesting theories may explain why the agricultural committee has been such a bastion 
of positivity for tobacco interests in terms of the information it collects and displays in 
congressional hearings. On the one hand, the agricultural venue represents an atypically 
consensual committee. Agricultural venues are made up of committee members 
representing districts with high percentages of constituents living in rural areas and 
employed as farmers (Adler and Lipinski 1997). Constituents within these districts have 
a high desire for government benefits and subsidies to a sist the farming communities in 
their districts (Jones 1960; Browne 1995; Adler andLipinski 1997). Each of these 
committee members’ constituencies tend to focus their efforts on obtaining beneficial 
treatment for their own specific commodity and seek to avoid conflict whenever 
possible (Browne 1990; 1995).  
In distributive issue contexts like agricultural policy where policy actions are 
driven by legislators’ constituencies, legislators tend to cooperate with each other and 
support each other’s demands for constituency benefits in order to ensure legislative 
support for their own constituency’s demands in the future (Mayhew 1974; Weingast 
1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Tullock 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988). As 
such, even when agricultural committee leaders haveno direct constituency-related 
incentive to collect and put information on display that is supportive of the tobacco 
industry, they do so in order to curry favor from tobacco state legislators on future 
legislative initiatives. By contrast, this culture of cooperation does not exist on the other 
committees that encroached upon the agricultural committee’s control over the issue. As 
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such, if the above expectations hold true, we should expect the following hypotheses to 
be confirmed: 
 
Unified Subsystem Member Statement Tone Hypothesis: Agricultural committee 
members will be more supportive of the tobacco industry in their opening statements 
than members of other committees.    
 
Unified Subsystem Testimony Tone Hypothesis: Since agricultural committees fit the 
unified subsystem type, agricultural committees will produce significantly more positive 
testimony toward the tobacco industry than other committees. Since most members of 
the committee is in agreement on the conception of a policy issue, the personal belief 
systems and constituency characteristics of committee chairs will have little to no 
impact on the information collection process.  
 
Anecdotal evidence seems to confirm the consensual nature in which 
congressional hearings are conducted in the agricultural committee. According to 
interviews with congressional committee staff, agricultural committee members are 
typically in full agreement on witness selection (Committee Staff Interviews 2010). 
Minority committee members typically will not use their privilege to invite witnesses to 
testify at a congressional hearing because the majority has selected the individuals they 
would have asked to have testify (Committee Staff Interviews 2010). Majority 
committee staff members also typically prepare question  and opening statements for 
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members of the minority, a practice unheard of in other committees in Congress 
(Committee Staff Interviews 2010).  
 
[Tables 4.1 and 4.2 Here] 
 
On the other hand, the finding that the agricultura committee served as a 
sympathetic informational venue for tobacco proponents could be attributed to the fact 
that agricultural venues holding hearings on tobacco policy were typically controlled by 
committee chairs and ranking minority members from the leading tobacco-producing 
states.12 As stated in Chapter 2, committee chairs and, to a lesser extent, minority 
ranking members are the main actors responsible for deciding which witnesses will be 
invited to testify at congressional hearings (Sachs 2003; Palmer 2007; LaForge 2010). 
Thus, instead of committees acting in a consensual nature to invite witnesses, 
committee chairs may simply be acting based in their own interests and using their own 
beliefs and the beliefs of their constituents to guide witness selection decisions even as 
other committee members disagree with their decisions.  
As Table 4.1 demonstrates, committee members from tobacco states chaired just 
over 73% of the agricultural venues holding hearings on the topic of tobacco policy. On 
the other hand, committee members from tobacco states only chaired around 10% of the 
                                                
12
 As will be elaborated upon in more detail later, tobacco states include the following: North Carolina, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, Georgia, and South Carolina. As Worsham (2006) states, according to the 
Economic Research Service of the USDA these states comprise the leading producers of tobacco. Five of 




other venues holding hearings on tobacco policy.  Furthermore, as Table 4.2 depicts, 
committee members from tobacco states made up around 43% of the minority ranking 
members in agricultural committees holding hearings on tobacco policy. By contrast, 
only about 16% of the minority ranking members from ther committees holding 
hearings on tobacco policy hailed from tobacco state . This ultimately leads one to 
wonder whether past findings of the agricultural committees’ informational bias toward 
selecting witnesses supportive of the tobacco industry can be attributed more to the 
consensual quality of politics within the agricultural venue regardless of the beliefs and 
constituent characteristics of those controlling the committee or are more an artifact of 
the control that members from tobacco states have hd over agricultural committees 
holding hearings on tobacco policy. If the agricultural venue’s tendency to be 
sympathetic to the tobacco industry is simply based on the beliefs of committee chairs 
and the constituents of committee chairs, I expect the following hypotheses to be 
confirmed: 
 
Tobacco State Member Statement Tone Hypothesis: Committee members who represent 
large tobacco growing and producing communities will be more supportive of the 
tobacco industry in their opening statements than members of other committees. 
 
Tobacco State Chair Testimony Tone Hypothesis: Regardless of the type of committee 
conducting the hearing, hearings chaired by members from large tobacco growing and 
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producing states/districts will produce significantly more positive testimony toward the 
tobacco industry than committees chaired by non-tobacco producing states/districts.  
 
In the next section, I will detail the ways in whic these expectations will be tested 
using empirical data collected from congressional he ring transcripts.  
 
Data and Methods 
Case Selection. Cases of congressional hearings concerning tobacco policy were 
selected using a two pronged approach. First, hearings were selected by searching 
through hearings from the “Congressional Hearings Data Set” of the Policy Agendas 
project (http://www.policyagendas.org) that dealt with specific subtopics in the 
“Agricultural” topic area along with the “Tobacco Abuse, Treatment, and Education” 
subtopic of the “Health” topic area and picking outthose hearings whose descriptions 
noted that the whole hearing or a substantial part of the hearing dealt with tobacco 
policy. In order to ensure all cases were selected, I then conducted searches using on 
Lexis-Nexis Congressional Universe (http://www.lexisnexis.com) for hearings using the 
following search terms: tobacco, cigarette, cigar, and smoking. Through this method, I 
obtained 176 individual cases of hearing documents published that at least substantially 
concerned the topic of tobacco policy. Data from these hearings were then aggregated at 
the committee and subcommittee level for each indivdual Congress, which condensed 




Dependent Variables – Tone of Committee Member Statements. The tone of 
committee member statements was determined as follows. Particular arguments made 
over the course of a statement were coded as either supportive toward the tobacco 
industry, moderate, or opposed to the tobacco industry. More specific information on 
how each statement was assigned can be found in Appendix C. Using PDF XChange 
Viewer’s free PDF editing software13, notations were made to denote the positive, 
moderate, and negative suppositions made over the course of a statement. Then, the 
overall statement was coded using the following five-point scale: 
• Very negative (-2): Statements made up of mostly or all negative arguments 
toward the tobacco industry and very little to no positive or neutral arguments 
• Negative (-1): Statements with mostly negative arguments toward the tobacco 
industry and a substantial, but not equal portion of positive arguments and 
statements with a fairly equal balance of negative and neutral arguments 
• Neutral (0): Statements made up of nearly all neutral arguments toward the 
tobacco industry or statements with a fairly equal balance of negative and 
positive statements made toward the tobacco industry 
• Positive (1): Statements with mostly positive arguments toward the tobacco 
industry and a substantial, but not equal portion of egative arguments and 
statements with a fairly equal balance of positive and neutral arguments 
                                                
13
 PDF XChange Viewer allows users to highlight and mark up PDF documents obtained by other sources. 
This software can prove invaluable to individuals seeking to content analyze documents on a limited 




• Very positive (2): Statements made up of mostly or all positive arguments 
toward the tobacco industry and very little to no negative or neutral arguments 
 
Dependent Variable – Tone of Testimony. I analyze the tone of information presented 
in congressional hearings on the topic of tobacco policy by analyzing the actual content 
of hearing testimony itself. Using the same general approach that I used for opening 
statements, I assign each individual piece of testimony a score on a five point scale from 
-2 (very negative toward tobacco) to 2 (very positive toward tobacco) to denote the 
degree of its favorability toward the tobacco industry. I then take the average of scores 
of pieces of testimony given before a particular committee in a particular Congress to 
measure the overall tone of testimony in that committee for that Congress.  
 
Dependent Variable – Percentage of Health and Safety Advocates and Experts. 
Although group affiliations on their own are not the most effective indicator of overall 
informational tone, these affiliations do help to gain insight into the types of 
information being focused on in congressional hearings. With respect to tobacco policy, 
one would expect that the health and safety aspects of the issue may be avoided by 
tobacco proponents due to the overwhelming consensu that developed that tobacco use 
was harmful to people’s health. On the other hand, tobacco proponents may seek to 
draw attention to the health and safety aspects of the issue in order to rebut existing 
images through the calling their own health and safety experts to testify in opposition to 
the claim that tobacco use is harmful to one’s healt . In order to analyze these 
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propositions, I measured the information gathered fom health and safety advocates and 
experts in congressional hearings on tobacco policy as follows. First, I coded the 
number of those testifying at hearings that qualified as a health and safety advocates and 
experts. These groups include the following: health nd safety bureaucratic agencies, 
medical experts from universities, pro-health interest groups, pro-safety interest groups, 
fire fighters, environmental groups concerned with air quality, and scientific experts. I 
then took the percentage of health and safety advocates and experts that testified in front 
of a particular committee in a given Congress.  
 
Dependent Variables – Percentage of Tobacco Farmers and Tobacco 
Manufacturers and Sellers. Representatives of the tobacco industry can be split into 
two different categories: farmers and manufacturers/s llers. Due to the comparatively 
less economically fortunate circumstances of tobacco farmers, the public at large 
generally looks upon tobacco farmers with more sympathy than the 
manufacturers/sellers of tobacco who many feel have profited off of the sale of an 
unhealthy product. As such, tobacco opponents may seek to call manufacturers/sellers 
of tobacco products to testify at hearings because these opponents can more effectively 
create the image of an evil tobacco industry when questioning those who make the most 
money off of the product as opposed to questioning farmers who are just trying to 
scrape by the best they can off of the income they get from growing tobacco. On the 
other hand, proponents of tobacco may seek to call tobacco farmers to testify over 
manufacturers/sellers because these farmers create a more sympathetic picture of what 
could happen to poor working farming families if tobacco use was banned. In order to 
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analyze these propositions, I measured the information gathered from tobacco farmers 
and tobacco manufacturers/sellers in congressional hearings on tobacco policy as 
follows. First, I coded the number of those testifying at hearings that qualified as either 
a tobacco farmer or a tobacco manufacturer/seller. Tobacco farmers include any 
individual farmer growing tobacco and/or any agricultural interest group representing 
the interests of tobacco growers. Tobacco manufacturers/sellers include tobacco 
companies (i.e. Phillip Morris USA, Inc.), interest groups representing the tobacco 
industry (i.e. Tobacco Institute), tobacco dealers, and tobacco exporters. I then took the 
percentage of both tobacco farmers and tobacco manufacturers/sellers that testified in 
front of a particular committee in a given Congress.  
 
Independent Variable – Subsystem Venue.  As stated earlier, distributive theorists 
argue that politics within committees is characteriz d by a degree of compromise 
amongst different actors within congressional committees. Congressional policymakers 
seek to cooperate with each other and support each other’s demands for constituency 
benefits in order to ensure legislative support for their own constituency’s demands in 
the future (Mayhew 1974; Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Tullock 1981; 
Weingast and Marshall 1988). In the specific case of tobacco policy, due to the 
consensual nature of politics within the agricultural subsystem and the historical role of 
the committee in promoting all agricultural commodities including tobacco, it is 
expected that hearings held by agricultural committees in Congress will be significantly 
more positive toward the tobacco industry than a typical run of the mill committee. By 
contrast, there is no reason to expect that each of the other types of committees 
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encroaching on the agricultural committee’s jurisdictional turf on the issue will be any 
more likely than a run of the mill committee to be more negative toward the tobacco 
industry. Each of these committees should be significantly more negative toward the 
tobacco industry than the agricultural committee, but not necessarily any more negative 
than each other. In order to test the validity of these expectations, I created categories 
and dummy variables for each of the types of subsystem  represented by particular 
committees in Congress that held hearings on the issue of tobacco policy relatively 
often. These categories include the following: agriculture, health/safety, and judiciary. 
 
Independent Variable – Constituency Characteristics. As stated earlier, past findings 
that agricultural committees tended to produce information sympathetic to the tobacco 
industry in congressional hearings could be attribued to the fact that the main leaders in 
the agricultural committees and subcommittees holding hearings on tobacco policy were 
made up of individuals from the leading tobacco-producing states. Thus, chairs from 
tobacco-producing states may have stacked hearing testimony to produce information 
consistent with their own constituents’ interests in the issue and encountered little 
resistance due to the fact that the minority leader rep esented similar constituent 
interests, and thus, tended to agree with the selections made by the chair. In any event, 
if committee members come to hearings with the intention of representing their own 
interests, we should expect that those individuals representing tobacco interests will 
participate with the purpose of bolstering information supportive of tobacco interests 
and debunking information in opposition to tobacco interests.  
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In order to capture the effect of constituency interests on the subject of tobacco 
policy, I use Worsham’s (2006) criteria for coding tobacco states. According to 
Worsham (2006), tobacco states include the following: North Carolina, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Georgia, and South Carolina. As Worsham (2006) states, 
according to the Economic Research Service of the USDA these states comprise the 
leading producers of tobacco. Five of the six also comprise the largest manufacturers of 
tobacco products. Thus, I create a dummy variable that is coded 1 if committee 
members hail from these tobacco states and 0 if they do not.  
  
Independent Variable – Personal Beliefs. In the case of tobacco policy, more 
conservative individuals would likely be more supportive of tobacco interests as the 
tobacco industry represents a significant portion of the economy and regulation of 
particular industries is antithetical to conservatie belief systems. By contrast, more 
liberal individuals are more supportive of policies that regulate industries in order to 
protect the public, and thus, may be less supportive of tobacco interests. In order to 
measure the ideological preferences of committee and subcommittee members, I use 
Poole and Rosenthal’s first-dimension DW-Nominate scores, which are based off of roll 
call votes taken by the committee members (http://voteview.org). This variable is 
measured on a continuous scale from -1 to 1 with hig er scores indicating a more 




Control Variable – Time. It is expected that some elements of information colle tion 
and display in tobacco policy simply cannot be accounted for by elements of changes in 
different key characteristics between different committees across different time periods. 
For instance, as time goes on and information about the harmful effects of tobacco use 
become more prevalent, images of the tobacco industry at large may become more 
negative, which will likely influence all stages of the congressional hearing process. To 
control for the effects of time on informational collection, I include dummy variables 
for each decade that congressional hearings took place: (1971-1980; 1981-1990; 1991-
2000; 2001-2004).14 The 1970’s (1971-1980) serve as the reference decade for variables 
in the model.  
 
Control Variable – Chamber. Of the two chambers of Congress, the House represents 
smaller constituencies, and thus, may operate in a more parochial manner than the 
Senate. As such, the House may be a more receptive venue for tobacco interests than 
the Senate. In order to control for this effect, I created a dummy variable for each of the 
                                                
14
 Although including dummy variables for each of the Congresses can be argued to be more 
appropriate, doing so uses up a large number of degrees of freedom. With the small number of cases in 
the committee level models, the loss of degrees of freedom made it impossible for the statistical 
package to estimate the F statistic, which is necessary to show the significance of the overall model. 
Furthermore, it is likely that certain characteristics of the chairmen will be nearly perfectly collinear with 
the particular Congress being controlled for. For instance, since the House and Senate are typically 
controlled by the same party, it is likely that there are relatively few instances where differences in party 
control will be observed within Congresses. Additionally, ideological differences within Congresses and 
between chairs are also likely to be muted due to the high correlation between ideological preferences 
and party identifications. As Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) note, one of the drawbacks of their suggested 
method of using time dummies for each time period studied is that it cannot account for the effects of 
variables where there is little to no variation within the time period. As such I use the decade variable 
approach, as it allows time effects to be captured without using up too many degrees of freedom and 
allows certain important variables to vary so their effects can be more helpfully studied.  
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models, which equal 0 if the hearing takes place in the Senate and 1 if the hearing takes 
place in the House.  
 
Statistical Model – Pooled OLS. In order to test the expectations laid out above, I 
conducted a series of pooled OLS regression analyses that grouped data based on the 
committee or sub-committee a particular hearing was held in for the committee level 
models and grouped data based on the member presenting statements in the statement 
model. A pooled OLS regression assumes that any two unit years can be compared 
whether across committees or across times and its est mator is a weighted average of 
collapsing groups down to a single, mean time point and differencing each observation 
within each group from its group mean. I now turn to a discussion of the results of my 
analyses.  
 
Committee Members Statements – Results 
 
[Figure 4.1 Here] 
 
As stated earlier, committee member statements provide important insights into 
why particular committee members participate in congressional hearings. Before 
reporting the results of what determines the tone of these statements, it is important to 
first analyze how the tone of these statements haveebb d and flowed over time across 
particular important groupings. Figure 4.1 presents a graph of the differences between 
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the average tone of statements made by Democrats and Republicans in tobacco hearings 
across time. As this graph demonstrates, Democrats and Republicans were relatively 
undivided on the issue of tobacco policy until the 103rd Congress. In fact, contrary to 
expectations, in a few Congresses prior to the 103rd Congress, Democrats were actually 
more supportive of tobacco interests than Republicans in congressional hearings. 
Nonetheless, after the 103rd Congress, a gulf did develop between Republicans and 
Democrats in tobacco policy with Republicans being the more supportive of the two 
parties toward tobacco interests. This result, however, can likely be attributed to the 
well-documented influx of southern state legislators, including individuals from tobacco 
growing states, into the Republican Party, over time. Furthermore, although there have 
been clear differences between the two parties in their support for the tobacco industry 
since the 103rd Congress, since the 105th Congress both parties have consistently 
decreased and increased their support for tobacco interests in concert. In any event, 
even if differences in the two parties have developd recently, it is clear that this is only 
a recent development and tobacco policy has clearly not been a partisan issue in terms 
of congressional hearing participation throughout his ory.  
 
[Figure 4.2 Here] 
 
 On the other hand, as Figure 4.2 depicts, fairly consistent differences are evident 
throughout time in the average tone of reasons given by tobacco state legislators vis-à-
vis non-tobacco state legislators for their respectiv  participation in congressional 
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hearings on tobacco policy. On the one hand, tobacco state legislators have been 
consistently supportive of tobacco interests in statements in giving in congressional 
hearings. Even at their lowest point in the 105th Congress, the average statement tone 
score for tobacco state legislators only fell barely below 1. On the other hand, with the 
notable exception of the 96th Congress, statements from non-tobacco state legislator  
have been decidedly neutral to negative toward the tobacco industry. It is clear, at least 
anecdotally, from these graphs that the issue of tobacco policy has been far more of a 
constituent oriented issue than a partisan issue across time.  
 
[Table 4.3 Here] 
 
 Turning now to a more systematic analysis of opening statements across time, 
Table 4.3 presents the results presents the results of the pooled ordinal probit model 
testing the determinants of the tone of opening statements on the topic of tobacco 
policy. Overall, the model performs very well, as the pseudo R-squared of 0.300 is 
fairly robust by pseudo R-squared standards and the Wald Chi2 of 407.9 is significant at 
all levels of statistical significance. 
Each of the control variables are significant and in their expected directions. As 
expected, time has a significant impact on the toneof member statements with each 
successive decade producing significantly more negative statements concerning the 
tobacco industry than the reference point of the 1970’s. This result likely is suggestive 
of the increasingly negative aura surrounding tobacco use due to the consensus in the 
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health community concerning the harmful effects of tobacco use. Also, as expected, 
House members are significantly more likely to give statements that are more 
supportive of tobacco interests than the Senate, lik ly due to the parochial politics that 
operate within that chamber. 
 More importantly for this study, however, venue biases and individual member 
constituency and ideological biases have significant effects on the tone of members’ 
statements. First of all, as expected, individuals from tobacco-producing states were 
significantly more positive in their tone toward the tobacco industry when explaining 
the reasons for their participation in the hearing. I terestingly, despite the non-partisan 
and seemingly non-ideological nature of the issue, more conservative committee 
members were significantly more positive toward the tobacco industry than more liberal 
members.  
 In terms of venue biases, the results demonstrate th  two particular venues 
contain legislators with significant biases in their r asons for participating in 
congressional hearings when compared with a miscellan ous set of committees. As 
expected, members of agricultural committees tended to be more supportive of the 
tobacco industry when participating in hearings than other committees. This result 
demonstrates that members of agricultural committees t nded to stick together in their 
support of the tobacco industry even if their belief systems or lack of presence of 
tobacco in their economy would normally lead them toward opposition of the product.  
Thus, in terms of participation by committee members, it is apparent that both 
individual characteristics of the member and overall committee biases affect how 
hospitable members will be toward the tobacco industry when participating in 
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congressional hearings. This result is significant in that it demonstrates the venue where 
tobacco interests are likely to be subject to less har h questioning and the individuals 
who are likely to seriously question the information put forth by tobacco interests. I 
now turn to an analysis of the determinants of the ov rall tone of congressional hearing 
testimony to determine whether the same dynamics that drive the tone of member 
statements also drive the tone of overall testimony presented in congressional hearings. 
 
Overall Tone of Testimony – Results 
 
[Figure 4.3 Here] 
 
 Before discussing the results of the model testing the determinants of the overall 
tone of testimony concerning tobacco policy in congressional hearings, it is important to 
first analyze how the tone of testimony has ebbed and flowed throughout time in order 
to demonstrate how images of the tobacco industry in Congress have deteriorated over 
time. Figure 4.3 presents a graph depicting the average tone of testimony per 
congressional session on the topic of tobacco policy. As the graph demonstrates, while 
the tone of testimony has experienced relatively wide jumps and falls from Congress to 
Congress, the tone has generally trended in a negativ  direction toward the tobacco 
industry, across time. Once again, this is not surprising as this presumably mirrors 
thoughts on tobacco use, as information about the harmful effects of tobacco use 
disseminated throughout the American public. Furthermore, this result is also 
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suggestive of the finding of past studies that the agricultural committee’s jurisdictional 
control over the tobacco policy issue began to break down over time, and thus, more 
and more information began to produced by other committees (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993; Worsham 2006). In summary, it is clear that te tone of the information presented 
on tobacco policy has become decidedly more negative over time.  
 
[Table 4.4 Here] 
 
Turning now to a more systematic analysis of the testimony of witnesses on the 
subject of tobacco policy across time, Table 4.4 presents the results of the pooled OLS 
regression model testing the determinants of the ton of testimony. Overall, the model 
performs very well, as it explains around 58% of the variation in the dependent variable 
and the F-statistic of 33.17 is significant at all standard levels of statistical significance. 
As expected and as depicted in Figure 4.3, time has a significant impact on the overall 
tone of testimony heard in congressional hearings. Each decade subsequent to the 
1970’s all represent significant breaks from the 1970’s in the overall tone of testimony 
in congressional hearings. Even when controlling for other factors, each decade 
subsequent to the 1970’s saw significantly more negative testimony presented in front 
of congressional committees than the 1970’s. This lends support to the claim that the 
tone of testimony about tobacco interests became mor negative as information 
uncovering the health effects of tobacco use disseminated throughout society.  
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More importantly for this study, however, it is also apparent from the results in 
Table 4.4 that the individual characteristics of committee leaders had no statistically 
significant effect on the tone of testimony presented in front of congressional 
committees on the subject of tobacco policy. The fact that the chair and the minority 
ranking member hailed from tobacco states had no impact on to tone of testimony. 
Furthermore, not even the percentage of tobacco state legislators within a particular 
committee had any sizable effect on the tone of testimony about tobacco policy. 
Additionally, personal belief systems of committee chairs also did not translate into 
having a significant effect on the tone of information presented about tobacco policy.  
However, while the individual characteristics of committee leaders had no 
substantial effect on the tone of tobacco testimony, the effects of one committee venue 
in particular had a decidedly large impact on the tone of testimony. As expected, 
agricultural committees tended to produce more information supportive of tobacco 
interests in hearings than the baseline group of miscellaneous committees. More 
specifically, the tone of testimony presented in front of agricultural committees was an 
expected 1.799 units more positive toward tobacco interests than testimony presented in 
front of the baseline category of miscellaneous committees. By contrast, no other 
committee venue produced significant differences in the tone of overall testimony 
toward tobacco interests when compared with the basline case of a miscellaneous 
group of committees and subcommittees.  
These results provide firm reaffirmation of the conlusions arrived at by 
punctuated equilibrium theorists. In the case of tobacco policy, it is apparent that the 
agricultural venue is uniquely supportive of tobacco interests in terms of the 
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information presented in congressional hearings. On the other hand, individual 
characteristics of committee leaders have no impact on the tone of testimony. I now turn 
to an analysis of the types of groups that testify at congressional hearings to determine 
whether certain committees focus on particular aspect  of the issue over other aspects. 
 
Types of Witnesses - Results 
 
[Figure 4.4 Here] 
 
Figure 4.4 contains a graph depicting the evolution in the broad categories of 
witnesses that have testified during hearings concerning tobacco policy. As Figure 4.4 
demonstrates, representatives of private interests (i.e. tobacco farmers, tobacco 
manufacturers, health and safety interest groups, etc.) have by far been the most 
preponderant type of group testifying at congressional hearings throughout the history 
of the issue. More specifically, representatives of private interests have never made up 
less than 40% of the total witnesses testifying at hearings on the subject of tobacco 
policy and even made up as high as 82% of the witnesses testifying during the 97th 
Congress.  
The other general types of groups testifying (experts, federal politicians, 
state/local politicians, and federal bureaucrats) have not made up a large percentage of 
the groups testifying on the issue. These categories individually have only rarely made 
up more than 20% of the groups testifying at congressional hearings on the topic of 
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tobacco policy. Of particular note, despite the clear medical controversies on the issue 
especially in its early stages, experts (i.e. individuals representing a non-ideological 
think tank and/or university) have not made up a siz ble portion of the individuals 
called to testify. More explicitly, experts have only made up more than 20% of the total 
witnesses testifying on the issue of tobacco policy twice (during the 105th and 107th 
Congresses). As I will demonstrate in later chapters, xperts have routinely made up a 
very sizable portion of witnesses testifying at congressional hearings on the topics of 
climate change and biotechnology. Yet, despite the possible need for medical and 
scientific experts to provide expert information to clear up the supposed controversy 
over the harmful effects of tobacco use, hearings were more routinely utilized as a 
forum for representatives of private interests to espouse their viewpoints on the issue. 
Why have hearings in tobacco policy been dominated by representatives of 
private interests when hearings on other issues with a technical component have been 
used to call large percentages of experts to testify? Unlike the other issues we will be 
discussing, the technical aspects of the tobacco issue did not pervade every single 
dimension of the tobacco issue. For instance, the agricultural committees, which held 
the majority of the hearings on tobacco policy especially in its early stages, largely 
ignored the health and safety aspects of the issue because such matters were not 
important to policy they would be making. Instead, they focused on issues related to 
growing tobacco crops. In such dimensions of issues, expert testimony is relatively less 
important since farmers can speak for themselves as to what is most beneficial for them. 
As such, agricultural hearings, for the most part, were used as a forum for tobacco 
farmers to express their support for/opposition to particular policies being proposed by 
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the federal government. This type of use of the hearing process is likely how the process 
operates in many issues where the public and politicians generally understand what is at 
stake in the issue (i.e. welfare policy, abortion plicy, tax policy, etc.). However, as we 
will see in the more technical issues of climate change and biotechnology policy, 
experts are routinely called to testify at congressional hearings to provide credibility for 
certain arguments and/or to provide information to policymakers to help them better 
understand what to do on a policy issue. Although this happened to a lesser extent in 
tobacco hearings than it did in other hearings, experts were also called at tobacco 
hearings (particularly when the health and safety aspects of the issue were addressed) in 
order to provide credibility for one side of the debate over another and to potentially 
give congressional policymakers an idea on how to address the issue in future policy. 
 
[Table 4.5 Here] 
 
 Nonetheless, with the trends in the broad categoris of witnesses called to testify 
on tobacco policy laid out, I can now turn to an analysis of whether committees with 
certain characteristics tend to ignore or focus on certain types of witnesses to determine 
the types of subjects certain committees focus on during their hearings. Table 4.5 
presents the results of the pooled OLS regression model testing the determinants of the 
percentage of testimony given by health and safety advocates and experts. Overall, the 
model performs well, as it explains around 45% of the variation in the dependent 
variable and the F-statistic of 23.89 is significant t all standard levels of statistical 
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significance. In terms of the control variables in my analysis, first of all, there are no 
significant differences between the different chambers of Congress in terms of the 
percentage of health and safety experts and advocates lled to testify in congressional 
hearings. Furthermore, while hearings in the 2000’s contained a significantly greater 
percentage of those concerned with the health and sfety aspects of the tobacco issue 
when compared to the 1970’s, no other decades stoodout as being significantly 
different from the 1970’s in this respect. 
Once again, the individual characteristics of committee leaders had no 
statistically significant effect on the types of witnesses presenting testimony in front of 
congressional committees on the subject of tobacco policy. Committee hearings lead by 
members hailing from tobacco states were not significantly different from those led by 
members from non-tobacco states in the percentage of testimony given by those 
concerned about the health and safety aspects of the tobacco issue. Additionally, the 
percentage of tobacco state legislators within a particular committee had no sizable 
impact on the percentage of health and safety advocates and experts called to testify. 
Ideology of committee leaders also did not have a significant effect on the percentage of 
health and safety experts called to testify on the tobacco issue.  
 Once again, the key determinant of the types of indiv duals called to testify at 
hearings appears to be the type of committee venue in which a hearing takes place. As 
expected, agricultural committees call an expected 23% less health and safety advocates 
and experts than typical run of the mill committees, a result which is significant at all 
standard levels of statistical significance. Thus, it appears that agricultural venues also 
serve as hospitable venues for tobacco interests by taking focus off the health and safety 
138 
 
aspects of the issue, to which tobacco proponents would not like to draw attention, and 
putting more focus on the economic aspects of the issue. Interestingly, judiciary 
committees call around an expected 22% less health and safety advocates and experts 
than the baseline case of miscellaneous committees. However, this result should not be 
taken to mean that judiciary committees are necessarily a hospitable venue for tobacco 
interests. As the results in the last section demonstrated, judiciary committees were no 
different than miscellaneous committees in the tone f t stimony presented in 
congressional hearings. The result in this analysis ikely demonstrates the degree to 
which judiciary committees concentrated on litigation toward the tobacco industry (an 
only marginally more positive topic than the health and safety aspects of the issue).  
 As stated earlier, representatives of the tobacco industry can be split into two 
different categories: farmers and manufacturers/seller . Due to their comparatively less 
fortunate economic circumstances and the fact that they are seen as blue-color 
hardworking individuals, tobacco farmers are generally looked upon in a sympathetic 
fashion by the public. On the other hand, tobacco sellers and manufacturers like Phillip 
Morris USA, Inc. are looked upon much less favorably in large part due to the large 
amounts of money they have made through selling and marketing a harmful product to 
the general public (Worsham 2006; Givel 2006). With the vastly different ways that 
society views tobacco farmers and manufacturers/seller , it leads one to wonder: do 
committees with different characteristics call one type of tobacco representative over 
another in order to portray the tobacco industry in a particular light? 
 




 Table 4.6 presents the results of the pooled OLS regression model testing the 
determinants of the percentage of testimony given by to acco farmers. Overall, the 
model performs well, as it explains around 68% of the variation in the dependent 
variable and the F-statistic of 110.62 is significant t all standard levels of statistical 
significance. In terms of the control variables in my analysis, first of all, there are no 
significant differences between the different chambers of Congress in terms of the 
percentage of tobacco farmers called to testify in co gressional hearings. Furthermore, 
no decades stood out as being significantly different from the 1970’s in terms of the 
percentages of tobacco farmers called to testify at he rings on the topic of tobacco 
policy. 
In terms of the key variables in my analysis, the individual characteristics of 
committee leaders once again had no statistically significant effect on the percentage of 
tobacco farmers presenting testimony in front of congressional committees on the 
subject of tobacco policy. Committee hearings lead by members hailing from tobacco 
states were not significantly different from those led by members from non-tobacco 
states in the percentage of testimony given by tobacco farmers. Additionally, the 
percentage of tobacco state legislators within a particular committee had no sizable 
impact on the percentage of tobacco farmers called to testify. Ideology of committee 
leaders also did not have a significant effect on the percentage of tobacco farmers called 
to testify on the tobacco issue.  
However, while the individual characteristics of committee leaders had no 
substantial effect on the percentage of testimony given by tobacco farmers in front of 
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particular committees, one committee venue in particular was significantly more likely 
to call tobacco farmers than any other type of committee venue. As expected, 
agricultural committees tended to call greater percentages of tobacco farmers to testify 
at hearings on the topic of tobacco policy than any other type of committee venue in 
Congress. More specifically, agricultural committees call an expected 44% greater 
percentage of tobacco farmers to testify at hearings on the subject of tobacco policy 
than typical run of the mill committees, a result which is significant at all standard 
levels of statistical significance. By contrast, no other committee venue produced 
significant differences in the percentage of tobacco farmers called to testify at tobacco 
hearings when compared with the baseline case of a miscellaneous group of committees 
and subcommittees. This result is hardly surprising due to the subject matter jurisdiction 
addressed by agricultural committees and the fact that farmers are routinely allowed to 
testify at agricultural committee hearings dealing with a wide variety of agricultural 
products. Furthermore, as I have already addressed, agricultural committees also have 
the reputation of being a kinder venue toward tobacco interests than the rest of the types 
of venues in Congress. However, while the agricultura  committees certainly give 
tobacco farmers a forum to express their viewpoints to congressional policymakers and 
the public, is this same forum provided to the manuf ct rers/sellers of the tobacco 
industry. 
 




 Table 4.7 presents the results of the pooled OLS regression model testing the 
determinants of the percentage of testimony given by to acco manufacturers and sellers. 
Overall, the model only performs modestly well, as it explains around 14% of the 
variation in the dependent variable and the F-statistic of 2.23 is significant at the 0.05 
level of statistical significance. In terms of the control variables in the analysis, first of 
all, there are no significant differences between the different chambers of Congress in 
terms of the percentage of tobacco manufacturers and sellers called to testify in 
congressional hearings. Furthermore, no decades stood out as being significantly 
different from the 1970’s in terms of the percentages of tobacco manufacturers and 
sellers called to testify at hearings on the topic f tobacco policy. 
Individual characteristics of committee leaders once again had no statistically 
significant effect on the percentage of tobacco farmers presenting testimony in front of 
congressional committees on the subject of tobacco policy. Of most importance, 
committee hearings lead by members hailing from tobacco states were not significantly 
different from those led by members from non-tobacco states in the percentage of 
testimony given by tobacco manufacturers/sellers. The personal belief systems of 
committee leaders also do not have a significant effect on the percentage of tobacco 
manufacturers/sellers called to testify on the tobacco issue.  
 As Table 4.7 further demonstrates, only the type of committee venue holding 
hearings on the topic of tobacco policy has any significant effect on the percentage of 
testimony given by tobacco manufacturers and seller. Interestingly, despite their bias 
toward calling larger percentages of tobacco farmers to testify than a typical committee, 
agricultural committees actually call significantly smaller percentages of tobacco 
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manufacturers/sellers than a typical run of the mill committee. More specifically, in 
agricultural committees, tobacco manufacturers/sellers make up 11% less of the total 
witnesses testifying at hearings on the subject of tobacco policy than they do in typical 
run of the mill committees, a result which is significant at the 0.05 level of statistical 
significance. 
 This result likely demonstrates a few characteristics of the dynamics of witness 
selection in the issue of tobacco policy. First of all, agricultural committees have called 
significantly fewer tobacco manufacturers/sellers to testify in front of them, because the 
information they would provide would not be as important to the legislation within their 
jurisdiction as it would be to other types of committees in Congress. Furthermore, while 
the agricultural committees have gained the reputation for protecting the tobacco 
industry as a whole, the fact is that agricultural committees really only want to protect 
one aspect of the industry: tobacco farmers. Thus, agricultural committees have no 
desire to give a public platform to a part of the industry that sometimes is at odds with 
the viewpoints of the farmers they are trying to prtect. Finally, and possibly most 
importantly, one of the most important goals of congressional hearings is to conduct 
oversight of other actors in society (both governmetal and nongovernmental). Other 
committees likely called a greater amount of tobacco manufacturers/sellers to testify not 
because they wanted to provide a public forum for tobacco companies to express their 
viewpoints (although in some cases this may have been the case). Rather, these 
committees sought to call these actors to publicly question them, discredit the idea that 
tobacco is a safe product for consumption by the public, and discredit the business 
practices of tobacco companies. Non-agricultural committees (with the exception of 
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judiciary committees) do not focus their oversight scrutiny on farmers, because society 
looks more sympathetically on blue-color tobacco farmers than they do on the 
companies who actually manufacture and sell tobacco nd make the most money out of 
the sale of the product.  
 Interestingly, judiciary committees call around an expected 17% less 
representatives of tobacco manufacturers and seller than the baseline case of 
miscellaneous committees, a result that is significant at the 0.05 level of statistical 
significance. As stated earlier, this result should not be taken to mean that the judiciary 
committees are biased one way or another with respect to who they call to testify at 
hearings concerning the topic of tobacco policy. More than likely, the result in this 
analysis demonstrates that judiciary committees concentrated on litigation toward the 
tobacco industry and thus called more attorneys and legal experts to testify rather than 
having representatives of the tobacco industry testify. 
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has demonstrated, in tobacco policy, information collection and 
display decisions appear to be influenced more by the venue in which hearings takes 
place than by the characteristics of who controls the hearing. In particular, the 
agricultural venue contained individuals that were more supportive of tobacco interests 
in their stated reasons for participating in hearings, selected witnesses that gave 
testimony that was more pro-tobacco in tone than typical committees, and tended to 
focus less on the health and safety aspects of issues that tobacco interests are likely to 
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want to ignore and more on the sympathetic components of the tobacco industry: 
tobacco farmers. For tobacco interests, the most important factor in determining how 
positive a hearing would be toward their interests wa  whether the hearing took place in 
agricultural venues or not.  
On the other hand, the individual characteristics of committee members only had 
an impact on individual participation decisions while having no significant impact on 
information collection activities. This result ultimately raises the following question: 
why do the individual characteristics of committee chairmen, particularly whether they 
come from a tobacco state or not, have no significat impact on information collection 
and display decisions? After all, the committee chairm n is likely the most important 
actor in hearing collection and display decisions ad should be able exert influence over 
the process, as he or she pleases (Sachs 2003, 11). First of all, in venues outside of the 
agricultural committee, tobacco state chairmen must deal with a more hostile 
environment. According to committee rules, committee chairmen are required to allow 
the minority ranking member (who is more than likely not going to be from a tobacco 
state) to call at least one witness to testify at a he ring (Sachs 2003, 11; Staff Interviews 
2010). In agricultural committees, this will not matter, because the minority side is very 
unlikely to put up a witness antagonistic to tobacco interests due to the consensual 
environment that operates there. On the other hand, in other committees, the minority 
side will more than likely seek to put up witnesses that are antagonistic toward the 
tobacco industry, because these committee members have no economic interests tied to 
tobacco or agricultural products in general. Furthermore, because of the prevailing 
wisdom about the harmful health consequences of tobacco use, even stacking testimony 
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in the tobacco industry’s favor is a risky endeavor, as the public would likely dismiss 
the hearing as purely political and the result would be damaging to the chairman’s 
reputation.   
In any event, tobacco state chairmen also knew that they did not need to stack 
testimony in more contentious venues like labor and commerce committees. They could 
depend on the agricultural venue to be steadfast defen rs of tobacco policy in terms of 
the information put out in congressional hearings. In turn, tobacco state legislators could 
turn their efforts to steadfastly defending tobacco interests on a more individual level 
through their participation within more contentious venues rather than trying to control 
the flow of information. 
 However, as we will see in the next chapter, dependable venues for certain 
points of view do not always form. Tobacco is a uniq e issue in some respects. 
Although there was a conflictual component to the issue that developed over time, the 
issue started as mainly a distributive issue in which the main concern was protection of 
a particular group in society: tobacco farmers. Even as the issue became more 
conflictual and information concerning the health consequences of tobacco mounted 
over time, tobacco farmers still remained as a group that would be disadvantaged by 
tobacco regulations and members of the agricultural committee had the duty of 
protecting agricultural interests no matter whether se farmers came from their 
districts or not. After all, members from tobacco states had generally supported farmers 
of other commodities. Nonetheless, venues like agricultural venues in which politics are 
generally consensual are not present in all venues, nor will they always be driven to act 
in a consensual fashion in all issues. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how when 
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issues become more partisan and conflictual over time, ndividual belief systems will 
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Table 4.2. – Distribution of Minority Ranking Members’ 
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Figure 4.1. Partisan Polarization of 
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Figure 4.2. Tobacco State vs. Non-Tobacco 







TABLE 4.3.  Pooled Ordered Probit Regression Results Testing the Determinants 
of the Tone of Committee Member Statements in Tobacco Hearings 
Independent Variable Coefficient Robust Standard 
Error 
z score 
Ideology 1.036** 0.194 5.34 
Tobacco State 1.358** 0.188 7.21 
Agricultural Committee 1.421** 0.199 7.15 
Health/Safety Committee -0.151 0.158 -0.96 
Judiciary Committee -0.113 0.196 -0.58 
Chamber 0.411* 0.142 2.88 
1980’s -0.378* 0.166 -2.28 
1990’s -0.612** 0.147 -4.16 
2000’s -0.773** 0.225 -3.43 
Cut 1 -0.261 0.191  
Cut 2 0.043 0.190  
Cut 3 0.649 0.198  
Cut 4 0.894 0.200  
N 992   
Adjusted R2 0.300   
Wald Chi2 407.9**   
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Dependent variable: Tone of statements given by committee members in congressional 
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TABLE 4.4.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Testing the Determinants of Overall 
Tone of Testimony in Tobacco Hearings. 
Independent Variable Coefficient Robust Standard 
Error 
t score 
Constant 0.222 0.301 0.74 
Chair Ideology 0.216 0.256 0.84 
Chair Tobacco State 0.244 0.292 0.83 
Percentage Tobacco State -0.509 0.485 -1.05 
Ideological Polarization 0.007 0.348 0.02 
Agricultural Committee 1.799** 0.382 4.71 
Health/Safety Committee -0.127 0.319 -0.40 
Judiciary Committee -0.152 0.384 -0.40 
Chamber 0.188 0.232 0.81 
1980’s -0.452* 0.198 -2.28 
1990’s -0.836** 0.212 -3.94 
2000’s -1.124* 0.354 -3.18 
N 103   
Adjusted R2 0.582   
F Statistic 33.17**   
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
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Figure 4.4. Types of Group Affiliations of 
Witnesses Testifying at Congressional 








TABLE 4.5.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Testing the Determinants of the 
Percentage of Testimony Given By Health and Safety Advocates and Experts 
Independent Variable Coefficient Robust Standard 
Error 
t score 
Constant 0.218* 0.065 3.34 
Chair Ideology -0.070 0.077 -0.91 
Chair Tobacco State -0.016 0.056 -0.28 
Percentage Tobacco State -0.009 0.116 -0.08 
Ideological Polarization 0.037 0.102 0.36 
Agricultural Committee -0.233** 0.064 -3.65 
Health/Safety Committee 0.127* 0.067 1.89 
Judiciary Committee -0.220* 0.069 -3.19 
Chamber -0.055 0.046 -1.21 
1980’s 0.089 0.051 1.73 
1990’s 0.103 0.065 1.59 
2000’s 0.281* 0.091 3.10 
N 103   
Adjusted R2 0.447   
F Statistic 23.89**   
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 






TABLE 4.6.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Testing the Determinants of the 
Percentage of Testimony Given By Tobacco Farmers 
Independent Variable Coefficient Robust Standard 
Error 
t score 
Constant 0.064 0.055 1.18 
Chair Ideology 0.005 0.048 0.09 
Chair Tobacco State 0.063 0.089 0.71 
Percentage Tobacco State -0.022 0.110 -0.20 
Ideological Polarization -0.087 0.069 -1.26 
Agricultural Committee 0.441** 0.095 4.64 
Health/Safety Committee -0.007 0.025 -0.31 
Judiciary Committee 0.002 0.029 0.08 
Chamber 0.009 0.042 0.21 
1980’s 0.021 0.041 0.52 
1990’s 0.021 0.037 0.58 
2000’s -0.055 0.039 -1.42 
N 103   
Adjusted R2 0.676   
F Statistic 110.62**   
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 





TABLE 4.7.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Testing the Determinants of the 
Percentage of Testimony Given By Tobacco Manufacture s and Sellers 
Independent Variable Coefficient Robust Standard 
Error 
t score 
Constant 0.156* 0.073 2.13 
Chair Ideology 0.079 0.052 1.51 
Chair Tobacco State 0.012 0.053 0.22 
Percentage Tobacco State 0.012 0.131 0.09 
Ideological Polarization 0.113 0.075 1.51 
Agricultural Committee -0.114* 0.056 -2.03 
Health/Safety Committee 0.03 0.061 0.50 
Judiciary Committee -0.167* 0.075 -2.23 
Chamber 0.039 0.040 0.98 
1980’s -0.112 0.070 -1.60 
1990’s -0.167 0.073 -2.00 
2000’s -0.0901 0.097 -0.93 
N 103   
Adjusted R2 0.139   
F Statistic 2.23*   
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 






Chapter 5. Climate Change Policy – Partisan Issue Contexts, 




 In 2005, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works held a 
hearing on the Kyoto Protocol, an international protoc l intended to stabilize 
greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. During this hearing, then-Chairman James 
Inhofe, a Republican, made the following statement co cerning climate change and the 
Kyoto Protocol: 
“Let me be clear at the outset. I believe the countries that have 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol are wasting their economic resources, 
because the science does not justify it. Anthropogenic climate 
change is, I have characterized, is perhaps the greatest hoax ever 
perpetuated on the American people. Even if humans were
causing global warming – and we are not – but even if we were, 
Kyoto would do almost nothing to avert it (Hearing Doc. 2008-
S321-13).” 
By contrast, in the previous Congress, in 2003, at another hearing in front of the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works again chaired by James Inhofe, 
the minority ranking member James Jeffords, an Independent caucusing with the 
Democrats, made the following statement accusing Senator Inhofe of dragging his feet 
on the climate change issue: 
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“Unfortunately we aren’t here today to talk about moving 
forward to find innovative solutions to real world problems. 
Instead, today’s hearing will largely be a mirror or the reverse of 
the robust and growing consensus in the mainstream community 
on climate…Unfortunately, there is no new information to be 
found here today that would dissuade us from acting quickly and 
responsibly to reduce greenhouse gas and mercury emissions. In 
today’s discussion of a literature survey of climate research, the 
skeptics are trotting out an argument that is several years old and 
already discarded by their peers. It is abundantly clear that now is 
the time to act (Hearing Doc. 2005-S321-5).” 
 From both sets of statements, it is clear that these two leaders within the same 
congressional committee disagreed vehemently on how hearings should proceed on the 
topic of climate change. On the one hand, Senator Inhofe was clearly of the mindset that 
climate change is a hoax and the information collection and display decisions in 
congressional hearings should be conducted with the goal of demonstrating the lack of 
scientific consensus on the issue that he believed was the reality. On the other hand, 
Senator Jeffords clearly believed that scientific consensus had already been arrived at 
on climate change and hearings should be conducted to find ways to solve the problem. 
As this chapter will demonstrate, in the issue of climate change, hearing politics within 
most venues in Congress are characterized by conflit between two opposing groups. In 
these situations, unlike what was found in tobacco policy, information collection and 
display decisions will be driven more by the characteristics of individual committee 
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members and leaders than by the perceived institutional biases of those conducting the 
hearings.  
Climate Change Issue Context  
 Unlike tobacco policy, the dynamics of congressional hearing politics in the 
issue of climate change have been relatively untilled in political science literature, to 
date. Nonetheless, the issue presents an interesting case study of informational 
collection and display decisions, as there are logical reasons to suspect that these 
decisions may operate along a number of lines. First of all, it is a highly technical policy 
area that involves significant risks and problems for the general public where early 
action may be key to solving the problem, but also inv lves significant perceived 
economic costs to carry out the necessary policies to solving the problem. Thus, if in 
any policy area, legislators would be concerned in getting the best information in order 
to make the most informed decision possibly on the issue, it would be in issues similar 
to climate change policy. As stated earlier, informational theorists argue that the 
outcomes of particular policies are uncertain, which poses a difficulty for legislators 
who prefer to choose policies where the outcome is c rtain, so that they can take credit 
for policies that they know will succeed and avoid embarrassment in voting for policies 
with harmful outcomes for their constituencies (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 
1990; Krehbiel 1991). As such, when policy outcomes are particularly uncertain, 
committee members will attempt to collect the best information possible. On newer and 
more technical policy issues, policymakers do not have the expertise to be confident 
their conclusions on an issue are correct, if they ave developed any beliefs at all. Thus, 
policymakers typically must genuinely collect quality information so that they can 
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develop expertise on the issue, which will inform their conclusions as to what effects 
particular policies will have (Ainsworth 2002; McQuide 2007). When policymakers are 
uncertain, the only cue they have to determine the validity of information is the 
perceived expertise of the individual giving the information. As such, if the 
informational perspective of informational collection is correct, the following 
hypotheses should be confirmed: 
 
Informational Perspective Member Statement Tone Hypothesis: Member statements will 
be relatively neutral concerning climate change, particularly at early stages of the issue 
when uncertainty concerning the issue is relatively great. Furthermore, subsystem and 
personal belief biases will not be an important determinant of member statements on 
the issue. 
 
Informational Perspective Testimony Tone Hypothesis: The tone of testimony 
concerning climate change will be relatively unbiased and representative of a variety of 
different perspectives, particularly at early stages of the issue when uncertainty 
concerning the issue is relatively great. Furthermoe, subsystem and personal belief 
biases will not be an important determinant of the tone of witness testimony concerning 
the issue. 
 
 Informational Perspective Expert Testimony Hypothesis: Legislative hearings will be 
constructed so that expert information on a topic is gathered and that the testimony of 
technical and policy experts on a particular issue hould be valued. Expert testimony 
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(i.e. scientific experts) rather than interest group testimony will be the most 
predominant type of testimony presented in hearings particularly at early stages of the 
issue when uncertainty concerning the issue is relativ ly great. 
 
 Nonetheless, as anyone following the issue can surely attest, wildly divergent 
opinions have developed amongst actors involved with the issue. On the one hand, there 
are members of the environmental coalition who argue that climate change is a 
significant problem and that current economic practices will only lead to future 
environmental problems that could threaten the world’s survival (Liftin 2000, 249). On 
the other hand, there are members of the economic coalition who argue that climate 
change is not a significant problem, evidence is not clear enough to warrant policy 
action on the issue, and attempting to solve the problem will only harm the economy 
(Liftin 2000, 249).  
 Some may argue that the lines of debate fit neatly into the demarcations that 
separate the jurisdictions of venues within the climate change policy area. According to 
this perspective, differences in the collection of p licy information will be influenced 
by the biases involved with the subsystem that a particular committee or subcommittee 
operates within due to the consensual nature of politics that operate within that 
subsystem (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995; 
Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones, 
and Jochim 2009). Indeed, the issue of climate change i cludes many competing 
subsystems and concomitant institutional venues within Congress that could potentially 
fight over how the issue of climate change is defined. Much like agricultural 
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committees were more hospitable to tobacco interests, some argue that those venues 
that routinely deal with the interests of those who would be harmed by the actions 
necessary to ameliorate climate change (i.e. energy committees) would be likely to be 
more sympathetic to economic interests. On the other hand, institutional venues that 
routine deal with the interests of those concerned with environmental protection (i.e. 
environmental committees) would be likely to gather information that is sympathetic to 
environmental interests.  
 Of the types of institutional venues examining the biotechnology industry, the 
venue type that is most likely to act as a unified subsystem on the issue of climate 
change is the science subsystem, which includes both of the science committees in the 
House and Senate. Many members of the science committees have expressed that their 
desire to serve on the science committees is derived from their desire to serve their 
constituents (Smith and Deering 1990; Deering and Smith 1997; Frisch and Kelly 
2006). Since politics amongst members of constituency-oriented committees tends to be 
more consensual than other types of committees (Fenno 1973; Smith and Deering 1990; 
Deering and Smith 1997), we may expect that members of the scientific committees that 
make up the science subsystem will be more united in their support of scientific 
research, as these committees were created in part to support scientific research. Due to 
the large portion of the scientific community’s insistence that climate change is a 
problem, venues like the science committees that are more likely to promote the 
scientific community may also be more sympathetic to the potential dangers of climate 
change. As such, if subsystems are unified in the issue of climate change, I expect the 




Unified Subsystem Member Statement Tone Hypothesis: Members from congressional 
committees that are expected to be sympathetic to interests that downplay the 
significance of the climate change problem (i.e. energy and agricultural committees) 
will present statements that are more pro-economic toward the issue of climate change. 
Members from congressional committees that are expected to highlight the importance 
of tackling the climate change issue (i.e. environme tal and science committees) will 
present statements that are more pro-environmental toward the issue of climate change. 
 
Unified Subsystem Testimony Tone Hypothesis: Congressional committees that are 
expected to be sympathetic to interests that downplay the significance of the climate 
change problem (i.e. energy, economic, and agricultura  committees) will preside over 
hearings that produce more pro-economic testimony tward the issue of climate 
change. Congressional committees that are expected to highlight the importance of 
tackling the climate change issue (i.e. environmental and science committees) will 
preside over hearings that produce more pro-environme tal testimony toward the issue 
of climate change. 
 
 Conversely, with the economic costs of solving the problem on the one hand and 
the increased visibility of the problem as the result of the advocacy of such public 
figures as Al Gore on the other hand, climate change is a visible and controversial 
enough issue that could potentially provide an issue political parties can align 
themselves around. Indeed, significant evidence has been found that political parties 
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have aligned themselves into distinct camps on enviro mental issues in general. More 
specifically, based on League of Conservation Voters voting scores, Republicans and 
Democrats have become increasingly divided over the issue of environmental policy 
since the 1970’s (Shipan and Lowry 2001; 245). Therefore, if political parties have 
diverged from each other on all environmental policy issues, there is good reason to 
expect that parties have aligned themselves around the issue of climate change in 
particular. 
 If political parties have aligned themselves into different camps on the issue of 
climate change, this is a significant development tha will likely influence how 
information collection and display decisions play out. As political parties become more 
polarized on the issue of climate change, it becomes ore likely that each committee 
venue will be split into competitive coalitions by virtue of the control party leaders have 
over the committee appointment process and the fact th t most committees’ 
memberships break down along partisan lines (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005). 
Therefore, as parties become more polarized on an issue, the likelihood that any 
naturally sympathetic venues to one side or another will be present decreases, as there 
will likely be two political parties at odds with each other on the issue within each 
committee venue. In these cases, we should expect that the personal views of those 
running the hearing should have more of an impact on the information collection and 
display process than the type of committee venue in which the hearing takes place.  
 As I will demonstrate later on, the two political parties have become more 
polarized on the issue of climate change over time. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in 
general, the congressional hearing process acts in a very partisan manner when issues 
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are more controversial and operate along partisan lnes (Staff Interviews 2010). 
Committee staff members tend to select witnesses to tes ify with an eye toward 
supporting whatever viewpoint their chair is seeking to get across in a particular hearing 
(Staff Interviews 2010). While minority staff members are given the chance to select at 
least one witness to testify at a hearing, the majority f witnesses are selected by the 
staff members of the majority party (Staff Interviews 2010). Furthermore, although this 
rarely occurs, minority staff members have complained that majority staff members 
have scheduled hearings on days when they knew a minority witness would not be 
available likely to avoid having that witness testify at a hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). 
Thus, if climate change has increasingly become a more controversial and more partisan 
issue, over time, it would not all be surprising to observe these same types of partisan 
dynamics in the conduct of congressional hearings i controversial issue areas also 
occurring in climate change hearings, as well.  
 However, it should be noted that the climate change issue becoming more 
partisan does not necessarily mean that party identifications of key actors will trump 
belief systems in determining information collection and display decisions in 
congressional hearings. The polarization of parties into separate camps in the climate 
change debate may or may not be due to political parties exerting influence over their 
members to act in a certain way on the issues at hand, even when these actions may 
conflict with their own belief systems. Nonetheless, even if political parties are not 
influencing their members to separate into different camps on the issue, the fact that 
they are divergent on the issue at hand creates a situation where two coalitions 
diametrically opposed to one another on the issue will be present in committee after 
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committee due to the partisan nature of committee mmber selection. Thus, no venues 
will be homogenous in their viewpoints on the issue, and the characteristics of who 
controls the committee will be far more important de erminant of information collection 
and display decisions.  
 The polarization of committees into different camps on the issue of climate 
change also becomes important due to the potential effect that changes in the belief 
systems of key committee actors can play in information collection. Policy actors, 
including those that sit on congressional committees and subcommittees, tend to hold 
the following types of beliefs on policy issues (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 194-196): 
• Deep core beliefs – very general normative assumptions about human nature 
and the role of government in providing for the public good that span across all 
policy issues  
• Policy core beliefs – more specific normative assumptions concerning an entire 
policy issue 
•  Secondary beliefs – very specific assumptions about single policy issue that 
are not considered to encapsulate an entire policy issue 
 If these belief systems guide how committees and subcommittees process 
information, it seems logical to expect that these belief systems will also have a 
powerful influence on what types of information these institutional entities collect 
during the congressional hearing process. In the specific case of climate change, more 
conservative individuals would likely be more supportive of economic interests in the 
climate change debate, as the increased regulation of particular industries that would be 
required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is antithetical to conservative belief 
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systems. By contrast, more liberal individuals tend to believe in a more active role for 
the government in protecting individuals from environmental harm. If belief systems 
guide how congressional committees make information collection and display decision 
in congressional hearings, we should expect the following hypotheses to be confirmed: 
 
Belief System Member Statement Tone Hypothesis: Indviduals with more liberal/pro-
environmental beliefs will give statements that are more pro-environmental toward the 
climate change issue. Individuals with more conservative/pro-economic beliefs will give 
statements that are more pro-economic toward the climate change issue.  
 
Belief System Testimony Tone Hypothesis: Committees with chairs that have more 
conservative/pro-economic beliefs will produce testimony that is more pro-economic 
toward the issue of climate change. Committees with chairs that have more liberal/pro-
environmental beliefs will produce testimony that is more pro-environmental toward the 
issue of climate change.  
In the next section, I will detail the ways in whic these expectations will be tested 
using empirical data collected from congressional he ring transcripts. 
 
Data and Methods 
Case Selection. Cases of congressional hearings concerning climate change policy were 
selected using a two pronged approach. First, hearings were selected by searching 
through hearings from the “Congressional Hearings Data Set” of the Policy Agendas 
project (http://www.policyagendas.org) in the following subtopic areas: “Air Pollution, 
169 
 
Global Warming, and Noise Pollution,” “Weather Forecasting and Related Issues, ” and 
“International Resources Exploitation and Resources Agreement.” I then selected those 
hearings whose descriptions noted that the whole hearing or a substantial part of the 
hearing dealt with climate change policy. In order to ensure all cases were selected, I 
then conducted searches using on Lexis-Nexis Congressional Universe 
(http://www.lexisnexis.com) for hearings using the following search terms: climate 
change, global warming, and greenhouse gas. Through this method, I obtained 142 
individual cases of hearing documents published that at least substantially concerned 
the topic of climate change policy. Data from these hearings were then aggregated at the 
committee and subcommittee level for each individual Congress, which condensed the 
number of cases to 95 cases.  
 
Dependent Variable – Tone of Committee Member Statements. The tone of 
committee member statements in the specific case of climate change was determined as 
follows. Particular arguments made over the course of a statement were coded as either 
supportive of the economic coalition in the climate change debate, moderate, or 
supportive of the environmental coalition in the climate change debate. More specific 
information on how each statement was assigned can be found in Appendix D. Using 
PDF XChange Viewer’s free PDF editing software15, notations were made to denote the 
                                                
15
 PDF XChange Viewer allows users to highlight and mark up PDF documents obtained by other sources. 
This software can prove invaluable to individuals seeking to content analyze documents on a limited 




positive, moderate, and negative suppositions made over the course of a statement. 
Then, the overall statement was coded using the following five-point scale: 
• Very pro-economic (-2): Statements made up of mostly or all pro-economic 
arguments and very little to no pro-environmental or neutral arguments 
• Pro-economic (-1): Statements with mostly pro-economic arguments and a 
substantial, but not equal portion of pro-environmetal arguments, or statements 
with a fairly equal balance of pro-economic and neutral arguments 
• Neutral (0): Statements made up of nearly all neutral arguments on the climate 
change issue or statements with a fairly equal balance of pro-environmental and 
pro-economic arguments 
• Pro-environmental (1): Statements with mostly pro-environmental arguments 
and a substantial, but not equal portion of pro-economic arguments, or 
statements with a fairly equal balance of pro-environmental and neutral 
arguments 
• Very pro-environmental (2): Statements made up of mstly or all pro-
environmental arguments and very little to no pro-ec nomic or neutral 
arguments 
 
Dependent Variable – Tone of Testimony. I analyze the tone of information presented 
in congressional hearings on the topic of climate change policy by analyzing the actual 
content of hearing testimony itself. Using the same general approach that I used for 
opening statements, I assign each individual piece of t stimony a score on a five point 
scale from -2 (very pre-economic on the climate change issue) to 2 (very pro-
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environmental on the climate change issue) to denote the basic tone of each individual 
piece of testimony. I then take the average of the scores for each piece of testimony 
given before a particular committee in a particular Congress to measure the overall tone 
of testimony in that committee for that Congress.  
 
Dependent Variable – Percentage of Scientific Testimony. In climate change 
hearings, one of the most prevalent and interesting group of individuals giving 
testimony are scientific experts. Due to the fact tha scientific experts have established a 
general consensus that climate change is occurring (Oreskes 2004), they are generally 
seen as promoting the pro-environmental side in the debate on climate change. Thus, 
naturally, we may expect that scientific experts may be excluded from hearings when 
those controlling the hearing espouse a more pro-economic belief system. On the other 
hand, many committee members often seek a certain bala ce in the types of witnesses 
they call in order to demonstrate that witnesses from all walks of life support the 
position they are seeking to espouse (Staff Interviews 2010). Thus, we may not expect 
any significant differences in scientific witness te timony.  
In order to study the factors that influence the decisions to select scientific 
witnesses to testify at climate change hearings, I measured the information gathered 
from scientific experts in congressional hearings as follows. First, I coded the number 
of those testifying at hearings that qualified as an independent scientific expert. 
Scientific experts include those representing non-partisan think-tanks, universities, or 
governmental research institutions. Those scientific experts representing partisan 
interest groups were not included, because they could be seen more as representing a 
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particular interest than as trying to provide unbiased expert information. I then took the 
percentage of scientific experts that testified in fro t of a particular committee in a 
given Congress.  
 
Independent Variable – Personal Beliefs. In the case of climate change policy, deep 
core beliefs should affect information collection and display decisions as follows. More 
conservative individuals would likely be more supportive of economic interests in the 
climate change debate, as the increased regulation of particular industries that would be 
required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is antithetical to conservative belief 
systems. By contrast, more liberal individuals tend to believe in a more active role for 
the government in protecting individuals from environmental harm. In order to measure 
the ideological preferences of committee and subcommittee members that characterize 
deep core beliefs, I use Poole and Rosenthal’s first-d mension DW-Nominate scores, 
which are based off of roll call votes taken by the committee members 
(http://voteview.org). This variable is measured on a continuous scale from -1 to 1 with 
higher scores indicating a more conservative member ideology.  
In climate change policy, policy core beliefs comprise more specific beliefs 
about the role of government specifically in protecting the environment. These beliefs 
may slightly differ from the ideological beliefs that characterize deep core belief 
systems. For instance, although some individuals may have conservative beliefs about 
the role of government in general, these same individuals may believe that protection of 
the environment is a special instance, in which aggressive governmental policies are 
necessary. In order to measure the more specific poli y core beliefs that span 
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environmental policies in general, I use the League of Conservation Voters voting 
scores (http://www.lcv.org/scorecard/), which are based off of roll call votes taken by 
the committee members on bills with an environmental dimension. This variable is 
measured on a continuous scale from 0 to 100 with hig er scored indicating a more pro-
environmental belief system.  
 
Independent Variable – Ideological Polarization. In the context of the overall tone of 
climate change testimony, it is very likely that ideological polarization between the 
parties may have another effect aside from making venues more competitive. According 
to committee rules, committee chairmen are required to allow the minority ranking 
member to call at least one witness to testify at a he ring (Sachs 2003, 11; Staff 
Interviews 2010). Minority ranking members will likely be relatively more likely to 
exercise this privilege when the ranking member’s views are far apart from the 
chairman’s and the ranking member does not believe his or her views will be 
represented at the hearing otherwise.  As I will demonstrate later, climate change was a 
relatively non-contentious issue at its start with both parties in agreement about the 
potential seriousness of the problem. Thus, minority ranking members (mostly 
Republicans) likely did not exercise their privilege at the issue’s start as they agreed 
with the decisions made by committee chairmen. However, as time has worn on and the 
two parties have become more and more divided on the issue of climate change, the 
impetus for the minority ranking member to exert the privilege to call at least one 
witness to testify on behalf of their position on the issue has become much stronger. 
Due to the fact that the two parties started from a pro-environmental position toward the 
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climate change issue and the fact that Democrats have st yed relatively pro-
environmental over time while Republicans have become significantly more pro-
economic in their views, it is likely that this polarization has had the effect of causing 
testimony to become more pro-economic rather than more pro-environmental over time. 
Democrats were relatively equally motivated throughout time to ensure the pro-
environmental position would be presented at these arings, while Republicans have 
become more motivated to ensure that the pro-economic position is represented as they 
have strayed away from the pro-environmental position on the issue. In order to 
measure this effect, I create two variables taking the absolute values of the differences 
between both the DW-Nominate scores and the League of Conservation Voter Scores.  
 
Independent Variable – Policy Subsystem Bias.  In the specific case of climate 
change, if there are subsystem biases in the collecti n of information, congressional 
committees that are expected to be sympathetic to interests that downplay the 
significance of the climate change problem (i.e. energy committees) will preside over 
hearings that produce more pro-economic testimony tward the issue of climate change. 
Congressional committees that are expected to highlight the importance of tackling the 
climate change issue (i.e. environmental and science committees) will preside over 
hearings that produce more pro-environmental testimony toward the issue of climate 
change. In order to test the validity of this expectation, I created categories and dummy 
variables for each of the types of subsystems repres nt d by particular committees in 
Congress that held hearings on the issue of climate change policy relatively often. These 




Independent Variable – Kyoto Protocol Dimension. One of the most controversial 
debates that took place with respect to the climate change issue was the debate over the 
Kyoto Protocol. Regardless of partisan affiliation, the vast majority of legislators 
regardless of their core beliefs tended to disagree with ratification of the protocol due to 
the significant responsibilities in decreasing emissions that it would put on the United 
States. Disagreement amongst all congressional policymakers with the Kyoto Protocol 
was so great that with a 97-0 vote, the Senate passed the Bird-Hagel Resolution which 
stated that the United States should be signatory to the Kyoto Protocol (105 S. Res. 98). 
Thus, due to the extreme disagreement with the Kyoto Protocol amongst congressional 
policymakers, we should expect more negative information to be presented and more 
negative statements to be given in Kyoto Protocol hearings simply by virtue of the vast 
disagreement with the Protocol amongst representatives. I control for this effect by 
including a dummy variable coded 1 when a committee or subcommittee held at least 
one hearing dealing with the Kyoto Protocol during a particular Congress.  
 
 
Control Variable – Time. It is expected that some elements of information colle tion 
and display in climate change policy simply cannot be accounted for by elements of 
changes in different key characteristics between different committees across different 
time periods. To control for the effects of time on informational collection, I include 
dummy variables for each decade that congressional hearings took place: (1980-1990; 
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1991-2000; 2001-2006).16 The 1980’s (1980-1990) serve as the reference decade for 
variables in the model.  
 
Control Variable – Chamber. Of the two chambers of Congress, the House represents 
smaller constituencies, and thus, may operate in a more parochial manner than the 
Senate. As such, due to their broader constituency bases, the Senate may show more of 
a concern toward broader policy issues like environme tal protection. In order to 
control for this effect, I created a dummy variable for each of the models, which equal 0 
if the hearing takes place in the Senate and 1 if the hearing takes place in the House.  
 
Statistical Model – Pooled OLS. In order to test the expectations laid out above, I 
conducted a series of pooled OLS regression analyses that grouped data based on the 
committee or sub-committee a particular hearing was held in for the committee level 
models and grouped data based on the member presenting statements in the statement 
model. A pooled OLS regression assumes that any two unit years can be compared 
                                                
16
 Although including dummy variables for each of the Congresses can be argued to be more 
appropriate, doing so uses up a large number of degrees of freedom. With the small number of cases in 
the committee level models, the loss of degrees of freedom made it impossible for the statistical 
package to estimate the F statistic, which is necessary to show the significance of the overall model. 
Furthermore, it is likely that certain characteristics of the chairmen will be nearly perfectly collinear with 
the particular Congress being controlled for. For instance, since the House and Senate are typically 
controlled by the same party, it is likely that there are relatively few instances where differences in party 
control will be observed within Congresses. Additionally, ideological differences within Congresses and 
between chairs are also likely to be muted due to the high correlation between ideological preferences 
and party identifications. As Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) note, one of the drawbacks of their suggested 
method of using time dummies for each time period studied is that it cannot account for the effects of 
variables where there is little to no variation within the time period. As such I use the decade variable 
approach, as it allows time effects to be captured without using up too many degrees of freedom and 
allows certain important variables to vary so their effects can be more helpfully studied.  
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whether across committees or across times and its est mator is a weighted average of 
collapsing groups down to a single, mean time point and differencing each observation 
within each group from its group mean. I now turn to a discussion of the results of my 
analyses.  
 
Committee Member Statements – Results 
 
[Figure 5.1 Here] 
 
Committee member statements provide important insight  into why particular 
committee members participate in congressional hearings. Before reporting the results 
of what determines the tone of these statements, it is important to first analyze how the 
tone of these statements have changed over time between the two political parties. As 
stated earlier, if differences emerge between the two parties on the issue of climate 
change, individual venues are likely to be more conflictual and personal beliefs of key 
committee members are likely to matter more in information collection and display 
decisions. Figure 5.1 presents a graph of the differences between the average tone of 
statements made by Democrats and Republicans in climate change hearings across time. 
Remember that more positive values represent more pr - nvironmental positions 
toward climate change while more negative values represent more pro-economic 
positions toward climate change. As this graph depicts, at the start of the issue, 
Democrats and Republicans were relatively undivided n their statements toward 
climate change. To be sure, as expected, the Democrats were the more pro-
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environmental of the two political parties in the early stages of the issue’s development. 
Nonetheless, differences between the two parties’ mmbers on the climate change issue 
were relatively muted during the early stages of information collection and display on 
the topic.   
However, as time has worn on, wider gaps in the viewpoints of those 
participating in hearings on the topic of climate change have become more apparent. 
Starting in the 102nd Congress, Republicans participating in congressional hearings have 
become decidedly pro-economic in their reasons for participating in climate change 
hearings. By contrast, Democrats have stayed relativ y pro-environmental in their 
reasons for participating in hearings on the subject of limate change. Thus, while 
climate change has not always been a partisan issue throughout its history in terms of 
the reasons that committee members give for participating in hearings, the issue has 
become more and more of an issue where members have arr nged themselves along 
party lines. I expect that this increased partisanship hould have a decided effect in 
making political dynamics within venues holding hearings on climate change more 
conflictual. 
 
[Table 5.1 Here] 
 
 Turning now to a more systematic analysis of opening statements across time, 
Table 5.1 presents the results of the pooled OLS regression model testing the 
determinants of the tone of opening statements. Overall, the model performs very well, 
as the pseudo R-squared of 0.337 is fairly robust by pseudo R-squared standards and the 
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Wald Chi2 of 498.09 is significant at all levels of statistical significance. Each of the 
control variables are significant and in their expected directions. As expected, time has 
a significant impact on the tone of member statements with both the 1990’s and 2000’s 
producing statements significantly more pro-economic in tone concerning the climate 
change issue than the reference point of the 1980’s. Also, as expected, House members 
are significantly more likely to give statements that are more pro-economic in tone 
concerning climate change than members of the Senate, likely due to the parochial 
politics that operate within the House.  
In terms of venue biases, the results demonstrate th  none of the types of 
venues operating on the issue of climate change contains legislators with significant 
biases in their reasons for participating in congressional hearings when compared with a 
miscellaneous set of committees. Despite the fact that members of the scientific 
committee could be hypothesized to have more faith in following scientific advice than 
other congressmen due to the fact that congressmen to some degree self-select onto the 
committee they belong (Adler and Lipinski 1997; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; 
Frisch and Kelly 2005), not even scientific committee members gave statements that 
were significantly different in tone from a miscellaneous set of committees. Due to the 
partisan nature of the issue, it is not surprising that different committees have not been 
unified in their viewpoints in the issue in the same way that agricultural committees 
were unified in support of tobacco farmers. 
On the other hand, individual characteristics of memb rs giving statements have 
a clear and significant effect on the tone of statements detailing their reasons for 
participating in climate change hearings. Both deep core and policy core belief systems 
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are significant determinants of the reasons that committee members give for 
participating in climate change hearings. With respect to deep core beliefs, more 
conservative members tend to participate with the int ntion of bolstering the pro-
economic viewpoint at hearings. More specifically, committee members with more 
conservative DW-Nominate scores were significantly more likely to give statements 
that were more pro-economic toward the climate change issue than their more liberal 
counterparts. Unsurprisingly, more pro-environmental policy core beliefs were also 
related to members giving more pro-environmental resons for participating in climate 
change hearings. More explicitly, committee members with more pro-environmental 
League of Conservation Voters’ voting scores were significantly more likely to give 
statements that were more pro-environmental on the climate change issue than members 
with less pro-environmental LCV scores.  
Finally, as Table 5.1 further demonstrates, member statements tend to be 
significantly different when dealing with certain aspects of the climate change issue. In 
particular, when the Kyoto Protocol was addressed by a committee or subcommittee 
during a particular congressional session, member statements tended to be more pro-
economic toward the climate change issue than those given in committees during 
sessions when the Kyoto Protocol was never addressed. Due to the fact that the Kyoto 
Protocol was defeated unanimously by both Democrats and Republicans when it was 
considered by the U.S. Senate, it stands to reason that committee members with many 




Nonetheless, in terms of participation by committee members, it is apparent that 
most venues are made up of a variety of pro-economic and pro-environmental 
legislators that will have very different takes on the climate change issue. Therefore, 
regardless of whether certain types of information are overrepresented at climate change 
hearings due to the biases of the committee venue or those controlling the committee, 
they are likely to also be subject to harsh lines of questioning regardless of the 
committee venue in which the hearing takes place. I now turn to an analysis of the 
determinants of the overall tone of congressional he ring testimony to determine 
whether the same dynamics that drive the tone of member statements also drive the tone 
of overall testimony presented in congressional hearings. 
 
Overall Tone of Testimony – Results 
 
[Figure 5.2 Here] 
 
 Before discussing the results of the model testing the determinants of the overall 
tone of testimony concerning climate change in congressional hearings, it is important 
to first analyze how the tone of testimony has ebbed and flowed throughout time. Figure 
5.2 presents a graph depicting the average tone of testimony per congressional session 
on the topic of climate change. As the figure depicts, although the tone of testimony has 
experienced relatively wide jumps and falls from tie period to time period, the tone 
has generally trended in a pro-economic direction. This result generally comports with 
my expectation that belief systems and polarization have had a decided effect on the 
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tone of climate change testimony. For instance, as tho e likely to support the pro-
economic position (i.e. Republican Party members) began to control institutional venues 
with power over congressional hearings after the 104th Congress, congressional hearing 
testimony began to take a considerably more pro-economic bent. The tone of testimony 
took on a particularly pro-economic bent during the 105th Congress when, for the first 
time, the overall tone of testimony was slightly pro-economic in tone. After the 105th 
Congress, although testimony does become somewhat pro-environmental in tone at 
times (particularly in the 107th Congress when Democrats held control of the Senate), 
the tone of testimony never reaches the levels of pro-environmentalism that 
characterized the era in which pro-environmentalists controlled all committee venues  
responsible for informational collection and display decisions.  
 It should be noted that even after those with pro-ec nomic/anti-environmental 
positions began to control information and collection decisions, the tone of testimony 
does not take on an overwhelmingly pro-economic bent. In fact, the overall tone of 
testimony was pro-economic in tone only in two time periods (in the 105th and 108th 
Congresses). This result is suggestive of two possibilities. First of all, pro-
environmentalists were still likely in leadership positions in committees making 
information collection and display decisions, even if only in a minority capacity. Due to 
rules that allow the minority ranking member to call at least one witness to testify at a 
hearing (Sachs 2003, 11; Staff Interviews 2010), the pro-environmental position likely 
still received representation in congressional hearings on climate change.  
 Secondly, those with pro-economic positions were att mpting to overcome 
information within institutional venues that for years had noted the potential problems 
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involved with anthropogenic climate changes. Trying to stack information in a 
completely different tone from the way it had been presented for years likely would 
have been met with calls that information was being u fairly stacked and call into 
question the informational validity of the hearing itself. This type of mindset can be 
seen in the opening statement of then-Chairman Dana Rohrabacher in a hearing on 
climate change in front of the House Committee on Science’s Subcommittee on Energy 
and Environment in 1995, shortly after Republicans took control of both chambers of 
Congress. In his opening statement, Representative Rohrabacher noted the following: 
[I]t is my goal, as Chairman of this subcommittee, to see that 
every time we have a hearing, that unlike – and I was very 
disappointed my first six years in Congress - was there would 
never really be a dialogue…You would have the experts here and 
you would have all the experts who agreed with the 
Subcommittee chairman testify in the first panel, and this is when 
all the members of the news media were here. And then you 
would have anybody, anybody who might get on as a witness 
who disagreed with the Subcommittee chairman’s predilections, 
were put on the last panel in the late afternoon, and nobody was 
there to hear them…Well, as long as I am Subcommittee 
chairman, we are going to try our best to have bothsides of every 
issue presented, and side by side, and promote dialogue between 
the expert witnesses.  
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As this quote demonstrates, the goal of pro-economic chairmen was not to totally 
dismiss the pro-environmental side in the climate change debate, but rather to promote 
more dialogue in the debate. It is likely that not presenting the pro-environmental side 
would have exposed them to charges of favoritism, more so than pro-environmentalists 
who could promote the supposition that their stacking of testimony represented the 
positions of scientific experts, at large.  
 
[Table 5.2 Here] 
 
 Turning now to a more systematic analysis of the testimony of witnesses on the 
subject of climate change across time, Table 5.2 presents the results of pooled OLS 
regression models testing the determinants of the ton of testimony. Due to the fact that 
deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs are likely to be correlated with one another as 
political parties tend to become more homogenous in their belief systems, there was a 
good chance that many of the independent variables in the model could exhibit 
multicollinearity with each other. Thus, tests were conducted to determine the degree of 
multicollinearity within the model. With these tests, it was determined that deep core 
belief systems were high collinear with environmental belief systems. Thus, two 
different models were created placing environmental belief systems into one model and 
ideological belief systems into another model. 
 As Table 5.2 demonstrates, both models perform reasonably well, as they can 
explain between 29-35% of the variance in the tone of t stimony heard in a particular 
hearing. In terms of the control variables in the analysis, it appears that the institutional 
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chamber holding the hearings had negligible effects on the tone of hearing testimony. 
The House and Senate did not produce significantly different testimony in tone in either 
of the models. Furthermore, the decade in which the hearing took place only has 
significant effects on the tone of hearing testimony in Model II. In Model II, only the 
1990’s produced significantly more pro-economic testimony than the 1980’s.  
 More importantly for this project, contrary to the expectation of punctuated 
equilibrium theorists, the perceived institutional bias of a committee does not seem to 
have a large impact over whether information is gathered that recognizes or refuses to 
recognize that the climate change problem exists. Only foreign policy committees 
exhibit significant differences than the baseline case of miscellaneous committees, a 
result that is only significant in Model II and is oddly inconsistent with expectations. 
Due to the fact that a large portion of the foreign policy hearings dealt with the Kyoto 
Protocol, which was overwhelmingly rejected by both parties, we should expect that 
members of this committee would be more likely to present pro-economic information. 
Yet, holding all other variable equal, foreign policy committees actually presented 
testimony that was around 0.554 units more pro-enviro mental than the baseline case of 
miscellaneous committees.    
On the other hand, the belief systems of committee and subcommittee chairmen 
with the responsibility of making informational collection and display decisions have a 
significant impact on the tone of hearing testimony. Unsurprisingly, chairmen with 
more pro-environmental policy core beliefs presided over hearings that contained 
testimony with a more pro-environmental tone on the subject of climate change. A one-
unit increase in the pro-environmentalism of committee and subcommittee chairmen’s 
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League of Conservation voter scores leads to an expected increase of 0.007 units in the 
tone of supportiveness of the member’s statement toward the pro-environmental 
viewpoint in the more specific climate change debat. Put in a more substantive fashion, 
a change from an extremely anti-environmental chairm n to one that is more moderate 
in his or her environmental beliefs (an increase from 0 to 50) leads to an expected 
increase of 0.35 units in the tone of testimony presented in front of a committee or 
subcommittee on the climate change debate. A change from an extremely anti-
environmental chairman to an extremely pro-environme tal chairman (an increase from 
0 to 100) leads to an expected increase of 0.7 units in the tone of testimony presented in 
front of a committee or subcommittee on the climate change debate. However, only 
policy core belief systems are significant determinants of the overall tone of testimony 
in climate change hearings. With respect to deep core beliefs, increases in the 
conservatism of the DW-Nominate scores of committee and subcommittee chairmen 
had no impact on the tone of testimony on the issue of climate change. 
 Ideological polarization between committee leaders’ policy core belief systems 
also has a significant impact on the tone of testimony presented on the subject of 
climate change. More specifically, committees and subcommittees with greater absolute 
differences between chairmen and minority ranking members’ League of Conservation 
Voters scores produced testimony that was significatly more pro-economic in tone 
than committees with smaller differences between committee leaders in these belief 
systems. These differences emerging is likely a result of members with a more pro-
economic bent taking leadership positions in committees, and if in the minority, 
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demanding that testimony with a pro-economic bent b represented in hearings on 
climate change.  
 Additionally, when committees and subcommittees addressed the issue of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the tone of testimony tended to be more pro-economic in tone than in 
committees and subcommittees that did not address th  i sue. Since Republicans 
controlled all committees that addressed the Kyoto Protocol issue, this result likely 
demonstrates that the Democratic minority was less inclined to ensure that pro-
environmental viewpoints would be represented during hearings on an issue that they 
were less in line with the pro-environmental positin than they were on other parts of 
the issue. On the other hand, ideological polarization in deep core beliefs appears to not 
be a significant factor in influencing the tone of testimony presented on climate change 
hearings.  
 The results from Table 5.2 clearly demonstrate that individual belief systems 
have a much larger role in determining the tone of witness testimony at a hearing than 
committee venues, a result which is the exact opposite f what was found in the issue of 
tobacco policy. Nonetheless, some of the results in he preceding section are either 
anomalous or are not as strong as one would expect. For instance, why do foreign 
policy committees produce more pro-environmental testimony when one would 
logically expect the opposite? Furthermore, why are the DW-Nominate scores that 
measure a committee chair’s deep core beliefs not asignificant determinant of the tone 
of testimony when these same scores were such a powerful determinant of individual 
committee members’ positions on the issue?  
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 The answers to these questions likely can be uncovered by excluding members 
of the federal bureaucracy as part of the witnesses that make up the calculation of the 
tone of testimony in front of a particular committee. One of the most important 
purposes for which congressional hearings are conducte  is to oversee other actors in 
society, particularly members of the federal executive branch. During interviews with 
staff members, many interviewees noted that witness s lection done for the purposes of 
overseeing another actor operates in a very different fashion than witness selection in 
typical run-of-the-mill hearings (Staff Interviews 2010). Unlike in many parliamentary 
democracies, legislative actors do not often have a specified time period to directly 
question the executive branch on the decisions that they make. However, through the 
congressional hearing process, congressional committee and subcommittee members do 
have the opportunity to call executive officials to testify before them and directly 
attempt to discredit the information they provide (Staff Interviews 2010). As a result, at 
times, interestingly, congressional hearings may be organized to over-represent 
viewpoints that are inconsistent with the positions f those sitting on the committee 
(Staff Interviews 2010).  
 In the case of climate change policy, this issue becomes particularly pertinent 
because climate change policy is very partisan and is likely to generate intense scrutiny 
of the executive branch particularly when the presid nt is from the opposite party of the 
leaders of the committee conducting the hearing. If a substantial number of witnesses 
were chosen in order for committee chairs to discredit their policy choices/opinions, it 
may lead to some of the anomalous and weaker than expected results found in the 
previous analysis because the measurement used mixes the tone of witnesses prepared 
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for a wide variety of purposes. If witness selection f r oversight purposes is as different 
from witness selection in normal hearings as staff members suggest, these two groups of 
witnesses should be separated. Of course, it is very difficult to determine whether a 
witness is being called to oversee their activities or not because committee leaders do 
not always express their intentions for calling particular witnesses to testify. However, 
since oversight of the executive branch is a key function of congressional committees 
and subcommittees, the most likely persons to be call d for oversight purposes are 
members of the federal executive bureaucracy.  
 
[Table 5.3 Here] 
 
 In order to demonstrate the effects that inclusion of witnesses called for 
oversight purposes can have over the results, I have recalculated the tone of testimony 
presented in front of particular committees and subcommittees in particular Congresses 
by eliminating the tone of statements made by members of the federal bureaucracy in 
my calculations.  Table 5.3 presents the results of po led OLS regression models testing 
the determinants of the tone of testimony excluding members of the federal 
bureaucracy. Once again, the analysis is separated into two models to avoid 
multicollinearity problems between the deep core and policy core belief variables. As 
Table 5.3 demonstrates, the models excluding federal bu eaucrats performs 
considerably stronger than the original models, as the e models can now explain around 
58-60% of the variation in the dependent variable. In terms of the control variables in 
the analysis, the results do not change much between these models and the original set 
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of models. Once again, the tone of testimony present d i  front of House committees is 
not significantly different from the testimony presented in front of Senate committees 
and only the 1990’s exhibit significantly different tone of testimony from the 1980’s, 
with the 1990’s being significantly more pro-economic in tone than the 1980’s.  
 The perceived institutional bias of a committee once again does not seem to 
have a large impact over the tone of information in the issue area of climate change. 
Furthermore, when the testimony of federal bureaucrats is removed from the analysis, 
the tone of testimony given in front of foreign policy committees is not significantly 
different from the baseline case of miscellaneous committees. The difference in results 
concerning foreign policy committees can likely be attributed to the key oversight role 
the foreign policy committees played during the negotiation of key climate change 
treaties, particularly the Kyoto Protocol. During hearings concerning climate change, 
foreign policy committees routinely called members of the federal bureaucracy to 
defend the provisions of the treaty. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the chairs of 
foreign policy committees did not call federal bureaucrats, who by and large supported 
the Protocol, to testify because they agreed with the provisions of the Protocol 
themselves. Rather, they called bureaucrats to testify in order to question the wisdom of 
signing onto a Protocol that they thought contained s rious flaws. This difference in 
results demonstrates how witness selection for oversight purposes can be very different 
from witness selection for general information collection and display purposes. 
 With respect to the effects of belief systems of key committee actors on the tone 
of testimony during hearings on the subject of climate change, as expected, policy core 
beliefs of committee chairs continue to have an important effect on the tone of hearing 
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testimony and without including federal bureaucrats in the analysis the effect becomes 
considerably stronger. Chairmen with more pro-environmental policy core beliefs 
presided over hearings that contained testimony with a more pro-environmental tone on 
the subject of climate change. A one-unit increase in the pro-environmentalism of 
committee and subcommittee chairmen’s League of Conservation voter scores leads to 
an expected increase of 0.009 units in the tone of supportiveness of the member’s 
statement toward the pro-environmental viewpoint in the more specific climate change 
debate. Put in a more substantive fashion, a change from an extremely anti-
environmental chairman to one that is more moderate in his or her environmental 
beliefs (an increase from 0 to 50) leads to an expected increase of 0.45 units in the tone 
of testimony presented in front of a committee or subcommittee on the climate change 
debate. A change from an extremely anti-environmental chairman to an extremely pro-
environmental chairman (an increase from 0 to 100) leads to an expected increase of 0.9 
units in the tone of testimony presented in front of a committee or subcommittee on the 
climate change debate. 
Interestingly, when federal bureaucrats are excluded from the analysis of the 
tone of testimony, the deep core beliefs of committee chairmen also becomes an 
important determinant of the tone of testimony in cl mate change hearings. More 
specifically, more conservative chairmen tend to oversee hearings with a more pro-
economic bent in tone. A one-unit increase in the conservatism of committee and 
subcommittee chairmen leads to an expected increase of 0.873 units in the pro-
economic tone of hearing testimony. Once again, the diff rence in results can likely be 
attributed to the fact that the criteria for witness selection for oversight purposes are 
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much different than the selection criteria for a normal run-of-the-mill hearing. When 
chairmen call witnesses from the federal bureaucracy to testify, they are likely doing so 
in order to directly question the wisdom of whatever policies they are pursuing rather 
than to bolster arguments made by one side or to genuin ly collect information. This 
possibility is even more likely when dealing with a p rtisan issue like climate change 
where the two sides are constantly trying to discredit ach other’s arguments in the 
debate.  
 Unsurprisingly, ideological polarization between committee leaders’ policy core 
belief systems once again had a significant impact on the tone of testimony presented on 
the subject of climate change, even after removing the testimony of federal bureaucratic 
officials from the analysis. Committees and subcommittees with greater absolute 
differences between chairmen and minority ranking members’ League of Conservation 
Voters scores produced testimony that was significatly more pro-economic in tone 
than committees with smaller differences between committee leaders in these belief 
systems. Additionally, when committees and subcommittees addressed the issue of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the tone of testimony tended to be more pro-economic in tone than in 
committees and subcommittees that did not address th  i sue. On the other hand, 
ideological polarization in deep core beliefs is stll not a significant factor in influencing 
the tone of testimony presented on climate change hearings, even when removing the 
testimony of federal bureaucratic officials from the analysis.   
 Nonetheless, the results in this section demonstrate th t belief systems of 
committee leaders have a far greater impact on the tone of hearing testimony than the 
perceived biases of committee venues. As stated earlier, more conflictual/partisan issue 
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contexts, like climate change has become, are likely to produce more conflictual venues 
in which a natural venue bias (like agricultural committees in the case of tobacco 
policy) is not likely to be present. I now turn to an analysis of the determinants of the 
prevalence of scientific experts at congressional he rings on climate change policy to 
determine whether chairmen with certain belief systems tend to censor certain types of 
information or whether all types of information are w lcomed in these environments. 
 
Types of Witnesses - Results 
 
[Figure 5.3 Here] 
 
Figure 5.3 contains a graph depicting the evolution in the broad categories of 
witnesses that have testified during hearings concerning climate change. As Figure 5.3 
demonstrates, congressional committees and subcommittees have called mostly experts, 
representatives of private interests, and members of federal bureaucratic agencies to 
testify before them at congressional hearings. In contrast to tobacco hearings, experts 
make up a sizable percentage of witnesses in congressional hearings on climate change 
policy. The percentage of experts testifying at hearings on the subject of climate change 
only once fell below 20% of the individuals testifying at hearing (the 105th Congress) 
and even reached as high as 67% of the witnesses during the 97th Congress. In such a 
technical issue like climate change, it is logical to expect that committee members will 
want to collect information from experts to try to c me to an informed decision on the 
issue or to simply add credibility to their own predisposed policy positions.  
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As Figure 5.3 further depicts, from the early stages of the climate change issue 
until around its midpoint (the 96th-103rd Congresses), experts made up the largest 
category of witnesses during all congressional session  where the issue was addressed. 
However, after the 103rd Congress, the categories of federal bureaucratic officials and 
representatives of private interests began to make up sizable percentages of the total 
witnesses called to testify at climate change hearings while the percentage of experts 
testifying at climate change hearings began to declin . The percentage of experts 
testifying has shown steady increases since the 105th Congress and has made up the 
largest category of witnesses from the 106th-109th Congresses.  
Nonetheless, representatives of private interests have also begun to make up an 
increasingly sizable percentage of the total witnesses testifying at climate change 
hearings. More specifically, representatives of private interests have gone from making 
up none of the witnesses testifying in climate change hearings during the start of the 
issue to now making up around 40% of the witnesses testifying during the most recent 
Congress studied (the 109th Congress). As such, it seems that hearings are morand 
more becoming a forum for private interests to exprss their viewpoints than it has been 
in the past. Such results are consistent with the exp ctation that hearings are most likely 
to be used for genuine information collection at their earliest stages. Experts were such 
a preponderant group in the early stages of the issue, because politicians genuinely did 
not know how to handle the issue or even if the problem was truly happening. However, 
as time has gone on and the beliefs of committee members concerning climate change 
have become more concrete and divergent, committee members have relied on experts 
less and more on representatives of private interests to present testimony in front of 
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them at congressional hearings. Nonetheless, as stated e rlier, experts still make up a 
significant percentage of witnesses at hearings on climate change policy. This result 
suggests that hearings have still served as a platform for expert information to be 
disseminated to congressional policymakers and the public, likely in order to justify the 
viewpoints of committee leaders that select witnesses to testify at hearings.  
Before moving on to a more robust analysis of one of the most important types 
of experts that testify at climate change hearings (scientific experts), another significant 
result displayed in Figure 5.3 is worth mentioning. As Figure 5.3 demonstrates, federal 
bureaucratic officials make up a fairly large portin of the officials testifying on the 
issue of climate change. In one Congress (the 104th), federal bureaucratic officials even 
make up the largest percentage of witnesses (around 50% of the witnesses) testifying on 
the topic of climate change. This result is noteworthy because in no other issue have 
federal bureaucrats made up such a sizable portion of the witnesses testifying on an 
issue in a particular Congress. This result provides further support for the proposition 
stated in the previous section that in partisan issue  like climate change, congressional 
committees more closely scrutinize members of the executive branch and potentially 
use hearings as a forum for oversight more than in other issues.  
 
 
[Table 5.4 Here] 
 
 As stated earlier, scientific experts make up one f the most interesting groups to 
analyze in congressional hearings due to the fact th t many in the scientific community 
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have argued that climate change is a serious problem that should be addressed by the 
government. However, do conservative, pro-economic individuals still avoid calling 
scientific experts to testify despite the fact that most in the scientific community 
espouse a pro-environmental stance on the issue? Table 5.4 displays the results of the 
model determining the percentage of scientific testimony presented in congressional 
committees in a particular Congress. As was the casfor the overall tone of testimony, 
concerns about multicollinearity lead to the creation of two different models, placing 
environmental belief systems into one model and ideological belief systems into another 
model. Overall, both models perform respectably, as both can explain about 27% of the 
variance in the dependent variable and both models’ F-statistics are significant at all 
standard levels of statistical significance. In terms of the control variables in the 
analysis, once again, it appears that both time and the institutional chamber holding the 
hearings had negligible effects on the percentage of scientific experts called to testify at 
congressional hearings on climate change. Only the 1990’s were significantly different 
from the baseline 1980’s decade in hearing testimony with the 1990’s producing 
significantly smaller percentages of scientific testimony. The House and Senate did not 
produce significantly different percentages of scientific testimony in either of the 
models.  
 Interestingly, venue characteristics and issue dimension characteristics are a 
much more significant determinant of percentage of scientific testimony than the 
characteristics of committee leaders, a result that is the exact antithesis of the results 
found in the last section. As expected, due to their key role in examining scientific 
issues in Congress, science committees produced an xpected increase of about 24-27% 
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in the percentage of scientific experts when compared with the baseline case of 
miscellaneous committees. Furthermore, committees that held at least one hearing on 
the Kyoto Protocol also produced an expected decrease of around 25-26% in the 
percentage of scientific experts testifying when compared with committees that did not 
hold hearings on the Kyoto Protocol. This result is not particularly surprising since 
committees that held hearings on the Kyoto Protocol concentrated on the development 
of treaties on the issue, and as such, are more likely to concern themselves with how 
treaties were negotiated and what impacts the treaty will have rather than focusing on 
the scientific aspects of the issue.  
While committee venue and issue dimension characteristics are significant 
indicators of the degree to which scientific experts will be called to testify at 
congressional hearings, the belief systems of committee and subcommittee chairmen 
with the responsibility of making informational collection and display decisions have no 
significant impact on the percentage of scientific experts called to testify at 
congressional hearings. This comports well with evid nce from committee staff 
interviews that committee chairmen often seek a certain balance in the types of 
witnesses they call in order to demonstrate that witnesses from all walks of life support 
the position they are seeking to espouse (Staff Interviews 2010). In this case, even pro-
economic members sought out scientific experts to testify at congressional hearings in 
order to provide the pro-economic side credibility when presenting information 
concerning climate change. Pro-economic members wanted to demonstrate that there 
was more debate within the scientific community on the issue of climate change than 
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 This chapter provides some important information that can go a long way 
toward explaining why information collected within congressional institutions has 
appeared to trend in a direction that discounts the importance of solving the climate 
change problem while scientific evidence has evidently become more solid on the issue 
over time. From 1995-2006, policymaking institutions within Congress were, the vast 
majority of the time, controlled by policymakers who believed that climate change is 
not a significant problem. Thus, in order to support this belief, they gather more 
information that is consistent with their beliefs even while expert information continues 
to mount in opposition to these beliefs. In the end, much like how the public tends to 
choose the news source that supports their opinions on matters, policymakers gather 
information that is consistent with their beliefs on the issues.  
 With this said, those with a pro-economic viewpoint o  the climate change issue 
did not ignore the scientific aspects of the issue ev n though scientific experts at large 
did not necessarily support their position in the debate. Pro-economic committee 
chairmen were sure to show balance in the types of individuals called to testify in 
hearings in order to demonstrate that a balance of individuals supported their position in 
the debate. In this case, pro-economic chairmen attmpted to demonstrate that there was 
more debate on the hypothesis that climate change was caused by anthropogenic 
sources than the media and past congressional hearings had demonstrated. It is likely 
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that pro-environmental chairmen also called economic experts to their own hearings in 
order to demonstrate that environmental regulation w uld not significantly harm the 
economy.  
 Nonetheless, it is also clear from the results in this chapter that institutional 
biases are not evident in information collection and display decisions. It is clear that no 
venues chose information with the intention of leaving out particular viewpoints. No 
types of committees even exhibited traits amongst the participation of its members that 
would suggest they are biased venues. Likely the reason that individual characteristics 
of committee leaders and members were more important in the case of climate change 
when compared to tobacco policies is due to the more pa tisan nature of the issue. 
Although this chapter remains agnostic on whether party identification of members was 
an important factor in information collection and display decisions, it is clear that the 
positions of members on the climate change issue did separate along party lines as the 
issue matured. As this occurred, the likelihood that wo groups antagonistic toward each 
other would be represented on committee after committee became more likely. In the 
next chapter, I will analyze the issue of biotechnology to demonstrate how information 
collection and display dynamics can change drastically depending on the dimension of 
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Figure 5.1. Polarization of Committee 






TABLE 5.1.  Pooled Ordered Probit Regression Results Testing the Determinants 
of Tone of Committee Member Statements on Climate Change Issue 
Independent Variable Coefficient Robust Standard 
Error 
z score 
Ideology -1.572** 0.225 -6.99 
LCV Score 0.020** 0.003 7.47 
Environmental 
Committee 
-0.342 0.219 -1.56 
Energy Committee -0.030 0.198 -0.15 
Science Committee 0.209 0.202 1.03 
Foreign Policy 
Committee 
-0.115 0.216 -0.53 
Agricultural Committee 0.418 0.303 1.38 
Resources Committee -0.226 0.217 -1.04 
Kyoto -0.540** 0.125 -4.33 
Chamber -0.385* 0.151 -2.54 
1990’s -1.016** 0.167 -6.10 
2000’s -0.422* 0.187 -2.26 
Cut 1 -1.624 0.284  
Cut 2 -1.026 0.286  
Cut 3 -0.209 0.281  
Cut 4 0.362 0.270  
N 807   
Pseudo R2 0.337   
Wald Chi2 498.09**   
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Dependent variable: Tone of statements given by committee members in congressional 
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Figure 5.2. Average Tone of Testimony  




TABLE 5.2.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Testing the Determinants of Overall 
Tone of Testimony in Climate Change Hearings 






Chair LCV Score 0.007* 
(0.003) 
  





Environmental Polarization  -0.006* 
(0.003) 
  



























































N 95 95  
Adjusted R2 0.348 0.293  
F Statistic 6.39** 4.96**  
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Standard Errors in Parentheses 






TABLE 5.3.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Testing the Determinants of Overall 
Tone of Testimony Excluding Bureaucratic Administration Officials in Climate 
Change Hearings 






Chair LCV Score 0.009** 
(0.002) 
   --- 
 
 





Environmental Polarization  -0.006* 
(0.003) 
   ---  



























































N 90 90  
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.578  
F Statistic 24.88** 28.02**  
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
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Figure 5.3. Types of Group Affiliations of 
Witnesses Testifying at Congressional 








TABLE 5.4.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Testing the Determinants of the Level 
of Testimony Given By Scientific Experts in Climate Change Hearings 






Chair LCV Score -0.001 
(0.001) 
    --- 
 
 





Environmental Polarization  -0.001 
(0.001) 
    --- 
 
 

























































N 95 95  
Adjusted R2 0.272 0.272  
F Statistic 16.19** 18.19**  
Note: *  p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Standard Errors in Parentheses 






Chapter 6. Biotechnology Policy –Multidimensional Issue Areas and 
Information Collection and Display Decisions 
 
Introduction 
 In 2001, the House Committee on Government Reform’s Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources held a hearing to analyze some of 
the issues involved with using biotechnology tools t  collect embryonic stem cells to be 
used in the quest to cure different diseases. During this hearing, then-Chairman Mark 
Souder, a conservative Republican from Indiana made the following statement 
concerning the use of biotechnology for the purpose of harvesting embryonic stem cells: 
“We all desperately want to find cures for the diseases that affect 
our friends, our families, and our neighbors. Yet, in our quest to 
find these cures, we must not ignore or rationalize the 
tremendous questions posed by destroying living human 
embryos. Neither should we overlook all the ethical alternatives 
that exist that do not require the taking of one’s life in order to 
improve the life of another (2002-H401-37).” 
 By contrast, at the same hearing, the then minority ranking member of the 
committee, Elijah Cummings, made the following statement in direct opposition to the 
viewpoints expressed by Rep. Souder in the previous statement: 
“We know that top scientists believe that embryonic stem cells 
may lead to breakthrough treatments for devastating disorders 
affect countless American families….Embryonic stem cell
research conducted according to Federal guidelines would in no 
practical sense result in the deprivation of life. It holds a very real 
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promise, however, of saving, extending and improving the 
quality of tens of millions of lives affected by some of the most 
debilitating and dangerous human diseases and disabilit es (2002-
H401-37).” 
From the previous statements, it would seem that the issue of biotechnology, and 
thus congressional hearing politics concerning the issue, operates in much the same 
fashion as the partisan issue of climate change. Nonetheless, the issue of biotechnology 
is much more multi-dimensional than the previous statements portray. On some other 
facets of the issue, hearing politics operate in a different fashion than how 
biotechnology politics are portrayed above. For insta ce, during a pair of hearings in the 
108th congressional session conducted by the House Agricultural Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit, Rural Development, and Research on the use of 
biotechnology for agricultural purposes, then-Chairm n Frank Lucas, a Republican 
from Oklahoma, made the following statement trumpeting the positive uses of 
biotechnology in the agricultural community: 
I can think of few technologies that provide as much hope for the 
future as biotechnology. The fact that we are able to create 
healthier, friendlier, and higher yielding crops as a result of 
modern biotechnology should not be taken lightly…We can 
cower in fear of science every morning when we wake up, or we 
can get out of bed, turn on the electric lights, [and] eat our 
breakfast foods that are able to be stored longer and kept fresher 
than ever (2003-H161-13). 
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 During the same set of hearings, Tim Holden, the minority ranking member of 
the committee at the time, also expressed approval of the use of biotechnology for 
agricultural purposes: 
Over the past few years, the biotechnology sector has made great 
strides in addressing a wide variety of problems experienced 
throughout the world….The role of the biotechnology sector in 
ensuring the economic viability of both farmers and non-farmers 
can also not be overstated. They have provided farmers with a 
whole new set of products to assist in increasing crop yields, 
giving them another means by which to keep their farms running 
(2004-H161-17) 
 The preceding statements seem to portray an issue area where hearing politics 
operate in a consensual manner similar to how hearing politics operated within the 
agricultural committees on tobacco policy. From these two sets of statements, it is clear 
that biotechnology is an issue area where hearing politics will in large part be dictated 
by the dimension of the issue that is being examined at a hearing. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, during the early development of the issue, information collection and 
display decisions operated in a fashion consistent with how decisions would be made by 
committee members genuinely seeking information on an issue. However, as time 
moved on and committee members gained a better undestanding of the issue, hearings 
began to be used to fit the institutional biases of committees or the belief systems of 





Biotechnology Issue Context 
According to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, the term 
biotechnology refers to “any technological application that uses biological systems, 
living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or m dify products or processes for 
specific use (UN Convention on Biological Diversity).” As this definition suggests, the 
term biotechnology can refer to a number of different activities that make up the use of 
living organisms to modify materials for a specific purpose. The activities include, but 
are not limited to, the following: 
• Environmental biotechnology – the use of organic materi l to maintain 
biodiversity and to more quickly degrade harmful contaminants in an 
environment 
• Biotechnology in pharmaceutical manufacturing – the us  of organic material to 
manufacture medical drugs, vaccines, and antibiotics 
• Gene therapy -  the use of genes “to treat or prevent disease” through replacing 
abnormal genes and/or repairing or altering dysfunctio al genes(U.S. National 
Library of Medicine)  
• Genetic testing – the use of biotechnology to test individuals for potential 
diseases and to attempt to treat individuals based on the results of these tests 
• Agricultural biotechnology – the manipulation of genetic material within crops 
and plants to increase agricultural productivity, ward off pests without the use 
of pesticides, and improve the taste and appearance of food among other 
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advantages. May also refer to the genetic alteration of animals for the purpose 
of improving food production. 
• Industrial biotechnology – the use of biotechnology to increase efficiency in 
manufacturing industries (i.e. textiles, chemicals, food processing, etc.) 
• Cloning – the use of biotechnology to make genetically identical living items 
(i.e. humans, animals, cells, tissues, etc.) 
• Stem cell treatment – the introduction of cells with the ability to “renew 
themselves indefinitely and differentiate into descendent cells that have a 
specific function” into tissue in order to treat disease (Okarma 2001; Sheingate 
2006, 255) 
• Marine biotechnology – the use of biotechnology processes in ocean 
environments to improve the ecological environment in the ocean 
• Genetic sequencing – the study of the genetic makeup of different species of 
animals and plants (i.e. Human Genome Project) 
Although each of the preceding purposes for which botechnology is used makes 
use of the same tool to accomplish specific purposes, th y have not always been treated 
in the same fashion by U.S. policymakers. For instance, according to past research on 
the topic, as Sheingate (2006) demonstrates, U.S. policy has generally followed a 
“bifurcated” path in which the U.S. government has supported the development of 
agricultural biotechnology techniques while strongly regulating the use of 
biotechnology for health purposes, in particular for cl ning and stem cell therapies. 
Sheingate (2006) further shows that information presented on the issue has been more 
positive across time when addressing the agricultural dimension of the issue than it has 
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been in the health dimension of the issue. The consensus politics that have operated on 
the issue of agricultural biotechnology is interesting in light of the significant debate on 
the issue and the fact that the European Union has placed significant regulations on 
agricultural biotechnology (Sheingate 2006). However, why have divides occurred in 
the tone of information presented on agricultural biotechnology vis-à-vis health 
biotechnology? Are the two issues treated differently by all congressional actors 
regardless of the institutional biases of the committees they serve on or their own belief 
systems or do informational tones depend on the chara teristics of the committee 
holding the hearing? 
 As stated in an earlier chapter, multiple dimensio exist in many policy issues 
and not all of these dimensions will cause a divide amongst different political parties 
(Riker 1982; Wolbrecht 2000; Talbert and Potoski 2002) or amongst individuals with 
different belief systems. In Congress, different dimensions of a policy issue can all be 
considered simultaneously by different policy venues like committees and 
subcommittees (Simon 1983; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 2001). As such, the 
different dynamics on these dimensions may cause subsy tems to act very differently 
depending on the dimension being considered. In such issue contexts, certain 
dimensions of the issue may exhibit qualities consistent with distributive issue contexts 
while other dimensions of the issue may exhibit qualities consistent with more partisan 
issue contexts.  
On policy issues that are more complex and multidimensional, multiple existing 
policy subsystems working on other related issues have a vested interest in 
policymaking on the issue (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998; Fenger and Klok 2001; Weible 
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2008; Jones and Jenkins-Smith 2009; Weible, Sabatier, nd McQueen 2009). Each 
subsystem working on the issue may exhibit completely different characteristics 
depending on what dimension of the issue is being examined. On dimensions of the 
issue with a distributive component, committees within subsystems whose members 
have a vested interest in extracting benefits on the issue may exhibit qualities consistent 
with unified subsystems when collecting and displaying information in hearings. On the 
other hand, on dimensions of the issue with a partisan component, committees within 
subsystems may exhibit qualities consistent with competitive subsystems when 
collecting and displaying information in hearings. 
The existence of multidimensionality in certain issue  can clearly be seen in the 
policy domain of biotechnology. First of all, early on in the issue, little was known 
about biotechnology and the potential effects (both negative and positive) that the tool 
could have on society. As McQuide (2007) describes, public knowledge of the issue 
was relatively sparse at the start of the issue’s emergence on the U.S. government’s 
agenda. According to polling done in January of 1985 when the topic was beginning to 
gain more congressional attention in congressional he rings, 54% of the public had not 
heard of biotechnology or genetic engineering and 35% had no opinion or did not know 
whether or not it was necessary for the industry to be regulated by the government17 
(McQuide 2007). During congressional hearings on the topic of biotechnology, 
congressional committee members spoke of the need to balance the benefits and risks of 
biotechnology and of the need to gather information on the topic to make well-informed 
                                                
17
 McQuide (2007) takes this information from a Cambridge Reports/Research International Survey from 
January of 1985.  
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decisions. For instance, in 1977, during a hearing on biotechnology policy in front of 
the Committee on Science and Technology’s Subcommittee on Science, Research, and 
Technology, the ranking member for the minority, Harold Hollenbeck, made the 
following statement concerning the purpose of the hearing: 
[W]e are all looking forward to learning more about this intricate 
field in the coming months, such that we can make a w ll-
informed contribution to legislative consideration in the future on 
the future of genetic engineering (78-H701-22). 
In 1977, Don Fuqua, the then-chairman of the Science Policy Task Force under the 
Senate Committee on Science, Technology, and Space s ok  of the need to understand 
how to strike a balance between the risks and benefits of biotechnology research: 
These hearings will attempt to cast some needed light on two 
questions that have been at the heart of the recombinant DNA 
controversy: how can we reap the benefits of recombinant DNA 
research while protecting humanity against unacceptable 
biological risks; how can we protect researchers, the public at 
large, and the environment from hazard while respecting the 
scientist’s freedom to conduct research in a responible manner; 
and finally, to what degree can this protection be accomplished 
by self-regulation and to what degree must we rely on public 
authority?...In these circumstances the time is propitious for a 
renewed inquiry into this complicated but important issue of 
science policy (78-S261-21). 
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 Both of the preceding statements suggest that congressional policymakers were 
not confident of what the consequences of using biotechnology tools would be and 
wanted to gain a better understanding of the issue at congressional hearings in order to 
make the best decisions possible on the issue. As I will demonstrate later, the generally 
neutral tone of both Republican and Democratic committee member statements on the 
issue during its emergence on the congressional agend  is suggestive of this possibility. 
If congressional policymakers were genuinely uncertain about the effects of 
biotechnology policy and wanted to gain the best information possible on the issue, we 
would expect the following hypotheses to be confirmed: 
 
Informational Perspective Member Statement Tone Hypothesis: Member statements will 
be relatively neutral concerning biotechnology, particularly at early stages of the issue 
when uncertainty concerning the issue is relatively great. Furthermore, subsystem and 
personal belief biases will not be an important determinant of member statements on 
the issue. 
 
Informational Perspective Testimony Tone Hypothesis: The tone of testimony 
concerning biotechnology will be relatively unbiased and representative of a variety of 
different perspectives, particularly at early stages of the issue when uncertainty 
concerning the issue is relatively great. Furthermoe, subsystem and personal belief 





 Informational Perspective Expert Testimony Hypothesis: Legislative hearings will be 
constructed so that expert information on a topic is gathered and that the testimony of 
technical and policy experts on a particular issue hould be valued. Expert testimony 
(i.e. scientific experts) rather than interest group testimony will be the most 
predominant type of testimony presented in hearings particularly at early stages of the 
issue when uncertainty concerning the issue is relativ ly great. 
 
Nonetheless, as time moved on in the issue area, congressional policymakers 
became more confident in their viewpoints on the issue. However, unlike the other two 
issue areas I have examined, the beliefs of congressional policymakers and the politics 
concerning the issue differed based on the dimension of the issue being analyzed. 
Certain biotechnology issue dimensions were relatively uncontroversial and generally 
led to agreement between the two parties on the dimnsion of the issue at hand. For 
instance, during hearings on the Human Genome Project, committee members from 
both parties generally spoke very positively about the project and the potential benefits 
the research could generate while downplaying the risks that could come from engaging 
in the project18.  Many other topic areas including marine biotechnology, industrial 
biotechnology, and environmental biotechnology also foll wed this same general trend 
of consensus.  
Yet, while politics on many dimensions of the biotechnology issue were marked 
with consensus, a few dimensions of the issue produced their share of controversy in the 
                                                
18
 See the following hearing documents for examples of the consensus between the two parties on the 
Human Genome Project: 90-H701-34, 90-S261-32, 90-S311-58, 2003-H361-36 
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public at large. In particular, the dimensions of the issue dealing with agricultural 
biotechnology and the use of biotechnology tools to create and clone human embryos 
and human embryonic stem cells for health purposes have been the source of some 
debate in society. In the case of agricultural biotechnology, controversy over the issue 
has centered on whether or not genetically modified crops are harmful to the 
environment or to the health of the individuals who consume them. Proponents of the 
use of biotechnology in agriculture argue that genetically modified crops grow faster 
and are more resistant to the harmful effects of pests, drought, and other conditions that 
limit the growth of plants than are traditionally grown crops (Bakshi 2003, 212). 
Furthermore, these advances in plant productivity can be obtained without the use of 
fertilizers and insecticides that can be expensive and harmful to the environment 
(Bakshi 2003, 212). As a result, biotechnology has been held up by its proponents as a 
method to increase the availability of food in regions where poor growing conditions 
have led to widespread starvation (Bakshi 2003, 212).  
 On the other hand, opponents of the use of biotechnology in agriculture have 
argued that the benefits of genetically modified crops are not worth the significant 
environmental and health risks that could result from their use. In particular, opponents 
argue that, among other harmful effects, genetically modified crops may increase 
allergic reactions to food, increase resistance to an ibiotic medicines amongst 
individuals who consume genetically modified food, unintentionally harm species that 
were not intended to be affected by genetic modification of crops, and increase the 
toxicity of food (Bakshi 2003, 213-221). As such, opp nents of agricultural 
218 
 
biotechnology are very distrustful of food that has been genetically modified and seek 
to use food that has only been grown through natural methods. 
 The lines of debate in the issue of agricultural biotechnology seem to have the 
opportunity to divide across committee venues as opposed to within these venues. In 
particular, due to the consensual nature of politics within the agricultural subsystem and 
the historical role of the committee in promoting all agricultural commodities, members 
of the agricultural committees in Congress will be significantly more positive toward 
the use of biotechnology than a typical run of the mill committee. The genetic 
manipulation of crops provides farmers with a new tool o increase agricultural 
productivity and ward off pests without the use of pesticides. As such, members of both 
political parties within the agricultural subsystem are likely to be supportive of 
biotechnology, due to its importance for farmers in their respective districts, and will 
likely use congressional hearings on the topic to encourage development of this tool for 
future use. On the other hand, while other committees may not necessarily be more 
negative toward the use of biotechnology, due to the lack of consensus in other 
committees, it is more likely that the safety risks involved with agricultural 
biotechnology will be addressed in these other committees. As such, if the preceding 
analysis is correct, we should expect the following hypotheses to be confirmed: 
 
Agricultural Unified Subsystem Member Statement Tone Hypothesis: Agricultural 
committee members will be more supportive of the biotechnology industry in their 




Agricultural Unified Subsystem Testimony Tone Hypothesis: Since agricultural 
committees fit the unified subsystem type, agricultural committees will produce 
significantly more positive testimony toward the biotechnology industry than 
miscellaneous committees. Since most members of thecommittee are in agreement on 
the conception of a policy issue, the personal belief systems of committee chairs will 
have little to no impact on the information collection process in the agricultural policy 
dimension of biotechnology.  
 
 In addition to the agricultural subsystem, another subsystem type which could 
have the potential to act as a unified subsystem on the issue of biotechnology is the 
economic promotion subsystem, which is made up of the two Small Business 
committees in the House and Senate and the Joint Eco omic Committee.  The economic 
promotion subsystem possesses certain qualities that could cause it to act as a unified 
subsystem when dealing with the issue of biotechnology. First of all, many members of 
the Small Business committees that operate within the economic promotion subsystem 
have expressed that their desire to serve on the committee is derived from their desire to 
serve their constituents, particularly small busineses that operate within their individual 
districts and states (Smith and Deering 1990; Deering and Smith 1997; Frisch and Kelly 
2006). Politics within committees whose members are more constituency-oriented tend 
to be more consensual and less divisive, as congressional policymakers support each 
other’s demands for constituency benefits to ensure legislative support for their own 
constituency’s demands in the future (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Weingast 1979; 
220 
 
Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Tullock 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Smith and 
Deering 1990; Deering and Smith 1997; Maltzman 1997).  
 Additionally, much like the stated goal of the committees within the agricultural 
subsystem is to promote the agricultural industry, the goal of many of the committees 
within the economic promotion subsystem is to assist the development of businesses, 
particularly small businesses. For instance, the House Small Business Committee states 
that its mission is “to protect and assist small businesses.” As such, the committee has 
the jurisdiction to assist with “small business financial aid, regulatory flexibility, and 
paperwork reduction.” This stated jurisdiction suggests a committee that seeks to 
decrease barriers to the development of businesses rather than placing more regulations 
on an industry. As such, we may logically expect tha e committee would be biased 
toward reducing the barriers to development of businesses in all industries, including 
biotechnology.  
In the specific context of biotechnology policy, committees within the economic 
promotion subsystem have the jurisdiction to conduct hearings on a wide variety of 
general economic topics including federal government promotion of biotechnology 
companies, patenting of products produced through the use of biotechnology, and the 
practical and commercial uses of biotechnology in areas like agriculture. While some of 
these issues are somewhat controversial, many of these issues have the propensity to 
unite members of the economic promotion subsystem in support of the biotechnology 
industry. For instance, in the case of federal promotion and support of the 
biotechnology industry, members of the economic promotion subsystem are more likely 
than members of other committees to recognize how beneficial federal promotion and 
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research and development assistance can be to small businesses within an industry. 
While not all members of the economic promotion subsystem will have a biotechnology 
firm in their district or state, they are also likey to realize that support for federal 
promotion of the biotechnology industry may lead to support from other committee 
members when an industry in their state or district needs federal promotion and/or 
assistance. Furthermore, while many opponents of patents for biotechnology products 
argue that such patents could ultimately lead to the patenting and commercialization of 
actual living organisms like animals and humans, due to their experience working to 
promote small businesses of all types, members of the economic promotion subsystem 
are likely to downplay such criticisms because they recognize the importance of such 
patents to small burgeoning businesses like many biotechnology firms.   
As such, since many biotechnology companies are small businesses and since 
the development of the biotechnology industry has te potential to positively affect the 
economy in many different districts and states, memb rs of the economic promotion 
committees are likely to be supportive of the biotechnology industry. On the other hand, 
while other committees may not necessarily be more negative toward the use of 
biotechnology, due to the risks involved with expansio  of the biotechnology industry 
and the lack of consensus concerning these issues in other committees, it is more likely 
that the risks that could result from expanding the biotechnology industry will be 
addressed in these other committees. As such, if the preceding analysis is correct, we 




Economic Promotion Unified Subsystem Member Statement Tone Hypothesis: Small 
Business and Joint Economic committee members will be more supportive of the 
biotechnology industry in their opening statements than members of miscellaneous 
committees.    
 
Economic Promotion Unified Subsystem Testimony ToneHypothesis: Since Small 
Business and Joint Economic committees fit within te unified subsystem of economic 
promotion, Small Business and Joint Economic committees will produce significantly 
more positive testimony toward the biotechnology industry than miscellaneous 
committees.  
 
 The final subsystem with the potential to act likea unified subsystem in 
information and collection decisions is the science subsystem, which is made up of the 
two science committees in the House and Senate. Much like the agricultural and small 
business committees in the House and Senate, many members of the science 
committees have expressed that their desire to serve on these committees is derived 
from their desire to serve their constituents (Smith and Deering 1990; Deering and 
Smith 1997; Frisch and Kelly 2006). Since politics amongst members of constituency-
oriented committees tends to be more consensual than ot er types of committees (Fenno 
1973; Smith and Deering 1990; Deering and Smith 1997), we may expect that members 
of the scientific committees that make up the science subsystem will be more united in 
their support of scientific research and development, as these committees were created 
in part to support scientific research. Since biotechnology is a heavily science-centric 
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industry that requires a significant amount of scientific research and development to 
expand and thrive, we may expect that the committees that make up the science 
subsystem will be more positive toward the biotechnology industry when collecting and 
displaying information in congressional hearings than other types of committees.  
 With this said, the scientific committees face certain obstacles that may prevent 
them from acting like a prototypical unified subsystem when collecting and displaying 
information in congressional hearings. First of all, unlike the committees that make up 
the economic promotion and agriculture subsystems, the scientific committees in 
Congress held a significant amount of hearings on the biotechnology issue during the 
early stages of the development of the issue in Congress. As stated earlier, during the 
early stages of the issue, beliefs had not yet developed and members were genuinely 
uncertain about what actions to take on the issue. Thus, during the early stages of the 
process, the science committees may have used the congressional hearing process to 
hear from a variety of different perspectives rather an using the process to express and 
drum up support for scientific research and development. Furthermore, on several 
occasions, science committees did have to address th  more controversial dimensions of 
the biotechnology issue (i.e. human cloning and embryonic stem cell research) when 
conducting hearings. As was the case in the climate change issue, controversial issues 
have the potential to divide committees, even those that normally act as unified 
subsystems. Nonetheless, if the science subsystem acts as a unified subsystem in the 




Science Unified Subsystem Member Statement Tone Hypothesis: Science committee 
members will be more supportive of the biotechnology industry in their opening 
statements than members of miscellaneous committees.    
 
Science Unified Subsystem Testimony Tone Hypothesis: Science committees will 
produce significantly more positive testimony toward the biotechnology industry than 
miscellaneous committees.  
 
  In contrast to the dimensions of the issue described above, in the case of the use 
of biotechnology tools to create and clone human embryos and human embryonic stem 
cells for health purposes, debate over the issue centers around the ethical nature of using 
material from human embryos to help cure diseases. Proponents of using material from 
human embryos to help treat diseases argue that the lternatives to using embryonic 
materials are not as effective, and thus, ethical considerations should not prevent the 
government from allowing medical researchers to use embryonic material to find cures 
to diseases. As Nisbet (2004, 132) notes, unlike adult stem cells, embryonic stem cells 
“have yet to be programmed to be specific” to certain p rts of the human body like the 
brain or the heart. As such, according to proponents of embryonic stem cell treatments, 
while adult stem cells can only form tissue from the part of the body they originated, 
embryonic stem cells have the ability to form a wide variety of tissues from many 
different parts of the body, and thus, are easier to harvest and culture for the purpose of 
curing diseases like Parkinson’s Disease, AIDS, and spinal cord injuries (Nisbet 2004; 
Raff 2003; Smith et al 2007).  
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 Opponents of embryonic stem cell research counter that the derivation of human 
embryos to date necessarily involves the destruction of the embryo (Nisbet 2004, 132). 
As such, since most critics of embryonic stem cell research believe that embryonic 
matter is where life begins, critics argue that the derivation of embryonic stem cells 
involves the unnecessary taking of a human life. Furthermore, as the following portion 
of an opening statement made by Rep. Souder attests, critics of embryonic stem cell 
research also argue that embryonic stem cell research is unnecessary since adult stem 
cells has the same potential to cure diseases as embryonic stem cells: 
Contrary to the impressions created by advocates for embryonic 
stem cell research, the potential of such cells remains entirely 
speculative, because embryonic stem cells have never b en 
successfully used in clinical applications with human patients. 
Lost in the debate is the fact that all of the clini ally successful 
human applications of stem cells to date have been conducted 
with adult stem cells (2002-H401-37).  
 Controversy also surrounds the issue of cloning of embryos for much of the 
same reasons that disagreements occurred in the issue of tem cell research. While 
virtually all participants in the cloning debate ar opposed to the use of cloning for 
reproductive purposes, a great deal of disagreement exists over whether cloning of 
human embryos should be utilized for therapeutic purposes. As Kfoury (2007, 112) 
describes somatic cell nuclear transfer, more commonly referred to as therapeutic 
cloning, involves “the transfer of nuclear material isolated from a somatic cell into an 
enucleated oocyte in the goal of deriving embryonic cell lines in the same genome as 
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the nuclear donor.” In the following opening statement during a hearing on therapeutic 
cloning, Henry Waxman, a representative from California, describes some of the 
reasons why proponents of somatic cell nuclear transfer research are supportive of the 
use of somatic cell nuclear transfer/therapeutic cloning techniques: 
Somatic cell nuclear transfer has two benefits compared to stem 
cell research on embryos from a fertility clinic. First, the possible 
outcome of this research is the production of tissue  that are 
genetic match to the patient, reducing the risk of rejection such as 
that we have often seen with organ recipients. Second, the 
technique holds great potential for studying genetic and other 
diseases because scientists could potentially develop c lls using 
nuclei from people who have the disease. This would not 
generally be possible using embryos donated from fertility clinics 
because researchers cannot select the genes for such cells (2007-
H401-14). 
 Critics of somatic cell nuclear transfer techniques counter that due to the fact 
that the first step in human reproductive cloning is somatic cell nuclear transfer (Rhind 
et al 2003), this technique could ultimately lead to the reproductive cloning of human 
beings. Furthermore, since critics generally subscri e to the belief that human life 
begins at the creation of an embryo and somatic cell nuc ear transfer involves the 
creation of a human embryo, critics argue that the technique is unethical because it 
requires the creation of human life only for it to be destroyed. In the following opening 
statement on the subject of somatic cell nuclear transfer techniques, Mark Souder, a 
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former representative from Indiana, sums up the opposition to somatic cell nuclear 
transfer techniques: 
The research necessarily requires the destruction of living human 
embryos, and in the case of cloning, the special creation of 
embryos to be destroyed for their stem cells. The res arch 
necessarily requires a large number of eggs, likely leading to the 
exploitation of women in order to obtain their eggs for research 
(2007-H401-14). 
 As the previous information suggests, clear controversy exists on the issue of the 
cloning and use of human embryos for health purposes. Furthermore, unlike the case of 
agricultural biotechnology, the lines of debate have the potential to divide individuals 
from the two different political parties. More specifically, conservative individuals tend 
to believe that life begins when an egg is fertilized. As such, conservatives are more 
likely to have ethical misgivings with embryonic matter being utilized for health 
purposes. On the other hand, since liberals tend to ot believe that life begins when an 
egg is fertilized, they are less likely to have ethical issues with the use of embryonic 
matter being utilized for health purposes. Since the process of ideological polarization 
(i.e. the separation of the two parties into two distinct ideological camps) has increased 
the likelihood that conservatives will primarily befound in the Republican Party and 
liberals will be found in the Democratic Party (see Theriault 2008 for an example), it is 
more likely that conservatives and liberals will be found on committee after committee 
dealing with the issue of the use of human embryos for health purposes. As such, it is 
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expected that divisions between two different groups on this controversial dimension of 
the issue will be present on committee after committee.  
 As stated earlier, when the two political parties b come more polarized on an 
issue, the likelihood that any naturally sympathetic venues to one side or another will be 
present decreases, as there will likely be two politica  parties at odds with each other on 
the issue within each committee venue. In these cass, we should expect that the 
personal views of those running the hearing should have more of an impact on the 
information collection and display process than the type of committee venue in which 
the hearing takes place. Furthermore, since committee chairmen are required to allow 
the minority ranking member to call at least one witness to testify at a hearing (Sachs 
2003, 11; Staff Interviews 2010), even when the committee chairs are liberal, hearings 
on these issue dimensions will be relatively more negative toward biotechnology than a 
typical biotechnology hearing because the conservative minority ranking members will 
be more likely to exercise their privilege to call witnesses that are critical of the use of 
biotechnology to create and clone human embryos and embryonic stem cells. As such, 
if the preceding analysis is correct, we should expect the following hypotheses to be 
confirmed: 
 
Controversial Dimension Member Statement Tone Hypothesis: On the controversial 
health aspects of the biotechnology issue, individuals with more liberal beliefs will give 
statements that are more positive toward the biotechnology industry. Individuals with 
more conservative beliefs will give statements that are more negative toward the 




Committee Chair Belief Testimony Tone Hypothesis: Committees with chairs that have 
more conservative beliefs will produce testimony that is more negative toward the 
biotechnology industry. Committees with chairs that ve more liberal beliefs will 
produce testimony that is more supportive of the biotechnology industry.  
 
Controversial Dimension Testimony Tone Hypothesis: In general, hearings dealing with 
the controversial health aspects of the biotechnology industry will have a more negative 
tone toward the biotechnology industry than other aspects of the issue. 
 
 As this section has demonstrated, the biotechnology issue area operates very 
differently depending on the dimension of the issue being analyzed. In the next section, 
I will detail the ways in which different expectations regarding how congressional 
hearings politics will be conducted in biotechnology will be tested using empirical data 
collected from congressional hearing transcripts. 
 
Data and Methods 
Case Selection. Cases of congressional hearings concerning biotechnology policy were 
selected using a two pronged approach. First, hearings were selected by searching 
through hearings from the “Congressional Hearings Data Set” of the Policy Agendas 
project (http://www.policyagendas.org) in the following subtopic areas: “Agriculture: 
Research and Development,” “Health: Research and Development, ” “Science, Space, 
Technology, and Communications: Research and Development,” and “Environment: 
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Research and Development.” I then selected those hearings whose descriptions noted 
that the whole hearing or a substantial part of the hearing dealt with biotechnology 
policy. In order to ensure all cases were selected, I then conducted searches using on 
Lexis-Nexis Congressional Universe (http://www.lexisnexis.com) for hearings using the 
following search terms: biotechnology, genetically enhanced, genetically altered, 
genetically engineered, genetically modified, genetic ngineering, genetic test, cloning, 
embryonic transfer, genome, gene therapy, recombinant, somatic cell, stem cell, 
transgenic, biodegradation, bioremediation, and growth hormone. Through this method, 
I obtained 158 individual cases of hearing documents published that at least 
substantially concerned the topic of biotechnology policy. Data from these hearings 
were then aggregated at the committee and subcommittee level for each individual 
Congress, which condensed the number of cases to 118 cases.  
 
Dependent Variable – Tone of Committee Member Statements. The tone of 
committee member statements in the specific case of biotechnology was determined as 
follows. Particular arguments made over the course of a statement were coded as 
supportive of the biotechnology industry, moderate, or opposed to the biotechnology 
industry. More specific information on how each statement was assigned can be found 
in Appendix E. Using PDF XChange Viewer’s free PDF editing software19, notations 
were made to denote the positive, moderate, and negativ  suppositions made over the 
                                                
19
 PDF XChange Viewer allows users to highlight and mark up PDF documents obtained by other sources. 
This software can prove invaluable to individuals seeking to content analyze documents on a limited 




course of a statement. Then, the overall statement was coded using the following five-
point scale: 
• Very negative (-2): Statements made up of mostly or all negative arguments 
toward the biotechnology industry and very little to no positive or neutral 
arguments 
• Negative (-1): Statements with mostly negative arguments toward the 
biotechnology industry and a substantial, but not equal portion of positive 
arguments and statements with a fairly equal balance of negative and neutral 
arguments 
• Neutral (0): Statements made up of nearly all neutral arguments toward the 
biotechnology industry or statements with a fairly equal balance of negative and 
positive statements made toward the biotechnology industry 
• Positive (1): Statements with mostly positive arguments toward the 
biotechnology industry and a substantial, but not equal portion of negative 
arguments and statements with a fairly equal balance of positive and neutral 
arguments 
• Very positive (2): Statements made up of mostly or all positive arguments 
toward the biotechnology industry and very little to no negative or neutral 
arguments 
 
Dependent Variable – Tone of Testimony. I analyze the tone of information presented 
in congressional hearings on the topic of biotechnology policy by analyzing the actual 
content of hearing testimony itself. Using the same general approach that I used for 
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opening statements, I assign each individual piece of t stimony a score on a five point 
scale from -2 (very negative toward biotechnology) to 2 (very positive toward 
biotechnology) to denote the basic tone of each individual piece of testimony. I then 
take the average of the scores for each piece of testimony given before a particular 
committee in a particular Congress to measure the overall tone of testimony in that 
committee for that Congress.  
 
Dependent Variable – Percentage of Testimony Given by Ethical and Safety 
Experts. In biotechnology hearings, individuals with a wide range of group affiliations 
and backgrounds are called to testify. In particular, as we will see later, individuals 
recognized as experts in their respective fields have a made up a large portion of the 
witnesses called to testify at biotechnology hearings. Of these experts, ethical and safety 
experts constitute a group that is particularly interesting to analyze. On the one hand, 
some of the arguments against the use of biotechnology that have gained the most 
traction amongst the public question the safety and ethical ramifications that could 
come from using biotechnology in particular contexts. As such, committee members 
supportive of biotechnology may shy away from calling ethical and safety experts to 
testify at congressional hearings on the subject of biotechnology in order to avoid 
calling attention to the potential safety and ethical problems  that could result from the 
utilization of biotechnology tools.  
On the other hand, as stated earlier, committee members often seek a certain 
balance in the types of witnesses they call in order to demonstrate that witnesses from 
all walks of life support the position they are seeking to espouse (Staff Interviews 
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2010). As such, much like pro-economic committee chairs still called substantial 
numbers of climate scientists to testify at hearings on climate change, pro-
biotechnology chairs may still decide to call nearly s many ethical and safety experts 
as anti-biotechnology chairs. Thus, we may not expect any significant differences in the 
percentage of ethical and safety expert witness testimony between chairs with different 
beliefs on the biotechnology issue. 
In order to study the factors that influence the decisions to select ethical and 
safety expert witnesses to testify at biotechnology hearings, I measured the information 
gathered from ethical and safety experts in congressional hearings as follows. First, I 
coded the number of those testifying at hearings that qualified as an independent ethical 
or safety expert. Ethical and safety experts include recognized experts in safety or 
ethical issues representing non-partisan think-tanks, universities, or governmental 
research institutions, and religious leaders (i.e. pri sts, rabbis, pastors) who were called 
to testify for their religious expertise. Those exprts clearly representing interest groups 
espousing a particular cause were not included, because they could be seen more as 
representing a particular interest than as trying to provide unbiased expert information. I 
then took the percentage of these experts that testified in front of a particular committee 
in a given Congress.  
 
Independent Variable – Personal Beliefs. As I will discuss in the next section, I 
expect that personal beliefs will only have a sizable impact on the witness selection 
stage of the hearing process on dimensions of the issue where there are clear differences 
in viewpoints between members of the two parties on the dimension. More specifically, 
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on dimensions of the issue concerning the use of human embryos and stem cells for 
health purposes, more conservative individuals should be less likely to be supportive of 
biotechnology while more liberal individuals will be more supportive of the use of 
biotechnology in this particular fashion. As such, on this dimension of the issue, as 
chairs become more conservative and less liberal, the tone of testimony concerning the 
issue should be less supportive of biotechnology.  
On other dimensions of the issue, more conservative individuals may actually be 
more inclined to support biotechnology due to their r putation for supporting and 
promoting the use of tools to help grow of the economy while more liberal individuals 
may be less supportive of biotechnology due to their reputation of being cautious about 
technologies that have the potential to harm the enviro ment. As such, differences 
between conservative and liberal committee members in their statements for 
participating in the hearing may develop. Nonetheless, since these differences are not 
likely to be strong enough to motivate committee chairs to overcome the barriers that 
exist to stacking  a hearing with a certain type of testimony, it is unlikely that 
differences in the beliefs of committee chairs will translate into differences in the tone 
of testimony.  In order to measure the ideological preferences of committee and 
subcommittee members that characterize deep core beliefs, I use Poole and Rosenthal’s 
first-dimension DW-Nominate scores, which are based off of roll call votes taken by the 
committee members (http://voteview.org). This variable is measured on a continuous 




Independent Variable - Dimensions of Issue. As stated earlier, in the biotechnology 
issue area, it is expected that dimensions of the issue dealing with the creation and 
cloning of human embryos and human embryonic stem clls for health purposes will 
encourage more conflict between the political parties han other dimensions of the issue. 
When committees and subcommittees deal with this issue dimension, it should have two 
distinct effects on the tone of information. First of all, in this dimension of the issue, we 
should expect that differences in the belief system of committee chairs will be an 
important determinant of the tone of hearing testimony while on other dimensions of the 
issue the belief systems of committee chairs will be relatively unimportant. Secondly, 
since committee chairmen are required to allow the minority ranking member to call at 
least one witness to testify at a hearing (Sachs 2003, 11; Staff Interviews 2010), even 
when the committee chairs are liberal, hearings on these issue dimensions will be 
relatively more negative toward biotechnology than a typical biotechnology hearing 
because the conservative minority ranking members will be more likely to exercise their 
privilege to call witnesses that are critical of the use of biotechnology to create and 
clone human embryos and embryonic stem cells.  
 I expect that on other dimensions of the issue that the ideology of key committee 
actors will not be a significant factor in information collection and display decisions in 
congressional hearings. In addition to the controversial health aspect of the issue that 
was already mentioned, the remaining hearings on the issue of biotechnology took place 
in the following three additional categories: other alth uses, agricultural uses, and 
miscellaneous topics. This hearing topic breakdown is slightly modified from the 
hearing breakdown used in Sheingate’s (2006) research on biotechnology hearings. 
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Instead of keeping health hearings in one category, I have separated the health hearings 
out into hearings I think will divide the two political parties and hearings where party 
differences will be relatively muted. The breakdown of hearing topics into categories of 
hearings is as follows: 
• Controversial health: Human cloning, somatic cell nuclear transfer, embryonic 
tissue research, and stem cell research 
• Other health: Transgenic humans, Human Genome research, gene therapy, 
genetic testing, insurance issues, genetic privacy, nd pharmaceuticals 
• Agricultural: Micro-organisms, genetically modified plants, genetically 
modified livestock, genetically modified organism release, and genetically 
modified food 
• Miscellaneous: Industrial biotechnology, marine biotechnology, patenting, 
economic prospects for biotechnology companies, enviro mental 
biotechnology, unspecific biotechnology research, university-biotechnology 
industry relations, legal and voluntary regulation of general biotechnology 
In order to consider the effects detailed above, I create a variable that equals 1 if the 
committee or subcommittee held at least one hearing dealing with any of the first three 
topics stated in the previous list. Each of these variables was then interacted with the 
ideology of the committee chairs/committee members. The category of miscellaneous 
hearings serves as the baseline for comparison. 
 
Ideological Polarization. As we saw in the last chapter, as time has worn on and 
Democrats and Republicans became more and more divide  on the issue of climate 
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change, the impetus for the minority ranking member to exert the privilege to call at 
least one witness to testify on behalf of their positi n on the issue has become much 
stronger. Ultimately, this increasing polarization had the effect of causing testimony to 
become more pro-economic over time. In the case of biotechnology, since the two 
parties have seen little polarization on most aspect  of the issue and since the two 
parties have remained relatively equally divided throughout time on the contentious 
aspect of the issue, it is unlikely that polarization will play as key of a role in affecting 
the tone of testimony in hearings on the policy issue. Nonetheless, since the effect has 
been found in other issue areas, it is worth including in a model of the biotechnology 
issue area as well. In order to measure the possibility of this effect, I create a variable 
taking the absolute value of the difference between th  DW-Nominate scores of the two 
key actors in the witness selection process: the chair and the minority ranking member.  
 
Policy Subsystem Bias. In the case of biotechnology policy, due to the consensual 
nature of politics within the agricultural subsystem and the historical role of the 
committee in promoting all agricultural commodities, it is expected that hearings held 
by agricultural committees in Congress will be signif cantly more positive toward the 
use of biotechnology than a typical run of the mill committee. The genetic manipulation 
of crops provides farmers with a new tool to increase gricultural productivity and ward 
off pests without the use of pesticides. As such, members of both political parties within 
the agricultural subsystem are likely to be supportive of biotechnology, due to its 
importance for farmers in their respective districts, and will likely use congressional 
hearings on the topic to encourage development of this tool for future use. Additionally, 
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due to the stated role of the small business committees in Congress in attempting to 
reduce barriers to small business development in the U.S., I also suspect that 
committees within the economic promotion subsystem will be more positive toward 
biotechnology than a typical committee. In order to test the validity of these 
expectations, I created categories and dummy variables for each of the types of 
subsystems represented by particular committees in Congress that held hearings on the 
issue of biotechnology policy relatively often. These categories include the following: 
agriculture, economic promotion, science, health, judiciary, and environment. 
 
Control Variable – Time. It is expected that some elements of information colle tion 
and display in biotechnology policy simply cannot be accounted for by elements of 
changes in different key characteristics between different committees across different 
time periods. For instance, as time goes on and congressional committee members learn 
more about the consequences of using biotechnology as a tool and fears about 
biotechnology are either allayed or confirmed, we should expect that viewpoints will 
begin to crystallize regarding the acceptability of biotechnology amongst policymakers 
who were initially uncertain about the issue. This crystallization of viewpoints will also 
be expected to affect decisions at all stages of the congressional hearing process. To 
control for the effects of time on informational collection, I include dummy variables 
for each decade that congressional hearings took place: (1975-1980; 1981-1990; 1991-
239 
 
2000; 2001-2006).20 The 1970’s (1975-1980) serve as the reference decade for variables 
in the model.  
 
Control Variable – Chamber. Of the two chambers of Congress, the House represents 
smaller constituencies, and thus, may operate in a more parochial manner than the 
Senate. As such, the House may be a more receptive venue for tools like biotechnology 
that can be used to assist agricultural interests than he Senate. Furthermore, due to their 
broader constituency bases, the Senate may show more of a concern toward broader 
concerns like the potential environmental, health, safety, and ethical effects of 
biotechnology. In order to control for this potential effect, I created a dummy variable 
for each of the models, which equal 0 if the hearing takes place in the Senate and 1 if 
the hearing takes place in the House.  
 
Statistical Model – Pooled OLS. In order to test the expectations laid out above, I 
conducted a series of pooled OLS regression analyses that grouped data based on the 
                                                
20
 Although including dummy variables for each of the Congresses can be argued to be more 
appropriate, doing so uses up a large number of degrees of freedom. With the small number of cases in 
the committee level models, the loss of degrees of freedom made it impossible for the statistical 
package to estimate the F statistic, which is necessary to show the significance of the overall model. 
Furthermore, it is likely that certain characteristics of the chairmen will be nearly perfectly collinear with 
the particular Congress being controlled for. For instance, since the House and Senate are typically 
controlled by the same party, it is likely that there are relatively few instances where differences in party 
control will be observed within Congresses. Additionally, ideological differences within Congresses and 
between chairs are also likely to be muted due to the high correlation between ideological preferences 
and party identifications. As Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) note, one of the drawbacks of their suggested 
method of using time dummies for each time period studied is that it cannot account for the effects of 
variables where there is little to no variation within the time period. As such I use the decade variable 
approach, as it allows time effects to be captured without using up too many degrees of freedom and 
allows certain important variables to vary so their effects can be more helpfully studied.  
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committee or sub-committee a particular hearing was held in for the committee level 
models and grouped data based on the member presenting statements in the statement 
model. A pooled OLS regression assumes that any two unit years can be compared 
whether across committees or across times and its est mator is a weighted average of 
collapsing groups down to a single, mean time point and differencing each observation 




Committee Member Statements – Results 
 
 [Figure 6.1 Here] 
 
Committee member statements provide important insight  into why particular 
committee members participate in congressional hearings. Before reporting the results 
of what determines the tone of these statements, it is important to first analyze how the 
tone of these statements have changed over time between the two political parties. 
Figure 6.1 presents a graph of the differences between the average tone of statements 
made by Democrats and Republicans in biotechnology hearings across time. More 
positive values indicate higher support of biotechnology tools. As this graph details, at 
the start of the issue, uncertainty amongst committee members appeared to reign on the 
issue. From the 94th-98th Congresses, the average tone of hearing statements ade by 
committee members on the issue of biotechnology hovered fairly closely around the 
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neutral tone area with the average tone of the members of both party’s opening 
statements never rising above 0.5 or below -0.5.  
This result is consistent with my expectation that on new and complicated issue 
areas with no concrete linkages to past issues, committee members may express sincere 
uncertainty on how to make policy in the issue area. Unlike climate change policy 
where committee members could use their beliefs about other environmental issues to 
guide how they would collect and display information on hearings on climate change 
policy, biotechnology represented a much more multi-faceted issue where committee 
members did not have a readily apparent belief system to fall back on immediately. As 
such, members did not appear to have a concrete agend  in participating in 
biotechnology hearings at the issue’s start.  
As Figure 6.1 further depicts, after the 99th congressional session, statements 
made by committee members of both parties began to take on a fairly consistently 
supportive tone toward the use of biotechnology. This result suggests that committee 
members became more confident of the safety of biotechnology as they learned more 
and more about the issue area. Furthermore, throughout most of the history of the issue, 
Democrats and Republicans were relatively undivided on the issue of biotechnology 
policy. While Republican committee members were slight y more supportive of 
biotechnology in their stated reasons for participating in hearings on the policy area 
through most of the issue’s history, the differences b tween Republican and Democratic 
committee members were relatively small. Furthermore, during the 102nd, 105th, and 
107th-109th Congresses, Democratic committee members were actually more supportive 
of biotechnology interests than their Republican counterparts. 
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 Interestingly, the only significant division in statements of Democratic and 
Republican committee members on the issue of biotechnology occurred during the 107th 
Congress when Democratic committee members were fairly solidly supportive in the 
tone of their statements toward biotechnology while Republican members were actually 
slightly negative in the tone of their statements. Although not depicted on the chart, the 
107th Congress also represents a congressional session when attention was focused on 
the controversial dimensions of the issue. During the 107th Congress, 67% of the 
hearings on the subject of biotechnology dealt with the issue of the creation or cloning 
of human embryos or embryonic stem cells. By contrast, during the preceding 106th 
Congress, only 8% of the hearings dealt with this controversial dimension of the issue. 
As such, this lends credence to the argument that the controversial dimension of the 
issue represents a dimension where a gulf between Rpublican and Democratic 
committee members in their positions is apparent. As such, we should expect that 
hearing politics in this dimension of the issue should operate in much the same way that 
politics operated in the issue of climate change whre viewpoints between the two 
parties were also divisive. On the other aspects of he issue, however, there is no 
evidence to suggest that hearing politics will operat  in a fashion consistent with other 
partisan issues.  
 
[Table 6.1 Here] 
 
 Turning now to a more systematic analysis of opening statements across time, 
Table 6.1 presents the results of the pooled ordinal probit model testing the 
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determinants of the tone of opening statements. Model I presents analysis without the 
interactive effect between topic areas and the ideology of committee chairs while Model 
II presents analysis with the effect. The models are separated to demonstrate the effect 
of ideology on the overall issue of biotechnology and its effect when separating out the 
controversial and non-controversial issue dimensions. As the models demonstrate, the 
model with the interactive effect performs much better than the model without the 
effect. While the model without the interactive effect has a Wald Chi2 of 55.62 that is 
significant at all levels of statistical significance, the pseudo R-squared of 0.0377 is 
very low even by pseudo R-squared standards. On the other hand, the model with the 
interactive effects perform moderately well, as the ps udo R-squared of 0.1161 is 
moderate in terms of pseudo R-squared standards and the Wald Chi2 of 165.39 is 
significant at all levels of statistical significance. 
 Using Model II, in terms of the control variables in the analysis, the statements 
from members of the House were significantly different in tone from statements made 
by members of the Senate. However, interestingly and co trary to expectations, senators 
were more likely to give statements that were favorble toward the biotechnology 
industry than they were to give statements that were less favorable toward the 
biotechnology industry. The decade in which the hearing took place also has significant 
effects on the tone of committee member statements on he issue of biotechnology. 
Statements made during the 1980’s, 1990’s, and 2000’s were all more likely to be more 
positive toward biotechnology than statements given during the beginnings of the issue 
in the 1970’s. This result is likely suggestive of the fact that the biotechnology was very 
new and policymakers were not certain how to deal with the issue. Thus, committee 
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members came to hearings during the 1970’s with a more neutral stance toward the 
issue than in future decades when policymakers becam  more comfortable with the 
safety of biotechnology.  
As expected, the type of committee venue in which the hearing took place had a 
statistically significant effect on the tone of committee member statements at hearings 
in two different types of venues. Members of both the agricultural committees and the 
economic promotion committees in Congress were more likely to give statements that 
were more positive toward the biotechnology industry than members of the baseline 
case of miscellaneous committees.  This result is expected since both agricultural 
committee members and members of economic promotion committees have a reputation 
for being united in their positions on issues like biotechnology that directly impact the 
farming community and the business communities respectively.  
With respect to the effect of belief systems of committee members on the tone of 
their statements in congressional hearings concerning biotechnology, as Model I 
demonstrates, the ideology of committee members doen t have any significant effect 
on the tone of statements on the biotechnology issue a  a whole. However, as Model II 
depicts, after separating the issue into the four dimensions described earlier, the 
ideology of members becomes a significant indicator of the tone of member statements 
in two out of the four dimensions of the issue. First of all, as expected, when 
committees deal with dimensions of the issue concerning the creation or cloning of 
embryos and embryonic stem cells, the ideologies of committee members become a 
significant determinant of the tone of their statements. More specifically, when the 
subject matter of the hearing dealt with the creation or cloning of embryos and 
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embryonic stem cells, more conservative committee mmbers were significantly more 
likely to give statements that were less favorable toward the biotechnology industry 
than their more liberal counterparts. This result is not surprising in light of the 
similarities between this dimension of the issue and the very partisan issue of abortion 
where individuals’ positions and governmental policymakers’ actions are also heavily 
influenced by their personal belief systems.  
Perhaps more surprisingly, the personal ideologies of committee members were 
also a significant determinant of the tone of their statements on biotechnology policy 
when the hearing dealt with the miscellaneous category of biotechnology issues. More 
specifically, when the subject matter of a hearing dealt with the miscellaneous category 
of biotechnology issues, more conservative members w e significantly more likely to 
give statements that were more positive toward the biotechnology industry than their 
more liberal counterparts. Although this result was not necessarily expected, it is an 
intuitive result in light of the fact that this category of hearings dealt in large part with 
economic development and regulatory issues. Since mor conservative individuals are 
seen as more supportive of the business community than their liberal counterparts and 
since conservatives would not have the ethical reservations with supporting 
biotechnology in this dimension of the issue that tey may have in the more 
controversial aspects of the issue, it makes sense that more conservative committee 
members would be more supportive of the biotechnology industry during hearings on 
the miscellaneous dimension of the issue. However, as we saw in the case of tobacco 
policy, conservative members’ tendencies to oppose regulation of industries when 
individually participating in congressional hearings were not strong enough to translate 
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into biased information collection strategies at the witness selection stage of the hearing 
process. It will be interesting to see if the same process holds true in the case of 
biotechnology hearings. Nonetheless, it is clear from these results that the ideology of 
committee members is not a significant determinant of the tone of hearing testimony in 
the other dimensions of the biotechnology issue that did not have a sizable partisan 
component.  
 In terms of the independent effect of the dimensio tudied by a particular 
hearing on the tone of member statements concerning biotechnology policy, statements 
made in all other dimensions of the issue tended to be significantly more negative 
toward the biotechnology industry than statements made during hearings on the 
miscellaneous aspects of the issue. This result is not urprising in the case of the health 
dimensions of the issue, as Sheingate (2006) discovered that U.S. policy has been more 
restrictive of the biotechnology industry when dealing with the health aspects of the 
issue. However, despite the U.S. federal government’s history of promoting the 
agricultural biotechnology industry, committee members’ statements during hearings on 
agricultural biotechnology policy tended to be significantly more negative in tone 
toward the biotechnology industry than statements made during hearings on the 
miscellaneous dimension of the issue.  
When interpreted another way, these results also mean that committee member 
statements made in hearings dealing with the miscellaneous dimension of the issue were 
significantly more positive in tone toward the biotechnology industry than statements 
made in all other hearings on the topic of biotechnology. Since the miscellaneous 
category of hearings includes a wide variety of subjects where the economic benefits of 
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biotechnology are likely to be emphasized and the remaining topic areas contain a series 
of risks that could be brought up in hearings, these r ults actually make more intuitive 
sense than one would first anticipate. I now turn to an analysis of the determinants of 
the overall tone of congressional hearing testimony t  determine whether the same 
dynamics that drive the tone of member statements also drive the tone of overall 
testimony presented in congressional hearings. 
  
Overall Tone of Testimony – Results 
 
[Figure 6.2 Here] 
 
 Figure 6.2 presents a graph depicting the evolution of the tone of testimony on 
biotechnology over time. As the figure demonstrates, at the start of the issue’s 
development information concerning biotechnology was relatively balanced between 
those opposed to biotechnology and those supportive of biotechnology. This result is 
interesting in that it is suggestive of the possibility that congressional policymakers 
were genuinely confused on what to do on the issue. D ring the 94th and 95th 
Congresses, the issue was very new and policymakers had not formed any opinions on 
the safety of this new technology. As such, it appears that they called a wide variety of 
witnesses with a wide range of perspectives on the biot chnology issue.  
 As the issue progressed and congressional policymakers likely became more 
assured of the safety of biotechnology, regardless of which political party controlled 
Congress, information presented in congressional hearings on the issue of 
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biotechnology became generally supportive of the use of biotechnology. Interestingly, 
the 107th Congress represents a significant break in the genrally supportive tone of 
testimony toward biotechnology. As stated earlier, although not depicted on the chart, 
the 107th Congress also represents a congressional session when attention was focused 
on the controversial dimensions of the issue. As such, it is not surprising that this 
Congress produced testimony that was comparatively negative in bent.  
 
[Table 6.2 Here] 
 
 Turning now to a more systematic analysis of the testimony of witnesses on the 
subject of biotechnology across time, Table 6.2 presents the results of pooled OLS 
regression models testing the determinants of the ton of testimony. Model I presents 
analysis without the interactive effect between controversial topic areas and the 
ideology of committee chairs while Model II presents analysis with the effect. The 
models are separated to demonstrate the effect of ide logy on the overall issue of 
biotechnology and its effect when separating out the controversial and non-controversial 
issue dimensions. As the models demonstrate, the model with the interactive effect 
performs much better than the model without the effct, as the model with the 
interactive effect explains around 44% of the variation in the dependent variable while 
the model without the effect only explains around 26% of the variation.  
 Using Model II, in terms of the control variables in the analysis, it appears that 
the institutional chamber holding the hearings had negligible effects on the tone of 
hearing testimony. The House and Senate did not produce significantly different 
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testimony in tone in either of the models. However, the decade in which the hearing 
took place does have significant effects on the ton f hearing testimony. The 1980’s, 
1990’s, and 2000’s produced significantly more positive testimony toward 
biotechnology than the 1970’s. As stated earlier, this result is likely suggestive of the 
fact that the biotechnology was very new and policymakers were not certain how to deal 
with the issue. Thus, the testimony was more balanced and more negative than in future 
decades when policymakers became more comfortable with the safety of biotechnology.  
 More importantly for this paper, as expected, even when controlling for the fact 
that the agricultural dimension of the issue may insp re more positivity toward 
biotechnology than other aspects of the issue, the agricultural committees collect and 
display information that is significantly more positive in tone toward biotechnology 
than a typical run of the mill venue.  More specifically, the tone of testimony presented 
in front of agricultural committees was an expected 0.909 units more positive toward 
biotechnology than testimony presented in front of the baseline category of 
miscellaneous committees. When considered in combinatio  with the results of tobacco 
policy, it is clear that agricultural committees choose information with a mind toward 
demonstrating that policies supportive of farming iterests are justified.  
 Economic promotion committees also collect information that is more positive 
in tone toward the biotechnology industry than a typical run of the mill committee. The 
tone of testimony presented in front of economic promotion committees was an 
expected 0.860 units more positive toward biotechnology than testimony presented in 
front of the baseline category of miscellaneous committees. This result is intuitive in 
light of the fact that the economic promotion subsystem contains committees that are 
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very supportive of the small business community and that many biotechnology 
companies are small businesses. 
 Interestingly, despite their role as promoters of cientific research, the science 
committees in Congress do not select witnesses that give testimony that is significantly 
more positive toward the biotechnology industry than a typical run of the mill 
committee. This result can likely be attributed to the fact that, unlike the agricultural 
and economic promotion committees, the scientific committees held a significant 
portion of hearings during the early stages of the issue when beliefs had not yet 
developed concerning the appropriate policy positions t  take. As stated earlier, during 
the early stages of the issue, testimony presented i  congressional hearings concerning 
biotechnology was relatively balanced between those opposed to biotechnology and 
those supportive of biotechnology, which suggests that congressional committees like 
the science committees used the hearing process to genuinely collect information to 
help inform their policy decisions. As such, conducting hearings during the early stages 
of the issue may have prevented the science committees from acting like a unified 
subsystem on the biotechnology issue. Furthermore, unlike the agricultural and 
economic promotion committees, science committees did have to address the more 
controversial dimensions of the biotechnology issue (i.e. human cloning and embryonic 
stem cell research) on several occasions when conduti g hearings on the topic. As will 
be discussed later, due to the more divisive and cotroversial nature of politics 
concerning human cloning and embryonic stem cell research, hearings concerning these 
issues tended to take on a more negative tone than ot er hearings on the topic of 
biotechnology. As such, the fact that scientific committees had to deal with these 
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controversial dimensions of the issue may also account for the less positive tone of 
testimony in front of the committees when compared to agricultural and economic 
promotion committees.  
 With respect to the effect of belief systems of key policymakers on the tone of 
information in congressional hearings, as Model I demonstrates, the ideology of 
committee members does not have any significant effect on the tone of information on 
biotechnology. However, as Model II depicts, when committees deal with dimensions 
of the issue concerning the creation or cloning of embryos and embryonic stem cells, 
the ideologies of committee chairs become a significant determinant of the tone of 
hearing testimony. More specifically, when committees deal with the more 
controversial dimension of the biotechnology issue, a one unit increase in the 
conservatism of committee chairs is related to an expected decrease of 1.295 units in the 
tone of support for biotechnology interests in hearing testimony. On the other hand, the 
ideology of committee chairmen in all other dimensio  of the biotechnology issue is 
not a significant determinant of the tone of hearing testimony. Thus, it is clear that in 
multi-dimensional issue areas like biotechnology, it is mportant to consider what 
dimension of the issue is being examined by a committee, as it appears to be a key 
determinant as to whether committee chairmen will use the hearing process to collect 
and display information consistent with their belief systems or not.  
 In addition to strengthening the importance of belief systems of committee 
chairs on the tone of testimony, the controversial i sue dimension in biotechnology 
policy also has an independent effect in increasing the negativity of the tone of hearing 
testimony toward biotechnology. More specifically, testimony in front of committees 
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that dealt with the more controversial dimension of the biotechnology issue was an 
expected 0.889 units more negative toward biotechnology than the baseline case of 
miscellaneous biotechnology hearings. As stated earlier, this result is likely suggestive 
of the fact that , committee chairmen are required to allow the minority ranking member 
to call at least one witness to testify at a hearing (Sachs 2003, 11; Staff Interviews 
2010). Thus, even when the committee chairs are liberal, hearings on the more 
controversial issue dimension of biotechnology willbe relatively more negative toward 
biotechnology than a typical biotechnology hearing because the conservative minority 
ranking member will be more likely to exercise their privilege to call witnesses that are 
critical of the use of biotechnology to create and clone human embryos and embryonic 
stem cells. Hearings concerning all other dimensions of the issue produced testimony 
that was not significantly different from the baselin  case of hearings concerning 
miscellaneous biotechnology topics.  
 
Types of Witnesses - Results 
 
[Figure 6.3 Here] 
 
 Figure 6.3 contains a graph depicting the evolution in the broad categories of 
witnesses that have testified during hearings concerning biotechnology. As Figure 6.3 
demonstrates, congressional committees and subcommittees have called mostly experts, 
representatives of private interests, and members of federal bureaucratic agencies to 
testify before them at congressional hearings. In contrast to tobacco hearings but similar 
to hearings on climate change policy, experts make up a sizable percentage of witnesses 
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in congressional hearings on biotechnology policy. The percentage of experts testifying 
at hearings on biotechnology policy never fell below 25% of the individuals testifying 
at hearing and even reached as high as 62% of the wi n sses during the 95th Congress. 
This result is not surprising considering the techni al nature of the issue of 
biotechnology policy. In such a technical issue, committee members will want to collect 
information from experts to try to come to an informed decision on the issue or to 
simply add credibility to their own predisposed policy positions.  
 As Figure 6.3 further depicts, in the early stages of the biotechnology issue area 
(the 94th-98th Congresses), experts made up the largest category of witnesses during the 
vast majority of congressional sessions. In the early stages of the issue, experts only did 
not make up the largest category of witnesses during the 96th Congress. However, after 
the 98th Congress, experts were only the largest category of witnesses during the 105th 
Congress. Nonetheless, even in the 105th Congress, the percentage of experts present at 
hearings on the topic of biotechnology never again reached their heights at the early 
stages of the issue. After the 98th Congress, witnesses representing private interests (i.e. 
interest groups, companies, private citizens, etc.)routinely made up the largest category 
of witnesses at hearing on biotechnology policy.  
Once again, these results are consistent with the exp ctation that hearings are 
most likely to be used for genuine information collection at their earliest stages. 
Remember that in the same time period where experts made up the predominant witness 
category, committee member statements and witness testimony tended to be more 
neutral in tone than at later stages of the issue. Congressional committee and 
subcommittee chairs likely came into hearings at the early stages of the issue with an 
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open mind as to whether biotechnology could have a positive or harmful effect on 
society. As such, they decided to call witnesses with strong credentials because they felt 
the information provided by these witnesses would be very credible and could be used 
to make rational policy decisions on a highly techni al policy issue like biotechnology. 
Once members’ perceptions of biotechnology became mor  concrete and the 
biotechnology industry began to take hold in the U.S., representatives of private 
interests began to be the predominant category of witnesses testifying on the topic of 
biotechnology at congressional hearings. The preponderance of representatives of 
private interests in biotechnology hearings is consistent with the conception that 
hearings are at least partially utilized to give private interests a public platform to 
express their viewpoints. Nonetheless, as stated earlier, interestingly, experts still made 
up a significant percentage of witnesses at hearings o  biotechnology policy. This result 
suggests that hearings in biotechnology policy, even in the later stages of the issue, were 
not solely utilized as a platform for private interests to express their views on the issue. 
Rather, hearings also served as a platform for expert information to be disseminated to 
congressional policymakers and the public, likely in order to justify the viewpoints of 
committee leaders that select witnesses to testify at hearings.  
 
[Table 6.3 Here] 
 
 As stated earlier, of the expert groups that testifi d during hearings concerning 
biotechnology policy, ethical and safety experts constitute a group that is particularly 
interesting to analyze, due to the likelihood of these experts to bring up the risks 
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involved with the use of biotechnology. Do more conservative individuals, who we 
already know are more likely to call witnesses thatgive testimony that is more negative 
in tone during hearings on the controversial aspects of he biotechnology issue, also call 
disproportionate amounts of witnesses that are likely to bring up the risks involved with 
the use of biotechnology as well? Table 6.3 presents the results of the pooled OLS 
regression model testing the determinants of the percentage of testimony given by 
ethical and safety experts.  
Overall, the model performs respectably as it can explain about 22% of the 
variance in the dependent variable and the F-statistic is significant at all standard levels 
of statistical significance. In terms of the control variables in that analysis, first of all, 
there are no significant differences between the diff rent chambers of Congress in terms 
of the percentage of ethical and safety experts called to testify in congressional hearings 
on the topic of biotechnology policy. Furthermore, while hearings in the 1990’s and 
2000’s contained a significantly smaller percentage of thical and safety experts when 
compared to the 1970’s, the 2000’s were not significantly different from the 1970’s in 
this respect. 
 Turning now to the key variables of importance in the analysis, as expected, the 
dimension of the biotechnology issue being addressed by a particular hearing has a 
distinct effect on the types of groups that testify at a hearing. In the particular case of 
ethical and safety experts, committees and subcommittees that dealt with the health 
dimensions of the biotechnology issue (both controve sial and uncontroversial) called 
significantly more ethical and safety experts to testify than the baseline case of 
committees dealing with miscellaneous dimensions of the issue. The effect is more 
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pronounced in the case of controversial hearings. More specifically, committees dealing 
with the more controversial dimension of the issue concerning the creation or cloning of 
embryos and embryonic stem cells call around a predicted 12% greater percentage of 
ethical and safety experts at hearings than the basline case of committees dealing with 
miscellaneous dimensions of the issue. By contrast, committees and subcommittees that 
deal with the less controversial health dimensions of the issue call around a predicted 
6% greater percentage of ethical and safety experts at hearings than the baseline case of 
committees dealing with miscellaneous dimensions of the issue. These results are 
logical in light of the fact that much of the ethical and safety concerns regarding the 
issue are likely to come up more when dealing with health issues than with other 
dimensions of the issue. In particular, the most controversial dimension of the issue 
concerning the creation or cloning of embryos and embryonic stem cells is likely to 
attract ethical and safety experts due to the significa t ethical controversies that are 
clearly apparent in that particular dimension of the issue.  
 Nonetheless, while the dimension of the issue being addressed by a hearing has 
a definitive effect on the types of witnesses testifying at a congressional hearing, the 
belief systems of the most important actors in witness selection activities, committee 
and subcommittee chairs, have no significant impact on the percentage of testimony 
given by ethical and safety experts at hearings on the topic of biotechnology policy. 
Even when the biotechnology issue is split into the several different dimensions that 
make up the issue, the belief systems of committee and subcommittee chairs have no 
significant impact on the percentage of testimony given by ethical and safety experts in 
any of the dimensions of the issue. This comports well ith evidence from committee 
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staff interviews that committee chairmen often seek a certain balance in the types of 
witnesses they call in order to demonstrate that witnesses from all walks of life support 
the position they are seeking to espouse (Staff Interviews 2010). Even though ethical 
and safety experts are likely to discuss the risks involved with biotechnology 
techniques, pro-biotechnology chairs still call these xperts to testify just as much as 
anti-biotechnology chairs in order to give the entire hearing process and the information 
presented in the hearing more credibility.  
 Finally, unlike what was the case for the tone of member statements and the tone 
of witness testimony on the issue of biotechnology, venue characteristics are not a 
significant indicator of differences in the percentage of testimony given by ethical and 
safety experts at hearings on the topic of biotechnology policy. None of the committee 
types included in the model produced significantly different percentages of testimony 
given by ethical and safety experts than a typical run of the mill committee. I now turn 
to the conclusion to discuss the significance of the results.  
 
Conclusion 
 The issue of biotechnology was chosen, because it encapsulates all of the 
different ways that hearing politics can operate in a single issue. On the one hand, 
during the early stages of the issue, committee members clearly did not know exactly 
what types of policies should be passed concerning the use of biotechnology. As such, 
committee members apparently used the hearing process to call large amounts of 
experts and did not clearly stack the hearings to display information that was stacked in 
one way or another. However, as the issue matured and committee members began to 
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understand both the risks and rewards of biotechnology tools, different dimensions of 
the issue began to develop that operated in very different ways.  
 With respect to the agricultural dimension of the issue, the agricultural 
committee, in particular, clearly selects witnesses with the purpose of advancing the 
interests of farmers. Agricultural committee members consistently called witnesses who 
thought biotechnology could lead to greater crop productivity. The result, as Sheingate 
(2006) has uncovered, has been that agricultural biotechnology has been largely 
accepted by the public and has remained relatively d regulated by the government. 
When considered in tandem with the results found in tobacco policy, it becomes clear 
that agricultural committees are particularly likely to hear from individuals who are 
supportive of agricultural programs. The agricultural committees clearly represent the 
archetypal example of the truly unified subsystem in politics. Whether polarization has 
made within subsystem politics more conflictual or whether the increasing breakdown 
of jurisdictional clarity in congressional institutions has prevented particular committees 
from becoming attached to certain conceptions of policy issues (Baumgartner, Jones, 
and MacLeod 2000), very few committee venues exhibit the informational collection 
and display biases across different issues that the agricultural venues in Congress do.  
 With respect to the dimension of the issue dealing with the economic/business 
elements of biotechnology (i.e. patents, federal promotion of the industry, etc.), 
committees within the economic promotion subsystem also showed the propensity to 
act like a unified subsystem on the issue of biotechnology. Members of the two small 
business committees in the House and Senate and the Joint Economic Committee were 
significantly more positive toward the biotechnology industry in their statements during 
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hearings on the issue. Furthermore, and perhaps more i portantly, committees within 
the economic promotion subsystem also called witnesses that presented testimony that 
was more positive in tone than a typical run of the mill committee. These results 
demonstrate that economic promotion committees, particularly the Small Business 
committees, have the propensity to act in protection of small businesses like many 
biotechnology firms. As such, the economic promotion subsystem may be a burgeoning 
unified subsystem; particularly on issues like the economic dimensions of the 
biotechnology issue that are likely to unite members of the committees that make up the 
subsystem.  
 In contrast to the agricultural and economic dimensio s of the issue, the more 
conflictual dimension of the issue dealing with thecr ation or cloning of embryos and 
embryonic stem cells for health purposes has lead to differences of opinions and 
testimony tone depending on who was controlling the committee. More conservative 
individuals have generally wanted more government rgulation of biotechnology in this 
issue while more liberal individuals have wanted the government to provide more 
resources to those attempting to engage in creating or cloning embryos or embryonic 
stem cells for health purposes. This result in large part stems from the fact that the 
underpinnings of this dimension of the issue are rooted in the very partisan issue of 
abortion. In many ways, this dimension of the issue i  ven more partisan and 
ideologically driven than climate change policy. As such, the likelihood that two groups 
antagonistic toward each other would be represented on committee after committee 
became more likely. Thus, no naturally hospitable venue to any conception of policy 
issues have been present in this dimension of the issue and the real changes in 
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informational tone have occurred when changes in the belief systems of those with 
control over congressional committees take place. 
 The biotechnology issue demonstrates that not only must researchers consider 
the characteristics of the issue being addressed whn analyzing how hearing politics 
will operate, they must also understand that different dimensions of the same issue may 
operate very differently as well. Furthermore, hearing politics in one issue may even 
operate very differently depending on how mature the issue is, and thus, how confident 
committee members are in their beliefs and policy positions concerning the issue. In the 
next chapter, I will conclude this project by discusing some of the general lessons 





Note: There is a gap in this chart between the 95th and 97th Congresses, because there was no data 
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Figure 6.1. Polarization of Committee 






TABLE 6.1.  Pooled Ordered Probit Regression Results Testing the Determinants 
of Tone of Committee Member Statements on Biotechnology Issue. 
Independent Variable                  Model I            Model II 





Ideology -0.148 0.160 1.013** 0.295 
Controversial Health Topic    ---    --- -0.702** 0.188 
Ideology*Controversial    ---    --- -2.895** 0.401 
Agricultural Topic    ---    --- -0.330* 0.179 
Ideology*Ag Topic    ---    --- 0.068 0.387 
Other Health Topic    ---    --- -0.441** 0.140 
Ideology*Other Health    ---    --- -0.361 0.334 
Agricultural Committee 0.604* 0.249 0.527* 0.264 
Science Committee 0.314 0.227 0.218 0.200 
Health Committee 0.020 0.215 0.056 0.208 
Judiciary Committee 0.159 0.256 0.068 0.223 
Environmental Committee -0.097 0.219 0.136 0.234 
Economic Committee 1.837** 0.567 1.710** 0.544 
Chamber -0.249 0.162 -0.274* 0.159 
1980’s 0.499* 0.212 0.693* 0.233 
1990’s 0.821** 0.197 1.135** 0.233 
2000’s 0.738* 0.253 1.150** 0.271 
Cut 1 -0.606 0.279 -0.947 0.278 
Cut 2 -0.194 0.282 -0.467 0.275 
Cut 3 0.424 0.277 0.238 0.273 
Cut 4 0.840 0.280 0.713 0.276 
N 649 649 
Pseudo R2 0.0377 0.1161 
Wald Chi2 55.62** 165.39** 
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Dependent variable: Tone of statements given by committee members in congressional hearings 
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TABLE 6.2.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Testing the Determinants of the 
Overall Tone of Testimony in Biotechnology Hearings. 
Independent Variable Model I Model II 






Constant -0.066 0.292 0.019 0.329 
Chair Ideology 0.021 0.273 0.223 0.370 
Controversial Health Topic    ---    --- -0.889** 0.248 
Ideology*Controversial    ---    --- -1.295** 0.354 
Agricultural Topic    ---    --- -0.270 0.222 
Ideology*Ag Topic    ---    --- 0.277 0.448 
Other Health Topic    ---    --- -0.246 0.181 
Ideology*Other Health    ---    --- -0.097 0.457 
Ideological Polarization 0.089 0.383 -0.122 0.297 
Agricultural Committee 0.958* 0.330 0.909** 0.266 
Science Committee 0.410 0.368 0.353 0.261 
Health Committee 0.091 0.316 0.298 0.287 
Judiciary Committee -0.208 0.372 -0.172 0.257 
Environmental Committee 0.120 0.172 0.160 0.227 
Economic Committee 1.106* 0.352 0.860* 0.288 
Chamber -0.029 0.149 -0.077 0.122 
1980’s 0.681* 0.235 1.057** 0.306 
1990’s 0.932** 0.186 1.293** 0.263 
2000’s 0.497* 0.296 1.196** 0.346 
N 118 118 
Adjusted R2 0.260 0.439 
F Statistic 31.98** 25.58** 
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
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Figure 6.3. Types of Group Affiliations of 
Witnesses Testifying at Congressional 








TABLE 6.3.  Pooled OLS Regression Results Testing the Determinants of the 
Percentage of Testimony Given By Ethical and Safety Experts 
Independent Variable Coefficient Robust Standard 
Error 
t score 
Constant 0.090* 0.046 1.93 
Chair Ideology -0.010 0.038 -0.25 
Controversial Health Topic 0.117* 0.040 2.91 
Ideology*Controversial 0.082 0.074 1.12 
Agricultural Topic -0.012 0.023 -0.54 
Ideology*Ag Topic 0.007 0.040 0.16 
Other Health Topic 0.058* 0.032 1.78 
Ideology*Other Health 0.082 0.089 0.92 
Ideological Polarization 0.051 0.041 1.25 
Agricultural Committee -0.036 0.025 -1.44 
Science Committee -0.020 0.035 -0.57 
Health Committee -0.022 0.050 -0.43 
Judiciary Committee 0.055 0.050 1.10 
Environmental Committee -0.017 0.028 -0.62 
Economic Committee 0.002 0.034 0.07 
Chamber 0.016 0.019 0.87 
1980’s -0.082* 0.043 -1.91 
1990’s -0.106* 0.049 -2.14 
2000’s -0.096 0.058 -1.64 
N 118   
Adjusted R2 0.220   
F Statistic 18.29**   
Note: *p =< .05 **p<= .001(one-tailed).   
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
Dependent variable: Percentage of Testimony Given by Ethical and Safety Experts 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: Lessons about the Politics of Information 
Collection and Display in Congressional Hearings 
 
Introduction 
As past research has demonstrated, policy information clearly plays a very 
important role in the policymaking process. Quality policy information has the ability to 
inform policymakers on the potential effects of policy proposals, so that they can make 
the best possible decisions on what policy proposals to pursue (Fenno 1974; Krehbiel 
1991). As such, the quest for such quality policy information has been argued to guide 
the organization of Congress into congressional committees, so that policy experts can 
inform the floor about the potential effects of policy proposals (Krehbiel 1991; Jones 
1994, 151). Past research suggests that policy information can also have an important 
impact on policy decisions. For instance, changes in the tone of policy information 
presented in congressional hearings can produce policy changes in the form of changes 
in law and changes in federal appropriations for prgrams when the preponderance of 
the information presented about an issue shifts in valence in the opposite direction from 
the direction of information presented in the past (i.e. from negative to positive) 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993; Talbert, Jones, a d Baumgartner 1995; Jones, 
Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones, and 
Jochim 2009). Furthermore, under certain circumstances, policymakers can change their 
beliefs when presented with a piece of information hat conflicts with their views on an 
issue (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier and Weible 2007).  
With all of the clear impacts that policy information can have on substantive 
policy decisions, having control over the way information is collected and displayed to 
other policymakers and the public can be a very important power to possess. Within 
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Congress, the primary power to collect and display information belongs to the 
congressional committees and subcommittees that condu t congressional hearings on 
policy issues. Through congressional hearings, congressional committees and 
subcommittees can call almost anyone they choose to tes ify before them and extract 
information out of these witnesses that is relevant to the policymaking process. 
Furthermore, since most congressional hearings are open affairs that can be viewed by 
the public and other policymakers via C-SPAN cable outlets (Palmer 2007; Hallowell 
2008) and since congressional hearings make up a large portion of the media coverage 
of Congress (Gandy 1982), information presented in congressional hearings has the 
potential to be displayed to a wide variety of interested individuals.    
However, while congressional hearings clearly have the potential to serve as an 
important tool for congressional policymakers to collect and display information, a 
degree of controversy exists amongst scholars concerni g how the process is utilized in 
practice by congressional committees. While some scholars argue that congressional 
committees and subcommittees will use the congressional hearing process to collect 
expert information and/or provide a balance of persctives in order to ensure that the 
best possible information to make policy decisions is available to congressional 
lawmakers (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991; Diermeier and 
Feddersen 2000), others argue that congressional committees instead use the hearing 
process to stack hearing testimony to over-represent wit esses that share the viewpoints 
of important committee members (Truman 1951; Berry 1984; Davidson and Oleszek 
1985). Furthermore, even amongst the community of scholars that argue that 
congressional committees are biased in the way they collect and display information in 
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congressional hearings, scholars are divided on what factors and biases drive how 
committees select information to collect and display in congressional hearings. On the 
one hand, some scholars argue that certain types of subsystem venues (i.e. 
congressional committees and subcommittees) will be biased in the way that their 
members collect and display information in congressional hearings due to the 
consensual politics and united understanding of an issue that operates amongst members 
of these subsystems (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 193; Talbert, Jones, and 
Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009). On the other hand, other scholars argue that 
those who control the witness selection process in congressional hearings (i.e. 
committee chairs) will be biased by their own beliefs and other personal characteristics 
when deciding how policy information will be collect d and displayed in congressional 
hearings (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; Sabatier and Weible 2007). 
As with most debates over trying to explain activities that occur in the political 
realm, the findings in this project have demonstrated that each of the preceding 
arguments concerning hearing politics have a degree of validity. Rather than attempting 
to understand which of the theoretical explanations f the congressional hearing process 
has the “most” explanatory value, the key to truly nderstanding what factors drive 
information collection and display decisions in congressional hearings is to determine 
the conditions under which different explanations have more explanatory value vis-à-vis 
other theoretical perspectives. As the findings in the previous chapters demonstrate, 
hearing politics operate very differently depending o  the characteristics of the issue 
dimension being examined, the stage in the development of the issue, and the type of 
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subsystem in which the hearing takes place. In this c apter, I will describe the key 
findings of this project with respect to how congressional hearing politics operate under 
different policy and subsystem contexts.  
 
Key Findings about Information Collection and Display in Congressional Hearings 
Stacking of Congressional Hearing Testimony. According to proponents of the 
conventional wisdom concerning congressional hearing politics, hearings serve no 
greater purpose than a “window-dressing” event or “propaganda channel” through 
which congressional committees and subcommittees can display carefully selected 
information to actors outside the committee (i.e. mmbers on the floor, interest groups, 
the general public, etc.) in order to drum up support for positions espoused by 
committee members and/or “claim credit” for providing policy benefits to constituents 
(Truman 1951; Berry 1984; Davidson and Oleszek 1985). As was discussed in Chapter 
1, the idea that congressional hearings are no morethan “propaganda channels” or 
“dog-and-pony shows” is flawed due to the time, energy, and resources devoted to 
conducting congressional hearings in Congress. However, the idea derived from the 
conventional wisdom that committees and subcommittees stack witness testimony to fit 
a particular perspective is a valid argument for which I find clear and persuasive support 
in the issue areas examined in this project.   
 Even in technical policy areas like climate change and biotechnology policy that 
may be difficult for a layperson to understand, selection of witnesses that will present 
testimony espousing committee leaders’ preferred positions in policy debates clearly 
occurs. In each of the issue areas examined, in most dimensions of the issues, the 
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overall tone of testimony fit the perceived biases of the committee venue and/or the 
chair of the committee or subcommittee conducting the hearing. First of all, in the issue 
area of tobacco policy, the tobacco industry, particularly farmers, received far more 
positive treatment during hearings in front of the agricultural committee than the 
industry did during hearings in front of other types of committees. When the 
agricultural committees conducted hearings on the topic of tobacco policy, 
representatives of the interests of tobacco farmers w e more likely to be invited to 
testify than they were in front of other committees, health and safety advocates and 
experts that were the most likely to discuss the healt  and safety aspects of the tobacco 
issue were less likely to be invited to testify than they were in front of other types of 
committees, and the overall tone of testimony presented on the issue was significantly 
more positive toward the tobacco industry than the ton  of testimony presented in front 
of other types of committees.  
 In the issue of climate change, while no types of venues emerged as being 
biased in the tone of witness testimony concerning the issue, committee staff fairly 
clearly chose a large portion of their witnesses based on whether or not they were likely 
to present testimony that fit the chair’s viewpoints on the issue. During hearings on the 
climate change issue, changes in the tone of witness testimony across different 
committees across time were significantly related to changes in the belief systems of the 
chair of the committee holding the hearing. More spcifically, conservative chairs and 
chairs with pro-economic beliefs on general environme tal issues tended to preside over 
hearings that produced testimony that was more pro-economic in tone. By contrast, 
liberal chairs and chairs with pro-environmental beliefs on general environmental issues 
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tended to preside over hearings that produced testimony that was more pro-
environmental in tone.  
 In the issue of biotechnology, biases in committee ton  based on the type of 
venue conducting the hearing and the beliefs systems of the chair presiding over the 
hearing were both evident during hearings on different dimensions of the issue. First of 
all, both agricultural and economic promotion committees were significantly more 
positive toward the use of biotechnology than a typical run of the mill committee. 
Furthermore, when hearings dealt with the use of human embryonic matter for health 
purposes, changes in the tone of testimony concerning the issue were significantly 
related to changes in the belief systems of the chair presiding over the committee 
conducting hearings on the issue. More specifically, conservative chairs presided over 
hearings where the overall tone of testimony was more critical of the potential ethical 
and safety risks that could arise from the use of biotechnology techniques on human 
embryos for health purposes. On the other hand, liberal chairs presided over hearings 
where the overall tone of witness testimony was more positive about the potential 
benefits of the use of biotechnology on human embryos for health purposes.  
 As the preceding examples demonstrate, congressional c mmittees and their 
staffs seem to select witnesses with a mind toward choosing witnesses that will espouse 
the preferred viewpoint of the committee holding the hearing. However, the argument 
that committees stack witness testimony to only represent one side in a particular 
political argument is a bit overstated. While the majority of witnesses in most hearings 
will likely share the viewpoints of the chair presiding over the hearing, minority party 
leaders on committees have different tools at their disposal to ensure that witnesses 
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representing their viewpoints on an issue will be allowed to testify at hearings before 
the committee.  
First and foremost, as stated in Chapter 2, procedural r les in the House and 
Senate require all congressional committees and subcommittees (except the Senate 
Appropriations Committee) to permit the minority party to call its preferred witnesses 
on at least one day of the hearing if a majority of minority committee or subcommittee 
members vote to invoke this rule (Davis 2011b, 2011c). Although the so-called 
“minority witness rule” is seldom formally invoked by the minority party, it serves as 
an important procedural safeguard to ensure that the minority party’s preferred 
witnesses are not totally excluded from a hearing (Davis 2011b, 2011c). In practice, 
strong norms exist within virtually all congressional committees that dictate that the 
majority party honors the requests of minority committee members to invite at least one 
witness to testify during a hearing. On many committees, however, committee norms 
dictate that minority members may invite even more than one witness to testify 
depending on the total number of witnesses being invited to testify at a particular 
hearing (Staff Interviews 2010). Furthermore, in addition to the procedural rules and 
norms that permit the minority to call at least one witness to testify at a congressional 
hearing, rank and file members can use opening statements, speeches, and statements to 
the press to call into question the fairness of a he ring if the majority does not allow 
them to call their preferred witnesses to testify at a hearing. Since committee chairs do 
not want their reputation damaged by having the fairness of their hearings called into 




Evidence of the minority party’s role in witness selection can be seen best in the 
partisan issue contexts studied in the previous chapters. First of all, in the issue of 
climate change, even after those with pro-economic beliefs began to control institutional 
venues in Congress and started to control witness slection activities in the climate 
change issue area, hearing testimony presented in front of congressional committees on 
the issue did not become overwhelmingly pro-economic in tone like one would expect 
if the majority party was stacking witnesses to exclude the minority party’s preferred 
witnesses on an issue. Furthermore, as the chair and the minority ranking member’s 
beliefs on general environmental issues diverged within a committee and the 
Republican on the committee likely became increasingly more pro-economic in his or 
her viewpoints on general environmental issues, the ton  of hearing testimony became 
increasingly pro-economic in tone even when controlling for the belief systems of the 
chair conducting the hearing. This demonstrates that c nges in the minority party’s 
viewpoints on an issue can also have an important impact on the tone of testimony on a 
particular issue.  
The witness selection process for climate change hearings conducted by the 
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee during the 108th and 109th 
Congresses provides solid evidence of the effect of the minority on the witness selection 
process in congressional hearings on the topic of climate change. During this time 
period, James Inhofe, a conservative Republican from Oklahoma served as chairman of 
the committee. Sen. Inhofe is a noted climate change skeptic who was called the theory 
of anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) climate change “the greatest hoax ever 
perpetuated on the American people (Hearing Doc. 2008-S321-13).” However, despite 
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Sen. Inhofe’s solidly pro-economic stance on the issue of climate change, the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee still invited witnesses that provided 
testimony arguing that climate change is a serious environmental problem that should 
be tackled by the federal government while Inhofe was chairman of the committee. In 
the 108th Congress, while most witnesses espoused the viewpont that climate change 
was not a problem that should be tackled by the fedral government, 1 (or 33.33%) of 
the 3 witnesses on the climate change issue provided testimony supporting the argument 
that climate change is a serious environmental problem. During hearings conducted by 
the committee in the 109th Congress, while over half (56.25%) of the witnesses called to 
testify espoused the very pro-economic viewpoint in the debate, 6 (or 37.5%) of the 16 
witnesses called to testify provided testimony thatw s very pro-environmental in tone 
toward the climate change issue. As this example demonstrates, even when those with 
solidly pro-economic viewpoints controlled committee venues, witnesses espousing the 
pro-environmental perspective still were invited to testify at hearings dealing with 
climate change policy.  
The role that minority party members play in witness selection is also evident 
when examining hearings dealing with the controversial health aspects of the 
biotechnology issue area. First of all, even when co trolling for the beliefs of the chair, 
the overall tone of testimony in front of committees and subcommittees that held 
hearings dealing with the creation and cloning of human embryos and human 
embryonic stem cells for health purposes was more negative toward the biotechnology 
industry than the tone of testimony in front of committees dealing with all other 
dimensions of the issue. This result demonstrates that even when committee chairs are 
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liberal and thus likely to support the use of biotechnology on human embryonic matter 
for health purposes, witnesses that do not support the use of biotechnology on human 
embryos will still be called to testify due to the influence that conservative minority 
members can have on witness selection.  
The witness selection process for climate change hearings conducted by the 
House Committee on Government Reform’s Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources during the 107th and 109th Congresses provides further 
evidence of the effect of the minority on the witness selection process for biotechnology 
hearings. During this time period, Mark Souder, a conservative Republican from the 
state of Indiana served as chairman of the subcommittee. During his time in Congress, 
Rep. Souder was also known as a staunch opponent of mbryonic stem cell research and 
cloning of human embryos mostly due to his belief that human life begins with the 
creation of a human embryo. As an opponent of biotechnology research on human 
embryos, Souder argued in statements concerning the issu  that the potential of 
embryonic stem cell research was “entirely speculative”, required the “destruction of 
living human embryos”, and would likely lead to the “exploitation of women in order to 
obtain eggs for research.” Nonetheless, despite Rep. Souder’s clear opposition to 
embryonic stem cell research, the subcommittee he chaired still invited witnesses who 
were very supportive of increased federal funding of embryonic stem cell research and 
who trumpeted the potential benefits that this research could provide for those suffering 
from debilitating diseases like Parkinson’s disease, AIDS, and spinal cord injuries. For 
instance, in two hearings held on the issue during the 107th Congress, although the 
majority (58.8%) of witnesses that were invited to testify in front of the subcommittee 
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on the issue vehemently opposed the use of embryonic matter for health purposes, 7 
(41.1%) of the 17 witnesses expressed support in some way for such use of embryonic 
matter. Furthermore, in the hearing held on the issue during the 109th Congress, while 
the overall tone of testimony tended to be opposed to embryonic stem cell research, 3 
(37.5%) of the 8 witnesses called to testify expressed overall support for such research. 
Once again, this example demonstrates that while the overall tone of testimony in a 
hearing will generally fit the beliefs of the chair of the committee or subcommittee, 
perspectives and positions that are not shared by the chair will often be represented in 
witness testimony on the topic. As such, the idea that hearing testimony is stacked to 
only represent the perspectives of the chair is somewhat overstated.  
With this said, the preceding examples do not preclude the possibility that 
stacking of testimony to ignore alternative positions on an issue occurs under certain 
circumstances. However, stacking of testimony is not likely to occur within competitive 
subsystems working on partisan issues like the two issues described above. Instead, 
stacking of testimony is more evident when the membrs within a committee espouse 
similar positions on an issue. Such agreement amongst committee members is most 
likely to occur within unified subsystems that are dealing with issues that are 
particularly likely to unite committee and subcommittee members.  
The agricultural committees in Congress clearly stacked testimony to support 
policies that would benefit farmers when dealing with policy issues that directly 
impacted the agricultural community. For instance, when dealing with tobacco policy, 
of the 1094 witnesses called before the agricultural committees, 1021 (93.3%) were 
very supportive of the tobacco industry in their testimony before the committee. By 
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contrast, the tone of testimony of only 14 (1.3%) witnesses could be classified as 
negative or very negative toward the tobacco industry. Additionally, when considering 
the use of biotechnology tools that have the potential to improve crop productivity, of 
the 172 witnesses called before the agricultural committees on the issue, 140 (81.4%) 
were very supportive of the use of agricultural biotechnology. On the other hand, the 
tone of testimony of only 19 (11%) witnesses could be classified as opposed or very 
opposed to the use of agricultural biotechnology.  
As these examples demonstrate, while witnesses with alternative positions were 
sometimes called to testify during hearings in front f the agricultural committees on 
issues important to farmers, the vast majority of witnesses called to testify presented 
testimony that was supportive of the agricultural community. This finding can likely be 
attributed to the fact that the issues being examined united agricultural committee 
members in support of the farming community. As such, witnesses that opposed the 
tobacco industry and agricultural biotechnology did not appear in many hearings on 
these issues because no one on the committee was clamoring for them to appear in the 
way that minority members clamor for witnesses representing their perspectives to 
appear during hearings dealing with more partisan isues like climate change. Most, if 
not all, members on the agricultural committees likely agreed with the witness 
selections made by the chair, so alternative perspectives were less likely to be heard in 
committees within the agricultural subsystem.   
Hearings as a Tool for Information Collection. In an ideal world, most citizens would 
likely want congressional committees and subcommittees to use the congressional 
hearing process to gather information that would hep congressional policymakers make 
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the best policy decisions possible. After all, the hearing process affords congressional 
policymakers with the opportunity to call almost anyo e they choose, ranging from 
policy experts to federal executive branch officials, to testify before them and extract 
information out of these witnesses that is relevant to the policymaking process. 
Unfortunately, the evidence for the use of congressional hearings to genuinely collect 
information is decidedly mixed even in technical policy issues like climate change and 
biotechnology.  
To review, the idea that congressional committees and subcommittees utilize the 
congressional hearing process to genuinely collect policy-relevant information rests on 
the following two expectations. First of all, as Leyd n (1995, 433) describes, if 
committee and subcommittee chairs genuinely wanted to use the hearing process to 
gather information to inform their decisions on important policy issues, we would 
expect that they would instruct their staffs to seek out witnesses that are representative 
of the diverse set of viewpoints on an issue in order to provide as many different 
informational perspectives about a policy problem as possible. Secondly, if committees 
use the hearing process to collect the best information possible to inform congressional 
policymakers’ decisions, we should also expect that committee and subcommittee 
chairs would seek out non-partisan, non-ideological policy experts to testify, as these 
individuals are the most likely candidates to provide the information necessary for 
congressional committee members to become experts on a p licy issue. 
With respect to the first expectation, on the one hand, the overall tone of witness 
testimony concerning the use of biotechnology was relatively balanced during the early 
stages of the issue’s development in the 94th and 95th Congresses. When considered in 
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combination with the fact that the tone of committee members’ statements concerning 
biotechnology was also relatively neutral and balanced during the same time period, this 
balance in testimony seems to suggest that committees called a wide variety of 
witnesses with a wide range of perspectives to testify on the issue because they 
genuinely wanted to collect the best policy information possible. Thus, as the example 
of biotechnology policy suggests, committees and subcommittee have demonstrated the 
willingness to use the hearing process to call witnesses with a variety of different 
positions on a particular issue.  
Nonetheless, examples of congressional committees and ubcommittees using 
the hearing process to call witnesses with a wide variety of viewpoints on an issue 
rather than using the process to call witnesses that share the beliefs of the chair are few 
and far between. As the last section demonstrated, in at least one dimension of each of 
the issues studied in this project, the overall tone f testimony fit the perceived biases of 
the committee venue and/or the chair of the committee or subcommittee conducting the 
hearing. Even in the aforementioned issue area of biotechnology, in several dimensions 
of the issue, the tone of testimony presented was clearly related to the institutional 
biases of the committee running the hearing or the beliefs of the chair of the committee 
running the hearing. If committees and subcommittees w re using the hearing process 
to genuinely gather information in these issue areas, the tone of testimony would likely 
not match the biases of the committees and subcommittees running the hearings so 
consistently, because members of these institutions would want to hear from a variety of 




With respect to the second expectation, evidence that congressional committees 
and subcommittees seek to call expert witnesses to tes ify at hearings is decidedly 
mixed. On the one hand, during the early stages of the climate change and 
biotechnology issue areas, experts made up far and away the most common type of 
witness called to testify at congressional hearings. For instance, in the early stages of 
the biotechnology issue area’s development (the 94th-98th Congresses), experts made up 
55.29% of the witnesses called to testify in hearings on the issue. However, as time has 
progressed, experts have made up an increasingly smaller percentage of witnesses 
testifying during hearings on the biotechnology issue. More specifically, during the later 
stages of the biotechnology issue’s development (the 105th-109th Congresses), experts 
only made up 33.66% of the witnesses called to testify during hearings on the issue.  
The same general trend with respect to expert testimony can also be found in the 
issue of climate change. In the early stages of the climate change issue area’s 
development (96th-100th Congresses), experts made up 62.58% of the witnesses called 
to testify during climate change hearings. By contrast, during the later stages of the 
issue’s development (105th-109th Congresses), experts have only made up an average of 
37.47% of the witnesses called to testify during hearings dealing with climate change. 
As this evidence demonstrates, it is clear that expert testimony has been valued in both 
the biotechnology and climate change issue areas, as experts have consistently made up 
a significant portion of the witnesses called to testify in both issue areas. Nonetheless, it 
is also clear that the percentage of expert witnesses called to testify in both of these 
issue areas has fallen significantly over time.  As such, it appears that testimony from 
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policy experts is not as valued in the climate change and biotechnology issue areas as it 
once was.  
 As the previous analysis suggests, even in technical and complex policy areas 
like climate change and biotechnology where policymakers may have difficulty 
determining the best policy action to take, congressional committees have not 
consistently used congressional hearings to collect unbiased information from policy 
experts. Nonetheless, congressional committees and ubcommittees have shown the 
willingness to seek out expert testimony and witnesses providing a balance of 
viewpoints on an issue when examining a technical issue that is in the early stages of its 
policy development. Consider once again the example of biotechnology policy. During 
the very early stages of this issue, experts far and away were the most common type of 
group called to testify at hearings on the issue. Frthermore, the witnesses called to 
testify on the issue presented testimony that altogether was balanced in tone and 
represented the wide variety of different positions  the issue. As this example 
demonstrates, committees and subcommittees do not always use the hearing process to 
invite witnesses that will espouse the preferred viwpoint of the committee or 
subcommittee holding the hearing. When an issue is n wer and more technical and 
committee members are more likely to be uncertain about the potential effects of policy 
decisions, committees and subcommittees seem to be mor  likely to use the hearing 
process to call witnesses that espouse a wide cross-section of different positions on a 
policy issue. Furthermore, committees and subcommittees also call larger percentages 
of experts to testify on technical issues during the earliest stages of the issue, likely 
because these experts have the knowledge necessary to reduce some of the uncertainty 
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amongst committee and subcommittee members concernig potential policy options to 
tackle the issue.  
Nonetheless, by and large, committees and subcommittees end to use the 
hearing process to collect and display information hat matches and bolsters the 
positions of committee and subcommittee members. The hearing process in technical 
issue areas like climate change and biotechnology is no exception to this general 
finding. For instance, as committee members become mor  confident in their 
understanding of biotechnology and aspects of the issue began to take on qualities 
consistent with partisan and distributive issue areas, committees seemed to use the 
hearing process to collect and display information hat fit either the institutional biases 
of the committee holding the hearing or the belief systems of the chair of the committee 
holding the hearing. Furthermore, as the issue has progressed and the beliefs of 
committee members concerning biotechnology have becom  more concrete, committee 
members have relied less on the experts that are most likely to reduce uncertainty on the 
proper policy actions to take on an issue and more on representatives of private interests 
that are the most likely to present biased information at a hearing to present testimony 
in front of them at congressional hearings.  
As such, even in technical policy issues like climate change and biotechnology, 
over time, congressional committees tend to end up using the hearing process to select 
witness that will bolster the beliefs and positions f those holding key positions on the 
committee. Nonetheless, it would be very shortsighted to argue that congressional 
committees only use congressional hearings for this purpose and seldom use the process 
to genuinely collect and display policy-relevant information that will help congressional 
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policymakers make the best decisions on an issue area. Indeed, under certain 
circumstances (i.e. the issue is technical at its early stages of development), 
congressional committees can and have used the hearing process to call the types of 
witnesses that suggest they are using the process to genuinely collect information. 
 
Distributive Issues and the Effects of Unified Subsystem Biases. As the previous 
sections have shown, overall, congressional committees and subcommittees tend to use 
the hearing process to collect and display information that can be used to bolster the 
viewpoints of the committee members responsible for selecting these witnesses (i.e. 
committee chairs and minority ranking members).  Nonetheless, as stated earlier in this 
chapter, a significant degree of controversy exists amongst the community of scholars 
that argue that congressional committees are biased n the way they collect and display 
information in congressional hearings with respect to the factors and biases that drive 
how committees select information to collect and display in congressional hearings. On 
the one hand, punctuated equilibrium scholars have found that certain types of 
subsystem venues (i.e. congressional committees and ubcommittees) are biased in the 
way that their members collect and display information in congressional hearings due to 
the consensual politics and united understanding of an issue that operates amongst 
members of such subsystems (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993; Talbert, Jones, and 
Baumgartner 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009). On the other hand, Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) scholars argue that those who control the witness selection process 
in congressional hearings (i.e. committee chairs) will be biased by their own beliefs and 
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other personal characteristics when deciding how policy information will be collected 
and displayed in congressional hearings (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; 
Sabatier and Weible 2007).  
As with most competing explanations of the behavior of actors within the 
political realm, proponents of both theories of information collection and display 
decisions have a great deal of evidence to back up their claims. As such, the key to truly 
understanding information collection and display decisions in congressional hearings is 
not to determine which of the competing explanations is “more correct.” The key to 
truly understanding which biases drive witness selection and other information 
collection and display decisions in congressional he rings is to determine the conditions 
under which different explanations have more explanatory value vis-à-vis other 
theoretical perspectives. 
As my theory of information collection and display politics explains, the biases 
that drive information collection and display decisions in congressional hearings will 
differ depending on the type of issue being examined at a hearing and the type of 
subsystem context within which the committee or subcommittee holding the hearing 
operates. In distributive issue contexts where policies are likely to benefit specific 
constituencies in society (Lowi 1964, 1972; Weingast 1979), subsystems made up of the 
congressional policymakers that represent these constituencies will act as unified 
subsystems whose members generally agree on conceptions of policy issues due to the 
common characteristics of their constituencies, and thus, use the hearing process to 
collect and display information that supports policies designed to benefit members’ 
constituents. Furthermore, in unified subsystems dealing with a distributive issue that is 
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likely to increase unity amongst subsystem members, the individual characteristics (i.e. 
belief systems) of committee chairs are unlikely to have significant impact on the tone 
of witness testimony because most members, regardless of their personal characteristics, 
are likely to agree on the tone of information that should be presented at a hearing. As 
such, committees and subcommittees will use the hearing process to call witnesses that 
will bolster the decisions committee members would have made absent this information 
(Sabatier 1978; Feldman and March 1981; Weiss 1988; Galster 1996; Shulock 1999) 
and to demonstrate to members outside the committee that members of the subsystem 
have the expertise necessary to keep jurisdictional control over the issue area (King 
1997).  
Three issue subsystems working on issues examined in this project exhibit 
characteristics that make them strong candidates to act as unified subsystems. These 
subsystems include the agricultural subsystem made up of the two agricultural 
committees in both chambers of Congress, the science subsystem made up of the two 
science committees in both chambers of Congress, and the economic promotion 
subsystem made up of the two small businesses committees n both chambers of 
Congress and the Joint Economic Committee. Each of t ese subsystem types share 
certain characteristics that make them all likely to act as unified subsystems when 
collecting and displaying information in congressional hearings. First of all, all of these 
subsystems consist of congressional committees whose members have expressed that 
their desire to serve on the committee is derived from their desire to serve their 
constituents (Smith and Deering 1990; Deering and Smith 1997; Frisch and Kelly 
2006). As stated in earlier chapters, politics within committees whose members are 
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more constituency-oriented tend to be more consensual and less divisive, as 
congressional policymakers support each other’s demands for constituency benefits to 
ensure legislative support for their own constituency’s demands in the future (Fenno 
1973; Mayhew 1974; Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Tullock 1981; 
Weingast and Marshall 1988; Smith and Deering 1990; Deering and Smith 1997; 
Maltzman 1997). As such, a culture of cooperation amongst committee members may 
be more likely to be present in these constituency-oriented than would be the case in 
committees that were more policy or prestige oriented.  
In addition to the constituency-oriented nature of committees within these 
subsystems, each of these committees also have a reason, by virtue of their jurisdiction, 
stated committee missions, and the issues being examined, to be biased in information 
collection and display decisions. In the case of the agricultural subsystem, agricultural 
committees have traditionally served the role as protectors and promoters of agricultural 
interests in Congress. In two of the issue areas exmined in this project, agricultural 
committees had strong reasons to assert this role as a defender of agricultural interests. 
In the case of tobacco policy, agricultural committees had a reason to use the hearing 
process to collect and display information that wassupportive of the tobacco industry, 
because tobacco is an agricultural crop and putting restrictions on tobacco products 
likely would harm the economic vitality of farmers that produce the crop. In the case of 
biotechnology policy, despite the risks involved with using such tools, biotechnology 
tools have been demonstrated to increase agricultural productivity, which can also help 
the economic circumstances of those in the agricultural community. As such, it would 
make sense for the agricultural committees in Congress to use the hearing process to 
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tout the benefits and downplay the risks of using biotechnology tools for agricultural 
purposes. 
In the case of the economic promotion subsystem, the committees within the 
subsystem, particularly the small business committees, have generally served as 
supporters of economic interests, particularly those f small businesses. For instance, 
the House Small Business Committee states that its mis ion is “to protect and assist 
small businesses (House Small Business Committee).” In the biotechnology issue area, 
committees within the economic promotion subsystem had strong reasons to act as a 
defender of the biotechnology industry. The biotechnology industry is a relatively new 
industry with the potential to help the competitiveness of the American economy. Many 
biotechnology firms need assistance from the governm nt in reducing regulatory 
barriers to development, obtaining patents for inventions created through 
biotechnology, and obtaining assistance for scientif c research and development. 
Furthermore, many biotechnology firms are small businesses and two of the main 
committees in the economic promotion subsystem are small business committees whose 
mission and jurisdiction includes protection and assistance for small businesses. As 
such, it would be logical for the committees within the economic promotion subsystem 
to use the hearing process to attempt to bolster support for the biotechnology industry 
within Congress.  
In the case of the science subsystem, the two committees within the subsystem 
have generally assumed the role as a supporter of scientific research and development. 
In both the issue areas of climate change and biotechnology, committees within the 
science subsystem have strong reasons to assert thi role as a defender of the interests of 
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the scientific community. In the case of climate change, due to the large portion of the 
scientific community’s insistence that climate change is a problem, venues like the 
science committees that are more likely to promote the scientific community may also 
be more sympathetic to the potential dangers of climate change. In the case of 
biotechnology policy, since biotechnology is a heavily science-centric industry that 
requires a significant amount of scientific research and development to expand and 
thrive, members of the science subsystem may be morlikely to support the use of 
biotechnology than members of other committees working on the issue. As such, in 
both the climate change and biotechnology issue areas, we may logically expect that 
congressional committees within the science subsystem would use the hearing process 
to collect and display information that is sympathetic toward the scientific community. 
Nonetheless, despite the strong reasons for each of these subsystems to act as 
unified subsystems when collecting and displaying information in congressional 
hearings, only committees within certain subsystems have clearly used the hearing 
process to advance the assumed biases of their respective subsystems. In the case of the 
agricultural subsystem, committees within the subsystem have consistently utilized the 
hearing process to collect and display information hat was supportive of the 
agricultural community. In the case of tobacco policy, member statements given by 
members of the agricultural committee were more positive in tone toward the tobacco 
industry than statements given by members of a typical committee, witnesses called to 
testify in front of the committee gave testimony that was more positive in tone toward 
the tobacco industry than witnesses chosen to testify in front of a typical committee, and 
greater percentages of farmers were called to testify in front of the committee than a 
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typical committee. In the case of biotechnology policy, the tone of member statements 
and witness testimony presented before the committee was more positive in tone toward 
the use of biotechnology than a typical run of the mill committee. In both issue areas, it 
is clear that the agricultural committees in Congress utilized the hearing process to 
collect and display information that supported the int rests of the agricultural industry. 
The same use of the hearing process to present informati n that fits the general biases of 
the subsystem in which a hearing takes place can be found in how the economic 
promotion subsystem collected and displayed information during hearings dealing with 
the biotechnology issue. In these hearings, the tonof member statements and witness 
testimony presented before committees in the economic promotion subsystem was more 
positive in tone toward the biotechnology industry than a typical run of the mill 
committee. As such, it is clear that both the agricultural and economic promotion 
subsystems acted as unified subsystems in the way they each collected and displayed 
information in congressional hearings covering issue  that were of utmost importance to 
members of the subsystem. 
With this said, despite reasons to suspect that the science subsystem would act 
as a unified subsystem in the issue areas of climate change and biotechnology, science 
committees were did not collect information that was significantly different than a 
typical run of the mill committee during hearings con erning these issue areas. More 
specifically, the tone of member statements and testimony presented before the 
committee was not significantly different when compared to miscellaneous run of the 
mill committees in both the climate change and biotechnology issue areas. These results 
lead one to wonder, why have the committees that make up other subsystems not been 
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as biased in terms of information collection and display decisions as the committees that 
make up the agriculture and economic promotion subsystems? More specifically, why 
have the committees that make up the science subsystem not been more biased in 
support of the scientific community in terms of their information collection display 
decisions in congressional hearings?  
Perhaps the main reason that the science subsystem did not act as a unified 
subsystem when collecting and displaying information in congressional hearings can be 
derived from the fact that the issue areas being examined by the science committees in 
Congress were not conducive to uniting subsystem mebers in support of a common 
cause. For instance, in the case of climate change, even the scientific aspects of the 
issue concerning whether or not changes in the global climate are occurring is a matter 
of controversy that has split members with different party affiliations and belief 
systems. As such, even if the scientific committee is generally a supportive venue for 
scientific research, the partisan nature of the issue over whether climate change is 
actually occurring can lead to divisions amongst memb rs that would otherwise be 
united on other issues. As issues become more partisan, like the climate change issue 
has become over time, it becomes more likely that committee venues like the science 
committees will be split into competitive coalitions by virtue of the control party leaders 
have over the committee appointment process and the fact that most committees’ 
memberships break down along partisan lines (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005). When 
competitive coalitions form within a committee venu, changes in who controls the 
committee are likely to lead to wide differences in what types of information will be 
collected and displayed in congressional hearings due to the wide differences in beliefs 
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about the issue amongst members of the committee or subcommittee. As such, when 
congressional committees deal with partisan issues, th  personal views of those running 
the hearing have more of an impact on the information collection and display process 
than the type of committee venue in which the hearing takes place.  
In addition to the highly partisan nature of the issue, climate change also does 
not contain the substantial distributive component found in issues like tobacco policy 
that has the propensity to unite members of a subsystem. Unlike tobacco policy, which 
has the potential to directly and tangibly benefit farmers living in the districts and states 
of agricultural committee members, climate change policy provides no tangible benefits 
to distribute to scientific researchers residing in the districts and states of scientific 
committee members. More specifically, while many climate scientists may argue that 
climate change is a problem that needs to be tackled by the federal government, policies 
to tackle the climate change issue likely would not pr vide many tangible economic 
benefits to scientific researchers that work on the issue. Thus, after considering the 
divisive nature of the climate change issue and the lack of a unifying distributive 
component within the issue, it is quite logical that scientific committees did not act as a 
unified subsystem when collecting and displaying information on the climate change 
issue. 
In the issue area of biotechnology policy, the case for science committees to act 
as unified subsystems when making information colletion and display decisions is 
quite a bit stronger. Unlike the climate change issue, the biotechnology issue area 
contains a large distributive component including issues like government support for 
biotechnology research and development where tangible overnment benefits can be 
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distributed to scientific researchers living in thestates and districts of members serving 
on the science committees in Congress. For example, the scientific committees 
frequently examined issues dealing with Human Genome Project, which was a large 
scientific research project designed to study the genetic makeup of the human body. The 
Human Genome Project required a great deal of funds a  support to carry out and had 
the potential to create jobs for large numbers of scientific researchers. As such, 
government policies dealing with biotechnology projects like the Human Genome 
Project had the potential to unite members of scientif c committees looking to distribute 
benefits that would benefit scientific researchers in committee members’ districts and 
states.  
Nonetheless, despite the presence of a distributive component in the 
biotechnology issue that had the potential to bring together members of the science 
subsystem in support of biotechnology research and development, the tone of 
information collected and displayed by the science committees on the biotechnology 
issue was not significantly different from a typical run of the mill committee. This result 
can likely be attributed to the fact that, unlike th  agricultural and economic 
committees, the science committees worked on aspects of the biotechnology issue that 
were likely to both divide members from different political parties within the subsystem 
and cause members of the subsystem to call witnesses with a variety of viewpoints in 
order to reduce uncertainty amongst subsystem members concerning the risks and 
benefits of biotechnology research and development. First of all, unlike committees 
within the agricultural and economic promotion subsystems who seldom held hearings 
during the early stages of the biotechnology issue, ci nce committees conducted a 
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significant amount of hearings during the early stages of the issue when little was 
known about biotechnology and congressional policymakers were uncertain as to what 
policy actions to take concerning the issue.21 As stated in previous section, during the 
early stages of the biotechnology issue, all congressional committees, including the 
science committees, seemed to use the congressional hearing process to hear from a 
variety of different perspectives, particularly from experts, rather than using the process 
to drum up support for scientific research and development. As such, it is not 
particularly surprising that science committees did not use the hearing process to bolster 
scientific research during the early stages of the issue, because members of the science 
subsystem were not certain enough to know whether the isks of the research 
outweighed its benefits during the early stages of the issue.  
In addition to the fact that the science committees h ld hearings on the issue of 
biotechnology during the early and uncertain stages of the issue, unlike committees 
within the agricultural and economic promotion subsystems, the science committees 
also confronted the controversial and partisan dimension of the biotechnology issue 
involving human cloning and embryonic stem cell research.22 As the results from the 
previous chapter demonstrate, policies related to the use of human embryonic matter for 
                                                
21
 Eleven of the cases in which science committees held hearings on the biotechnology issue during a 




 Congresses. By 
contrast, only three of the cases in which agricultural committees held hearings on the biotechnology 
issue during a particular Congress and one of the cases in which the economic promotion committees 




 Congresses.  
22
 Three of the cases in which science committees held hearings on the biotechnology issue during a 
particular Congress dealt with the controversial health aspects of the issue. By contrast, the agricultural 
and economic promotion committees have never held hearings that dealt with the controversial health 
aspects of the biotechnology issue.  
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health purposes clearly divided committee members with different core belief systems, 
in large part due to the similarities of the issue ar a to the issue area of abortion. Much 
like the climate change issue, this divisive dimensio  of the biotechnology issue served 
to divide scientific committee members in their support for biotechnology research and 
development who may have otherwise been united in their support for the technology 
when used for other purposes. Due to the divisive nature of human cloning and 
embryonic stem cell research, the tone of testimony and committee member statements 
on this dimension of the issue tended to be significantly more negative than testimony 
and statements given on other dimensions of the issu . As such, the fact that the science 
committees conducted hearings on the divisive dimension of the biotechnology issue 
likely served to drag down the overall supportive tone of testimony and member 
statements for biotechnology within the scientific subsystem.  
 As the analysis in the previous section suggests, the fact that the tone of 
testimony given in front of science committees on the biotechnology issue was not 
significantly more positive than a run-of-the-mill committee can likely be attributed to 
the high percentage of cases in which the committees worked on either the highly 
uncertain or controversial dimensions of the issue. Of the 36 cases in which science 
committees held hearings on the biotechnology issue, 14 (38.89%) either took place 
during the early stages of the issue during the 94th-99th Congresses or dealt with the 
controversial dimensions of the issue. By contrast, only 15.79% of the cases in which 
agricultural committees held hearings on the biotechnology issue and 12.50% of the 
cases in which the economic promotion committees held arings on the issue during a 
congressional session took place during the first five Congresses (94th-99th Congresses) 
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in which the issue was examined in congressional herings. The agricultural and 
economic promotion committees have yet to hold any hearings on the controversial 
aspects of the biotechnology issue.  
 
[Table 7.1 Here] 
 
In order to demonstrate the effects that different types of issue dimensions have 
had on the tone of testimony presented in front of the science committees, Table 7.1 
depicts the average tone of testimony presented in front of the science committees 
concerning biotechnology under different issue contexts. For the purpose of 
comparison, the average tone of testimony presented i  front of the committees within 
the agricultural and economic promotion subsystems is also presented. As Table 7.1 
demonstrates, while the overall tone of testimony presented in front of the science 
committees was moderately positive toward biotechnology, testimony tone was more 
negative toward biotechnology than the agricultural and economic promotion 
committees by a fairly significant margin. As Table 7.1 further depicts, the tone of 
testimony presented during hearings held prior to the 100th Congress was only 
moderately positive toward the biotechnology industry and decidedly more negative 
toward the biotechnology industry than the overall tone of testimony presented in front 
of the science committees. Furthermore, as expected, th  tone of testimony presented 
during hearings on the controversial dimension of the issue was slightly negative overall 
toward the biotechnology industry and significantly more negative toward the 
biotechnology industry than the overall tone of testimony presented in front of the 
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science committees. When cases where the science committees conducted hearings 
during the early stages of the issue (the 94th- 9th Congresses) and cases where the 
committees conducted hearings dealing with the controversial dimension of the issue 
are excluded, the average tone of testimony of 1.565 approaches the very positive 
average tone of testimony presented in front of the agricultural and economic promotion 
committees.  
As this analysis demonstrates, the type of issue being examined in a 
congressional hearing can have a powerful effect on the degree to which a subsystem 
venue is biased in the way it collects information. When committees consider partisan 
issues that are likely to divide members of a committee or new and technical issues that 
are likely to lead to high degrees of uncertainty amongst committee members, 
committee members are significantly less likely to be united in their conceptions of a 
policy issue, and thus, will be less likely to be united when making decisions on what 
information to collect and display at congressional hearings. As such, committees are 
less likely to be biased in the tone of information collected and displayed in 
congressional hearings when considering partisan and new and technical issue areas. By 
contrast, distributive issues that directly affect the constituents of committee members 
are more likely to unite committee members in support of a shared ideal. As such, 
committees are more likely to be biased in the toneof information collected and 
displayed in congressional hearings when considering distributive issue areas.  
Partisan Issues and the Effects of Committee Chair Beliefs. As stated earlier, many 
theorists argue that those who control the witness s lection process in congressional 
hearings (i.e. committee chairs) will be biased by their own beliefs and other personal 
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characteristics when deciding how policy information will be collected and displayed in 
congressional hearings (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; Sabatier and Weible 
2007). As such, rather than members of committees vnues being united and biased in 
the tone of information they collect and display at hearings on a particular issue, the 
tone of information collected and displayed at congressional hearings will change 
dramatically within a committee depending on the beliefs and individual characteristics 
of those in charge of the committee (i.e. committee chairs). In Chapter 2, I argue that 
the degree to which the beliefs and other characteristics of committee chairs will affect 
the tone of testimony presented at congressional hearings will largely depend on the 
issue and subsystem context in which a hearing takes place. 
 On the one hand, the belief systems and other chara teristics of committee 
chairs are unlikely to affect the tone of testimony presented in front of committees that 
are part of unified subsystems confronting a distribu ive issue that is likely to unite 
subsystem members. Consider, for instance, the example of agricultural committees 
conducting hearings on the issue of tobacco policy. The tobacco issue is a distributive 
issue for agricultural committee members that is likely to unite members of the 
agricultural subsystem due to the significant effects the policy decisions in the issue 
area can have on farmers living in the districts of agricultural committee members. In 
the tobacco issue area, on the one hand, rank and file committee members working on 
the issue seemed to be biased by their individual beliefs and characteristics when 
making statements during congressional hearing on tobacco policy. For instance, 
committee members from tobacco states and committee members with more 
conservative beliefs tended to give statements that were more positive toward the 
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tobacco industry in tone than their counterparts that did not represent tobacco states and 
who had more liberal beliefs. Nonetheless, despite the fact that individual 
characteristics of individual members clearly affected the tone of individual member 
statements on the issue of tobacco policy, the individual characteristics of committee 
chairs had no significant impact on the tone of testimony presented during hearings on 
the topic of tobacco policy. Instead, as stated in the previous section, the type of 
committee venue that held the hearing was a more important indicator of the tone of 
testimony at a hearing than the personal characteristics of committee chairs. In 
particular, the testimony presented in front of agricultural committees was significantly 
more positive in tone toward the tobacco industry than the other committees that held 
hearings on the issue.  
 With this said, why are the individual characteristics of committee chairs not a 
significant indicator of the tone of testimony presented at tobacco hearings when the 
characteristics of committee members clearly were significant determinant of the tone 
of individual member statements? First of all, rememb r that individual members have 
much more control over their own individual statements than chairs have over the 
overall tone of testimony presented during hearings over which they preside. Unlike the 
other stages of the hearing preparation process, the personal staff members of individual 
members tend to have a greater role in crafting opening statements and lines of question 
for their respective members (Staff Interviews 2010). Of course, the final decisions on 
what particular committee members will say at a congressional hearing are ultimately 
up to the individual members that are participating at the hearing (Staff Interviews 
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2010). As such, individual committee members have a large degree of discretion to say 
whatever they please during congressional hearings o  a particular topic. 
 Committee chairs, on the other hand, do not have the same degree of discretion 
to be able to totally control who is invited to testify at a particular congressional 
hearing. More specifically, due to the formal rules and informal norms permitting the 
minority to call witnesses to testify at hearings and the fact that rank and file members 
can use opening statements and speeches to call into question the fairness of a hearing, 
committee chairs must often allow minority party members to have some input on the 
witness selection process. As such, committee chairs c nnot use the hearing process to 
choose witnesses that will only represent their viewpoints on a particular issue. 
 With this aspect of congressional hearing politics in mind, in unified subsystems 
that are tackling a distributive issue that is likely to unite subsystem members, the 
characteristics and beliefs of the committee chair presiding over a hearing should not be 
a significant determinant of the tone of testimony presented in that hearing. In unified 
subsystems, regardless of the personal beliefs and characteristics of a chair, each of the 
chairs are likely to have similar viewpoints on theissue at hand and will likely call 
witnesses that fit the common viewpoints shared amongst members of the committee. 
Furthermore, in unified subsystems dealing with an issue that is likely to united 
subsystem members, the minority side is very unlikely to use minority witness rules and 
norms to select witnesses that are antagonistic to he views of the chair due to the 
consensual political environment that generally operates amongst members of the 
subsystem and the fact that the minority party is unlikely to disagree with the majority 
party’s witness choices within a unified subsystem where everyone generally agrees on 
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the understanding of an issue. As such, in the tobacco issue, regardless of the 
characteristics of the chair presiding over the agricultural committees, the tone of 
testimony presented in front of the committee tended to be very positive toward the 
tobacco industry due to the shared support amongst members of the agricultural 
subsystem for tobacco farmers.  
On the other hand, when a member with characteristics that would make him or 
her more likely to support the tobacco industry (i.e. representing a tobacco state, 
espousing a conservative ideology) chaired venues otside the agricultural subsystem 
that were more contentious, the tone of testimony presented did not reach the level of 
support for the tobacco industry found when agricultura  committees held hearings on 
the issue. This result can likely be attributed to the role the minority plays in the witness 
selection process. For instance, unlike in agricultura  venues, many members of the 
health and safety and judiciary committees did not share the understanding that tobacco 
products are important to the economy of many different regions of the U.S. Instead, 
these members focused on the harmful effects that tob cco use has on the health and 
safety of those who use the product. As such, even when members that supported the 
tobacco industry chaired health and safety and judiciary committees, the minority used 
their rights to select witnesses to call witnesses that would present testimony that was 
largely unsupportive of the tobacco industry. Furthe more, if tobacco state chairman 
had utilized the hearing process to stack testimony that was only supportive of the 
tobacco industry, members of the minority would have likely used their rights to make 
speeches and opening statements to call into question the fairness of a hearing. As such, 
chairman that were tobacco supporters could not stack testimony in the tobacco 
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industry’s favor out of fear that the public would dismiss the hearing as political, which 
would damage the chairman’s reputation.  
With this said, while differences in the personal characteristics of committee 
chairmen are not likely to be a significant determinant of the tone of hearing testimony 
within unified subsystems tacking a distributive issue that is likely to unite committee 
members, the belief systems of committee chairs has been a highly significant 
determinant of the tone of testimony when committees hold hearings on partisan issues 
that are likely to heighten differences among subsystem members. With respect to the 
issues examined in this project, the belief systems of committee chairs had the most 
significant impact on the tone of testimony presented during hearings on the topics of 
climate change policy and the dimension of the biotechnology issue dealing with the 
use of biotechnology tools on human embryonic matter for health purposes. In the case 
of climate change policy, more conservative chairs nd chairs with more pro-economic 
belief systems tended to preside over hearings that produced testimony that was 
generally more pro-economic in tone. By contrast, more liberal chairs and chairs with 
more pro-environmental belief systems tended to preside over hearings that produced 
testimony that was generally more pro-environmental i  tone. In the case of the 
controversial health dimension of the biotechnology issue, conservative chairs tended to 
preside over hearings where the overall tone of witness testimony was more critical of 
the potential ethical and safety risks that could arise from the use of biotechnology on 
human embryos. By contrast, liberal chairs tended to preside over hearings where the 
overall tone of witness testimony was more positive about the potential health benefits 
of the use of biotechnology on human embryos.  
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In light of these results, the following question must be addressed: why have the 
personal beliefs of committee chairs had such a strong effect on the tone of testimony in 
the issue area of climate change and the controversial dimension of the biotechnology 
issue while having a comparatively muted effect in other issue areas? What makes these 
issue areas different from the other issue areas exmined in this project? Unlike the 
other issue areas examined in the project, both the controversial dimension of the 
biotechnology issue and the climate change issue are clearly partisan issue areas that 
have divided members with different partisan affiliat ons. With respect to the climate 
change issue area, Republicans and Democrats have become increasingly divided over 
environmental policy in general since the 1970’s (Shipan and Lowry 2001, 245). This 
polarization in general environmental beliefs between the two parties has clearly been 
evident in the specific environmental issue of climate change. As Chapter 5 
demonstrates, Republicans and Democrats became increasingly divided in the tone of 
the statements they made during congressional hearings dealing with the climate change 
issue.  With respect to the controversial dimension of the biotechnology issue, the use of 
biotechnology tools to create or clone embryos and embryonic stem cells is rooted in 
the very partisan debates over whether human life begins when an egg is fertilized and 
becomes an embryo. The fact that the climate change issu  and the controversial health 
dimension of the biotechnology issue are both partis n ssue areas is important due to 
the ability of partisan issue areas to heighten differences among members of a 
subsystem. When an issue causes divisions between mmbers of the two political 
parties, the likelihood that each committee venue will be split into competitive 
coalitions significantly increases due to the contrl that party leaders have over the 
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committee appointment process and the fact that moscommittees’ memberships break 
down along partisan lines (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005).  
When subsystems are split into competing coalitions, the characteristics of the 
chair of the committee conducting the hearing will likely have the largest impact on the 
tone of testimony presented in front of a particular committee. Although the minority 
party plays a role in selecting witnesses, ultimately the chair of the committee holding a 
hearing plays the most important role in the process of selecting witnesses to testify at 
congressional hearings. In addition to other responibilities, committee and 
subcommittee chairs are responsible for overseeing the process of selecting witnesses 
and sending the formal invitation to those selected to testify at a particular hearing 
(Sachs 2003; Palmer 2007; LaForge 2010). As stated earlier, when unified subsystems 
tackle a distributive issue that is likely to unite committee members, differences in the 
beliefs of committee chairs will not significantly affect the overall tone of testimony 
presented in hearings on an issue because committee embers are likely to have shared 
understandings of an issue and should agree on the selection of witnesses to testify at a 
hearing.  
On the other hand, when subsystems confront a partisan issue that is likely to 
divide subsystem members, committee members with different belief systems are likely 
to have very different understandings and positions on the issue at hand. For instance, in 
the conflictual dimension of the biotechnology issue area, liberals and conservatives are 
diametrically opposed to each other on the acceptability of embryonic stem cell 
research. Since committee staff members often evaluate the acceptability of a witness 
based on the degree to which the witness agrees with the positions of the chair (Staff 
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Interviews 2010), differences in the positions of chairmen can lead to wide differences 
in the tone of information presented by witnesses invited to testify at a hearing. Due to 
the fact that wider differences in viewpoints among committee members are likely to be 
found when a partisan issue is being examined, the beli fs of the chair rather than the 
committee venue in which a hearing takes place are crucial in determining the tone of 
testimony presented at hearings dealing with these types of issues. As such, changes in 
who controls a particular committee venue can have a substantial effect on the tone of 
testimony presented in front of a particular venue tackling a partisan issue. Therefore, it 
should not be surprising that the beliefs of committee and subcommittee chairs were 
most significant as determinants of the tone of testimony presented at hearings in the 
more partisan issue areas studied in this project while having a relatively muted effect 
on other issues where differences in the positions of individual members within a 
subsystem were less pronounced. 
Nonetheless, while the belief systems of committee chairs had a significant 
effect on the tone of testimony presented in the partisan issue areas studied in this 
project, the belief systems of committee chairs did not have a significant effect on the 
types of witnesses called to testify during hearings on any of the three issues analyzed 
in this project. For instance, although many in the climate science community have 
argued that climate change is a serious problem that should be addressed by the 
government, committee chairs with conservative and pro-economic beliefs on 
environmental issues were no more or less likely to call scientific experts than 
committee chairs with liberal and pro-environmental beliefs. The lack of impact of 
committee chair beliefs on the types of witnesses called to testify in hearings can likely 
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be attributed to the fact that committee chairs typically seek to ensure that individuals 
with a wide spectrum of different backgrounds come to testify at a particular hearing 
(Staff Interviews 2010). Committee staff members generally feel that bringing in 
witnesses from a wide cross-section of different backgrounds can demonstrate that 
individuals from all walks of life support the position the chair espouses (Staff 
Interviews 2010). As such, even if committee staff members tend to look for witnesses 
that will espouse the chair’s viewpoint on an issue, th y try to avoid calling witnesses 
with similar backgrounds. With the basic findings of this project laid out, I now turn to 
a discussion of the normative implications of these findings for congressional 
policymaking.  
  
Normative Implications of Information Collection and Display Politics: Are 
Congressional Hearings Worth the Time and Effort? 
While this project has confronted many different issues related to the politics of 
information collection and display in congressional hearings, the core of this project 
seeks to answer the following question: do committees and subcommittees conduct 
hearings with a mind toward ensuring that a particular viewpoint will be 
overrepresented in witness testimony during a hearing? As the analysis presented in the 
previous chapters clearly demonstrates, in most cases, it is clear that committees and 
subcommittees are biased in one way or another when sel cting information to collect 
and display in congressional hearings. Granted, due to the effects of the minority 
witness rule and informal norms of compromise betwen the majority and minority in 
witness selection, the conventional wisdom that committee chairs stack testimony to 
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only select witnesses that will espouse their positions while totally ignoring the 
positions of minority members when selecting witnesses may be a bit overstated. 
However, in almost every dimension of each issue area studied in this project, the 
overall tone of witness testimony fit the biases of either the committee venue 
conducting the hearing or the chair presiding over th  actions of the committee.  
For valid reasons, many skeptics of the hearing process may argue that these 
results call into serious question the utility of cnducting congressional hearings. After 
all, as stated in Chapter 1, the process of congressional committees is very costly in 
terms of money, time, and lost opportunities to engage in other policymaking activities. 
First of all, congressional hearings require congressional committees to hire and pay 
congressional staff members to conduct extensive res a ch on the topics being 
discussed at the hearing, including interviewing those testifying at hearings prior to the 
hearing taking place (Oleszek 1989, 98). Furthermore, congressional committees must 
also often pay for any expenses (i.e. travel, lodging, etc.) involved with ensuring that 
witnesses can appear at a committee hearing (LaForge 2010). Finally, the process of 
conducting hearings congressional hearings takes time away from congressional policy 
makers that could be used on other policymaking activities (i.e. writing legislation, 
forging compromises on bills, providing services to constituents, attending other 
committee meetings, etc.) that may be of utmost importance in determining whether 
constituents will reelect committee members in subsequent elections (Diermeier and 
Feddersen 2000, 52). Congressional committees do, in fact, spend a large amount of 
their time conducting congressional hearings. More sp cifically, between 1989-2004, 
Congress conducted an average of 11 congressional hearings per day on a wide variety 
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of policy topics.23 If congressional hearings are not a useful policymaking activity, the 
amount of time, money, and resources spent on hearings would be significantly wasteful 
to society.  
As such, in light of the findings that have been uncovered about congressional 
hearings in this project and the significant amount of time, money, and resources 
devoted to conducting congressional hearings, the following normative questions are 
important to consider. First of all, is it troubling that committee chairs use the hearing 
process to handpick witnesses that will fit a particular point of view in a debate when 
Congress spends so much time and resources to conduct these hearings? Secondly, 
should congressional committees spend less of their time on conducting hearings if 
committees are just going to use the process to call witnesses to testify that espouse a 
particular point of view? In sum, are congressional hearings a worthwhile policy 
activity for congressional policymakers to devote so much of their time, money, and 
resources?  
In my opinion, despite the fact that committees generally use the hearing process 
to collect and display information that fits a certain position espoused by important 
committee members, the hearing process still serves a number of important purposes in 
the congressional policymaking process. First of all, critics of the hearing process 
should not forget about the vast potential of hearings to collect and display important 
                                                
23
 Information on the number of hearings per Congress was collected from Baumgartner and Jones’s 
Policy Agenda Project website, which can be found here: http://www.policyagendas.org .  
Information on the number of days Congress was in session that was used to calculate the average 
number of hearings per day that Congress was in session can be found at the Library of Congress 
website here: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ds/ . 
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policy information that can inform policymakers’ decisions on an issue. As an 
informational gathering tool, congressional hearings afford congressional committees 
with the ability to call almost anyone they choose to testify before them and extract 
information out of these witnesses that is relevant to the policymaking process through 
questioning. Even when individuals are reluctant to testify at hearings, most 
congressional committees and subcommittees have the pow r to require individuals to 
appear before them by issuing subpoenas to those who refuse to testify (Palmer 2007). 
Although committees and subcommittees generally used this power to call witnesses 
that would present testimony bolstering the biases of committee members, during 
certain periods of certain issues, congressional committees and subcommittees seemed 
to use the process to attempt to gather the best information possible so that they could 
gain some perspective on what policy actions to take. For instance, in hearings 
conducted during the early stages of the biotechnology and climate change issue areas, 
experts in these issue areas who likely would present th  most informative testimony on 
the issues at hand made up by far the largest category of witnesses testifying at 
hearings. Furthermore, during the early stages of the biotechnology issue, the relatively 
neutral overall tone of testimony suggests that committees wanted to hear from 
witnesses espousing a wide variety of different pers ctives in order to properly 
understand the issue and arrive at the proper course of action to take. Thus, even though 
critics may be discouraged at the way congressional committees often use the process, 
they should not forget the fact that the process can and has been used by committees to 
collect solid policy information from experts on the issue. 
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However, even when committees and subcommittees utilize the process to select 
witnesses that will espouse their preferred viewpoint in a policy debate, the hearing 
process can still serve a number of important purposes in congressional policymaking. 
First of all, the congressional hearing process adds transparency to the process by 
which congressional policymakers make important decisions. Congressional hearings 
are very public affairs that are often televised, as they take place, on the C-SPAN cable 
outlets (Hallowell 2008). However, even if a hearing s not televised, unless extenuating 
circumstances dictate otherwise, congressional committees and subcommittees will 
typically print written transcripts of the testimony, questioning, and statements made by 
committee members and witnesses over the course of a hearing (Palmer 2007). As most 
staff members noted during interviews, the public nature of hearings allows 
congressional committees to “establish a record” that can be used for a variety of 
reasons at later stages of the hearing process (Staff Interviews 2010).  
First of all, due to the fact that witnesses and committee members are making 
public statements that can be checked later, these individuals cannot go back on these 
statements when decisions are being made in terms of what policy actions to pursue 
later in the process. Furthermore, through statements made by committee members and 
witness during the hearing process, the public can see what the original intent behind a 
particular policy decision was. The statements and testimony presented in congressional 
hearings can be particularly helpful when courts and other actors are trying to determine 
whether actions taken by government actors, particularly bureaucratic actors when 
implementing laws, are consistent with the original i tent of a particular law that has 
already been enacted (Staff Interviews 2010). Without the transparency of hearings, it 
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sometimes would be very difficult to determine what the original intent of a law is. As 
such, even if congressional committees use the hearing p ocess to stack testimony that 
bolsters the positions and decisions that the committee is already espousing and 
pursuing, this testimony can be very helpful in establishing why congressional 
policymakers made the decisions that they did. 
Related to the previous purpose, the congressional hearing process also affords 
committees with the opportunity to provide support for the decisions that policymakers 
within the committee are making. In a constitutional republic like the U.S., we should 
expect that our representatives will base their decisions on solid facts and reasoning. 
Through the hearing process, even if committees are only using the process to call 
witnesses that will bolster their own positions, citizens and policymakers outside the 
committee (i.e. other congressmen, executive branch officials, etc.) can at least see the 
information that is being presented to support legislative decisions made by these 
committees. From there, individuals outside the committee can judge for themselves 
whether or not they find the information presented by the committee to back up 
particular policy decisions to be compelling. Indee, as past research has shown, the act 
of holding a hearing on an issue can serve as an important stage in the life of a bill as 
holding a hearing has been found to demonstrate to the floor that a bill has been vetted 
seriously enough to be considered by the floor (Burstein and Hirsch 2007, 179; Oleszek 
1989; Diermeier and Feddersen, 2000; Krutz 2005) or that there are enough significant 
problems with a piece of legislation that it should not be passed (Brasher 2006). 
Although it was not the main focus of this particular project, one of the most 
important purposes for which congressional hearings are conducted is to versee other 
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actors in society, particularly members of the federal xecutive branch. Through the 
congressional hearing process, congressional committee and subcommittee members 
have the opportunity to call executive officials to testify before them and directly 
attempt to discredit the information they provide (Staff Interviews 2010). As we saw in 
the case of climate change hearings, when chairmen call witnesses from the federal 
bureaucracy to testify, they are likely doing so in order to directly question the wisdom 
of whatever policies they are pursuing rather than to bolster arguments made by one 
side or to genuinely collect information. This use of the hearing process to oversee the 
executive branch can be very healthy in the functioing of our government. Through 
strenuous questioning of executive branch officials by congressional committee 
members, these officials must regularly justify thedecisions they make when 
implementing laws passed by Congress. Furthermore, due to the transparent nature of 
the process, when officials make statements during hearings, they are officially “on the 
record” when they make these statements. As such, executive branch witnesses cannot 
retract or go back on statements made during hearings later on in the process without 
having to defend the reasons for doing so. As such, congressional hearings serve as an 
important method for holding our executive branch officials accountable to Congress 
and U.S. citizens.  
Finally, critics of our hearing process have often ignored the fact the minority 
party has some rights and powers in the hearing process. No, minority party members 
do not have the same powers over witness selection that the majority party, particularly 
the chair, has over the process. Indeed, the witness s lection process is a highly 
majoritarian process where the vast majority of witnesses selected will be chosen by the 
313 
 
committee chair and in most cases will be selected to bolster the positions espoused by 
the committee chair. However, should we expect that the minority party would have an 
equal say in who gets to testify at hearings as the majority party does? Through the 
process of winning elections and gaining the approval f American citizens, the 
majority party has earned the power to control the policymaking process within a 
particular chamber of Congress. This power includes being able to determine which 
witnesses will be able to testify at congressional hearings. Nonetheless, despite the 
largely majoritarian nature of the witness selection process, due to the formal rules and 
informal norms permitting the minority to call witnesses to testify at hearings and the 
fact that rank and file members can use opening statements and speeches to call into 
question the fairness of a hearing, committee chairs must often allow minority party 
members to have some input on the witness selection process. The degree to which 
committee chairs allow minority members to have input on the witness selection 
process (i.e. the number of witnesses that the minority party is allowed to select) may 
vary from committee to committee. However, on every committee, strong institutional 
norms are present that permit the minority party to call at least one witness it chooses to 
testify at a hearing. As such, even though the perspective favored by minority party 
members may not get equal consideration in a congressional hearing, the perspective 
will at least be presented once over the course of a hearing.  
Therefore, although some may argue that the biased nature of the witness 
selection process during hearings proves that the process is not worthy of attention by 
researchers, the important purposes of the hearing p ocess stated earlier provide enough 
justification for scholars to continue researching this woefully understudied 
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congressional institution. Furthermore, as this study has demonstrated, the politics of 
congressional hearings are far more nuanced than many past scholars have described. 
Those subscribing to the conventional wisdom of congressional hearings have assumed 
that committee chairs will always utilize the process to shut out the minority and choose 
witnesses that bolster the positions of committee chairs. Yet, due to the rules and norms 
that operate within Congress, totally shutting out the minority perspective in witness 
selection simply does not happen as often as the conventional wisdom describes. 
Furthermore, depending on the issue context and the subsystem context in which a 
hearing takes place, those in charge of a committee may not seek to stack witness 
testimony to only represent a particular viewpoint. Rather, they may seek to use the 
process to call executive branch witnesses they know will disagree with their positions 
in order to hold these officials accountable to Congress and the public or to call expert 
witnesses with a wide variety of perspectives on an issue in order to more properly 
understand an issue and reduce the uncertainty that surrounds that issue. Finally, even 
when committees use the process to bolster a particul r viewpoint in a debate, whether 
the institutional bias of a committee or the committee chair’s belief systems are driving 
witness selection decisions largely depends on the issue and subsystem contexts in 
which a hearing takes place.  
As such, the idea that all hearing politics operate the same way regardless of the 
issue being examined must be reexamined. Future researchers must continue to study 
the hearing process under a wide variety of different issue contexts to determine how 
decisions made over the course of the process can change depending on the context in 
which a hearing takes place. By looking at how the hearing process is conducted under 
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a wide variety of different contexts, we can gain a much greater appreciation for the 





Table 7.1 Average Tone of Biotechnology Testimony under Different 
Issue and Subsystem Contexts 
Subsystem Issue Context Average Tone of 
Testimony 
Science Overall  1.082 
 94th-99th Congresses 0.510 
 Controversial Dimension -0.365 
 After 99th Congress Excluding 
Hearings on Controversial 
Dimension 
1.565 
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Appendix A. List of Congressional Hearing Documents in Each 
Issue Area 
Tobacco Policy 
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 71-H161-4. Burley Tobacco – Proclamation 
of Marketing Quotas, Farm Poundage Quotas (H.J. Res. 365, H.R. 4328, H.R. 
4462, H.R. 5233, H.R. 5732). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of 
the House Committee on Agriculture. February 23, 1971; March 2 and 16, 1971.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 71-S161-3. Poundage Quotas for Burley 
Tobacco (S. 789). Hearing before the Subcommittee on Agricultural Production, 
Marketing, and Stabilization of Prices of the Senat Committee on Agriculture 
and Forestry. March 2, 1971.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 72-H161-10. Miscellaneous (H.R. 6217, 
H.R. 1161, H.R. 6915). Hearings before the House Committee on Agriculture. 
May 6 and 12, 1971; July 28, 1971.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 73-S261-4. Public Health Cigarette 
Amendments of 1971 (S. 1454). Hearings before the Consumer Subcommittee of 
the Senate Committee on Commerce. February 1, 3, and 10, 1972.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 72-H161-14. Lease, Sale, and Transfer of 
Tobacco Acreage-Poundage Quotas (H.R. 8055, H.R. 10037, H.R. 11643, H.R. 
12705, H.R. 12713). Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of the House 
Committee on Agriculture. February 8, 1972.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 72-S161-11. Tobacco Exports. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Agricultural Exports of the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry. February 22 and 28, 1972.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 72-H621-13. Change in Pay Status of 
Tobacco Graders (H.R. 9066). Hearing before the Subcommittee on Employee 
Benefits of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. April 13, 
1972.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 72-S161-19. Farm Program Administration. 
Hearing before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Farm Program Administration of 
the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Jul  6, 1972.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 73-H521-4. Elimination of Cigarette 
Racketeering. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary. September 28, 1972.  
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U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 73-H161-8. Review of Food, Agricultural, 
and Farm Credit Legislation. Hearings before the House Committee on 
Agriculture. January 29 and 30, 1973; February 5, 6, and 22, 1973 
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 74-H161-22. Miscellaneous (H.R. 1952, 
H.R. 2933, H.R. 9138, H.R. 4612, H.R. 9295, S. 2491). Hearings before the 
House Committee on Agriculture. March 5, 1973; May 29, 1973; July 10, 1973; 
July 10, 1973; July 17, 1973; December 13, 1973.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 73-H161-15. Amend Tobacco Marketing 
Quota Provisions (H.R. 6485, H.R. 6799). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Tobacco of the House Committee on Agriculture. April 12, 1973.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 73-S161-9. Tobacco Marketing Quotas 
(H.R. 6485, S. 1533). Hearing before the Subcommittee on Agricultural 
Production, Marketing, and Stabilization of Prices of the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry. April 13, 1973.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 74-H161-2. Suspension of Public Law 480 
Barter Program for Tobacco. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of 
the House Committee on Agriculture. May 22, 1973.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 73-H501-30. Little Cigars (H.R. 7482, S. 
1165, H.R. 3828). Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce. May 22, 23, and 24, 1973.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 73-H781-29. Trade Reform (Part 14) (H.R. 
6767). Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means. June 12, 13, 
14, and 15, 1973.   
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 74-H161-24. Increase in Tobacco Marketing 
Quotas. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of the House Committee 
on Agriculture. January 22, 1974.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 75-H161-10. Miscellaneous (H.R. 13267, 
H.R. 6468, H.R. 9054, H.R. 7954, S. 3801, H.R. 16857). Hearings before the 
House Committee on Agriculture. March 21, 1974; May 7, 1974; July 9, 1974; 
September 19, 1974; September 30, 1974.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 74-H161-38. Emergency Support Level 
Increases for Flue Cured Tobacco (H.R. 16056). Hearing before the 





U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 75-S161-5. Tobacco Price Supports (H.R. 
17506). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Agricultural Production, 
Marketing, and Stabilization of Prices of the Senat Committee on Agriculture 
and Forestry. December 10 and 12, 1974.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 76-H161-12. Miscellaneous (S. 435, H.R. 
6994, H.R. 6403, H.R. 1502, H.R. 2343, H.R. 11126). Hearings before the House 
Committee on Agriculture. April 17, 1975; May 20, 1975; July 28, 1975; 
September 11, 1975; September 25, 1975; December 18, 1975.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 75-S161-24. Transfer of Flue-Cured 
Tobacco Acreage Allotments (S. 700). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Agricultural Production, Marketing, and Stabilization of Prices of the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. May 13, 1975.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 76-H161-4. Tobacco Program. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of the House Committee on Agriculture. 
June 12, 13, and 20 1975; July 10, 11, and 18, 1975; August 13, 1975.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 76-H161-20. Flue-Cured Tobacco Leasing 
and Transfer (S. 700). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of the 
House Committee on Agriculture. February 4 and 5, 1976.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 76-S541-49. Cigarette Smoking and 
Disease, 1976 (S. 2902). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health of the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. February 19, 1976; March 24, 
1976; May 27, 1976.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 78-H161-18. Leasing of Flue-Cured 
Tobacco Marketing Quotas (H.R. 3416). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Tobacco of the House Committee on Agriculture. March 15, 1977.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 77-S161-17. Problems of Flue-Cured 
Tobacco Farmers. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Agricultural 
Production, Marketing, and Stabilization of Prices of the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. March 30, 1977. 
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 78-H161-6. Economic Value of Present 
Tobacco Program. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of the House 
Committee on Agriculture. October 6, 1977.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 78-S521-23. Racketeering in the Sale and 
Distribution of Cigarettes (S. 1487). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 
October 21, 1977.  
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U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 78-H501-75. Antismoking Initiatives of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. H aring before the 
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce. February 15, 1978.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 79-H521-10. Cigarette Bootlegging. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary. February 28, 1978; March 8, 1978; April 19, 1978.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 78-H781-48. Miscellaneous Measures to 
Discourage Cigarette Smuggling (H.R. 9667, H.R. 9722, H.R. 9733, H.R. 9763, 
H.R. 9905, H.R. 10066, H.R. 10579, H.R. 11152). Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Miscellaneous Revenue Measures of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means. March 21, 1978.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 79-S411-14. Disease Prevention and Health 
Promotion Act of 1978 (S. 3115). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health 
and Scientific Research of the Senate Committee on Human Resources. May 25, 
1978; June 7 and 9, 1978.   
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 79-H161-8. Economic Impact of Tobacco 
Program. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of the House 
Committee on Agriculture. July 21, 1978; August 4, 1978; September 15, 1978.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 79-H161-6. Effects of Smoking on 
Nonsmokers. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of the House 
Committee on Agriculture. September 7, 1978.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 79-H401-11. Quality of Scientific Evidence 
in FDA Regulatory Decisions (The Adoption of an Antismoking Warning in Oral 
Contraceptive Pill Labeling). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources of the House Committee on 
Government Operations. October 4, 1978.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 79-H501-30. Cigarette Smoking and Health 
– Update 1978. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 
October 5 and 6, 1978.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 79-S261-10. Smoking Deterrence Act of 
1978 (S. 3118). Hearings before the Subcommittee for Consumers on the Senate 




U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 79-H161-13. Five-Day Selling Week for 
Flue-Cured Tobacco. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of the 
House Committee on Agriculture. February 15, 1979.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 79-H161-25. Flue-Cured Tobacco Price 
Support Program for 1979 Marketing Year. Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Tobacco of the House Committee on Agriculture. July 31, 1979.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 80-H161-17. General Tobacco Issues in 
Kentucky. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco of the House 
Committee on Agriculture. February 1, 1980.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 80-H781-48. President’s Cash Management 
Initiatives in the Fiscal Year 1981 Budget. Hearings before the House 
Committee on Ways and Means. February 26, 1980; March 10, 1980.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 82-H361-29. Cigarette Advertising and the 
HHS Anti-Smoking Campaign. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. June 25, 
1981.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 82-H161-3. Limit Nonquota Tobacco in 
Quota Areas (H.R. 3179, H.R. 3277). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Tobacco and Peanuts of the House Committee on Agriculture. July 15, 1981.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 82-H161-48. Tobacco Price-Support 
Program. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Tobacco and Peanuts of the 
House Committee on Agriculture. February 1, 11, 12, 15, 16, and 22, 1982; 
March 6, 8, and 9, 1982; April 3, 1982.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 82-H361-85. Comprehensive Smoking 
Prevention Education Act (H.R. 5653, H.R. 4957). Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce. March 5, 11, and 12, 1982.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 82-S161-14. Oversight on the Tobacco 
Price Support Program. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry. March 15, 1982.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 82-S541-54. Comprehensive Smoking 
Prevention Education Act of 1981 (S. 1929). Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. March 16, 1982.  
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U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 82-S261-62. Comprehensive Smoking 
Prevention Education Act of 1981 (S. 1929). Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. May 10, 1982.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 83-S261-5. FTC’s Authority over Deceptive 
Advertising. Hearing before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. July 22, 1982.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 83-H161-6. Review of Tobacco Price 
Support Program Costs. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco and 
Peanuts of the House Committee on Agriculture. October 7, 1982.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 83-H161-25. Review of Tobacco Price 
Support Program. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Tobacco and Peanuts 
of the House Committee on Agriculture. February 25, 1983; March 18 and 25, 
1983; April 13, 14, and 15, 1983.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 83-H361-49. Smoking Prevention Education 
Act (H.R. 1824). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Enviro ment 
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. March 9 and 17, 1983.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 83-H361-65. Cigarette Safety Act (H.R. 
1880). Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health and Enviro ment of the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce. March 21, 1983.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 83-S541-31. Smoking Prevention Health 
and Education Act of 1983 (S. 772, S. 1116). Hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. May 5 and 12, 1983.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 83-S161-28. Proposed Changes in the 
Federal Tobacco Program. Hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. June 14, 1983. 
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 83-S141-14. Home Fire Deaths: A 
Preventable Tragedy. Hearing before the Senate Special Committee on Aging. 
July 28, 1983.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 84-H161-54. Review of Export Promotion 
Credit Programs. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco and Peanuts of 
the House Committee on Agriculture. March 7, 1984.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 84-S401-39. Cigarette Safety Study Act (S. 




U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 85-H161-23. Review of the Tobacco Seed 
and Plant Exportation Act. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco and 
Peanuts of the House Committee on Agriculture. September 12, 1984.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 86-H781-12. User Fees, Revenue Proposals 
Contained in President Reagan’s 1986 Budget, and Other Revenue Measures. 
Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means. June 19 and 20, 
1985.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 86-H361-5. Tobacco Issues (H.R. 760, H.R. 
2950, H.R. 3078, H.R. 2835). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and 
Environment of the Senate Committee on Energy and Commerce June 24, 1985; 
July 26, 1985.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 86-H161-5. Tobacco Equalization Act of 
1985 (H.R. 2600). Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco and 
Peanuts of the House Committee on Agriculture and the Subcommittee on 
Select Revenue Measures of the House Committee on Ways and Means. July 18, 
1985.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 85-S161-29. Tobacco Program 
Improvement Act of 1985 (S. 1418). Hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. July 22, 1985.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 86-S361-11. Expiring Excise Tax 
Provisions. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt
Management of the Senate Committee on Finance. September 10, 1985.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 86-S361-53. Expiring Cigarette Excise Tax 
Provisions: II. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt
Management of the Senate Committee on Finance. September 16, 1985.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 86-S401-34. Non-Smokers Rights Act of 
1985 (S. 1440). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil Service, Post Office, 
and General Services of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. 
September 30, 1985; October 1 and 2, 1985.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 86-H161-18. Review of Tobacco Quota 
Referendum; Agricultural Marketing Service Investiga on of Illegal Seed 
Exports; and Problems Related to Nonauction Warehouse Sales of Tobacco. 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco and Peanuts of the House 
Committee on Agriculture. November 1, 1985.  
U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 86-S361-89. Proposals Relating to Excise 
Taxes. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance. April 21, 1986.  
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U.S. Government Printing Office. CIS-No. 87-H161-13. Review the Status of 
Regulations Relating to Certification of Pesticides Used on Imported Tobacco. 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tobacco and Peanuts of the House 
Committee on Agriculture. April 22, 1986.  
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Appendix B. List of Congressional Committees Holding Hearings in 
Each Issue Area 
 
Tobacco Policy 
Subsystem House Committees Senate Committees 
Agriculture Agriculture  
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Tobacco 
Subcommittee on Tobacco and 
Peanuts 
Subcommittee on Specialty 
Crops and Natural 
Resources 
Subcommittee on Risk 
Management, Research, and 
Specialty Crops 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Agricultural 
Production, Marketing, and 
Stabilization of Prices 
Subcommittee on Production and 
Price Competitiveness 
Subcommittee on Agricultural 
Exports 









Trade, and Consumer 
Protection 
Subcommittee on Transportation 
and Hazardous Materials 
Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment 
Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations 
Consumer Subcommittee 
Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Consumer Protection, and 
Competitiveness 
Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer 
Protection 
Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Consumer 
 
Committee on Environment 
and Public Works 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Clean Air and 
Nuclear Regulation 
 
Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources25 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Public Health 
and Safety 
Subcommittee on Health 
Subcommittee on Health and 
Scientific Research 
 
Special Committee on Aging 
Full Committee 
  
                                                
24
 Committee also called Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and Committee on Commerce 
25
 Committee also called Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and Committee on Human Resources 
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Subsystem House Committees Senate Committees 
Judiciary Committee on the Judiciary 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee Number 1 
Subcommittee on Crime 
Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property 
Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual 
Property 
Committee on the Judiciary 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Business Rights, and 
Competition 
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws 
and Procedures 





Relations and Human 
Resources 
 
Committee on Post Office and 
Civil Service 
Subcommittee on Employee 
Benefits 
 
Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure 27 
Subcommittee on Aviation 
Subcommittee on Public 
Buildings and Grounds 
Subcommittee on Public 
Buildings and Economic 
Development 
 
Committee on Science and 
Technology 
Subcommittee on Natural 
Resources, Agriculture 
Research, and Environment 
 
 
Committee on Finance 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Taxation and 
Debt Management 
 
Committee on Governmental 
Affairs  
Full Committee 
Oversight of Government 
Management, Restructuring, 
and the District of Columbia 
Subcommittee 
Subcommittee on Civil Service, 
Post Office, and General 
Services 
 
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 
Full Committee 
 
Committee on Indian Affairs 
Full Committee 
  
                                                
26
 Committee also called Committee on Government Operations 
27
 Committee also called Committee on Public Works and Transportation 
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Subsystem House Committees Senate Committees 
Miscellaneous 
(cont’) 
Committee on Veterans’ 
Affairs  
Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations 
 
Committee on Ways and 
Means 
Full Committee 







Climate Change Policy 
Subsystem House Committees Senate Committees 
Environmental Committee on Energy and 
Commerce 
Subcommittee on Health and 
the Environment 
Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations 
Committee on Environment and 
Public Works 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Environmental 
Pollution 
Subcommittee on Environmental 
Protection 
Subcommittee on Toxic Substances 
and Environmental Oversight 
Subcommittee on Clean Air and 
Nuclear Regulation 
Subcommittee on Clean Air, 
Wetlands, Private Property, 
and Nuclear Safety 
Subcommittee on Clean Air, 
Climate Change, and Nuclear 
Safety 
Subcommittee on Hazardous 
Wastes and Toxic Substances 
Energy Committee on Energy and 
Commerce28 
Subcommittee on Energy and 
Power 
Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations 
Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Energy Research, 
Development, Production, and 
Regulation 
Science Committee on Science29 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Science 




Subcommittee on Space 
Subcommittee on Energy and 
Environment 
Subcommittee on Energy 
Subcommittee on Environment 
 
Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Science, 
Technology, and Space 
Subcommittee on Oceans and 
Fisheries 
  
                                                
28
 Committee also called Committee on Commerce. 
29
 Committee also called Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. 
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Subsystem House Committees Senate Committees 





Subcommittee on National 
Economic Growth, Natural 
Resources, and Regulatory 
Affairs 
 
Foreign Policy Committee on International 
Relations31 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Economic 
Policy, Trade and 
Environment 
Subcommittee on Human 
Rights and International 
Organizations 
Committee on Foreign Relations 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy, Export, and 
Trade Promotion 
Agricultural Committee on Agriculture  
Subcommittee on Department 
Operations, Research, and 
Foreign Agriculture 
Subcommittee on Forests, 
Family Farms, and Energy 
Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry  
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Research, 
Nutrition, and General 
Legislation 
Resources Committee on Resources 
Full Committee 




Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs  
Subcommittee on Water and 
Power Resources 
 
Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries 
Subcommittee on 
Oceanography and the Great 
Lakes 
Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Forests and 
Public Land Management 
                                                
30
 Committee also called Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. 
31
 Committee also called Committee on Foreign Affairs 
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Miscellaneous Committee on Government 
Reform 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on National 
Economic Growth, 
Natural Resources, and 
Regulatory Affairs 
Subcommittee on Energy and 
Resources 
 
Committee on Small Business 
Full Committee 
 
Joint Economic Committee 
Full Committee 
Committee on Appropriations 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs 
Appropriations 
 
Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation 
Subcommittee on the Consumer 
 








Subsystem House Committees Senate Committees 
Agricultural Committee on Agriculture  
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Resource 
Conservation, Research, 
and Forestry 
Subcommittee on Conservation, 
Credit, Rural Development, 
and Research 
Subcommittee on Livestock, 
Dairy, and Poultry 
Subcommittee on Department 
Operations, Research, and 
Foreign Agriculture 
Subcommittee on Risk 
Management, Research, and 
Specialty Crops 
Subcommittee on Department 
Operations, Research, and 
Foreign Agriculture 
Subcommittee on Department 
Operations, Oversight, 
Nutrition, and Forestry 
Subcommittee on Forests, 
Family Farms, and Energy 
Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry  
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Research, 
Nutrition, and General 
Legislation 
Subcommittee on Agricultural 
Research and General 
Legislation 
Subcommittee on Conservation 
and Forestry 
Science Committee on Science32 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Science, 
Research, and Technology 
Subcommittee on Basic 
Research 
Subcommittee on Research 
Subcommittee on Natural 
Resources, Agriculture 
Research and Environment 
Subcommittee on Investigations 
and Oversight 
Subcommittee on International 
Scientific Cooperation 
Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Science, 
Technology, and Space 
  
                                                
32




Subsystem House Committees Senate Committees 
Science (cont’) Committee on Science (cont’)33 
Subcommittee on Energy 
Subcommittee on Energy and 
Environment 
Technology Policy Task Force 
Subcommittee on Technology 
and Competitiveness 
Subcommittee on Technology, 
Environment, and Aviation 
Subcommittee on Technology 
Science Policy Task Force 
Subcommittee on Environment 
 
Health Committee on Energy and 
Commerce34 
Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment 
Subcommittee on Health 
Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer 
Protection 
Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and 
Pensions35 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Public Health 
and Safety 
Subcommittee on Public Health 
Subcommittee on Health 




Committee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Departments of 
Labor, Health and Human 
Services, Education, and 
Related Agencies 
 
Special Committee on Aging 
Full Committee 
  
                                                
33
 Committee also called Committee on Science and Technology and Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology 
34
 Committee also called Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and Committee on 
Commerce.  
35
 Committee also called Committee on Labor and Human Resources 
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Subsystem House Committees Senate Committees 
Judiciary Committee on the Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Crime 
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice 
Subcommittee on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and 
the Administration of 
Justice 
Subcommittee on Intellectual 
Property and Judicial 
Administration 
Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property 
Committee on the Judiciary 
Full Committee 
Subcommittee on Patents, 
Copyrights, and Trademarks 
Subcommittee on Technology and 
the Law 
Subcommittee on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure 
Environmental Committee on Energy and 
Commerce36 
Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment 
Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations 
Subcommittee on Environment 
and Public Works 
Subcommittee on Toxic 
Substances and 
Environmental Oversight 
Subcommittee on Hazardous 
Wastes and Toxic Substances 
Economic 
Promotion 
Committee on Small Business 
Subcommittee on Regulation 
and Business Opportunities 
Subcommittee on Regulation, 
Business, Opportunities, 
and Energy 
Subcommittee on Rural 
Enterprises, Agriculture, 
and Technology 
Subcommittee on Energy and 
Agriculture 
 
Joint Economic Committee 
Full Committee 
Committee on Small Business 
Full Committee 
Joint Economic Committee 
Full Committee 
  
                                                
36




Subsystem House Committees Senate Committees 









Committee on Government 
Reform37 
Subcommittee on Government 
Information, Justice, and 
Agriculture 
Subcommittee on Human 
Resources and 
Intergovernmental Relations 
Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources 
 
Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries 
Subcommittee on Oceanography 
Subcommittee on 
Oceanography, Gulf of Mexico, 
and the Outer Continental Shelf 
Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources 
Subcommittee on Energy 
Research and Development 
 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy, Export, and 
Trade Promotion 
 





                                                
37
 Committee also called Committee on Government Operations. 
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1) Arguments/evidence that tobacco use diminishes health risks  
2) Arguments/evidence of the tobacco industry’s focus on providing healthier/safer 
tobacco products (i.e. low tar/low nicotine cigarettes, little cigars, 
etc.)/diminishing the health/safety risks of tobacco products 
3) Lack of evidence that tobacco use causes certain helth 
problems/diseases/cancers 
4) Opposition to health taxes on tobacco products 
5) Alternative explanations for lung cancer/other diseases other than tobacco use 
6) Criticism of reports stating harmful effects of second-hand smoke 
7) Alternative explanations for health problems commonly attributed to second-
hand smoke 
8) Opposition to permitting liability suits against tobacco companies related to the 
harm caused by using tobacco products/deceptive information concerning health 
effects on tobacco products/advertisements 
9) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks of tobacco use when mixed with 
other drugs/products/etc. 
10) Refutation of arguments/evidence of damages caused by cigarette-oriented fires  
11) Lack of need for/disputed feasibility of improvements in cigarettes to reduce the 
risk of cigarette-oriented fires 
12) Opposition to denying compensation to veterans for tobacco related diseases 
13) Arguments/evidence of the tobacco industry’s commitent to uncovering the 
true health effects of tobacco use 
14) Arguments/evidence that the government has purposefully withheld information 
citing the lack of evidence that tobacco use leads to health problems 
15) Arguments/evidence that tobacco is healthier than other alternative recreational 
products/drugs (i.e. marijuana, alcohol, etc.)  
16) Refutation of arguments/evidence of the health care/oth r monetary costs of 
tobacco use 
17) Arguments/evidence that individuals are personally responsible for their own 
tobacco use and not tobacco companies 
 
B) General Regulatory Issues 
1) Opposition to more stringent regulation of tobacco pr ducts/Opposition to 
stricter penalties for disobeying regulations 
2) Support for more lenient regulation of tobacco products 
3) Opposition to/lack of need for federal cigarette testing programs 
4) Opposition to regulation of tobacco products by a federal regulatory body 
5) Opposition to regulating tobacco as a drug 
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6) Opposition to the establishment of mandatory cigarette fire safety standards 
without forming a commission to study the feasibility of manufacturing self-
extinguishing cigarettes  
7) Opposition to regulating all tobacco products like cigarettes 
8) Opposition to allowing states to regulate tobacco products more stringently than 
the federal government 
 
C) Regulation of Tobacco Use 
1) Opposition to/lack of need for government-funded programs/research to 
decrease tobacco use 
2) Opposition to efforts to restrict smoking to certain designated areas in public 
areas (i.e. federal buildings, parks, etc.)  
3) Arguments/evidence that forcing people to smoke in designated areas will hurt 
worker productivity 
4) Arguments/evidence that forcing people to smoke in designated areas will hurt 
businesses/attendance at club meetings 
5) Failures of past efforts to limit smoking to designated areas 
6) Opposition to ban on smoking on airplanes 
7) Opposition to government programs to reduce tobacco use by youths 
8) Arguments/evidence of the ineffectiveness of regulations/taxes in curbing 
tobacco use 
9) Arguments/evidence of the religious uses of tobacco products 
10) Arguments/evidence of efforts by the tobacco industry to reduce tobacco use 
among youths 
 
D) Regulation of Tobacco Sales 
1) Arguments/evidence of tobacco industry’s ability to self-regulate/voluntarily 
comply with regulations 
2) Opposition to government intervention in the sale of pr ducts 
3) Arguments/evidence of the dangers (economic, legal, ethical, constitutional, 
etc.) of regulation/taxes on tobacco products  
4) Opposition to federal efforts to equalize state tobacco taxes at high levels (if 
opposing because states will not have the priority to enact higher taxes, select 
Anti – D4) 
5) Opposition to ban on sale of tobacco products at particular facilities 
6) Opposition to higher excise taxes on tobacco products/expediting the collection 
of tobacco excise taxes 
7) Support for more orderly and efficient sale of tobacco 
8) Opposition to ban on cigarette sales in vending machines 
9) Lack of need for stricter regulation of cigarette sale  to youth 
10) Opposition to reversing the trend of prevalence of tobacco use by prominent 
figures (especially baseball players) 
11) Arguments/evidence that the trend of cigarette smugglin  can be attributed to 
tobacco taxes that are too high in some states 
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12) Arguments/evidence of the harmful effects of tobacco smuggling on the tobacco 
industry 
13) Arguments/evidence that states with high taxes should enforce these policies on 
their own 
14) Support for lower excise taxes on tobacco products 
15) Refutation of arguments/evidence of the tobacco industry’s intention to 
circumvent the tobacco regulation process 
 
E) Advertising 
1) Support for advertising regulation favorable to tobacco industry 
2) Opposition to stricter regulations/bans on advertising of tobacco products 
3) Arguments/evidence that tobacco companies do not attract young people 
4) Defense of tobacco industry advertising practices 
5) Concerns about restrictions on tobacco advertising 
6) Arguments/evidence that tobacco advertisements only encourage brand 
switching and do not attract new tobacco users 
7) Arguments/evidence that 1st amendment rights are violated by restricting 
tobacco advertising 
8) Refutation of claims that tobacco advertisements target particular subsets of the 
population (women, minorities, youths) 
9) Doubted effectiveness of banning tobacco advertisements in dampening tobacco 
use 
10) Support for allowing tobacco companies to voluntarily restrict tobacco 
advertisements 
11) Arguments/evidence that broadcasters can self-regulate tobacco advertising 
12) Opposition to increased funding for anti-tobacco advertisements 
13) Support for efforts to reduce funding for anti-tobacco advertisements 
14) Opposition to disallowing business expense deductions f r tobacco products 
advertising 
15) Arguments/evidence of the dangers (economic, legal, etc.) of regulation/bans on 
advertising of tobacco products 
16) Refutation of arguments/evidence that pro-tobacco advertisements are more 
prevalent than anti-tobacco advertisements 
 
F) Addiction/Tar and Nicotine Content 
1) Lack of evidence of tar and nicotine content’s harmful effects on health 
2) Opposition to/doubted effectiveness of government standards regulating the tar 
and nicotine content of cigarettes 
3) Effectiveness of cigarette filters in decreasing inhalation of smoke and tar 
4) Arguments that tobacco products are not addictive substances 
5) Arguments/evidence of the distinction between addiction and drug abuse 
6) Opposition to requirements to list tar and nicotine content (along with other 
ingredients) on tobacco products 
7) Opposition to classifying nicotine as a drug 
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8) Refutation of claims that the tobacco industry manipulates nicotine levels in 
tobacco products to ensure their products remain addictive 
9) Refutation of claims that U.S. tobacco companies’ use of graduated nicotine 
levels to promote initial use of snuff and progression to increasingly potent 
brands 
10) Arguments/evidence of the accuracy of tobacco industry’s own tests measuring 
tar and nicotine content of cigarettes 
 
G) Educating Public about Tobacco Risks 
1) Opposition to hazard labels on tobacco products/advertisements 
2) Arguments that the public is already aware of risks of tobacco use 
3) Disputed value of hazard labels as an effective detrr nt to tobacco use 
4) Criticism of assumptions underlying warning label rotation system 
5) Problems with cigarette manufacturers implementing the rotating hazard label 
system 
6) Opposition to anti-tobacco education campaigns 
7) Opposition to placing hazard labels concerning tobacco use on other products 
(i.e. contraceptives, drugs, etc.) 
8) Arguments/evidence of the harm done to the tobacco industry by opponents of 
tobacco industry exaggerating its risks to the public/concerns that opponents of 
the tobacco industry are given disproportionate time to express their views in 
public forums (i.e. congressional hearings) 
9) Arguments/evidence of the need to educate the public a out the benefits of the 
tobacco industry 
10) Concerns that anti-tobacco education programs will exaggerate risks of tobacco 
use and under-emphasize risks of other products (i.e. drug use, alcohol use, etc.)  
11) Arguments/evidence of the difficulty of tobacco companies in complying with 
hazard label regulations  
12) Refutation of arguments/evidence that tobacco companies deliberately attempt 
to suppress information about the harmful effects of tobacco use 
 
H) Pesticide Use 
1) Support and defense of use of pesticides on tobacco products 
2) Support for regulatory approval of pesticide use on tobacco products 
3) Support for applying pesticide standards applicable to U.S. tobacco farmers to 
crops imported into the U.S. in order to prevent unfair competition to U.S. 
tobacco farmers 
 
I)  Insurance 
1) Opposition to insurance industry practice of charging lower rates for individuals 
who do not use tobacco products 
2) Support for tobacco company takeover of insurance companies 




J) International Tobacco Market 
1) Importance of foreign trade of tobacco products to the U.S. economy 
2) Support for U.S. export of tobacco products 
3) Support for reinstatement and extension of the tobacco barter program 
4) Support for expanding U.S. tobacco export markets 
5) Support for efforts to make U.S. tobacco more competitiv  in the international 
market 
6) Opposition to bringing in cheap tobacco from other countries (if the reason for 
this opposition is to protect the American tobacco gr wer and strengthen the 
U.S. tobacco industry) 
7) Support for subsidies to tobacco farmers who export tobacco to other countries 
regardless of participation in acreage/poundage allotment programs 
8) Opposition to/dangers of stricter trade barriers on tobacco products 
9) Support for/benefits of breaking down trade barriers on tobacco 
products/sanctioning other countries that do not encourage free trade of tobacco 
10) Arguments/evidence that the tobacco barter program w s inappropriately 
suspended without proper notice to tobacco farmers 
11) Statement of benefits of tobacco barter program 
12) Support for increased Federal export credit and assist nce for tobacco 
13) Support for USDA enforcement of tobacco seed export con rol programs 
14) Arguments/evidence that tobacco farmers are not trea ed fairly under export 
credit and assistance programs 
15) Support for tobacco export policies that protect tobacco growers  
 
K)  Federal Tobacco Support Programs (i.e. Tobacco Price Support/Marketing 
Quota/Acreage Allotment System/etc.) 
1) Support for/need for policies that set prices/quotas at levels that are best for 
increasing the sale of tobacco   
2) Arguments/evidence of the economic importance of the tobacco price 
support/control and acreage/poundage allotment programs 
3) Support for federal government funding/support of  the tobacco industry/tobacco 
industry promotion research/agreements with the tobacco industry 
4) Support for leasing/selling of acreage/poundage marketing quota policies that 
provide the most benefits to tobacco farmers (need to look at the intent behind 
supporting the policy not opposition/support for the policy itself) 
5) Concerns that price levels/quotas are not being set at a level that is best for 
increasing the sale of tobacco 
6) Arguments/evidence that price support system and tobacco grading systems are 
of little to no cost to taxpayers/Arguments/evidenc of the revenues generated 
by taxes paid by the tobacco industry 
7) Support for allowing tobacco farmers to have control over the tobacco program 
8) Opposition to giving non-farmers/non-quota farms the ability to buy and lease 
tobacco allotments  
9) Support for governmental support to tobacco farmers hit by disasters 




11) Support for stabilization of support levels for tobacco against disruptive 
fluctuations 
12) Support for auction and grading systems that make selling tobacco easier for 
tobacco farmers 
13) Support for adjustments in acreage/poundage/pricing system to help farmers 
who were victims of circumstances beyond their control 
14) Support for compensating tobacco farmers if quota and price support program is 
eliminated 
15) Arguments/evidence that tobacco producers are paying a disproportionate 
amount into the tobacco price support system compared to the federal 
government 
16) Support for educating legislators about the need to support the tobacco 
allotment/quota programs 
17) Arguments/evidence of the need for federal policy to assist tobacco 
industry/farmers in price 
control/overproduction/underproduction/conservation/inflation/etc. problems 
18) Support for protecting small farmers from harms of certain price control 
programs 
19) Concerns about the harms to the tobacco industry/tobacco farmers of 
proposed/enacted changes to tobacco support programs (i.e. liberalizing the 
tobacco leasing/selling system, allowing the sell/leasing of tobacco 
allotments/quotas, changing the length of time for selling tobacco, changing 
price support formula, only allowing tobacco farmers to sell and lease tobacco 
allotments, etc.) 
20) Arguments/evidence of the importance of the tobacco grading system to the 
tobacco industry 
21) Support for increasing the pay of tobacco graders to improve the process for 
tobacco farmers 
22) Support for changes in the administration of tobacco quota/price support 
programs with the intent of improving the process for tobacco farmers 
23) Support for improving tobacco storage programs for farmers 
24) Support for giving farmers more authority in determining changes to tobacco 
price support/allotment/quota system 
25) Support for maintaining the integrity of the price support system 
26) Opposition to price supports/quota policies that are likely to hurt the tobacco 
industry 
27) Refutation of arguments/evidence that high tobacco prices can be blamed on 
tobacco growers 
28) Opposition to increasing tobacco marketing quotas in light of concerns that 
tobacco farmers may not be able to meet these quotas  
29) Support for/need for policies that set prices/quotas at levels that are best for 
meeting the needs of tobacco growers 
30) Support for/need for tobacco marketing policies/technologies that are best for 
meeting needs of tobacco growers 




32) Support for changes in the tobacco price support prgram to protect it from 
being eliminated 
33) Arguments/evidence of the need for tobacco proponents to unite to defend 
against the threat posed by opponents of the tobacc industry 
34) Support for lowering the cost burdens of tobacco farmers (i.e. lowering the price 
of tobacco allotments, assisting in lowering the price of supplies for tobacco 
farmers, reducing/eliminating the fee for graders to tamp no grade on tobacco 
products not subject to price supports, etc.) 
35) Support for penalizing those who tamper with tobacco rops 
36) Arguments/evidence that the tobacco price support/quo a system should be 
ended/significantly changed due to the harm the program is doing to the tobacco 
industry 
 
L)  Tobacco Settlement Agreement/Litigation 
1) Feared adverse impact (i.e. loss of income, loss of tobacco quota equity, and loss 
of equipment value) on tobacco producers if tobacco settlement agreement 
becomes law 
2) Adverse impact on tobacco industry/producers of tobacco settlement agreement 
3) Unfairness of tobacco settlement agreement to small vending machine 
companies 
4) Unfairness of tobacco settlement agreement to smokeless tobacco manufacturers 
and other small manufacturers of tobacco products 
5) Support for provisions in tobacco settlement agreement that provided tobacco 
companies with immunity from punitive damages for past actions and with 
immunity from future class action lawsuits 
6) Burdensome impact on convenience stores of tobacco settlement agreement 
provisions 
7) Criticism of tobacco settlement agreement for being too strict on tobacco 
companies 
8) Opposition to provisions in tobacco settlement agreem nt that required tobacco 
companies to pay for anti-smoking programs 
9) Support for compensating tobacco producers and farmers for adverse impact of 
tobacco settlement program 
10) Opposition to provisions in tobacco settlement program requiring tobacco 
companies to pay penalties if declines in youth smoking are not realized 
11) Opposition to requiring that attorney fees be paid by tobacco companies/support 
for allowing money from tobacco settlement agreements to be used to pay for 
attorney fees 
12) Arguments/evidence stating harmful effects of tobacco settlement agreement on 
Native Americans 
13) Opposition to government-sponsored litigation against tobacco industry 
14) Defense of antitrust exemption provisions in tobacco settlement in order to 
protect tobacco companies from suits 
 
M)  Economic Issues 
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1. Statement of information on tobacco policy without any conclusive findings or 
recommendations  
2. Description of information concerning tobacco use/advertising/etc. without any 
conclusive findings or recommendations 
3. Quest for more information about tobacco policy 
4. Statement of both sides in tobacco debate without taking a side in the debate 
5. Support /opposition for legislation to increase enforcement of tobacco smuggling 
(need to look at intent behind support of legislation) 
6. Arguments/evidence that tobacco smuggling can be attributed to disparities in taxes 
between states without taking a position on whether taxes being too high or too low 
are to blame 
7. Information about organized crime’s role in cigarette smuggling 
8. Support for encouraging the development of healthier tobacco products (If the 
tobacco industry is talking about how they have alrady made healthier products, 
Pro – A2 is more appropriate) 
9. Description of cigarette smuggling problem 
10. Support for the establishment of cigarette fire safety standards while agreeing to 
form a commission to study the feasibility of manufacturing self-extinguishing 
cigarettes 
11. Support for increasing tobacco excise taxes to pay for tobacco support program in 
order to keep the program alive/assist tobacco farmers 
12. Support for giving cigarette companies more discretion in complying with hazard 
label requirements 
13. Opinions on where revenues for increased excise taxes of tobacco products ought to 
be spent if it is necessary to increase excise taxes while still opposing excise taxes 
on tobacco products 
14. Support for applying pesticide standards applicable to U.S. tobacco farmers to crops 
imported into the U.S. without giving a reason for support  
15. Defense of a pesticide product without any opinion on the tobacco industry 
16. Support for phasing out the sale of tobacco in some VA facilities while allowing the 
sale of tobacco in other VA facilities  
17. Support for policies that are unanimously opposed by to acco farmers but are 
proposed in the interests of the tobacco industry as a whole 
18. Support for voluntary/market-based solutions to tobacco health problems while 
recognizing the health problems of tobacco use 
19. Support for compromise between tobacco companies and health advocates in 
settling tobacco-related litigation 
20. Debate over whether federal or state governments should receive benefits of tobacco 
settlement agreement  
21. Need for/support for compromise between tobacco companies and public health 
advocates in order to reduce tobacco use 






1) Arguments/evidence of health hazards of tobacco products 
2) Arguments/evidence of harmful effects of carbon monoxide in cigarettes 
3) Support for health taxes on tobacco products 
4) Arguments/evidence of dental problems related to tobacco use 
5) Support for permitting liability suits against tobacco companies related to health 
effects  caused by using tobacco products/deceptive information concerning 
health effects on tobacco products/advertisements 
6) Concerns about misleading information/marketing of supposedly healthier (i.e. 
low tar/low nicotine cigarettes, little cigars, smokeless tobacco, etc.) tobacco 
products 
7) Arguments/evidence of harmful effects of second-hand smoke 
8) Arguments/evidence of respiratory infections amongst children attributable to 
second-hand smoke 
9) Arguments/evidence stating risks of tobacco use when mixed with other 
drugs/products/etc. 
10) Arguments/evidence of damages caused by cigarette-oriented fires  
11) Need for/feasibility of improvements in cigarettes o reduce the risk of cigarette-
oriented fires 
12) Support for denying compensation to veterans for tobacco related diseases 
13) Concerns about misleading information presented by to acco advocates 
concerning the safety of tobacco products  
14) Arguments/evidence of the health care/other monetary costs of tobacco use 
15) Arguments/evidence that tobacco use leads to use of other more harmful 
drugs/recreational substances 
16) Refutation of arguments/evidence of the tobacco industry’s focus on providing 
healthier/safer tobacco products (i.e. low tar/low nicotine cigarettes, little cigars, 
etc.)/diminishing the health/safety risks of tobacco products 
 
B) General Regulatory Issues 
1) Support for/need for/feasibility of federal cigarette esting programs 
2) Support for more stringent regulation of tobacco prducts 
3) Opposition to more lenient regulation of tobacco prducts 
4) Support for regulation of tobacco products by a federal regulatory body 
5) Support for regulating tobacco as a drug 
6) Support for/need for the establishment of cigarette fire safety standards without 
forming a commission to study the feasibility of manufacturing self-
extinguishing cigarettes 
7) Support for regulating all/more tobacco products like cigarettes 
8) Arguments/evidence that tobacco regulations are more lenient in the U.S. than in 
other countries (basically an argument that says tobacco companies should not 
be complaining about how stringent tobacco laws are in the U.S.) 
9) Support for/need for more stringent enforcement of tobacco regulations 
10) Support for allowing states to regulate tobacco products more stringently than 




C) Regulation of Tobacco Use 
1) Support for government-funded programs/research to reduce tobacco use 
2) Support for/importance of efforts to reduce use of tobacco products 
3) Support for efforts to restrict smoking to certain designated areas in public 
facilities (i.e. federal buildings, parks, etc.)  
4) Successes of part efforts to restrict smoking to designated areas 
5) Support for ban on smoking in airplanes 
6) Arguments/evidence of safety risks of smoking on airpl nes 
7) Support for reversing the trend of prevalence of tobacco use by prominent 
figures (especially baseball players) 
8) Support for programs to reduce tobacco use by youths 
9) Arguments/evidence of high use of tobacco products amongst youths 
10) Support for providing incentives to individuals/businesses/etc. that take 
measures to discourage tobacco use 
 
D) Regulation of Tobacco Sales 
1) Support for federal efforts to equalize state tobacco taxes at high levels 
2) Support for ban on sale of tobacco products at particular facilities 
3) Support for stricter regulation of cigarette sales to youth 
4) Support for/benefits of increasing excise taxes on tobacco products/expediting 
the collection of excise taxes on tobacco products (unless the reason for 
increasing excise taxes is to save the tobacco program, in which case select 
Neutral – 12) 
5) Arguments/evidence that the trend of cigarette smugglin  can be attributed to 
tobacco taxes that are too low in some states 
6) Arguments/evidence that tobacco smuggling causes states to lose their rightful 
tax revenue 
7) Arguments/evidence of the tobacco industry’s intention o circumvent the 
tobacco regulation process 
8) Refutation of  arguments/evidence of the dangers (economic, legal, ethical, 
constitutional, etc.) of regulation/taxes on tobacco products  
9) Support for ban on cigarette sales in vending machines 




1) Support for stricter regulations/bans on advertising of tobacco products 
2) Opposition to more lenient regulations on advertising of tobacco products 
3) Arguments/evidence of growth of tobacco use among particular subsets of the 
population (women, minorities, youths) 
4) Support for increased funding/increased advertising pace/time for anti-tobacco 
advertisements 
5) Opposition to efforts to reduce funding for anti-tobacco advertisements 
6) Arguments/evidence of effectiveness of anti-tobacco advertisements 
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7) Support for disallowing business expense deductions f r tobacco products 
advertising 
8) Arguments/evidence that tobacco advertisements are effective in attracting new 
customers to use tobacco 
9) Refutation of claims that tobacco advertisements only e courage brand 
switching and do not attract new customers to use tobacco 
10) Arguments/evidence that tobacco advertisements target particular subsets of the 
population (women, minorities, youths) 
11) Refutation of claims that 1st amendment rights are violated by restricting 
tobacco advertising 
12) Arguments/evidence of effectiveness of banning tobacco advertisements on 
tobacco use 
13) Opposition to/problems with advertising/promotion of tobacco products 
14) Arguments/evidence that broadcasters/tobacco companies cannot self-regulate 
tobacco advertising 
15) Arguments/evidence that pro-tobacco advertisements are more prevalent than 
anti-tobacco advertisements 
16) Opposition to tobacco advertisements that distort scientific evidence about the 
health effects of tobacco use 
 
F) Addiction/Tar and Nicotine Content 
1) Support for/need for government to publicize tar and nicotine content (along 
with other ingredients) on tobacco products (Look at the reasoning behind this. 
If stated for health reasons, it is decidedly negative. If used to say that there is no 
reason to regulate tobacco tar and nicotine content, use in combination with A2 
for a neutral piece of testimony) 
2) Arguments/evidence of lack of effectiveness of cigarette filters in decreasing 
inhalation of smoke and tar 
3) Support for establishing government standards to regulate the tar and nicotine 
content of tobacco products 
4) Arguments/evidence of the addictive properties of tobacco 
5) Arguments/evidence of U.S. tobacco companies’ use of graduated nicotine 
levels to promote initial use of snuff and progression to increasingly potent 
brands 
6) Arguments/evidence that the tobacco industry manipulates nicotine levels in 
cigarettes to ensure their products remain addictive 
7) Support for classifying nicotine as a drug 
8) Arguments/evidence of the harmful effects of tar and nicotine content of 
cigarettes 
 
G) Educating Public about Tobacco Risks 
1) Support for/need for increased attention to education on health risks of tobacco 
products 
2) Support for warning labels on tobacco products/advertisements (including 
varying the message on the warning labels) 
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3) Arguments/evidence that the public is not sufficiently aware of risks of tobacco 
use 
4) Support for/need for/effectiveness of anti-tobacco education campaigns 
5) Support for placing hazard labels concerning tobacco use on other products (i.e. 
contraceptives, drugs, etc.) 
6) Support for government support/funding of efforts to educate the public about 
the risks of tobacco use 
7) Arguments/evidence that tobacco companies deliberately tempt to suppress 
information about the harmful effects of tobacco use
 
H) Pesticide Use 
1) Opposition to use of pesticides on tobacco products 
2) Arguments/evidence of the dangers involved with using pesticides on tobacco 
products 
3) Support for applying pesticide standards applicable to U.S. tobacco farmers to 
crops imported into the U.S. in order to discourage the sale and use of tobacco 
products 
 
I)  Insurance 
1) Support for industry practice of charging lower rates o individuals who do not 
use tobacco products 
2) Opposition to takeover of insurance companies by toacco companies 
 
J) International Tobacco Market 
1) Opposition to U.S. cigarette exports 
2) Support for suspension of the tobacco barter program 
3) Support for stricter trade barriers on tobacco products 
4) Opposition to breaking down trade barriers on tobacco products 
5) Refutation of arguments/evidence that the tobacco barter program was 
inappropriately suspended without proper notice to tobacco farmers 
6) Opposition to increased Federal export credit and assistance for tobacco 
7) Opposition to increased imports of tobacco products due to the harmful effects 
of tobacco use 
 
K)  Federal Tobacco Support Programs (i.e. Tobacco Price Support/Marketing 
Quota/Acreage Allotment System/etc.) 
1) Opposition to tobacco subsidies 
2) Arguments/evidence that tobacco support program costs money to taxpayers 
3) Opposition to federal efforts to increase tobacco production/sales (i.e. price 
support programs) 
4) Support for pricing policies/federal efforts that discourage tobacco 
production/sales 
5) Support for strict limits on/cuts to tobacco acreage/poundage allotments 
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6) Arguments/evidence that the federal government is paying a disproportionate 
amount into the tobacco price support system compared to tobacco producers 
7) Opposition to increasing the pay of tobacco graders to improve the process for 
tobacco farmers 
8) Arguments/evidence that federal funds to promote the tobacco industry diverts 
funds from anti-tobacco programs 
9) Support for using assessments paid by tobacco farmers to support the price 
support program for other purposes 
10) Opposition to federal government support/funding/agreements with tobacco 
industry 
11) Support for breaking tobacco farmers dependence on tobacco as a crop 
 
 
L)  Tobacco Settlement Agreement/Litigation 
1) Arguments that tobacco settlement agreement is overly favorable to tobacco 
industry 
2) Concerns that state tobacco settlement funds will be allocated to programs 
unrelated to tobacco use prevention 
3) Support for provisions in tobacco settlement agreement that required tobacco 
companies to pay for anti-smoking programs 
4) Opposition to compensating tobacco producers and farmers for adverse impact 
of tobacco settlement program 
5) Support for provisions in tobacco settlement program equiring tobacco 
companies to pay penalties if declines in youth smoking are not realized 
6) Support for requiring that attorney fees be paid by tobacco 
companies/opposition to allowing money from tobacco settlement agreements to 
be used to pay for attorney fees 
7) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating harmful effects of tobacco settlement 
agreement on Native Americans 
8) Inadequacy of tobacco industry payments mandated by settlement agreement 
9) Support for settlement agreement public health provisi ns 
10) Concerns about implications of agreement for current or future litigants in cases 
against the tobacco industry 
11) Support for government-sponsored litigation against tobacco industry 
12) Concerns that antitrust exemption in tobacco settlement agreement may give too 
much power to tobacco industry  
13) Support for requiring tobacco companies to disclose internal documents 
14) Support for enacting provisions preventing tobacco companies from seeking 
bankruptcy protection in order to avoid paying penalties to litigants in cases 
against tobacco industry 
 
M)  Economic Issues 









A) General Regulatory Policy 
1) Support for the precautionary principle (taking action on climate change before 
science has established that the problem is occurring) 
2) Support for stricter regulation of carbon dioxide emissions 
3) Opposition to more lenient regulation of carbon dioxide emissions 
4) Support for classifying carbon dioxide as a pollutant 
5) Support for economic penalties to discourage carbon di xide emissions 
6) Need for interagency cooperation on climate change issue
7) Criticism of climate change mitigation policies that do not go “far enough” 
8) Support for requiring federal agencies to consider th ir impact on the 
environment 
9) Support for more activity by federal agencies on the climate change issue 
10) Support for mandatory commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
11) Support for concrete greenhouse gas emission reduction goals 
12) Support for cap and trade program 
13) Evidence of state and local governments that have succe sfully enacted climate 
change mitigation measures 
14) Arguments defending the constitutionality of climate change mitigation policies 
15) Arguments/evidence that carbon sequestration (natural and manufactured) is not 
enough to mitigate climate change 
16) Need for comprehensive climate change mitigation strategy 
 
B) Agriculture/Plant Life/Natural Resources 
1) Support for natural carbon sequestration (i.e. growing more trees and increasing 
the ability of the soil to sequester carbon dioxide) as a method to control carbon 
dioxide emissions if used in combination with other activities (i.e. stricter 
regulation) or while admitting that sequestration is ot going to solve climate 
change by itself 
2) Arguments/evidence that climate change affects foodsupply 
3) Arguments/evidence of harmful effects of carbon dioxide on natural resources 
4) Arguments/evidence that climate change negatively affects agricultural 
production 
5) Arguments/evidence that climate change will have a n gative effect on plants, 
trees, and forests 
6) Arguments/evidence of negative impact of climate change on water supply 
7) Arguments/evidence of negative impact of climate change on fisheries 
8) Arguments/evidence of harmful effects of climate change on soil 
 
C) General Scientific Arguments/Evidence 
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1) Arguments/evidence that the climate is changing 
2) Arguments/evidence that climate change is caused by human activities 
3) Arguments/evidence of glacial melting 
4) Arguments/evidence that climate change reduces the ability of the ocean to 
absorb carbon dioxide 
5) Arguments/evidence of negative impact of climate change on coastal areas 
6) Arguments/evidence of connection of climate change to growth of greenhouse 
gases (particularly carbon dioxide) in the atmosphere 
7) Arguments/evidence showing the urgency of climate change mitigation 
8) Arguments/evidence of rise in sea level due to climate change 
9) Arguments/evidence of the potential negative impact of hanges in sea level due 
to climate change 
10) Strengths and relative certainty of research showing the existence of climate 
change, its harmful effects, and or its relation to anthropogenic sources 
11) Arguments/evidence that climate change will dissipate cloud cover leading to a 
positive feedback process that will increase severity of climate change 
12) Arguments/evidence of relationship between climate change and increased 
incidence of natural disasters 
13) Arguments/evidence that aerosols have dampened climate change trends, but 
will not continue to do so in the future 
14) Critique of methodology used in studies arguing climate change is not 
occurring/effects of climate change are not severe/climate change is not related 
to anthropogenic sources 
15) Arguments/evidence that solar flux will only exacerbate climate change issues 
caused by greenhouse effect 
 
D) Energy/Fuel 
1) Support for shifting from coal to alternative energy sources 
2) Support for renewable energy sources 
3) Arguments/evidence that fossil fuel use leads to climate fluctuations 
4) Feasibility of alternative non-carbon emitting fuels in replacing fossil fuels  
5) Role of insulation in reducing fossil fuel emissions 
6) Support for increasing CAFÉ fuel efficiency standards 
7) Support for imposing greenhouse gas emissions standards in automobiles 
8) Support for increasing energy efficiency standards of products 
9) Feasibility of increasing fuel efficiency of automobiles 
10) Support for more efficient lighting systems/light bul s 
11) Support for more efficient energy management in buildings 
12) Arguments/evidence that failing to mitigate climate change will lead to higher 
energy prices 
13) Arguments/evidence that climate change mitigation will lead to lower energy 
prices 
14) Arguments/evidence that climate change mitigation plicies will lead to a wider 
array of energy sources and energy independence 
15) Support for increased regulation of electricity/energy companies’ emissions 





1) Emphasis on the financial risks of ignoring climate change 
2) Arguments/evidence that climate change mitigation will not be significantly 
costly for the economy 
3) Arguments/evidence that climate change leads to political/economic instability 
4) Criticism of economic models showing high economic costs of climate change 
mitigation 
5) Arguments/evidence that economic costs of climate change mitigation will be 
reasonable 
6) Arguments/evidence of potential benefits to the economy of climate change 
mitigation 
7) Potential benefits to the economy of energy efficien y 
8) Arguments/evidence of positive impact of climate change mitigation policies on 
employment 
9) Arguments/evidence that businesses can be economically competitive while 
taking climate change mitigation measures 
 
F) Federal Funding/Support for Climate Change Research/Mitigation Programs 
1) Support for increasing funding/support for climate change mitigation programs 
2) Support for increasing funding/support for climate change research programs 
3) Support for federal support of private sector production of automobiles with 
lower greenhouse gas emissions 
4) Support for federal support/funding of renewable and clean energy technology 
research and development 
5) Support for giving National Office of Climate Change Response authority over 
climate change research 
6) Opposition to placing Department of Energy in change of climate change 
research programs 
 
G) International Climate Change Policy 
1) Support for stronger international climate change areements 
2) Need for international cooperation in climate research due to the global nature of 
climate change 
3) Arguments/evidence of harmful impact of climate change on agricultural 
production, industrialization, and economic development of developing 
countries 
4) Need for measures to encourage efficient energy use in d veloping countries 
5) Need for sustainable development for third world countries 
6) Need for U.S. leadership in reducing worldwide greenhouse gas emissions 
7) Arguments/evidence that U.S. lags behind internatiol community in climate 
change mitigation 
8) Support for assistance to developing countries in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions 




H) Need for Climate Change Research 
1) Need for more climate research to warn of the dangers of climate changes and 
mitigate its effects 
2) Importance of programs studying climate change 
3) Need for cooperation across different disciplines to address climate change 
4) Need to focus on policy-oriented climate change resarch 
 
I)  Health 







1. Statement of information on climate change without any conclusive findings 
2. Description of efforts to understand climate change without any conclusive findings 
or recommendations 
3. Support for nuclear energy, bio-fuels, and clean coal as methods to mitigate climate 
change 
4. Support for measures to encourage voluntary reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions by businesses and individuals (if to support climate change mitigation 
efforts - probably a 1; if to show that efforts to c ntrol climate change are not 
necessary - maybe a 0 or -1 depending on opinions about climate change science; if 
no opinion on climate change – probably a 0) 
5. Description of current climate change efforts without making recommendations 
6. Statement of complexity of climate change issue 
7. Support for requiring reporting measures for greenhouse gas emissions  
8. Need for more climate monitoring 
9. Evidence of businesses taking measures to mitigate climate change (if to support 
climate change mitigation efforts - probably a 1 iftrying to emphasize the 
effectiveness of voluntary measures or a 2 if admitting the science of climate change 
and not explicitly calling for voluntary measures or even calling for mandatory CO2 
emission reductions; if to show that efforts to contr l climate change are not 
necessary - maybe a 0 or -1 depending on opinions about climate change science; if 
no opinion on climate change – probably a 0) 
10. Need for more research on the ability of oceans to absorb carbon dioxide 
11. Statement of current climate change policy 
12. Arguments over which types of forestry practices should be utilized to ameliorate 
climate change 
13. Support for international climate change agreements with voluntary emission 
reduction goals 
14. Support for joint implementation programs in international climate change 
agreements 
15. Support for legislation enacting voluntary carbon sequestration programs as the sole 







A) General Regulatory Policy 
1) Opposition to the precautionary principle (taking action on climate change 
before science has established that the problem is occurring) 
2) Opposition to stricter regulation of carbon dioxide emissions 
3) Support for more lenient regulation of carbon dioxide emissions 
4) Opposition to classifying carbon dioxide as a pollutant 
5) Opposition to economic penalties to discourage carbon dioxide emissions 
6) Criticism of policies that go “too far” in attempting to mitigate climate change 
and end up hurting the economy as a result 
7) Opposition to requiring federal agencies to consider th ir impact on the 
environment 
8) Opposition to more federal activity by federal agenci s on the climate change 
issue 
9) Support for policies that emphasize the ability of the world to adapt to climate 
changes 
10) Problems with using current climate change research s a basis for policy 
changes to mitigate climate change 
11) Opposition to greenhouse gas emission reduction goals 
12) Opposition to cap and trade program 
13) Arguments/evidence of adverse impact of climate change mitigation on state and 
local governments 
14) Arguments that certain climate change mitigation policies may be 
unconstitutional 
15) Support for allowing greenhouse gas emissions to continue to rise 
 
B) Agriculture/Plant Life/Natural Resources 
1) Arguments/evidence that climate change does not affect food supply 
2) Ability of agricultural community to respond to climate changes 
3) Potential positive effects of increased greenhouse ga  emissions on plants and 
animals 
4) Arguments/evidence of adverse impact of mandatory greenhouse gas emissions 
standards on agriculture industry 
5) Arguments/evidence that natural carbon sequestration ctivities will solve the 
climate change problem on their own 
 
C) General Scientific Arguments/Evidence 
1) Arguments/evidence that climate change is not a significant problem 
2) Arguments/evidence that climate change is beneficial to the world 
3) Arguments/evidence that climate change is not caused by anthropogenic sources 
4) Arguments/evidence that solar energy flux is the prima y reason for fluctuations 
in global temperatures and this flux will only be temporary 
5) Arguments/evidence that the climate is not changing 




7) Refutation of arguments/evidence that climate change reduces the ability of the 
ocean to absorb carbon dioxide 
8) Refutation of arguments/evidence connecting climate change to growth of 
greenhouse gases (particularly carbon dioxide) in the atmosphere 
9) Arguments/evidence that climate change is a gradual problem that does not 
require immediate attention 
10) Critique of research finding evidence of climate change/harmful effects of 
climate change/climate change being related to anthropogenic sources 
11) Critique of methodology used in studies arguing climate change is 
occurring/effects of climate change are severe/climate change is related to 
anthropogenic sources 
12) Arguments/evidence of the ability of the world and its technology (particularly 
through the use of carbon sequestration practices and technology) to adapt to 
climate changes 
13) Arguments/evidence that climate change will have no ffect on cloud cover or 
may actually produce clouds that will lessen the severity of climate changes  
14) Refutation of arguments/evidence of rise in sea level due to climate change 
15) Refutation of arguments/evidence of the potential negative impact of changes in 
sea level due to climate change 
16) Refutation of arguments/evidence of relationship betwe n climate change and 
increased incidence of natural disasters 
 
D) Energy/Fuel 
1) Arguments/evidence that fuel efficiency standards have a constraining effect on 
the economy 
2) Difficulties of increasing fuel efficiency standards of automobiles 
3) Difficulties of replacing fossil fuels with non-carbon alternative energy sources 
4) Arguments/evidence that climate change mitigation will lead to higher energy 
prices 
5) Arguments/evidence of negative impact of climate change mitigation policies on 
energy companies 
6) Arguments/evidence that climate change mitigation plicies will limit U.S. 
electricity/energy supply 
7) Arguments/evidence of negative impact of climate change mitigation policies on 
automotive industry 
8) Arguments/evidence of negative impact of climate change mitigation policies on 
transportation industry   
 
E) Economy 
1) Arguments/evidence that businesses do not need to be influenced by economic 
penalties to voluntarily undertake climate change mitigation measures 
2) Arguments/evidence that economic costs of climate change mitigation will be 
high 




4) Arguments/evidence of economic benefits of climate change 
5) Arguments/evidence of adverse economic effects of mandatory greenhouse gas 
emissions standards 
6) Arguments/evidence of anticipated negative effects of mandatory greenhouse 
gas emissions standards on small businesses 
7) Arguments/evidence of adverse impact of climate change mitigation on 
consumers 
8) Arguments/evidence of climate change mitigation policies on employment 
9) Arguments/evidence of negative impact of climate change mitigation policies on 
steel industry  
10) Arguments/evidence of negative impact of climate change mitigation policies on 
construction industry   
11) Arguments/evidence of negative impact of climate change mitigation policies on 
paper industry  
 
F) Federal Funding/Support for Climate Change Research/Mitigation Programs 
1) Opposition to increased funding of for climate programs 
2) Support for placing Department of Energy in charge of climate change research 
programs 
3) Opposition to placing National Office of Climate Change Response in charge of 
climate change research programs 
 
G) International Climate Change Policy 
1) Opposition to international climate change agreements imposing mandatory 
greenhouse gas emissions standards 
2) Lack of need to cooperate with international community on climate change issue 
3) Need for other countries (particularly third world countries) to agree to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in order for U.S. to agree to mandatory reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions 
4) Opposition to binding emissions targets for developd countries (i.e. the U.S.) 
5) Opposition to non-binding emissions targets for developing countries 
6) National security concerns involved with agreeing to international 
environmental agreements with mandatory greenhouse ga  mission standards 
on some countries but not others 
7) Arguments/evidence of the inability of the U.S. to reduce carbon emissions to 
specified caps set out in international climate change agreements 
 
H) Need for Climate Change Research 
1) Need for more climate research to ensure that there d finitely is a problem 
before taking action 
2) Lack of need to focus on policy-oriented climate change research 
 
I)  Health 
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A) Agricultural Biotechnology/Genetically Modified Organisms 
1) Arguments/evidence of safety of GMO consumption 
2) Opposition to stricter regulation of agricultural biotechnology 
research/applications/GMO’s/food products 
3) Support for more lenient/more flexible regulation of agricultural biotechnology 
research/applications/GMO’s/food products 
4) Ability of agricultural biotechnology to alleviate hunger in poor communities 
5) Support for federal funding/support of agricultural biotechnology research 
6) Need for/support for more manpower/training for agricultural biotechnology 
research 
7) Benefits (agricultural, health, medical, scientific, e onomic, etc.) of agricultural 
biotechnology research/applications/GMO’s/food products 
8) Support for improving U.S. competitiveness in interational GMO/agricultural 
biotechnology market 
9) Opposition to international agreements regulating GMO’s 
10) Support for more lenient trade barriers on GMO’s 
11) Opposition to stricter trade barriers on GMO’s 
12) Arguments/evidence that biotechnology is superior to/safer than other methods 
for improving the agricultural industry 
13) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating problems and risks (ethical, 
environmental, health, scientific, economic, etc.) associated with 
GMO’s/agricultural biotechnology research/food products 
14) Need to/support for overcoming barriers to agricultural biotechnology research 
and development 
15) Support for private sector support/investment in agricultural biotechnology 
research and development 
16) Opposition to bans on GMO’s/agricultural biotechnology research/food products 
17) Arguments/evidence that agricultural biotechnology research and development 
will reduce harm to the environment  
18) Need to/support for dissemination of biotechnology research and applications  
19) Arguments/evidence that genetically modified organisms must be released into 
the environment to test their effects 
20) Arguments/evidence of the potential of biotechnology research and development 
to decrease agricultural surpluses by allowing farmers to engineer new products 
out of plants and crops 
21) Refutation of arguments/evidence that that biotechnology research will hurt the 
agricultural industry 
22) Need for/support for more basic research in agricultural biotechnology  
23) Arguments/evidence stating benefits (agricultural, health, economic, etc.) of 
plant genome project 
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24) Support for federal funding/support of plant genome project 
25) Opposition to requiring the placement of labels on agricultural products 
produced by biotechnology methods 
26) Arguments/evidence of the harm done to the agricultural biotechnology industry 
by groups exaggerating the risks associated with GMO’s/agricultural 
biotechnology research/food products 
27) Support for GMO’s/agricultural biotechnology research/food products 
28) Opposition to classifying biotechnology products as plant pesticides for 
regulatory purposes 
29) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks of deliberately introducing 
GMO’s into the environment 
 
B) Cloning 
1) Potential benefits (scientific, medical, etc.) of human reproductive cloning 
2) Importance of using cloning to produce embryonic stem cells to use in medical 
research 
3) Criticism of arguments that biotechnology research will lead to human 
reproductive cloning 
4) Criticism of arguments that cloning of other species/therapeutic cloning will 
lead to reproductive cloning of humans  
5) Arguments/evidence of potential benefits (medical, scientific, societal, 
agricultural, etc.) of general cloning (i.e. therapeutic cloning) 
6) Opposition to cuts/total ban on public funding of human reproductive cloning 
research 
7) Support for increases in public funding of human reproductive cloning research 
8) Opposition to ban on human reproductive cloning research 
9) Arguments/evidence of ability of scientists to voluntarily refrain from human 
reproductive cloning research 
10) Arguments/evidence that the risks of cloning are ovrstated 
11) Support for increases in public funding for general cloning research 
12) Opposition to ban on general cloning research 
13) Opposition to strict governmental guidelines/regulations governing cloning 
research 
14) Opposition to permanent ban on cloning research and development  
15) Support for cloning of human embryos 
16) Refutation of ethical and religious arguments against human cloning/refutation 
of arguments/evidence stating safety risks of human reproductive cloning 
17) Benefits (medical, scientific, societal, agricultural, etc.) of cloning human 
embryos 
18) Opposition to ban on cloning human embryos 
19) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks of cl ning human embryos 
20) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks of general cloning research 
21) Support for human reproductive cloning research and development 
22) Support for general cloning research and development 




24) Arguments/evidence that human embryo cloning is not synonymous with human 
reproductive cloning  
 
C) Stem Cell Research 
1) Support for stem cell research and the practical use of tem cells 
2) Benefits (medical, scientific, agricultural, etc.) of stem cell research 
3) Opposition to ban on/cuts in government funding/support of stem cell research 
4) Support for embryonic stem cell research  
5) Arguments/evidence that stem cell research will not lead to human cloning 
6) Need to use embryonic stem cells in stem cell reseach 
7) Support for/need for more federally approved cell lines for embryonic stem cell 
research (i.e. existing stem cells have been contami ated with mouse feeder 
cells) 
8) Arguments/evidence of the benefits of using excess in vitro fertilization embryos 
for stem cell research (i.e. the embryos will be destroyed and not put to use if 
they are not used)  
9) Opposition to ban on human embryonic/stem cell research and development 
10) Refutation of arguments/evidence that the benefits o  human embryonic stem 
cell research and development can be more effectively/ethically achieved 
through other methods (i.e. limiting stem cell research and development to the 
study of adult stem cells) 
11) Arguments/evidence that stem cell research does not fall under the ban on 
human embryo research 
12) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating the risks of/ethical arguments against 
stem cell research 
13) Support for government funding/support of stem cellresearch 
14) Arguments/evidence that proper safeguards have been/can be instituted to 
ameliorate risks of stem cell research 
15) Support for lifting funding ban on human embryo research in order to allow for 
federal funding of stem cell research 
16) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating problems and risks (ethical, religious, 
medical, scientific, legal, etc.) related to using human embryos in stem cell 
research 
17) Benefits (medical, scientific, agricultural, etc.) of using human embryos in stem 
cell research 
18) Ethical problems with not supporting stem cell research 
19) Support for government funding/support of general stem cell research 
20)  Support for the deliberate creation of embryos for research purposes 
21) Support for government funding/support of human embryonic stem cell research 
 
D) Industrial Biotechnology Research 
1) Support for industrial biotechnology research and applications 
2) Benefits/practical uses (medical, commercial, scientif c, environmental, etc.) of 
industrial biotechnology research 
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3) Support for making U.S. more competitive in international industrial 
biotechnology market 
4) Support for federal funding/support of industrial biotechnology research 
 
E) Tissue Research 
1) Support for human tissue research 
2) Benefits (scientific, medical, etc.) of human tissue research 
3) Support for federal funding/support of human tissue research 
4) Potential/realized medical benefits of fetal tissue transplantation research 
5) Support for public funding/support of fetal tissue transplantation research 
6) Opposition to decreased public funding/ban on public funding of fetal tissue 
transplantation research 
7) Ethical problems with not supporting fetal tissue transplantation research 
8) Criticism of arguments that express ethical problems associated with fetal 
transplantation research (i.e. research will encourage women to get abortions, 
claims of the sanctity of the lives of unborn fetuss, etc.) 
9) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks of fetal tissue transplantation 
research 
10) Arguments/evidence that proper safeguards have been/can be instituted to guard 
against risks of fetal tissue transplantation research 
11) Arguments/evidence stating risks of not funding fetal tissue transplantation 
research 
12) Arguments/evidence that fetal tissue transplantation research provides uniquely 
superior medical benefits than alternative methods 
13) Opposition to ban on fetal tissue transplantation research 
 
F) Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer Research 
1) Support for somatic cell nuclear transfer research 
2) Benefits (scientific, medical, ethical, etc.) of somatic cell nuclear transfer 
research 
3) Support for federal funding/support of somatic cell nuclear transfer research 
4) Opposition to bans on somatic cell nuclear transfer research and development 
5) Arguments/evidence that somatic cell nuclear transfer research and development 
is not synonymous with human cloning/will not necessarily lead to human 
cloning 
6) Refutation of arguments/evidence that benefits of somatic cell nuclear transfer 
research and development can be more effectively/ethically achieved by other 
means 
7) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks and dangers of somatic cell 
nuclear transfer research 
8) Arguments/evidence that proper safeguards have been/can be instituted to guard 
against risks of somatic cell nuclear transfer research and development 
 
G) Economic/Commercialization Issues 
1) Support for making biotechnology products more accessible to the public 
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2) Arguments/evidence of importance of biotechnology research and development 
to economic development 
3) Support for making U.S. more competitive in international biotechnology 
market 
4) Support for commercialization of biotechnology 
5) Anticipated/realized biotechnology commercial applications 
6) Support for/need to overcome barriers to biotechnology commercialization 
7) Support for federal stimulation of biotechnology commercialization 
8) Support for international cooperation to  speed up evelopment of commercial 
applications of biotechnology research and development 
 
H) Genetic Sequencing Research and Development 
1) Support for public and private human genome research  
2) Support for genomic invention 
3) Successes of human genome project 
4) Arguments/evidence that gene therapy will not lead to more ethically 
objectionable biotechnology research and development (i. . human cloning, 
positive eugenics, etc.) 
5) Support for federal funding/support of human genome project 
6) Potential/realized benefits (medical, societal, scientific, economic, 
environmental, agricultural, etc.) of human genome project 
7) Support for human genome project 
8) Support for international cooperation in human genome project implementation 
9) Support for patterning gene sequences 
10) Refutation of ethical arguments against patterning gene sequences 
11) Support for human genome diversity project 
12) Benefits (scientific, medical, societal, etc.) of human genome diversity project 
13) Support for gene therapy 
14) Opposition to stricter regulation of gene therapy 
15) Benefits (scientific, medical, agricultural, etc.) of gene therapy and gene transfer 
applications 
16) Arguments/evidence that genetic information will be kept confidential 
17) Remedies for discriminatory uses of genetic information 
18) Benefits (medical, scientific, societal, etc.) of using genetic tests to predict 
diseases 
19) Arguments/evidence of safety of genetic testing/human genome 
research/recombinant DNA research 
20) Support for recombinant DNA research 
21) Benefits (scientific, medical, societal, etc.) of recombinant DNA research 
22) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks (ethical, scientific, medical, 
environmental, legal, etc.) of genetic engineering           
23) Arguments/evidence of benefits (medical, societal, scientific, agricultural, etc.) 
of genetic engineering        
24) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks (ethical, scientific, medical, 
environmental, legal, etc.) of recombinant DNA research and development  
25) Arguments/evidence that genetic exchange is a natural process  
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26) Benefits (medical, scientific, agricultural) of embryonic transfer  
27) Support for the use of genetic biotechnology research nd development for 
enhancement purposes 
28) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks (ethical, scientific, medical, 
environmental, legal, etc.) of gene therapy and gene transfer applications 
29) Support for genetic screening programs 
30) Refutation of concerns that biotechnology research nd development will lead to 
the genetic manipulation of human behavior 
31) Support for making U.S. more competitive in human ge etic research 
32) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks involved with human genome 
project 
33) Benefits of using DNA information to law enforcement activities 
34) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating dangers (medical, societal, ethical, 
safety, etc.) of using genetic tests to predict disease 
 
I)  Patent/Privacy Issues 
1) Need for genomic invention patents 
2) Support for protection of patent rights of biotechnology researchers 
3) Opposition to moratorium on patenting of genetic structures 
4) Support for patenting of genetic structures 
5) Support for expediting private sector patent applications arising from 
biotechnology research/support for a more efficient patent application process 
6) Support for protection of trade secret data generated by biotechnology research 
7) Opposition to exempting certain groups from genetic structure patent liability 
8) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks of patenting genetic structures 
9) Support for patenting stem cells 
10) Support for allowing the Patent and Trademark Office to keep its user fees in 
order to ensure a higher quality patent process for biotechnology research and 
development 
11) Benefits (medical, ethical, economic, legal, etc.) of patenting genetic 
structures/protection of patent rights for biotechnology researchers/risks 
(economic, medical, legal, etc.) of not protecting patent rights for biotechnology 
researchers 
12) Arguments/evidence of the constitutionality of patenting genetic structures 
13) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating problems (ethical, legal, etc.) involved 
with patenting of genetic structures/protection of proprietary biotechnology 
information 
14) Refutation of arguments/evidence that legislation is ot necessary to provide 
necessary patent protection to entities engaging in biotechnology research and 
development  
15) Arguments/evidence of delays in patent approvals for pr ducts developed 
through biotechnology research and development/problems involved with patent 
delays 
16) Refutation of arguments/evidence that delays in patent approval for products 
developed through biotechnology research and development are the fault of 
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biotechnology companies (i.e. excessive litigation, not using means available to 
them to reduce patent time, etc.) 
17) Arguments/evidence that biotechnology research and development is 
sufficiently open to the public 
 
J) General Biotechnology Research and Development 
1) Benefits (agricultural, economic, scientific, medical, etc.) of biotechnology 
research and development 
2) Support for biotechnology research and development 
3) Support for preserving freedom of scientific inquiry 
4) Arguments/evidence of progress made by biotechnology research 
5) Arguments/evidence of the practical application of bi technology research 
6) Support for overcoming barriers impeding biotechnology research and 
development 
7) Opposition to considering the immediate benefits to the public of all scientific 
research 
8) Need for more manpower/training for biotechnology research 
9) Arguments/evidence that traditional methods of solving problems are not as 
effective as biotechnology research and applications could be/are in solving 
these problems 
10) Opposition to precautionary principle when considering whether or not to 
conduct biotechnology research and development 
11) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks (agricultural, scientific, medical, 
societal, safety, environmental, etc.) of biotechnology research 
12) Support for making U.S. more competitive in basic biotechnology research 
13) Concerns that definitions of biotechnology-related concepts are overly negative 
toward the biotechnology industry 
14) Criticism of the qualifications of those critiquing biotechnology research and 
development 
15) Arguments/evidence of the need to educate the public to understand the 
benefits/safety of biotechnology research and development 
16) Need for/support for more basic research in biotechnology  
17) Support for/need for better technology to assist bio echnology research and 
development efforts 
18) Concerns that the anti-biotechnology side in the debate is hiding information 
from the pro-biotechnology side 
19) Arguments/evidence of the harm done to the biotechnology industry by groups 
exaggerating the risks associated with biotechnology research and development 
 
K)  General Guidelines and Regulation of Biotechnology Research and 
Development 
1) Opposition to stricter governmental guidelines on biotechnology research 




3) Arguments/evidence that necessary safeguards are used when conducting 
biotechnology research  
4) Adequacy/overly restrictive nature of current guidelines/regulatory structure for 
protection against dangers of biotechnology research  
5) Opposition to interim and total bans on biotechnology research and development 
6) Arguments/evidence that researchers in public and private sector entities will 
voluntarily comply with federal guidelines 
7) Arguments/evidence that researchers in public and private sector entities can 
engage in self-regulation 
8) Opposition to rigorous monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to govern 
biotechnology research 
9) Support for looser penalties for violating federal biotechnology research and 
development guidelines 
10) Opposition to stricter penalties for violating federal biotechnology research and 
development guidelines 
11) Opposition to allowing states/localities to have thpriority to enact statutes 
beyond federal biotechnology regulatory standards 
12) Arguments/evidence of the dangers of over-regulation of biotechnology research 
13) Arguments/evidence of the difficulty of ensuring scientific accountability to the 
public 
14) Arguments/evidence that regulating biotechnology research is unconstitutional 
15) Adequacy of scientific community self-regulation in mitigating biotechnology 
risks 
16) Opposition to strict regulation of biotechnology techniques applied to human 
beings 
17) Support for more lenient regulation of biotechnology techniques applied to 
human beings 
18) Concerns about/opposition to banning new technologies 
19) Arguments/evidence of sufficient containment procedur s 
20) Opposition to considering human values in scientific policymaking 
21) Opposition to involving the public in all scientific safety decisions 
22) Opposition to state, local, and federal governmental i volvement in/control 
over/regulation of biotechnology research 
23) Opposition to the precautionary principle when designing/considering regulation 
of biotechnology research and development 
24) Opposition to holding scientists liable for damages of research that are not their 
fault 
25) Support for regulations that only require voluntary compliance 
26) Opposition to bans on biotechnology techniques applied to human beings 
27) Opposition to requiring licensing to undertake biotechnology research and 
development 
28) Opposition to international standards regulating biotechnology research 
29) Opposition to strict liability standards 
30) Opposition to international agreements regulating biotechnology research 
31) Opposition to allowing any citizen to sue a biotechnology researcher for 
perceived violations of biotechnology regulations 
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32) Arguments/evidence of sufficient monitoring and enforcement of biotechnology 
research guidelines 
33) Opposition to regulating biotechnology research and pplications as “tools” or 
“processes”/support for regulating the effects of bi technology research and 
applications on a case by case basis 
34) Importance of having scientific assessments back up regulatory guidelines of 
biotechnology research and development so that no regulatory delays occur 
35) Support for having regulation of biotechnology carried out by a friendly 
administrative agency to biotechnology (i.e. Department of Agriculture, NIH, 
etc.) 
36) Opposition to having regulation of biotechnology carried out by an unfriendly 
administrative agency to biotechnology (i.e. Environmental Protection Agency) 
37) Support for exempting certain biotechnology applications from regulatory 
review 
38) Opposition to regulations requiring biotechnology researchers and developers to 
obtain insurance before conducting biotechnology research and development 
39) Arguments/evidence of the dangers of over-complexity/insufficient clarity of 
regulatory environment/support for clarifying regulatory environment  
40) Arguments/evidence of public opinion noting the popularity of biotechnology 
research and development/lack of need for regulation of biotechnology research 
and development 
41) Need for more funding of regulatory agencies to ensure that biotechnology 
products can be evaluated and make their way to the market more quickly 
42) Support for allowing groups sympathetic to biotechnology (i.e. scientists, 
farming groups, etc.) to serve on advisory committees governing biotechnology 
regulation/funding 
43) Arguments/evidence that regulation can cause delay in biotechnology research 
and development/need to overcome regulatory delays in biotechnology research 
and development 
44) Opposition to price controls placed on biotechnology products 
45) Opposition to applying biotechnology regulations to all entities engaging in 
biotechnology research and development 
46) Support for more lenient trade barriers on biotechnology products (i.e. allowing 
the export of unapproved new drugs)/benefits of applying more lenient trade 
barriers to biotechnology products 
47) Opposition to stricter trade barriers on biotechnology products (i.e. not allowing 
the export of unapproved new drugs)/risks of applying stricter trade barriers to 
biotechnology products 
 
L)  Support/Investment in Biotechnology Research and Dev lopment 
1) Support for private sector support/investment in biotechnology research and 
development 
2) Support for tax credits to encourage private sector investment in biotechnology 
research and development 
3) Support for public funding/support of biotechnology research and development 
420 
 
4) Need to/support for overcoming capital access problems of biotechnology 
companies 
5) Support for longer, more sustained, and more easily ccessible federal monetary 
support of biotechnology research and development 
6) Need for/support for greater funding of public sector biotechnology research and 
development 
7) Benefits of public sector support/investment in biotechnology research and 
development 
8) Support for diverting federal funds/support from other scientific endeavors into 
biotechnology research and development 
9) Refutation of arguments questioning the constitutionality of federal efforts to 
assist the biotechnology industry  
10) Arguments/evidence that the costs of conducting biotechnology research and 
development can be cut down 
11) Refutation of claims that funds for biotechnology funds divert funds from other 
scientific endeavors 
12) Need for infrastructure to be put in place for biotechnology industry to flourish 
13) Support for federal stimulation of private sector investment in biotechnology 
research and development 
 
M)  General Health 
1) Potential of biotechnology research to reduce healt care costs 
2) Arguments/evidence of medical benefits of biotechnology research 
3) Arguments/evidence that biotechnology applications are not likely to cause an 
epidemic 
4) Arguments/evidence of biotechnology research’s ability to assist in curing 
diseases, especially genetic diseases 
5) Potential/realized pharmacological benefits of biotechnology research 
6) Arguments/evidence of potential and realized health benefits of biotechnology 
techniques applied to human beings 
7) Arguments/evidence that many diseases are genetic and m y be able to be 
solved through genetic methods 
8) Arguments/evidence that proper guidelines are in place to ensure the protection 
of the rights of subjects of medical biotechnology research and development  
9) Opposition to informing all subjects of the potential commercial applications of 
the donations that are making/giving these subjects proceeds from the research 
10) Arguments/evidence of potential uses of biotechnology t  test the health and 
safety of food 
11) Arguments/evidence of the potential ability of biotechnology to diagnose 
diseases 
12) Support for insurance company/Medicare coverage of drugs/therapies/etc. 
produced by biotechnology research and development  






1) Arguments/evidence that biotechnology research is not e vironmentally harmful 
2) Arguments/evidence of potential advantages of biotechnology applications to 
hazardous waste disposal 
3) Support for taking/need to take biotechnology applications seriously as a 
potential method for hazardous waste disposal  
4) Arguments/evidence that biotechnology research and development may help 
solve certain environmental problems 
5) Arguments/evidence that biotechnology research may be used to develop 
renewable energy sources 
6) Support for government funding/support of environmetal biotechnology 
research and development 
7) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks of bi technology applications to 
hazardous waste disposal 
 
O) General Risks and Dangers 
1) Arguments/evidence of safety of biotechnology research 
2) Lack of scientific basis for public concern regarding harmful effects of 
biotechnology research 
3) Proof of occupational safety of biotechnology research 
4) Capability of researchers to safely conduct biotechnology research 
5) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks of bi technology research and 
development 
6) Presentation of risk-benefit analyses showing that benefits outweigh risks of 
biotechnology research 
7) Evidence that rights of subjects of biotechnology research are respected 
8) Arguments/evidence that researchers must be sufficiently trained to engage in 
biotechnology research 
9) Arguments/evidence that sufficient scientific research has already been 
conducted on risks of biotechnology research/sufficient funds have been spent 
on research on risks 
10) Arguments/evidence that sufficient consideration of risks were considered prior 
to constructing regulations of biotechnology research and development 
11) Opposition to placing the burden of proving the safety of biotechnology research 
and development on those who are profiting from the res arch and development 
 
P) Psychological/Behavioral Biotechnology Research and Development 
1) Arguments/evidence that concerns about the capacity of biotechnology 
techniques to manipulate human behavior are overstat d 
2) Arguments/evidence of the potential of biotechnology techniques to treat 
psychological disorders 
 
Q) Private Sector-University-Public Sector Cooperation 
1) Support for cooperation between university and private sector in biotechnology 
research and development 
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2) Benefits (societal, health, scientific, economic, et .) of industry-university 
biotechnology research and development collaboration 
3) Support for government stimulation of industry-university biotechnology 
research and development 
4) Examples of innovation as the result of industry-university cooperation 
5) Merits of cooperation between federal government, uiversities, and the private 
sector 
6) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating the dangers (ethical, societal, etc.) of 
federal support/funding of industry-university biotechnology research and 
development 
7) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating the dangers (ethical, societal, etc.) of 
industry-university biotechnology research and development 
8) Arguments/evidence that sufficient controls are put in place to guard against the 
risks/dangers of industry-university biotechnology research and development 
9) Arguments/evidence that industry-university biotechnology research and 
development collaboration does not inhibit universitie  to conduct research as 
they please  
10) Opposition to regulation of industry-university biotechnology research and 
development 
11) Refutation of arguments/evidence that graduate students are exploited when 
conducting industry-university biotechnology research and development 
12) Support for/need for technology/information transfer programs/need to 
overcome barriers to technology transfer/evidence that companies that patent 
biotechnology will share their information with others 
13) Need for coordination among actors conducting/overseeing biotechnology 
research and development in order to ensure that resea ch goals are more 
quickly achieved 
14) Support for federal stimulation of interdisciplinary research  
15) Support for/benefits of university-government biotechnology research and 
development collaboration 
16) Support for/benefits of cooperation between federal government, universities, 
and the private sector 
17) Support for industry-government biotechnology research nd development 
18) Benefits (societal, health, scientific, economic, et .) of industry-government 
biotechnology research and development 
19) Support for collaboration between U.S. scientists and scientists from other 
countries 
 
R) Marine Biotechnology 
1) Support for marine biotechnology research and development 
2) Benefits (medical, scientific, food, environmental, economic, etc.) of marine 
biotechnology research and development 
3) Support for government funding/support of marine biotechnology research and 
development 





S) Biological Weapons 
1) Support for use of biotechnology research in biological weapons development 
2) Benefits (national defense, etc.) of use of biotechnology research in biological 
weapons development  
3) Refutation of concerns about the use of biotechnology research in biological 
weapons development 
4) Arguments/evidence that biotechnology research and development can be 
successfully utilized to defend against biological weapons 
 
T) Reproductive Biotechnology Research and Development 
1) Refutation of concerns about the use of genetic information to inform 
reproductive decisions 
2) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating the dangers (ethical, medical, health, 
etc.) of biotechnology research and development utilized for reproductive 
purposes 
3) Support for biotechnology research and development utilized for reproductive 
purposes 
4) Benefits (agricultural, medical, etc.) of biotechnology research and development 
utilized for reproductive purposes 
 
U) Animal Biotechnology Research 
1) Arguments/evidence stating benefits (agricultural, medical, economic, 
pharmaceutical, etc.) of transgenic (genetically altered) animal research and 
development 
2) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks (ethical, economic, 
environmental, health, ethical, etc.) of transgenic (genetically altered) animal 
research and development 
3) Refutation of concerns about the welfare of animals that are the subject of 
transgenic (genetically altered) animal research and development 
4) Opposition to stricter regulation of transgenic (genetically altered) animal 
research and development 
5) Support for transgenic (genetically altered) animal research and development 
6) Benefits (medical, societal, scientific, economic, agricultural, etc.) of animal 
genome projects 
7) Support for animal genome projects 
8) Support for federal funding/support of transgenic (genetically altered) animal 
research and development 
9) Benefits (agricultural, economic, health, etc.) of using bovine growth hormone 
10) Support for the use of bovine growth hormone 
11) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating risks (healt , environmental, ethical, 
safety, economic, agricultural, etc.) of using bovine growth hormone  
12) Support for government funding/support of bovine growth hormone research 
and development  
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13) Support for/benefits (educational, economic, health, gricultural, etc.) of 





1. Support for interdisciplinary communication in developing biotechnology 
regulations and standards 
2. Statement of technical/explanatory information about biotechnology/debate over 
biotechnology without any conclusive finding 
3. Description of efforts to understand biotechnology without any conclusive 
findings or recommendations 
4. Statement of both sides of the argument on the biotechnology issue without 
taking a firm side on the issue 
5. Quest for more information about the topic of biotechnology/support for more 
research on biotechnology risks and benefits 
6. Statement of proposed/current guidelines/regulatory structure governing 
biotechnology research without advocacy/opposition of the guidelines 
7. Contradictory comments that suggest both support for and opposition to certain 
provisions of legislation concerning biotechnology research and development 
8. Support for educating the public about biotechnology 
9. Arguments/evidence that risk-benefit analyses would be inconclusive in 
determining the risks and benefits of biotechnology research/presentation of 
inconclusive risk-benefit analyses concerning biotechnology research 
10. Arguments/evidence that there is no clear precedent supporting either side in the 
debate over first amendment protection of biotechnology research 
11. Support for regulation of biotechnology applications while opposing regulation 
of biotechnology basic research 
12. Need for balance between safety of research and free om of scientific inquiry 
13. Support for licensing institutions to engage in biotechnology research while 
opposing licensing of individuals to engage in biotechnology research  
14. Need for balance between safety concerns and protection of proprietary 
information 
15. Need to balance benefits and risks of cooperation between university and private 
sector in biotechnology research and development 
16. Statement on the timetables in which biotechnology applications can be 
reasonably expected to be realized 
17. Statement of how violators of biotechnology guidelin s have been dealt with 
18. Need to produce policies that balance risks and benefits of biotechnology 
research 
19. Need to balance risks and benefits of biotechnology research 
20. Statement of consequences of biotechnology research and development that are 
neither positive nor negative effects 
21. Statement of information on the economic impacts of bi technology on the 
agricultural industry without taking a stance on the desirability of these impacts 
22. Concerns about the priorities of biotechnology research (still seems to be 
optimistic about the benefits of the research, but is concerned that the tool is not 
utilized in the right ways) 
23. Description of methodology of biotechnology studies/risk assessments 
24. Support for funding of basic research but not applied research 
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25. Arguments/evidence of public opinion stating the ned to balance risks and 
benefits of biotechnology research and development 
26. Need for more communication amongst different actors in biotechnology 
research, development, and regulation 
27. Need to question where to place biotechnology reseach in terms of federal 
funding priorities  
28. Need for restructuring of relationships amongst different agencies concerning 
biotechnology research and development  
29. Arguments/evidence that biotechnology will make a large impact on society 
without saying whether this impact will be good or bad 
30. Support for funding of biotechnology research and development up until no 
progress is evident, at which time funding is revoked 
31. Arguments/evidence that biotechnology advisory bodies giving advice over 
regulatory decisions should be populated with many different sets of actors with 
different vested interests in the biotechnology debat  
32. Information on the federal government’s investment in biotechnology research 
and development without any commentary on the suitability of this funding 
33. Information on the economic status of biotechnology research and development 
without commentary on whether the development in the biotechnology industry 
should be encouraged  
34. Information about current patent situation in biotechnology industry without any 
commentary on the suitability of the situation  
35. Need for definitions of biotechnology concepts 
36. Statements by agency officials noting that they are considering shifting funding 
to support biotechnology research, but no firm commit ent  
37. Need to balance risks and benefits of protecting patent rights for biotechnology 
research and development 
38. Support for reducing the costs of biotechnology research and development 
39. Support for policies prohibiting insurance companies from denying coverage 
based on information obtained from genetic tests 
40. Support for policies that ensure the confidentiality of genetic information 
41. Arguments/evidence of the need to educate the public to understand both the 
risks and benefits of biotechnology research and development 
42. Support for standard that genomic inventions must be useful for them to be 
patentable  
43. Support for clarification of patent law concerning biotechnology application 
44. Support for policies prohibiting the discriminatory use of genetic information 
45. Description of alternative methods of obtaining stem cells without taking stance 
on whether these methods should replace traditional methods of obtaining stem 
cells 
46. Need to run studies to assess the effectiveness of regulatory framework 
47. Concerns about the validity of techniques that claim to not destroy human 
embryos (focus more on the intent behind the remarks) 
48. Support for legislation seeking to provide funding for embryonic stem cell 
research that does no harm to the human embryo (focus more on the intent 
behind the remarks)  
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49. Lack of need for/opposition to policies prohibiting insurance companies from 
denying coverage based on information obtained from genetic tests 
50. Lack of need for/opposition to policies that ensure the confidentiality of genetic 
information 
51. Need to balance risks and benefits of patent protecti n for biotechnology 
research and development 
52. Concerns about the validity/ethical nature of specific studies using 
biotechnology techniques (need to look at whether tis information is used to 
defend or attack biotechnology research and development)  






A) Agricultural Biotechnology/Genetically Modified Organisms 
1) Support for stricter regulation of GMO’s/agricultural biotechnology 
research/food products 
2) Opposition to more lenient regulation of GMO’s 
3) Problems and risks (ethical, environmental, health, scientific, economic, etc.) 
associated with GMO’s/agricultural biotechnology research/food products 
4) Concerns about safety of GMO consumption 
5) Opposition to federal funding/support of GMO’s/agricultural biotechnology 
research/food products 
6) Opposition to improving U.S. competiveness in interational GMO market 
7) Support for international agreements regulating GMO’s 
8) Opposition to more lenient trade barriers on GMO’s 
9) Support for stricter trade barriers on GMO’s  
10) Arguments/evidence that the benefits of GMO’s/agricultural biotechnology are 
overstated 
11) Arguments/evidence that benefits of agricultural biotechnology research can be 
achieved more effectively through the use of alternative methods 
12) Opposition to private sector support/investment in agricultural biotechnology 
research and development 
13) Support for bans on GMO’s/agricultural biotechnology research/food products 
14) Refutation of arguments/evidence that biotechnology research and development 
will actually reduce harm to the environment  
15) Arguments/evidence that biotechnology research will hurt the agricultural 
industry 
16) Refutation of arguments/evidence that genetically modified organisms must be 
released into the environment to test their effects 
17) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating benefits (agricultural, health, 
economic, etc.) of plant genome project 
18) Opposition to federal funding/support of plant genome project 
19) Need for/support for requiring the placement labels on agricultural products 
produced by biotechnology methods 
20) Need for/support for requiring biotechnology companies to pay for testing 
programs to separate genetically engineered products from natural products 
21) Support for classifying biotechnology products as plant pesticides for regulatory 
purposes 




1) Religious and ethical arguments against human reproductive cloning 
2) Opposition to human reproductive cloning research and development 
3) Concerns that cloning of other species/therapeutic cloning will lead to 
reproductive cloning of humans 
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4) Support for cuts/total ban on public funding/support of human reproductive 
cloning research 
5) Support for total prohibition of human reproductive cloning research 
6) Support for strict governmental guidelines/regulations governing cloning 
research 
7) Concerns that cloning of any kind will lead to human reproductive cloning 
8) Safety risks associated with human reproductive cloning 
9) Opposition to using cloning to produce embryonic cells for use in medical 
research 
10) Risks (ethical, scientific, medical, environmental, legal, etc.) of cloning in 
general 
11) Support for ban on general cloning research 
12) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating benefits o human reproductive 
cloning research and development 
13) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating benefits o general cloning research 
and development 
14) Support for permanent ban on cloning research and development 
15) Opposition to cloning of human embryos 
16) Arguments/evidence stating risks and dangers (ethical, safety, medical, etc.) of 
cloning of human embryos 
17) Arguments/evidence that cloning of human embryos is human reproductive 
cloning 
18) Support for ban on cloning human embryos 
19) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating benefits o cloning research and 
development using human embryos 
20) Arguments/evidence stating benefits of cloning can be more effectively/ethically 
achieved through alternative methods 
21) Environmental arguments against human reproductive loning 
22) Opposition to public funding/support of general cloning research and 
development 
23) Opposition to public funding/support of embryonic cloning research and 
development 
 
C) Stem Cell Research 
1) Opposition to stem cell research and the practical use of stem cells 
2) Problems and risks (ethical, religious, medical, scientific, legal, etc.) related to 
stem cell research 
3) Support for ban on/cuts in government funding/support of stem cell research 
4) Lack of necessity of/opposition to embryonic stem cell research 
5) Arguments/evidence that stem cell research will lead to human cloning 
6) Lack of need/opposition to the federal approval of m re cell lines for embryonic 
stem cell research 
7) Arguments against using excess in vitro fertilization embryos for stem cell 
research (i.e. embryos can be adopted by parents) 
8) Support for ban on human embryonic/stem cell research nd development 
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9) Arguments/evidence that the benefits of human embryonic stem cell research 
and development can be more effectively/ethically achieved through other 
methods (i.e. limiting stem cell research and development to the study of adult 
stem cells) 
10) Arguments/evidence that stem cell research does fall under the ban on human 
embryo research 
11) Opposition to the deliberate creation of embryos for research purposes 
12) Opposition to lifting funding ban on human embryo research in order to allow 
for federal funding of stem cell research 
13) Problems and risks (ethical, religious, medical, scientific, legal, etc.) related to 
using human embryos in stem cell research 
14) Arguments/evidence that the benefits of embryonic stem cell research and 
development have been overstated 
15) Arguments/evidence that proper safeguards have not been/cannot be instituted to 
ameliorate risks of stem cell research 
 
D) Industrial Biotechnology Research 
1) Opposition to industrial biotechnology research anddevelopment 
2) Problems (ethical, medical, scientific, etc.) associated with industrial 
biotechnology research and development  
3) Opposition to making U.S. more competitive in interational industrial 
biotechnology market 
4) Opposition to federal funding/support of industrial biotechnology research 
 
E) Tissue Research 
1) Support for ban on/decreased federal funding/support of fetal tissue 
transplantation research 
2) Statement of problems (ethical, legal, social, scientific, etc.) associated with 
fetal tissue transplantation research 
3) Arguments/evidence of potential increases in voluntary abortions associated 
with fetal tissue transplantation research 
4) Opposition to human tissue research 
5) Risks (ethical, medical, etc.) of human tissue research 
6) Opposition to federal funding/support of human tissue research 
7) Refutation of arguments stating benefits of fetal tissue transplantation research 
8) Arguments/evidence that the health benefits of fetal tissue transplantation 
research can be more effectively/ethically/safely achieved by other methods 
9) Arguments/evidence that proper safeguards are not/cannot be followed to guard 
against the risks of fetal tissue transplantation research 
10) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating ethical concerns with not supporting 
fetal tissue transplantation research 
11) Support for ban on fetal tissue transplantation research 
 
F) Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer Research 
1) Opposition to somatic cell nuclear transfer research 
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2) Risks (ethical, medical, environmental, safety, etc.) of somatic cell nuclear 
transfer research 
3) Opposition to federal funding/support of somatic cell nuclear transfer research 
4) Support for bans on somatic cell nuclear transfer research and development 
5) Refutation of arguments/evidence that somatic cell nuc ear transfer research and 
development is not synonymous with human cloning/will not necessarily lead to 
human cloning 
6) Arguments/evidence that benefits of somatic cell nuclear transfer research and 
development can be more effectively/ethically achieved by other means 
7) Arguments/evidence that benefits of somatic cell nuclear transfer research and 
development have been overstated  
 
G) Economic/Commercialization Issues 
1) Opposition to commercialization of biotechnology 
2) Potential/realized problems associated with biotechnology commercialization 
3) Anticipated increased risks in the event of commercialization of biotechnology 
4) Refutation of arguments/evidence of importance of bi technology research and 
development to economic development 
 
H) Genetic Sequencing Research and Development 
1) Opposition to federal funding and support of human ge ome project 
2) Statement of problems (ethical, legal, social, safety, etc.) associated with human 
genome project 
3) Opposition to human genome project 
4) Opposition to international cooperation in human geome project 
implementation 
5) Opposition to public and private human genome research 
6) Opposition to patterning gene sequences 
7) Problems (ethical, scientific, medical, etc.) with patterning gene sequences 
8) Potential/realized problems (ethical, medical, economic, etc.) with human 
genome project 
9) Support for stricter regulation of gene therapy 
10) Opposition to more lenient regulation of gene therapy 
11) Opposition to gene therapy 
12) Potential problems (ethical, medical, safety, etc.) associated with gene therapy 
and gene transfer applications 
13) Concerns about confidentiality of genetic information (only if these concerns are 
used to attempt to stultify development of biotechnology) 
14) Concerns about potential discriminatory use of genetic information (only if these 
concerns are used to attempt to stultify development of biotechnology) 
15) Dangers (medical, societal, ethical, safety, etc.) of using genetic tests to predict 
disease 
16) Opposition to genomic invention 
17) Failures of human genome project 
18) Arguments that gene therapy/genetic engineering will lead to human cloning 
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19) Risks (ethical, scientific, medical, environmental, legal, etc.) of genetic 
engineering 
20) Opposition to recombinant DNA research 
21) Risks (environmental, safety, ethical, scientific, etc.) of recombinant DNA 
research 
22) Arguments/evidence that the benefits of genetic biotechnology research 
(recombinant DNA research, gene therapy, genetic engin ering, human genome 
project, etc.) are overstated 
23) Arguments/evidence of monetary/opportunity costs of conducting genetic 
biotechnology research (recombinant DNA research, gene therapy, genetic 
engineering, human genome project, etc.) 
24) Risks (environmental, safety, ethical, scientific, etc.) of gene transplantation 
25) Refutation of arguments/evidence that genetic exchange is a natural process 
26) Opposition to the use of genetic biotechnology research and development for 
enhancement purposes (i.e. positive eugenics, growth hormones, etc.) 
27) Opposition to genetic screening programs 
28) Concerns that biotechnology research and development will lead to the genetic 
manipulation of human behavior 
29) Risks (ethical, medical, etc.) of using genetic biotechnology research and 
development for enhancement purposes (i.e. positive eug nics, growth 
hormones, etc.) 
30) Opposition to making U.S. more competitive in human ge etic research 
31) Opposition to human genome diversity project 
32) Risks (scientific, medical, societal, etc.) of human genome diversity project 
 
 
I)  Patent/Privacy Issues 
1) Opposition to protection of patent rights of biotechnology researchers 
2) Problems (ethical, legal, economic, agricultural, etc.) involved with patenting of 
genetic structures/protection of proprietary biotechnology information 
3) Support for moratorium of patenting of genetic structures 
4) Opposition to patenting of genetic structures 
5) Opposition to expediting private sector patent applications arising from 
biotechnology research/opposition to a more efficient patent application process 
6) Support for giving the public full information about biotechnology research 
7) Concerns that biotechnology has contributed to secrecy of scientific research 
8) Support for exempting certain groups from genetic structure patent liability 
9) Refutation of arguments/evidence of the constitutionality of patenting genetic 
structures 
10) Support for policies that would loosen protections f patent rights of 
biotechnology researchers and developers 
11) Arguments/evidence that legislation is not necessary to provide necessary patent 
protection to entities engaging in biotechnology research and development 
12) Arguments/evidence that delays in patent approval for products developed 
through biotechnology research and development are the fault of biotechnology 
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companies (i.e. excessive litigation, not using means available to them to reduce 
patent time, etc.) 
 
J) General Biotechnology Research and Development 
1) Support for/need for accountability of scientific community to the public 
2) Risks (agricultural, scientific, medical, societal, safety, ethical, environmental, 
etc.) of biotechnology research 
3) Opposition to governmental biotechnology research 
4) Support for considering the immediate benefits to the public of all scientific 
research 
5) Need to question importance of freedom of scientific inquiry 
6) Arguments/evidence that benefits of biotechnology research can be achieved 
more effectively through the use of alternative methods 
7) Support for precautionary principle when considering whether or not to conduct 
biotechnology research and development 
8) Concerns that definitions of biotechnology-related concepts are overly positive 
toward the biotechnology industry 
9) Criticism of the qualifications of those defending biotechnology research and 
development 
10) Arguments/evidence of lack of public confidence with biotechnology industry 
11) Criticism of efforts to make U.S. more competitive n international 
biotechnology market 
12) Arguments/evidence of the need to educate the public to understand the risks of 
biotechnology research and development 
13) Concerns that the pro-biotechnology side in the debate is hiding information 
from the anti-biotechnology side 
14) Arguments/evidence that the benefits of biotechnology research and 
development are overstated 
 
K)  General Guidelines and Regulation of Biotechnology Research and 
Development 
1) Support for strict governmental guidelines for biotechnology research 
2) Concerns that proper safeguards are not used when condu ting biotechnology 
research 
3) Concerns about guidelines for public protection against dangers of 
biotechnology research 
4) Support for interim or total bans on biotechnology research 
5) Pessimistic outlook for voluntary compliance with guidelines by biotechnology 
researchers in public and private entities 
6) Support for rigorous monitoring and enforcement procedures to govern research 
7) Support for state, local, and federal governmental i volvement in/control 
over/regulation of biotechnology research 
8) Inadequacy of guidelines/regulatory framework governing biotechnology 
research 
9) Support for strict penalties for violating federal guidelines 
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10) Viewed insufficiency of present containment procedur s/need for better 
containment procedures 
11) Arguments/evidence of lack of monitoring and enforcement of biotechnology 
research guidelines 
12) Support for giving states/localities the priority to enact biotechnology 
regulations beyond federal regulatory standards 
13) Support for considering human values in scientific policymaking 
14) Support for stricter regulation on biotechnology techniques applied to human 
beings 
15) Opposition to more lenient regulation of biotechnology techniques applied to 
human beings 
16) Refutation of arguments/evidence that researchers in public and private sector 
entities can engage in self-regulation 
17) Support for involving the public/workers in scientific safety decisions 
18) Support for applying biotechnology regulations to all entities engaging in 
biotechnology research and development 
19) Support for stricter governmental guidelines/regulations on biotechnology 
research 
20) Opposition to more lenient/more flexible governmental guidelines/regulations 
on biotechnology research 
21) Support for precautionary principle when designing/considering regulation of 
biotechnology research and development 
22) Opposition to regulations that only require voluntary compliance 
23) Support for bans on biotechnology techniques applied to human beings 
24) Support for requiring licensing to undertake biotechnology research and 
development 
25) Support for international standards regulating biotechnology research 
26) Support for strict liability standards 
27) Arguments/evidence that regulation of biotechnology research is not 
unconstitutional 
28) Support for international agreements regulating biotechnology research 
29) Support for allowing any citizen to sue a biotechnology researcher for perceived 
violations of biotechnology regulations 
30) Refutation of arguments/evidence of the dangers of over-regulation of 
biotechnology research 
31) Dangers of under-regulation of biotechnology research nd development 
32) Support for having regulation of biotechnology carried out by an unfriendly 
administrative agency to biotechnology (i.e. Environmental Protection Agency) 
33) Opposition to having regulation of biotechnology carried out by a friendly 
administrative agency to biotechnology (i.e. Department of Agriculture) 
34) Arguments/evidence that regulatory agencies have not been active enough in 
attempting to regulate biotechnology research and development 
35) Opposition to exempting certain biotechnology applications from regulatory 
review 
36) Support for regulations requiring biotechnology researchers and developers to 
obtain insurance before conducting biotechnology research and 
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development/concerns that biotechnology researchers and developers are unable 
to obtain insurance 
37) Support for regulating biotechnology research and applications as “tools” or 
“processes”/opposition to regulating the effects of bi technology research and 
applications on a case by case basis 
38) Arguments/evidence of public support for regulation of biotechnology research 
and development 
39) Support for price controls placed on biotechnology products 
40) Support for limiting availability of biotechnology products  
41) Arguments/evidence that the regulatory approval process for biotechnology 
research and development is sufficiently quick 
42) Opposition to more lenient trade barriers on biotechnology products (i.e. 
allowing the export of unapproved new drugs)/risks of applying more lenient 
trade barriers to biotechnology products 
43) Support for stricter trade barriers on biotechnology products (i.e. not allowing 
the export of unapproved new drugs)/benefits of applying stricter trade barriers 
to biotechnology products 
 
L)  Support/Investment in Biotechnology Research and Dev lopment 
1) Opposition to private sector support/investment in biotechnology research and 
development 
2) Opposition to tax credits to encourage private sector investment in 
biotechnology research and development 
3) Opposition to public funding/support of biotechnology research and 
development 
4) Opposition to overcoming capital access problems of biotechnology companies 
5) Concerns that funding for biotechnology research will divert funds from more 
important research efforts 
6) Support for placing limits on the amount of money spent on biotechnology 
research 
7) Arguments/evidence of the dangers of too much governm ntal 
support/investment of biotechnology research and development  
8) Arguments that enough is already being done to support biotechnology research 
and development despite contrary claims and no more needs to be done 
9) Arguments questioning the constitutionality of federal efforts to assist the 
biotechnology industry  
 
M)  General Health 
1) Concerns about patients using products developed throug  biotechnology 
research 
2) Dangers (ethical, medical, etc.) of biotechnology techniques applied to human 
beings 




4) Concerns about the violation of the rights of subjects of medical biotechnology 
research and development  
5) Support for informing all subjects of the potential commercial applications of 
the donations that are making/giving these subjects proceeds from the research 
6) Concerns that biotechnology research and development will lead to increases in 
uninsured and uninsurable individuals in society 
7) Arguments/evidence that the medical benefits of biotechnology research and 
development are overstated 
8) Concerns that biotechnology may drive up the costs f health care 
 
N) General Environmental 
1) Concerns about environmental hazards of biotechnology research 
2) Risks of using biotechnology research and development to clean up hazardous 
waste 
 
O) General Risks and Dangers 
1) Concerns about the rights of subjects of biotechnology research 
2) Concerns about the safety of biotechnology research 
3) Concerns about occupational hazards of biotechnology research 
4) Arguments/evidence of domestic and international public interest in 
biotechnology research containment 
5) Criticism of scientific evidence showing minimal risks of biotechnology 
research 
6) Presentation of risk-benefit analyses showing that t e risks outweigh the benefits 
of biotechnology research 
7) Concerns that researchers are not sufficiently trained to engage in biotechnology 
research 
8) Support for encouraging whistleblowers to speak out about dangers of 
biotechnology research 
9) Concerns about the safety of workers engaging in biotechnology research and 
development 
10) Concerns about the lack of research/lack of funding for research studying the 
risks and dangers of biotechnology research while allowing biotechnology 
research and development to continue/support for more research studying the 
risks and dangers of biotechnology research 
11) Concerns that risks of biotechnology research and development are not 
adequately considered before engaging in the research and development (i.e. 
tests of potential risks of biotechnology products are not conducted before 
releasing them on the market) 
12) Support for placing the burden of proving the safety of biotechnology research 
and development on those who are profiting from the res arch and development 
13) Concerns about the exploitation of animals who are subjects of biotechnology 
research 
 
P) Psychological/Behavioral Biotechnology Research and Development 
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1) Concerns about the capacity of biotechnology techniques to manipulate human 
behavior 
 
Q) Private Sector-University -Public Sector Cooperation 
1) Opposition to cooperation between university and private sector in 
biotechnology research and development 
2) Arguments/evidence stating the dangers (ethical, societal, etc.) of industry-
university biotechnology research and development collaboration 
3) Opposition to government stimulation of industry-university biotechnology 
research and development 
4) Opposition to federal support/funding of industry-university biotechnology 
research and development 
5) Arguments/evidence stating the dangers (ethical, societal, etc.) of federal 
support/funding of industry-university biotechnology research and development 
6) Arguments/evidence of insufficient controls put in place to guard against the 
risks/dangers of industry-university biotechnology research and development 
7) Arguments/evidence that industry-university biotechnology research and 
development collaboration inhibits universities to conduct research as they 
please  
8) Support for regulation of industry-university biotechnology research and 
development 
9) Arguments/evidence that graduate students are exploited when conducting 
industry-university biotechnology research and development 
10) Support for giving the public full information about industry-university 
biotechnology research and development collaboration 
11) Arguments/evidence stating the dangers (ethical, societal, etc.) of industry-
university-government biotechnology research and development collaboration 
12) Arguments/evidence stating the dangers of technology transfer programs 
 
R) Marine Biotechnology 
1) Opposition to marine biotechnology research and development 
2) Risks (scientific, environmental, health, etc.) associated with marine 
biotechnology research and development 
3) Opposition to federal funding/support of marine biotechnology research and 
development 
 
S) Biological Weapons 
1) Opposition to/support for bans on the use of biotechnology research and 
applications in biological weapons development 
2) Risks (technology falling into wrong hands, national defense, etc.) of use of 
biotechnology research in biological weapons development 
3) Concerns that biotechnology research and development is likely to be used to 
develop biological weapons 
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4) Refutation of arguments/evidence that biotechnology research and development 
can be utilized  develop a defense mechanism against a biological weapon attack 
5) Criticism of suspension of biotechnology regulations when the research will be 
used for national security purposes 
 
T) Reproductive Biotechnology Research and Development 
1) Concerns about the use of genetic information to inf rm reproductive decisions 
2) Dangers (ethical, medical, health, etc.) of biotechnology research and 
development utilized for reproductive purposes 
3) Opposition to biotechnology research and development utilized for reproductive 
purposes 
4) Support for bans on biotechnology research and development utilized for 
reproductive purposes 
 
U) Animal Biotechnology Research 
1) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating benefits (agricultural, medical, 
economic, etc.) of transgenic (genetically altered) animal research and 
development 
2) Arguments/evidence stating risks (ethical, economic, environmental, health, 
ethical, etc.) of transgenic (genetically altered) animal research and development 
3) Concerns about the welfare of animals that are the subject of transgenic 
(genetically altered) animal research and development 
4) Support for stricter regulation of transgenic (genetically altered) animal research 
and development 
5) Opposition to transgenic (genetically altered) animal research and development 
6) Opposition to federal funding/support of transgenic (genetically altered) animal 
research and development 
7) Refutation of arguments/evidence stating benefits (agricultural, economic, 
health, etc.) of using bovine growth hormone 
8) Opposition to the use of bovine growth hormone 
9) Risks (health, environmental, ethical, safety, economic, agricultural, etc.) of 
using bovine growth hormone  
10) Opposition to government funding/support of bovine growth hormone research 
and development 
 
